



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES



3 3433 08155627 0

LEDOX LIBRARY



Dugckinch Collection.
Presented in 1878.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR,

Translated from the GREEK of

THUCYDIDES.

VOLUME THE SECOND.

By WILLIAM SMITH, A. M.

Rector of the Parish of the *Holy Trinity* in *Chester*, and Chaplain to
the Right Honourable the Earl of *Derby*.

Μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος.



L O N D O N :

Printed by JOHN WATTS. MDCCCLIII.



WYVWY
200
8100

100 0 0 0 0 0

100 0 0 0 0 0

THE
HISTORY
OF
The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE FOURTH.

VOL. II.

B

C O N T E N T S.

Year VII. *The Athenians seize and fortify Pylus in Laconia. The Lacedæmonians make flight of it at first, yet afterwards exert their utmost efforts to dislodge them, that in vain. Their body thrown into Sphacteria is intercepted, and blocked up by the Athenian fleet. A suspension of arms and a truce ensue, but soon broke. Proceedings in Sicily: A naval engagement in the strait of Messene. At Athens, Cleon is drawn in by his own bravado to undertake the reduction of Sphacteria. He repairs thither, and compleats the work beyond all expectation. The Lacedæmonians, terribly distressed, send many proposals for a peace, but none are accepted. The Athenians invade the Corinthians: Battle of Solymia. Tragical period of the sedition at Corcyra. Death of Artaxerxes Longimanus.*

Year VIII. *Expedition against Ocyra. Continuation of affairs in Sicily. The surprise of Megara unsuccessfully attempted. A project formed for a total revolution in Bæotia. Brasidas beginneth his march for Thrace, and by his noble behaviour carries all before him. The battle of Delium. Successful progress of Brasidas in Thrace.*

Year IX. *Truce for a year. The affairs of Thrace continued.*



T H E
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

B O O K IV.

Y E A R VII.

THE ensuing summer, when the corn was beginning to ear, *Before Christ*
 ten sail of Syracusan, joined by an equal number of Locrian ^{425.}
 vessels, at the invitation of the inhabitants, stood away for *Affairs in Si-*
 Messene in Sicily, and took possession of the place. And thus Mes- *cily.*
 sene revolted from the Athenians. But this event was chiefly owing
 to the practices of the Syracusans; who, foreseeing that this town
 might open the way for the reduction of Sicily, were greatly afraid
 lest the Athenians should get established there, and with augmented
 forces pour out from thence upon them. The Locrians assisted out
 of enmity to the Rhegians, whom they were desirous to have it in
 their power to attack both by land and sea. At the same time also
 Vol. II. B 2 these

these Locrians broke in upon the territory of the Rhegians with their intire force, to deter them from any attempt to save Messene, and to gratify also those fugitives from Rhegium, who acted now in combination with them. For Rhegium had for a long time been embroiled in sedition, and so was unable to take the field against these invaders, who for the same reason were more eager to distress them. When the ravage was compleated, the Locrians marched their land-forces back, but their ships were stationed on the guard of Messene. They also were very busy in the equipment of an additional number, which were to repair to that station, and be ready to move from thence to any future operations of war.

*Attica is-
waded.*

About the same season of the spring, before the corn was fully grown, the Peloponnesians and allies made their inroad into Attica. Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded. They fixed their camp, and ravaged the country.

*A squadron sets
out for Sicily.*

The Athenians now sent out to sea the forty ships already prepared for the Sicilian voyage, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, who stayed behind to bring up this reinforcement, since Pythodorus the third in the commission was already in his post at Sicily. They had orders also in the course of the voyage to touch at Corcyra, and provide effectually for the preservation of those in the city, who were sadly infested by the outlaws posted on the mountain. Sixty sail of Peloponnesians were now upon that coast, to act in support of those on the mountain, who, as the city was sorely oppressed with famine, presumed they should with ease carry all before them. Demosthenes further, who had been in no public employ since his return from Acarnania, procured leave to go on board this fleet with authority to employ it on the coast of Peloponnesus, if he judged it for the service.

Pylus fortified.

When they were got to the height of Laconia, intelligence is brought them, that "the Peloponnesian fleet is now in Corcyra." Eurymedon and Sophocles were for making the best of their way thither.

thither. But it was the advice of Demosthenes to go first to Pylus, and after they had secured that place, to proceed in their voyage. This was positively refused; but it so happened, that a storm arose which drove the whole fleet to Pylus. Demosthenes insisted that they should immediately fortify the place, since this was the motive of his attendance in the fleet. He shewed them, that "there was at hand plenty of timber and stone for the work; that, beside the strength of its natural situation, the place itself was barren, as was also the greatest part of the adjacent country." For Pylus lies at the distance of about * four hundred stadia from Sparta, in the district which was formerly called Messenia; but the name given it by the Lacedæmonians is Coryphasium. The others replied, "There are many barren capes in Peloponnesus, which those may secure who have a mind to plunge the commonwealth into needless expences." This place however seemed to him to be better marked out for this purpose than any other, as being possessed of an harbour; and as the Messenians, who formerly bore some relation to it, and still used the same dialect with the Lacedæmonians, might from hence give them great annoyance, and at the same time effectually keep possession of it. But when neither the commanders nor soldiers, nor the inferior officers¹, to whom he afterwards communicated his project, would be brought to a compliance, he quietly let it drop till the mere love of employment, during the idleness of their suspended voyage, seditiously inclined the private soldiers to compass it with a wall. They took the work in hand, and ply'd it briskly. Tools they had none for hewing and fitting the stones; but picked out

* About forty
English miles.

¹ The word in the original is *Taxiarchs*. They seem to be nearly the same with *Captains of a company*, in the modern stile, as their command was over about one hundred men. *Taxiarchs* were also officers of a higher class, in number ten, every Athenian tribe appointing one, whose business it

was to marshal the armies, to order the marches and encampments, to take care of provisions, and to punish military offences. But the former seem to be the *officers* to whom Demosthenes applied himself in the present instance.

and

and carried such as they judged most proper for the work, and laid them one upon another as compactly as they could. The mud, that was any where requisite, for want of vessels, they carried on their shoulders, bending forwards as much as possible that it might have room to stick on, and holding it up with both hands clasped fast behind that it might not slide down. They spared no pains to prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to put the place in a proper posture of defence, before they could come to their disturbances. For the largest part of it was so well fortified by nature, that it stood in no need of the defence of art.

The news of this arrived at Sparta, during the celebration of some public festival. They set light by it; assured, that so soon as they appeared in fight, the enemy would either abandon it, or the place be recovered by an easy effort. And they were something more dilatory, because their army was yet in Attica.

The Athenians, having compleated their works on the side towards the land and on the other necessary spots in the space of six days, leave Demosthenes with five ships to guard it, and with the larger number resumed their voyage for Corcyra and Sicily.

The enemy retreats out of Attica.

But the Peloponnesians in Attica were no sooner advertised of this seizure of Pylus, than they marched back with all expedition. The Lacedæmonians and Agis their king regarded this affair of Pylus as their own domestic concern. And besides, as they had made the inroad early in the year and whilst the corn was yet green, many of them laboured under a scarcity of provisions. The weather also, which proved tempestuous beyond what was usual in that season, had very much incommoded the army. In this manner, many accidents concurred to accelerate their retreat, and to render this the shortest of all their invasions. For the whole of their stay in Attica was but fifteen days.

Bion.

About the same time Simonides an Athenian commander, having gathered together a small party of Athenians from the neighbouring garrisons

garrisons and a body of the circumjacent dependents, took possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendæans. It had declared against the Athenians, but was now put into their hands by treachery. Yet, the Chalcidæans and Bottizæans coming immediately to its relief, he was beat out of it again, and lost a great number of his men.

After the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica, the *Spartans*,² in conjunction with those of their allies who lay the nearest, marched without loss of time to the recovery of Pylus. The rest of the Lacedæmonians were longer in their approach, as but just returned from another expedition. Yet a summons had been sent all round Peloponnesus, to march directly for Pylus. Their fleet of sixty sail was also remanded from Corcyra, which being transported by land over the isthmus of Leucas arrive before Pylus, undescried by the Athenians who lay at Zacynthus. And by this time the land-army had also approached.

Demosthenes, before the coming up of the Peloponnesian fleet, had timely dispatched two vessels to Eurymedon and the Athenians on board that fleet now lying at Zacynthus, pressing them to return as the place was in danger of being lost; which vessels made the best of their way, in pursuance of the earnest commands of Demosthenes. But the Lacedæmonians were now preparing to attack the fortress both by land and sea, presuming it would easily be destroyed, as the work had been raised with so much precipitation and was defended by so small a number of hands. But, as they also expected the return of the Athenian ships from Zacynthus, they designed, in case they took not the place before, to bar up the mouths of the harbour, so as to render the entrance impracticable to the Athenians. For an isle which is called Sphaacteria, lying before and at a small

Steps for the recovery of Pylus.

The Lacedæmonians secure the isle Sphaacteria.

² The reader will be pleased to take notice, that the word *Spartans* is here emphatical. It means *those* of the first class, the noblest persons in the community, as is plain from the sequel.

distance,

* $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile.

distance, locks it up and rendereth the mouths of the harbour narrow; *that* near the fortrefs of the Athenians and Pylus a passage for two ships only abreast, and *that* between the other points of land for eight or nine. The whole of it, as desert, was overgrown with wood and quite untrod, and the compass of it at most is about * fifteen *stadia*. They were therefore intent on shutting up these entrances with ships moored close together and their heads towards the sea. And to prevent the molestation apprehended should the enemy take possession of this island, they threw into it a body of their heavy-armed, and posted another body on the opposite shore; — for by these dispositions the Athenians would be incommoded from the island, and excluded from landing on the main-land: And, as on the open coast of Pylus without the harbour there is no road where ships can lie, they would be deprived of a station from whence to succour the besieged: And thus, without the hazard of a naval engagement it was probable they should get possession of the place, as the quantity of provisions in it could be but small, since the seizure had been executed with slender preparation. — Acting upon these motives, they threw the body of heavy-armed into the island, who were draughted by lot out of all the bands. These for a time were successively relieved by others. But the last body, who guarded that post and were forced to continue in it, consisted of about four hundred and twenty exclusive of the Helots who attended them. And *these* were commanded by Epitadas the son of Molobrus.

Demosthenes. Demosthenes, perceiving by these dispositions that the Lacedæmonians would attack him by land and sea, provided for his own defence. The triremes yet remaining with him he drew ashore, and ranged them by way of palisade before the fortrefs. The mariners he armed with bucklers, sorry ones indeed, as most of them were only twigs of osier plaited. Better arms were not to be procured in so desert a place. And even these they had taken out of a cruizer of thirty oars and a light packet belonging to Messenians, who

who happened accidentally to put in. The Messenians on board them were about forty heavy-armed, whom he ranged amongst his own body. The greater part therefore of the unarmed as well as some who had armour he placed on the strongest parts of the fortrefs towards the continent, with orders to beat off the land-army whenever they approached. And having selected from his whole number sixty heavy-armed and a few archers, he marched out of the fortrefs to that part of the beach where he expected the enemy would endeavour to land. The shore indeed was rough and rocky, and bordered on the main-sea; yet, as the wall was weakest in this quarter, he judged it would soonest tempt and animate an assault. For never imagining they should be out-numbered in shipping, they had left the wall on this side but weak; and, should the enemy now force a landing, the place would undoubtedly be lost.

Sensible of this, and determined if possible to prevent their landing, Demosthenes posted himself with his chosen band on the very edge of the water, and endeavoured to animate them by the following harangue.

“ MY fellow-foldiers, here posted with me in this dangerous situation, I conjure you, in so urgent an extremity, to throw away
 “ all superfluous wisdom. Let not a soul amongst you compute the
 “ perils which now environ us, but regardless of the issue and inspired by hope let him charge the foe, and be confident of success.
 “ A situation desperate like this alloweth no room for calm consideration, but demands the most precipitate venture. Superior advantages however are along with us; — of this I am convinced, provided we only stand firm together, and scorning to be terrified at
 “ the number of our foes do not wilfully betray those advantages which are now in our favour. The shore is most difficult of access:— This in my judgment makes abundantly for us; — This
 “ will support us, if we keep our ground. But if we give way,
 VOL. II. C difficult

Speech of Demosthenes.

" difficult as it is now, their landing will be easy --- when there are
 " none to obstruct it. Nay, what is worse, we shall make the enemy
 " more furious, when, if we may afterwards press hard upon him,
 " it is no longer in his power to re-embark with ease. For so long
 " as they continue on board they may most easily be encountered ;
 " whilst they are busy in landing, they cannot so far over-match us,
 " as that we ought to shrink before their numbers. Large tho'
 " they be, the spot of action will be small for want of ground to
 " draw up in order. What tho' their force be superior for the land,
 " that advantage will be lost in their present service, when they must
 " act from their vessels and on the water, where many lucky contin-
 " gencies are requisite. And thus am I satisfied, that with these
 " disadvantages they are but merely a balance for our smallness of
 " number.

" As for you, O Athenians, who are now present, and who, by
 " the long experience of frequent descents, are perfectly convinced
 " that men, who stand firm and scorn to give way before the dash of
 " the surge or the menacing approach of a vessel, can never be beat
 " off --- from you I insist, that firmly embodied together and charg-
 " ing the enemy on the very margin of the water, you preserve all us
 " who are here, and preserve this fortress."

IN this manner Demosthenes having encouraged his men, the
 Athenians became more animated than ever ; and, marching forwards
 to the very margin of the sea, posted themselves there in order of
 battle. The Lacedæmonians were also in motion ; their land-force
 was marching to assault the fortress, and their fleet was approaching
 the shore. It consisted of forty-three vessels, and a *Spartan*, Thra-
 symelidas the son of Cratesicles, was on board as admiral. He
 steered directly for the spot on which Demosthenes expected his
 coming. In this manner were the Athenians assaulted on both sides,
 by land and sea.

The

The ships of the enemy came on in small divisions, because there *The attack.* was not room for larger. They slackened by intervals, and endeavoured by turns to force their landing. They were brave to a man, and mutually animated one another to beat off the Athenians and seize the fortrefs.

But Brasidas signalized himself above them all. He commanded *Brasidas.* a trireme; and observing that the other commanders and pilots, tho' they knew they could run aground, yet kept aloof because the shore was craggy, and shunned every hazard of staving their vessels, he shouted aloud, "that it was shameful for the saving of timber to "suffer enemies to raise fortifications within their territory." He encouraged them on the contrary "to force their landing, tho' they "dashed their vessels to pieces;" begging the confederates "in this "juncture not to refuse bestowing their ships on the Lacedæmonians in lieu of the great services they had done them, but to run "them ashore, and landing at all adventures to seize the enemy and "the fortrefs." In this manner he animated others, and having compelled his own pilot to run the vessel ashore, he was at once upon the stairs, and endeavouring to get down was beat back by the Athenians. After many wounds received, he fainted with loss of blood; and falling down upon the gunnel, his shield tumbled over into the water. It was brought ashore and taken up by the Athenians, who afterwards made it a part of the trophy, which they erected for this attack.

The others indeed with equal spirit endeavoured but yet could not possibly land, as the ground was difficult of access, and the Athenians stood firm and no where at all gave way. Such now was the strange reverse of fortune, that the Athenians upon land, upon Læconic land, beat off the Lacedæmonians who were fighting from the water; and the Lacedæmonians from ships were endeavouring a descent upon their own now hostile territory against Athenians. For at this period of time it was the general opinion, that *those* were

land-men and excelled most in land-engagements, but that *these* were sea-men and made the best figure at sea.

Repulsed.

The attack was continued the whole day and part of the next before it was given up. On the third day, they detached some vessels to Aſine to fetch timber for engines, hoping by them to accomplish the taking of the wall adjacent to the harbour, which tho' of a greater height yet might easier be approached by sea.

The Athenians reinforced.

During this pause, forty sail of Athenians came up from Zacynthus. This fleet had been enlarged by the accession of some guard-ships from off the station of Naupactus, and four sail of Chians. These no sooner discovered the main land about Pylus and the island Sphaoteria to be full of armed soldiers, the harbour also to be occupied by the ships of the enemy which lay quiet in their posts, than perplexed how to act they sailed back for the present to the isle of Prote not far distant and desert, and there spent the night.

And attack in their turn.

The day following, being formed into the order of battle, they shewed themselves again as ready for engagement, should the enemy venture to stand out against them into the open sea; and if not, were determined to force their way into the harbour. The enemy still kept in the same quiet posture, nor set about executing their former design of barring the entrances. They continued in their usual position along the shore, when they had manned their vessels, and got every thing ready to engage the assailants should they break into the harbour, where there was no danger of being straitened for room. The Athenians, perceiving their intent, broke into the harbour at both entrances. Falling there upon the greater number of vessels now advanced into deep water to obstruct the passage, they put them to flight; and following the chase, which could be but short, they shattered several, and took five, one of which had her whole crew on board. They proceeded to attack the rest, which had fled amain towards the shore. Some moreover, which had just been manned were disabled before they could lanch into the deep. Others, deserted

deserted by the mariners who had fled along the shore, they fastened to their own, and towed away empty. The Lacedæmonians seeing these things, and prodigiously alarmed at the sad event, lest now the communication should be cut off with the body in the island, rushed down with all their force to prevent it. Armed as they were they plunged into the water, and catching hold of the vessels in tow pulled them back towards the shore. It was now the apprehension of every soul amongst them, that the business flagged wherever he himself was not present. Great was the tumult in this contest for the ships, inverting the general custom of both contending parties. For the Lacedæmonians, inflamed and terrified, fought a sea-fight (if it may be so expressed) from the shore: The Athenians, already victorious, and eager to give their good-fortune its utmost completion, fought a land-battle from on board. The struggle on both sides was long and laborious, and blood was abundantly shed before the dispute could be ended. But at length the Lacedæmonians recovered all their empty vessels, excepting such as had been taken on the first onset. Each party being retired to their respective posts, the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered up the dead, and were masters of all the wreck and shatters of the action. Then, without loss of time, they ranged their vessels in circuit quite round the island, and kept a strict watch, as having intercepted the body of men which was posted there. *And in view of Sphacteria.* But the Peloponnesians on the main-land, with the accession of their auxiliaries who had now joined them, remained upon the opposite shore near Pylus.

When the news of this action at Pylus was brought to Sparta, it was resolved, as the great calamity was so urgent, that the *magistrates* *The Spartans highly perplexed.* in person should repair to the camp, and consult upon the very spot what resource they had left. And when their own eyes had shewed them the impossibility of relieving their men, and they were loth to leave them in the wretched extremity either of perishing by famine, or, overpowered by superior numbers, of being shamefully made prisoners,

soners, it was concluded “ to send to the Athenian commanders to
 “ ask a suspension of arms at Pylus, whilst they dispatched an em-
 “ bassy to Athens to procure an accommodation, and to obtain leave
 “ as soon as possible to fetch off their *Spartans*.” These commanders
 accepting the proposal, the suspension was agreed upon on the follow-
 ing conditions.

*A suspension of
 arms.*

“ THAT the Lacedæmonians should immediately deliver up the
 “ ships in which they had fought; and all the ships of war in gene-
 “ ral, which they had any where in Laconia, they should bring to
 “ Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians. That they should refrain
 “ from making any attempt whatever upon the fortrefs, either by sea
 “ or land.”

“ That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmonians on the
 “ main-land to carry over a stated quantity of provisions to those in
 “ the island, two Attic * *chaenix*’s of meal, with two *cotyls* of wine, and
 “ a piece of flesh for every Spartan, and a moiety of each for every
 “ servant. These provisions to be carried thither under the inspec-
 “ tion of the Athenians; and no vessels whatever to cross over with-
 “ out permission.”

“ That the Athenians, notwithstanding, be at liberty to continue
 “ their guard round the island, but not to land upon it; and should
 “ refrain from giving any annoyance to the army of the Peloponne-
 “ fians, either by sea or land.”

“ That if either party should violate these conditions either in the
 “ whole or any part whatever, the truce to be immediately void;
 “ otherwise, to continue in force till the return of the Lacedæmonian
 “ embassy from Athens.”

“ That the Athenians should convoy that embassy thither and back
 “ again in a trireme.”

* More than two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, *English* measure.

“ That

“ That upon their return the truce should be ended, when the
 “ Athenians should restore the ships now delivered to them, in the
 “ same number and condition as they were in before.”

On these conditions a suspension of arms took place, in pursuance of which the ships were delivered up to the number of sixty, and the ambassadors dispatched away, who arriving at Athens, addressed themselves as followeth :

“ HITHER, O Athenians, we are sent on the part of the La- *Speech of the*
 “ cedæmonians, to negotiate with you in behalf of their citizens in *Lacedæmo-*
 “ the island, and to propose an expedient which will tend very much *nian embassy.*
 “ to your advantage, and will at the same time preserve as much as
 “ possible our own honour, in the great calamity with which we are
 “ at present beset. It is not our purpose to run out into a long un-
 “ accustomed flow of words. We shall adhere to the rule of our
 “ country, to spare many words where few may suffice ; and then
 “ only to enlarge, when the important occasion requireth an exact
 “ detail for the more judicious regulation of necessary acts. Receive
 “ therefore our discourse with an attention cleared of enmity. Be in-
 “ formed as men of understanding ought ; and conclude that you are
 “ only to be put in mind of that judicious method of procedure, of
 “ which yourselves are such competent judges.

“ You have now an opportunity at hand to improve a present suc-
 “ cess to your own interest and credit, to secure the possession of what
 “ you have hitherto acquired, and to adorn it with the accession of
 “ honour and glory. You are only to avoid that insolence of mind
 “ so frequent to men who have been, till the present, strangers to
 “ success. Such men are ever apt to presume too much on larger
 “ acquisitions, tho’ merely because their present prosperity was be-
 “ yond their expectation : Whilst they, who have experienced the
 “ frequent vicissitudes of fortune, have gained a more judicious turn,
 “ and

“ and presume the least upon continuance of success. And there is
“ the highest reason to conclude, that experience hath improved the
“ commonwealth of Athens and us Lacedæmonians in this piece of
“ wisdom, much more than any other people.

“ But be assured of it now, when you behold the calamities with
“ which we are at present invironed; — we, who invested with the
“ highest honours and dignities of Greece, are this moment address-
“ ing ourselves to you, begging such favours as we formerly thought
“ were more peculiarly lodged in our own dispensation. Not that
“ we are thus reduced through failure of our strength, or through
“ former strength too haughtily exerted, but merely through the
“ weight of such unforeseen disasters as continually happen, and to
“ which the whole of mankind alike are ever subject. And from
“ hence it is right that you should learn, amidst the present strength
“ of your *State* and its late acquisitions, that fortune may not always
“ declare upon your side. Wise indeed are they, who in their esti-
“ mates of success make judicious allowances for chance. Such are
“ best able to bear the alternatives of calamity with prudence and
“ temper. Such will form their judgments of war, not as the infal-
“ lible means of accomplishing whatever scheme they please to un-
“ dertake, but as deriving its effects from the guidance of fortune.
“ Such are the persons who are most of all exempted from fatal mis-
“ carriages; because they are not puffed up by presuming too far on
“ present prosperity, and would gladly acquiesce in the peaceable en-
“ joyment of what they now possess.

“ It concerns your honour, Athenians, to deal in this manner with
“ us, lest, in case you now reject our proposals, when you your-
“ selves in future times miscarry (many such events must happen),
“ your present good-fortune may then be perversely ascribed to
“ chance, even tho’ you are now able to deliver down to posterity
“ the fame of your power and moderation beyond a possibility of
“ blemish. The Lacedæmonians invite you to agreement, and a con-
“ clusion

“ clusion of the war. They offer you peace and alliance, nay friend-
“ ship in its whole extent, and the exchange of good offices mutu-
“ ally revived ; demanding nothing in return but their citizens out of
“ the island. To this step they have condescended rather than be ex-
“ posed to the dangers incidental on either side; should *they* either
“ seize some favourable opportunity to force their escape by arms, or
“ holding out to the last against your blockade, be reduced with all
“ the aggravations of defeat. Great enmities, in our opinion, may
“ the soonest be brought to a firm determination ---- not when either
“ party having exerted all their strength, and gained the far greater
“ superiority in war, disdains the fair accommodation, and relieth on
“ that forced acquiescence which necessitated oaths impose ; but ra-
“ ther, when tho’ victory be within their reach, they recollect huma-
“ nity, and having succeeded by valour quite beyond their expecta-
“ tions, determine the contest with temper and moderation. Then
“ the foe, who hath not felt the extremity of force, is henceforth
“ disarmed by the strength of gratitude, and is more securely bound
“ by the affections of his own mind to abide for the future by all
“ his compacts. Such ready deference mankind are more apt to
“ shew towards those who have been with a remarkable superiority
“ their enemies, than to such as they have opposed in more equal
“ competition. It is natural, when men take the method of volun-
“ tary submission, for the pleasing contest of generosity to be kindled
“ between them ; but to hazard the last extremities, and even grow
“ desperate against that haughtiness which will not relent.

“ Now, if ever, is the crisis come to effect such a pleasing recon-
“ ciliation between us both, before the intervention of some incu-
“ rable event to ulcerate our passions, which may lay us under the
“ sad necessity of maintaining an eternal enmity both public and pri-
“ vate in regard to you, and you lose the benefit of those advanta-
“ geous offers we now lay within your option. Whilst the event is
“ yet undetermined, whilst the acquisition of glory, and of our
“ friendship

“ friendship is within your reach, whilst yet we only feel the weight
 “ of a supportable calamity, and are clear from foul disgrace, let us
 “ now be mutually reconciled ; let us give the preference to peace
 “ over war, and effectuate a cessation of miseries to the other Gre-
 “ cians. The honour of such an event will by them be more abun-
 “ dantly ascribed to you. At present they are engaged in a per-
 “ plexing warfare, unable yet to pronounce its authors. But in case
 “ a reconciliation now take place, a point for the most part within
 “ your decision, they will gratefully acknowledge you for generous
 “ benefactors.

“ If then you thus determine, you gain an opportunity to render
 “ the Lacedæmonians your firm and lasting friends, since now they
 “ request your friendship, and choose to be obliged rather than com-
 “ pelled. Reflect within yourselves how many benefits must in all
 “ probability result from such a lucky coincidence. For you cannot
 “ but know, that when *we* and *you* shall act with unanimity, the rest
 “ of Greece, conscious of inferiority, will pay us the utmost honour
 “ and regard.”

The Lacedæmonians talked in this strain upon the presumption, that the Athenians had formerly been desirous of peace, and had been obstructed merely through their opposition ; but now, thus freely tender'd, they would accept it with joy, and give up the *men*. The Athenians, on the contrary, reckoning the *Spartans* in the island already in their power, imagined that a peace would be at any time in their own option, and were now very eager to improve their present success. But such a measure was insisted upon most of all by Cleon: the son of Cleænetus, the greatest demagogue at this time, and most in credit with the people. It was he who persuaded them to return the following answer.

Cleon.

“ THAT,

“ THAT, previous to all accommodation, the *Spartans* shut up Answer of the Athenians.
 “ in the island must deliver up their arms and their persons, and be
 “ brought prisoners to Athens. When this was done, and the Lacedæmonians had surrender’d Nisæa and Pegæ, and Trœzene and
 “ Chalcis, (of which places they had not possessed themselves by
 “ arms, but in pursuance of a former treaty, when distress exacted
 “ compliance from the Athenians, and they had been obliged upon
 “ any terms to purchase peace), then they might fetch away their
 “ countrymen, and conclude a peace for whatever term both parties
 “ should agree.”

To this answer the Lacedæmonians made no direct reply ³. They Nothing effected.
 only requested that a *committee* might be appointed, with whom, after the arguments on each side should be freely offered and discussed, they might agree upon some expedient to mutual satisfaction. Cleon upon this broke out into loud invectives against them, affirming, “ he
 “ knew beforehand that they intended nothing just or fair; but now
 “ their view was manifest to all, as they had absolutely refused to
 “ have any transactions with the body of the *people*, and had thus
 “ expressed a desire to negotiate with a small *committee*: If their
 “ views were fair and upright, he called upon them to explain themselves in the presence of all.” But the Lacedæmonians perceiving that nothing they could urge would have any influence on the *people*, and in case, to ward off the distress they feared, they should make too large proposals, these offered and unaccepted, would expose them to the censure of their confederates; and that further, the Athenians would not comply with their demand on any reasonable terms; they

³ Diodorus Siculus, l. 12. says further, That the Lacedæmonian ambassadors offered to set at liberty an equal number of Athenians, who were now their prisoners. And, when this offer was rejected, the embassa-

dors replied freely, “ It was plain they set a
 “ higher value on Spartans than on their
 “ own citizens, since they judged an equal
 “ number of the latter not to be an equivalent.”

broke off all further conference, and quitted Athens. The very moment they return to Pylus, the truce was at an end. *The truce ends.* The Lacedæmonians redemanded their ships, according to the article for that purpose agreed on. But the Athenians objecting some infractions to them, such as an incursion towards the fortrefs, expressly prohibited by the articles, and some other matters of little consequence, absolutely refused a restitution. They justified the refusal upon this express stipulation between them, that "if the conditions were in any degree violated, the truce should immediately be void." The Lacedæmonians protested against these proceedings, and charging the detention of their ships with the highest injustice, broke off all further debate, and prepared for war.

Pylus was now the scene in which both these warring parties exerted their utmost efforts. The Athenians sailed the whole day round the island with two ships in an opposite course; in the night, their whole fleet was stationed round it upon guard, except on that side towards the main-sea when the weather was tempestuous. And to strengthen their guard, they had now received a reinforcement of twenty sail from Athens, so that the number of their shipping amounted in the whole to seventy. The Peloponnesians maintained their post on the continent, and made frequent assaults upon the fort: intent all along to seize the first favourable opportunity, and to accomplish the preservation of their countrymen.

Sicily.

In Sicily, this while, the Syracusans and confederates, augmenting the number of their guard-ships on the station of Messene with another Squadron they had since equipped, from Messene renewed the war. The Locrians spared no pains to spur them on from the great aversion they bore to the Rhegians. They had now broke into the territories of the latter with their whole force. They had even a mind to hazard a naval engagement against them, as they saw the number of Athenian ships at hand to be very inconsiderable, and had received intelligence that the larger numbers designed for this service

vice were stopped for the present to block up the isle of Sphaacteria. For should they once get the better at sea, they hoped, as they then might attack Rhegium both by sea and land, to find it an easy conquest, and so the posture of their own affairs would be considerably strengthened. For as Rhegium, which is a promontory of Italy, lies at a very small distance from Messene in Sicily, they could then prevent the approach of the Athenians, and be intirely masters of the *strait*. This *strait* is that part of the sea which runs between Rhegium and Messene, and over which lies the shortest cut from Sicily to the continent. It is the place which was formerly called Charybdis, and through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. As the current here sets in strongly from two great seas, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and runs with great rapidity, it is not at all strange that it should have been esteemed a dangerous passage.

Yet in the very middle of this strait the Syracusans and confederates, with a number of ships little more than thirty, were forced to engage in the evening of the day, the dispute beginning about a vessel that was passing through. They stood away to oppose sixteen sail of Athenians and eight of Rhegians. They were worsted by the Athenians; but each side separated in hurry and confusion, just as they could, to their several stations at Messene and Rhegium. They lost one ship in this action, which was stopped by the sudden approach of night.

*An action in
the strait of
Messene.*

But after this, the Locrians evacuated the territory of Rhegium, and the whole collected fleet of the Syracusans and confederates took a new station at Peloris of Messene, and their whole land-force attended. The Athenians and Rhegians sailing up to their station, and finding none at present on board the ships, rushed in amongst them. Yet they lost one of their own vessels by the force of a grappling-iron fastened upon it, the crew of which was saved by swimming. Immediately after this the Syracusans got on board, and being towed along the shore towards Messene, the Athenians came up again to at-
tack

tack them; but, the enemy running off into the deep and giving the first charge, they lose another of their ships. Tho' continuing to be towed along the shore, and to charge in this manner, yet the Syracusans, without suffering any loss, got safe into the harbour of Messene. And now the Athenians, having received intelligence that Camarina was betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his accomplices, stood away for that place.

Naxos.

In the mean while the Messenians, with their whole force by land, and accompanied by their ships, marched away against Chalcidic Naxos, which bordered upon their own territory. The first day they forced the Naxians to shelter themselves behind their walls, and then they plundered the country. The day following, sailing up the river Acefine, they plundered along the shore, and with their land-force made an assault upon the city. The Siculi, who live upon the mountains, were now pouring down in numbers to repel the Messenians. This the Naxians perceiving, became more courageous, and animating one another with the thought that the Leontines and their other Greek allies were now marching to their relief, they suddenly sally out of the city and fall upon the Messenians, whom they put to flight, and slaughtered more than a thousand of them; the remainder, with difficulty, escaping to their own homes: For the Barbarians attacked them upon their road, and made great havoc of them. The ships upon the station of Messene brake up soon after, withdrawing respectively to their own harbours.

Messene.

Immediately the Leontines and allies, in concert with the Athenians, appeared before Messene, as now reduced to a very low ebb. They assaulted it on all sides; the Athenians making their attempt from their ships on the side of the harbour, whilst the land-forces did the same on the body of the place. But the Messenians, and a party of Locrians commanded by Demoteles, who after their late blow had been left there for the security of the place, made a sudden sally from the city, and falling unexpectedly on the army of the Leontines, put
the

the greater part to flight, and did great execution upon them. This was no sooner perceived by the Athenians, than they threw themselves ashore to succour their confederates, and falling in with the Messenians, who had lost the order of their battle, drove them again behind their walls. This done, having erected a trophy, they put over to Rhegium. And after this, the Grecians of Sicily continued a land-war against one another, in which the Athenians had no participation.

At Pylus, the Athenians still kept the Lacedæmonians blocked up ^{Pylus.} in the island, and the army of the Peloponnesians remained in their old post upon the continent, in a state of inactivity. Their constant guard subjected the Athenians to excessive hardships, since provisions and fresh water were equally scarce. There was but one single fountain for their use, which lay within the fortress of Pylus, and yielded but a slender quantity of water. The majority of them were forced to dig into the gravel upon the beach of the sea, and take up with such water as could thus be got. They were further very much straitened in their station for want of room. They had not road enough for their ships to ride in with tolerable convenience, so that alternately one division lay ashore to take their necessary repasts, whilst the other lunched more to sea. But what discouraged them most was the length of the blockade, so contrary to what they had expected. They had imagined a few days siege would have worn out a body of men shut up in a barren island, and having only salt-water for their drink. But this had been redressed by the Lacedæmonians, who had by a public edict encouraged all who were willing to carry over into the island meal, and wine, and cheese, and any other eatable which might enable them to hold out, assigning a large pecuniary reward for any successful attempt of this nature, and promising freedom to every Helot who carried them provisions. This was performed through a series of dangers by several; but the Helots were most active of all, who putting off from Peloponnesus (wherever they

they chanced to be) landed by favour of the dark on the side of the island which lies upon the main-sea. Their chief precaution was to run over in a hard gale of wind. For whenever the wind blew from the sea, they were in less danger of being discovered by the guard of triremes, which then could not safely lie quite round the island. In executing this service they put every thing to hazard. As a prior valuation had been given in, they run their vessels on shore at all adventures; and the heavy-armed soldiers were ready to receive them at every place most convenient for landing. Those however, who ventured out when the weather was calm, were certainly intercepted. Such, further, as were expert at diving, swam over through the harbour, dragging after them by a string bottles filled with poppies mixed up with honey and the powder of linseed. These for a time escaped discovery, but were afterwards closely watched. No artifice was left unpractised on either side; some being ever intent to carry provisions over, and others to intercept them.

Athens.

At Athens, in the mean time, the people being informed of the hardships to which their own forces are reduced, and that those in the island receive supplies of provision, were perplexed how to act. They were full of apprehensions lest the winter should put a stop to their siege, being conscious of the impossibility of procuring them subsistence from any part of Peloponnesus; and more so, as the soil about them was barren, and that even in summer they were not able to furnish them with necessary supplies; that further, as no harbours were in the parts adjacent, there would be no commodious road for their shipping; so that, in case they relaxed their guard, the besieged would go securely away; or otherwise, they might get off, by the favour of stormy weather, in those vessels which brought over provisions. But they were most of all alarmed at the conduct of the Lacedæmonians, who, because they had now a safe resource in prospect, had discontinued all manner of negotiation. In a word, they highly repented the refusal of their former offers.

Cleon,

Cleon, conscious to himself that the blame of baffling that accom-
 modation would be thrown upon him, taxed them who brought the
 last advices as broachers of falsehoods. But those who had been sent
 to make the report, demanded, "since they could not be credited,
 " that a deputation might be sent to know its truth." For which
 office Cleon himself was nominated by the Athenians, in conjunction
 with Theogenes.

But now he plainly saw, that he must either be necessitated to
 make the same report as those had done whom he had charged with
 falsehood; or, should he report differently, must soon be convicted of
 a lye. He perceived also, that the inclinations of the people were
 mostly bent on an ample reinforcement; upon which, he ventured
 to give them this further advice — That "sending a deputation on
 " such an errand was quite superfluous, since opportunities might be
 " lost by so dilatory a measure: If they were really convinced of the
 " truth of the report, they should at once put to sea against their
 " enemies." He then proceeded to a malicious glance against Ni-
 cias son of Niceratus, who at that time presided over the military
 affairs. He hated him, and sneered him thus — That "if their
 " generals were really men, it would be an easy matter to sail thi-
 " ther with an additional strength, and make a seizure of those in
 " the island; for his own part, was he in command, he would do it
 " in a trice." The Athenians began immediately to clamour and
 rail at Cleon; for not instantly setting about that enterprise himself,
 which to him appeared so easy. This Nicias laying hold of, cha-
 grined at the same time by the sneer upon himself, called upon him
 aloud — "To take what force he pleased, and to perform the ser-
 " vice in his stead." Cleon, imagining this to be a mere verbal of-
 fer, declared himself ready. But when he found that Nicias was
 earnest in the point of resignation, he drew back, alledging, that "it
 " could not be, since not he but Nicias was General." He trembled
 now, since he never suspected that the other would venture to give

up his office to him. Nicias however called a second time upon him, and formally surrendered his office to him, so far as related to Pylus, desiring the Athenians to be his witnesses. The people now (for such is the temper of the multitude) the more pains Cleon took to decline the voyage, and disentangle himself from his own bravados, called out so much the more vehemently upon Nicias to give up the command, and roared aloud at the other to go on board. Unable now to extricate himself, he intimates his acceptance of the employ, and standing forth, averred, that "he was not under the least dread of the Lacedæmonians, would not be accompanied by so much as one Athenian, but would take only what Lemnians and Imbrians were at hand, and those targeteers who were come to their aid from Ænus, and the four hundred archers from other places. With these, *he said*, added to the military force already at Pylus, he would either in the space of twenty days bring off all the Lacedæmonians alive, or put them all to death upon the spot."

This big way of talking raised a laugh among the people; all men of sense however were not a little delighted. They concluded, they should compass by it one of these two desirable ends; either, to rid themselves effectually of Cleon, which they chiefly expected; or, should they be disappointed of this, to get those Lacedæmonians into their power⁴.

Having

4 The honour of Athens was very deeply concerned in the point, which had been the subject of this day's debate in the assembly of the people, and yet it hath turned out a mere comic scene. The dignity of the republic had never been well supported on these occasions, since the death of Pericles. Cleon had introduced all kinds of drollery and scurrility into the debates; and it was now become quite the same thing to the

people, whether they laughed with or laughed at him. He hath now railed Nicias, tho' none but a person of so diffident and fearful a temper as Nicias could so have been railed out of an honourable command; and then is laughed himself into it, and tho' an arrant poltroon is metamorphosed into a general of the first class, and soon after swells into a very hero. However, the Athenian good sense, whatever turn Phœydidēs gives it,

HAVING thus transacted the requisite points in the public assembly, where the Athenians had awarded the expedition to him by a formal decree, and Demosthenes, at Cleon's own request, was joined in the commission of commanders at Pylus, He hastened to his post with the senior *Agess*. His reason for associating Demosthenes in the command, was owing to some notice received that he was bent on landing upon the island; as the soldiers, terribly incommoded by the straits of their stations, and resembling besieged more than besiegers, were eager for this bold adventure. Demosthenes was animated more to the attempt, because the island had lately been set on fire. Before this accident, as it had been quite covered over with wood, and was pathless, because ever uninhabited; he durst not think of such a step, and judged all these circumstances to be for the enemy's advantage. For, tho' a more numerous army should have landed against them; they were enabled terribly to annoy them from posts unassured. What errors might be committed, or how large their strength, might be more easily concealed on that side by the covert of the woods; whereas all the errors of his own army would lie clear and open to observation, when the enemy might suddenly attack, and in what quarter they pleased, since battle must be intirely in their own option. On the other side, should he force them to a close engagement on rough and woody ground, the smaller number, by being skilled in the passes, he imagined, must prove too hard for a superior number without such experience; that by this means his own force,

He goes to Pylus.

it; can hardly be justified on this occasion, in trusting to important a commission upon Cleon purely for a joke. *Plutarch* says, they always bore his impertinent and mad way of talking, because it was humorous and diverting. Once, when the assembly had been met some time, and the people had sat long expecting his coming, at length he made his appearance with a garland on his head, and begged the favour of them to

adjourn till the morrow, "For at present," *said he*, "I am not at leisure, since I have sacrificed to day, and must entertain my friends." A loud laugh ensued at his impudence, and then they rose and adjourned. This affair of Pylus was however far from a jocular point; and the Athenians might have paid very dear for their mirth, had not Cleon been wise enough to associate Demosthenes with him in the command.

merely on account of its numbers, might be imperceptibly destroyed, as it could not be discerned, which part of it was hardest pressed, and stood most in need of support.

Demosthenes
intent on an
attack.

These inward suggestions were more prevalent in the mind of Demosthenes from the remembrance of his Ætolian defeat, which was partly owing to the woods amongst which he engaged. But as the narrowness of their station had necessitated his soldiers to land sometimes upon the skirts of the island, and under the cover of an advanced guard to dress their repast, a soldier, tho' intirely without design, set the wood on fire, which spread but slowly, till a brisk gale happening to arise, the greatest part of it was unexpectedly destroyed by the flames. Demosthenes, having gained by this means a clearer view of the Lacedæmonians, found them more numerous than from the quantity of victuals sent in by stipulation he was used to compute them. He then judged it highly to concern the Athenians to exert their utmost efforts: and, as the island was now become more opportune for a descent, he got every thing in readiness for its execution, having sent for a supply of men from the adjacent confederates, and busied himself about all the dispositions needful for success. He had further received an express from Cleon notifying his approach, who now, at the head of the supply he himself had demanded, arriveth at Pylus. No sooner were they joined, than they dispatched a herald to the camp on the continent, demanding — “ Whether they were
“ willing to order their people in the island to surrender their arms
“ and persons, without risking extremities, on condition to be kept
“ under an easy confinement till the whole dispute could be properly
“ accommodated ? ” — This being positively refused, they remained quiet one day longer; but on the succeeding day, having embarked their whole strength of heavy-armed on board a few vessels, they put out by night, and a little before the ensuing dawn landed on each side of the island, both from the main sea and the harbour, amounting in the whole to eight hundred men in heavy-armour. They
advanced

advanced with their utmost speed towards the first guard on the island. This was done in pursuance of a previous disposition: For this first guard consisted of about thirty heavy-armed: The main-body under Epitadas was posted about the centre, where the ground was most level and watry: And another party guarded the extremity of the island facing Pylus, which towards the sea was a rocky cliff, and by land altogether impregnable. On the top further of this cliff was seated a fort, built some ages before of stones picked carefully for the purpose. This they judged might be serviceable to them, should they be forced to shelter themselves from superior violence. In this manner was the enemy posted.

The Athenians immediately, in their first career, put the whole advanced guard to the sword, having surprised them yet in their huts, and but seeking to lay hold of their arms. Their landing was yet undiscovered, since the enemy judged their vessels to be only the usual guard which was every night in motion. *Lands on Sphaacteria.*

No sooner also was the dawn completely broke, than the remainder of the Athenian force was landed from a number of vessels somewhat more than seventy. All the mariners came ashore, in their respective distinctions of arms, excepting the rowers of the lowest bench^s. They were eight hundred archers, and a body no less numerous of targeteers. The Messenian auxiliaries attended, and all in general who had been employed at Pylus, except such as were necessarily detained for the guard of the fortresses.

^s It is in the original, excepting the *Thalamii*. The rowers on the different benches were distinguished by a peculiar name. Those of the uppermost were called *Thranite*; those of the middle, *Zeugite*; and those of the lowest, *Thalamii*. The labour of the *Thalamii* was the least, though most constant, because of their nearness to the water, and the shortness of their oars.

Much more strength and skill were required on the upper benches, and most of all on the uppermost, who for that reason had better pay. Those on the lowest bench seem to have been mere drudges at the oar, and qualified for nothing better; the others were more complete seamen, and ready on all occasions for the duty both of rowing and fighting.

According

According to a disposition formed by Demosthenes, they advanced in separate bodies, consisting of near two hundred more or less, and took possession of all the eminences. The design was, thus to reduce the enemy to a pangs of distress by surrounding them on all sides, and puzzling them in their choice which party first to make head against; that at the sight of numbers on all sides they might be quite confounded; and, should they then attack the body in their front, they might be harassed by others in their rear; or, should they wheel towards those on either flank, they might be exposed to the bodies both in front and rear. Which way soever the enemy might turn, they were sure to have behind them the light-armed and less martial of their opponents, infesting them with their bows and darts and stones. These would do execution from a distance: an enemy could not possibly engage with them; since even flying they would prevail, and when the enemy retreated would return briskly to their work. With so much address had Demosthenes previously plan'd the order of landing, and in close adherence to it brought them now to action.

The body commanded by Epitadas, and which was the bulk of the whole force in the island, when they saw their advanced guard intirely cut off and the enemy advancing to attack them next, drew up in order and marched towards the heavy-armed of the Athenians, designing to engage them. For the latter were so placed as to oppose them in front; the light-armed were posted on either of their flanks and in their rear. But against these heavy-armed they could not possibly come to action, nor gain an opportunity to exert their own distinguishing skill. For the light-armed, pouring in their darts on either of their flanks, compelled them to halt; and their opposites would not move forwards to meet them, but stood quiet in their post. Such indeed of the light-armed, as adventured in any quarter to run up near their ranks, were instantly put to flight; however, they soon faced about and continued their annoyance. They were not incum-
bered

bored with any weight of armour; their agility easily conveyed them beyond the reach of danger, as the ground was rough, and ever left desert had never been levelled by culture. In such spots the Lacedæmonians, under the load of their arms, could not possibly pursue. In this kind of skirmish therefore they were for a small space of time engaged.

When the Lacedæmonians had no longer sufficient agility to check the attacks of these skirmishing parties, the light-armed soon took notice that they slackened in their endeavours to beat them off. It was then, that their own appearance many times more large than that of their foes, and the very sight of themselves began to animate them with excess of courage. Experience had now lessened that terror in which they had been used to regard *this* foe. They now had met with no rough reception from them, which fell out quite contrary to what they firmly expected at their first landing, when their spirits had sunk very low at the thought, that it was against *Lacedæmonians*. Contempt ensued; and embodying, with a loud shout they rushed upon them; pouring in stones and arrows and darts, whatever came first to hand. At such a shout accompanied with so impetuous a charge, astonishment seized their foes quite unpractised in such a form of engagement; at the same time the ashes of the wood, which had been burnt, were mounting largely into the air. So that now each lost the sight of what was close before him, under the showers of darts and stones thrown by such numbers, and whirling along in a cloud of dust.

Amidst so many difficulties the Lacedæmonians now were sorely distressed. The safe-guards on their heads and breasts were no longer proof against the arrows, and their javelins were broke to pieces when poised for throwing. They were quite at a loss for some means of defence; they were debarred the prospect of what was passing just before them; and the shouts of the enemy were so loud that they could no longer hear any orders. Danger thus surrounding them

them on all sides, they quite despaired of the possibility of such resistance as might earn their safety. At last, a great part of that body being wounded, because obliged to adhere firmly to the spot on which they stood, embodying close, they retreated towards the fort on the skirt of the island, which lay at no great distance, and to their guard which was posted there. But when once they began to move off, the light-armed, growing more resolute and shouting louder than ever, pressed hard upon their retreat; and whatever Lacedæmonian fell within their reach, in the whole course of the retreat, was instantly slaughtered. The bulk of them with difficulty recovered the fort, and in concert with the guard posted there drew up in order to defend it, in whatever quarter it might possibly be assaulted. The Athenians, speedily coming up, were hindered by the natural site of the place from forming a circle and besetting it on all sides. Advancing therefore directly forwards, they endeavoured to beat the defendants off. Thus, for a long time, for the greatest part of the day, both sides persisted in the contest, under the painful pressures of battle and thirst and a burning sun. No efforts were spared by the assailants to drive them from the eminence; nor by the defendants to maintain their post. But here the Lacedæmonians defended themselves with more ease than in the preceding engagement, because now they could not be encompassed on their flanks.

When the dispute could not thus be brought to a decision, the commander of the Messenians, addressing himself to Cleon and Demosthenes, assured them, " they took a deal of pains to no manner
" of purpose; but would they be persuaded to put under his guidance
" a party of the archers and light-armed, to get a round-about
" way on the enemies rear by a track which he himself could find,
" he was confident he could force an entrance." Having received the party he demanded, marching off from a spot undescried by the Lacedæmonians in order to conceal the motion, and continuing to mount higher and higher along the ridge of rock that lay upon the
verge

verge of the island, in the quarter where the Lacedæmonians depending upon its natural strength had placed no guard, with great difficulty and fatigue he got behind them undiscovered. Now shewing himself on a sudden upon the summit and in their rear, he astonished the enemy with this unexpected appearance; and his friends, who now beheld what they so earnestly looked for, he very much emboldened. The Lacedæmonians were now exposed to the missive weapons on both sides; and (if a point of less consequence may be compared to one of greater) were in a state parallel to that of their countrymen at Thermopylæ⁶. For *those*, being hemmed in by the Persians in a narrow pass, were utterly destroyed: *These* now, in like manner beset on both sides, were no longer able to contend. Being but a handful of men opposed to superior numbers, and much weakened in their bodies for want of food, they quitted their post. And thus the Athenians became masters of all the approaches.

But Cleon and Demosthenes, assuredly, convinced that should the foe give way too fast, it would only conduce to their expeditious slaughter under the fury of the victorious troops, began to stop their fury, and to draw off their men. They were desirous to carry them alive to Athens, in case they would so far hearken to the voice of a herald as to throw down their arms, dejected as they must be in spirit and overpowered with the instant danger. It was accordingly proclaimed, that "such as were willing should deliver up their arms and their persons to the Athenians, to be disposed of at discretion."

⁶ The famous three hundred Spartans with king Leonidas at their head, who stopped the vast army of Xerxes at the pass of Thermopylæ, and at length perished all to a man. They were all afterwards intombed on the spot where they fell with this short epitaph;

VOL. II.

Tell, traveller, at Sparta what you saw,
That here we lie obedient to her law.

The same spirit and resolution was at this time generally expected from these Spartans, now encompassed round about by their enemies, in the isle of Sphacteria.

F

When

*The Spartans
Surrender.*

When this was heard, the greater number threw down their bucklers and waved their hands, in token of accepting the proposal. A suspension of arms immediately took place, and a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon the son of Pharax on the other. Of those who had preceded in the command, Epitadas, who was the first, had been slain, and Hippagretes who was his successor, lying as dead among the slain, tho' he had yet life in him, Styphon was now the third appointed to take the command upon him, according to the provision made by their law, in case their generals drop. Styphon intimated his desire of leave to send over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. This the Athenians refused, but however called over some heralds to him from the continent. Messages passed backwards and forwards twice or thrice; but the last who crossed over to them from the Lacedæmonians on the continent brought this determination — “ The Lacedæmonians permit you to take care of your own concerns, “ provided you submit to nothing base.” In consequence of this, after a short consultation with one another apart, they delivered up their arms and their persons. The remainder of the day and the succeeding night the Athenians confined them under a strong guard. But the day following, having erected a trophy upon the island, they got themselves in readiness to sail away, and distributed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the triremes. The Lacedæmonians, having obtained permission by a herald, fetched off their dead.

The number of those who were slain, and those who were taken alive, stood thus: They who had thrown themselves into the island amounted in the whole to four hundred and twenty heavy-armed. Of these three hundred wanting eight were carried off alive, the rest had been destroyed. Among the prisoners were about one hundred and twenty *Spartans*. The number of Athenians slain was inconsiderable: for it was not a standing fight. The whole space that these
men

men were besieged in the island, from the engagement at sea till the battle in the island, was seventy-two days. Twenty of these, during the absence of the ambassadors to negotiate an accommodation, they were supplied with food: The remainder of the time, they were fed by such as got over by stealth. Nay, meal and other eatables were found in the island, even when all was over. Their commander Eпитadas had made a more sparing distribution than his stores required.

Now the Athenians and Peloponnesians respectively drew off their forces from Pylus to return home: And the promise of Cleon, mad as it had been, was fully executed. For within the twenty days, he brought them prisoners to Athens, and made his words good ^{Cleon's bravado made good.} 7.

The expectation of Greece was more disappointed by this event, than by any other occurrence whatever in the series of the war. It was generally presumed that neither famine nor any extremity could have reduced these Lacedæmonians to deliver up their arms, but that sword in hand and fighting to the last gasp, they would have bravely perished. They could not afterwards believe that those who surrendered were like to those who were slain. Some time after, a soldier in one of the confederate bands of the Athenians, demanding with a sneer of one of them who were taken prisoners in the island, "if the slain were not men of true gallantry and courage?" the

7 It should be added here, that he also rebbed for the present a very able and gallant officer of the praise he merited on this occasion. The whole affair of Pylus was planned, carried into execution, and brought to a successful and glorious issue by the conduct and bravery of Demosthenes. Aristophanes (in *the Knights*) hath made a low comic character of the latter, and introduced him venting sad complaints against Cleon for pilfering the honour from

him. "This *Paphlagonian* (says he) hath
"snatched from every one of us whatever
"nice thing we had got to suit the palate
"of our lord and master (the *people*.) 'Tis
"but the other day, I myself had cooked
"up a noble pasty of Lacedæmonians at
"Pylus, when this vilest of scoundrels
"came running thither, pilfered it away
"from me, and hath served it up to table
"as if it was of his own dressing."

other replied, that "a spindle (by which he meant an arrow) " would be valuable indeed, if it knew how to distinguish the " brave;" intimating by this answer, that the slain were such as stones and darts dispatched in the medley of battle.

*The prisoners
carried to
Athens.*

When the prisoners were brought to Athens, it was the public resolution there "to keep them in bonds, 'till some definitive treaty " could be agreed on. And if previously to this, the Peloponnesians " should repeat their inroad into the Attic territory, they should all " undergo a public execution." They established also a garrison for Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus sending thither the most proper of their own people, as into their own native country (for Pylus is a part of the ancient Messenia) infested Laconia with depredations and did them vast damage, the more because they spoke the same dialect *.

*The Lacedæ-
monians sue
for peace.*

As for the Lacedæmonians, who never knew before what it was to be thus plundered, war in such a shape being new to them, and their Helots deserting continually to the foe; apprehensive farther, lest such unusual proceedings within their own district might draw worse consequences after them,—they had a painful sense of their present situation. This compelled them to send their embassies to Athens, desirous however at the same time to conceal what they really thought of their own state, and spare no artifice for the recovery of Pylus and their people. But the Athenians grew more unreasonable in their demands, and after many journeys to and fro sent them finally away with an absolute denial. Such was the course of proceedings in relation to Pylus.

*The Athenians
invade the
Corinthians.*

The same summer, and immediately on the close of the former event, the Athenians set out to invade Corinth with a fleet of eighty ships which carried two thousand heavy-armed of their own people, and with some horse-transports on board of which were two hundred horsemen. They were also attended by some of their confe-

• The Doric.

derates,

derates, by the Milesians and Andrians and Carysthians. Nicias the son of Niceratus with two colleagues commanded this armament. At the early dawn of morning they came to anchor between Cherronesus and Reitus, on the shore of that place which the Solygian hill overhangs, of which formerly the Dorians possessing themselves made war upon the Corinthians then in Corinth who were of Æolian descent. Upon that eminence there is now a village called Solygia. From the shore where the armament came now to anchor, this village was distant about * twelve, the city of Corinth † sixty, and the Isthmus ‡ twenty stadia.

* Near $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

† 6 miles.

‡ 2 miles.

The Corinthians, who had already been advised from Argos of the approach of the Athenian armament, had long since by way of prevention drawn their whole force together at the Isthmus, excepting what was in employ without the Isthmus and the five hundred absent in the guard of Ambracia and Leucadia. With all the rest of their people able to bear arms they were posted on the isthmus, to watch the approach of the Athenians. But when the Athenian fleet had passed by undiscovered by favour of the night, and signals notified their approach elsewhere, leaving half their force at Cenchrea to obstruct any attempt of the Athenians upon Crommyon, they marched with all speed against the enemy. Battus one of their commanders (for there were two such in the field) at the head of a separate body marched up to the open village of Solygia in order to defend it, whilst Lycophron with the remainder advanced to the charge. The Corinthians fell first upon the right wing of the Athenians who were but just landed before Cherronesus, and then proceeded to engage the whole of that army. The action was warm, and fought hand to hand. The right wing, consisting of the Athenians and also the Carysthians who were drawn up in the rear, gave the Corinthians a warm reception, and with much difficulty repulsed them. Retreating therefore upwards to a wall built of stone (for the ground was a continued ascent,) and being there above the enemy, they annoyed

annoyed them with stones; and having sung their psalm, rushed down upon them again. The Athenians having stood the shock, they engaged a second time hand to hand. But a band of Corinthians being come up to the support of their own left wing, occasioned the rout of the right wing of the Athenians, and pursued them to the sea-side. But the Athenians and Carystians now turned again, and beat them off from the ships.

Athenians
suffering.

In other parts of the action the dispute was resolute on both sides, especially where the right wing of the Corinthians, with Lycophron at its head, was engaging the left wing of the Athenians. They were apprehensive the enemy would endeavour to force their way to the village of Solygia. For a considerable space the battle was obstinate, neither side giving way; but at length, through the advantage on the Athenian side of being assisted by a party of horse, whereas their opposites had none, the Corinthians were broke and driven up the ascent, where grounding their arms, they came down no more to the charge, but remained in a quiet posture. In this rout of the right wing, numbers of the Corinthians perished, and Lycophron their general. But the rest of the body had the good fortune to make a safe retreat, and so to secure themselves upon the eminence, as they could not be briskly pursued, and were not compelled to move off with precipitation. When the Athenians perceived that the enemy would no more return to the charge, they rifled the bodies of the foes whom they had slain, and carried off their own dead, and then without loss of time erected their trophy.

Yet forced to
re-embark.

That division of the Corinthians which had been posted at Cenchrea to prevent any attempt upon Crommyon, had the view of the battle intercepted from them by the mountain Oneius. But when they saw the cloud of dust, and thence knew what was doing, they marched full speed towards the spot. The aged inhabitants also, when they were informed of the battle, rushed out of Corinth to succour their own people. The Athenians perceiving the approach
of

of such numerous bodies, and judging them to be sacreours sent up by the neighbouring Peloponnesians, threw themselves immediately on board their ships, with what spoil they had taken, and the bodies of their own dead excepting two, which not finding in this hurry they left behind. They were no sooner re-embarked than they crossed over to the adjacent islands, from whence they dispatched a herald to demand leave, which was granted, to fetch off the dead bodies they had left behind⁸.

The number of Corinthians slain in the battle was two hundred and twelve; that of Athenians somewhat less than fifty.

The Athenians, leaving the islands, appeared the same day before Crommyon, situated in its territory, and distant from the city of Corinth one hundred and twenty stadia^{*}. They landed and ravaged the country, and that night reposed themselves there. The day following they sailed along the coast; first to Epidaurus; and, after a kind of descent there, arrived at Methone, which lies between Epidaurus and Trœzen. Possessing themselves there of the isthmus of Cherronesus on which Methone is situated, they run up a wall across it, and fixed a garrison of continuance in that post, which for the future extended their depredations over all the districts of Trœzen,

*Their farther
proceedings.*

** About 12
English miles.*

⁸ This incident is related by Plutarch (in *the Life of Nicias*) as a proof of the great piety and humanity of Nicias. His asking leave to fetch off these two bodies was, according to that writer, an actual renunciation of the victory; since it was against all rules, for persons who had condescended to such a submission, to erect a trophy. But, without disparaging the good qualities of Nicias, or his obedience to the institutions of his country in regard to the dead, which were ever most sacredly observed, it may be questioned, whether he renounced the victory on this occasion. Thucydides says the

trophy was already erected, which ascertained, without doubt, the honour of the victory, and nothing is said of its demolition by the Corinthians, when they received this request of truce from Nicias. His re-embarking in a hurry seems a distinct affair. It had no connexion with the late battle, which had been clearly and fairly won; but was owing to a fresh army coming into the field on the side of the enemy. This stopped him indeed from gaining any fresh honour, but surely did not deprive him of what he was already possessed of.

Halias

Halias and Epidaurus. But the fleet, when once this post was sufficiently secured, sailed away for Athens.

Corcyra.

During the space of time which co-incided with these transactions, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who with the ships of the Athenians had quitted Pylus to proceed in the voyage to Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. They joined the Corcyréans of the city, marching out against those who were posted on the mount of Istone, *that* party who repassing soon after, the sedition were at this time masters of the country, and committed sad ravage. Accordingly they assaulted that post, and carried it by storm. The defendants, who had fled away in a body towards another eminence, were soon forced to capitulate "giving up their auxiliaries, and then giving up their own arms, to be proceeded with afterwards at the pleasure of the *people* of Athens." The commanders removed them all for safe custody into the isle of Ptychia, till they could conveniently be conveyed to Athens, with this proviso, that "if any one person should be caught in an attempt to get off, the whole number should forfeit the benefit of the capitulation."

Tragic period of the sedition.

But the leaders of the *populace* at Corcyra, apprehending that the Athenians, should they be sent to Athens, might possibly save their lives, contrive the following machination. — They tamper successfully with some of those who were confined in the isle, by the means of some trusty agents whom they sent privately amongst them, and instructed that "with great professions of regard for them, they should insinuate no other resource was left for them but to make their escape with all possible expedition, and that themselves would undertake to provide them with a bark, for it was the certain resolution of the Athenian commanders to give them up to the fury of the Corcyréan populace." — When they had given ear to these suggestions, and were on board the bark thus treacherously provided for them, and so were apprehended in the very act of departure, the articles of capitulation came at once to an end, and they were all given

given up to the Corcyreans. Not that the Athenian commanders did not highly contribute to the success of this treachery ; since, in order to make it go down more easily, and to lessen the fears of the agents in the plot, they had publicly declared that “ the conveyance of those persons to Athens by any other hands would highly chagrin them, because then, whilst they were attending their duty in Sicily, others would run away with all the honour.” The Corcyreans had them no sooner in their power, than they shut them up in a spacious edifice. Hence afterwards they brought them out by twenties, and having formed two lines of soldiers, in all military habiliments, facing one another, they compelled them to walk between the lines, chained one to another, and receiving blows and wounds as they passed along from those who formed the lines, and struck at pleasure so soon as they perceived the objects of their hatred. They were followed by others who carried scourges, and lashed those forwards who moved not readily along. Threescore persons had been brought forth and destroyed in this manner, before those who remained in the edifice became sensible of their fate. For they had hitherto imagined, that those who fetched them out did it merely to shift their confinement. But when they learned the truth from some person or other whom they could not disbelieve, they called out aloud on the Athenians, and implored as a favour to be put to death by them. To stir from the place of their confinement they now absolutely refused, and averred, that to the utmost of their power they would hinder every body from coming in to them. But the Corcyreans had not the least inclination to force an entrance by the doors. They mounted up on the top of the edifice, and tearing off the roof, flung the tiles and shot arrows down upon them. The others protected themselves to the best of their power ; and many of them were employed in making away with themselves by cramming the arrows shot from above down their own throats. Others, tearing away the cordage from the beds which happened to be within, or twisting such ropes as they could from shreds

of their own garments, so strangled themselves to death. No method was omitted during the greatest part of the night (for night dropt down upon this scene of horror) till, either dispatched by their own contrivance, or shot to death by those above, their destruction was completely finished. So soon as it was day, the Corcyréans, having thrown their bodies on heaps into carriages, removed them out of the city. But their wives, so many as had been taken prisoners in company with their husbands, they adjudged to slavery for life.

In this manner the Corcyréans from the mountain were destroyed by the people. And a sedition so extensive was brought to this tragical period, so far at least as relates to the present war. For nothing of the same nature broke out afterwards so remarkable as to need a particular relation.

The Athenians departing from Corcyra, made the best of their way for Sicily, whither they were bound at first setting out, and prosecuted the war there in concert with their allies.

Anactorium. In the close of this summer, the Athenians on the station of Nampactus, marching in junction with the Acarnanians, possessed themselves of Anactorium, a city of the Corinthians, situated on the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It was put into their hands by treachery. In consequence of this, the Corinthian inhabitants were ejected, and the place repeopled by new inhabitants invited thither from all parts of Acarnania. And the summer ended.

Death of Artaxerxes.

The ensuing winter, Aristides the son of Archippus, one of those who commanded the squadrons which the Athenians had put out to raise contributions among their dependents, apprehended Artaphernes a noble Persian, at Eion on the river Strymon. He was going to Lacedæmon on a commission from the King. Being conveyed to Athens, the Athenians had his letters, which were wrote in Assyrian, translated and read in public. Their contents were large, but the principal was this passage addressed to the Lacedæmonians — that “ he
“ was

" was not yet properly informed what it was they requested of him.
 " For tho' he had been attended by frequent embassies, yet they did
 " not all agree in their demands. If therefore they were desirous to
 " make an explicit declaration, they should send some of their body
 " to him in company with this Persian." But the Athenians after-
 wards sent Artaphernes back to Ephesus in a trireme, and with an
 embassy of their own, who meeting at that place with the news that
 Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes was lately dead (for about this time that
 monarch died) the ambassadors returned back to Athens.

The same winter also the Chians demolished their new fortification. Chians.
 The Athenians had expressly ordered it, suspecting that they were in-
 tent on some innovating schemes. It availed nothing, that they had
 lately given the Athenians all possible securities, and the strongest as-
 surances that they would in no shape attempt or think of innovations.
 And thus the winter ended; and with it the seventh year of this war,
 of which Thucydides hath compiled the history, was brought to a
 conclusion.

Y E A R V I I I.

Early in the following summer, at the time of the new moon, the Before Christ,
 sun was partially eclipsed; and in the beginning of the same month, 424.
 the shock of an earthquake was felt. Darius No-

The fugitives from Mitylene and Lesbos in general, who to a great Antandrus.
 number had sheltered themselves on the continent, assemble in a body,
 and having hired some additional succours in Peloponnesus, and drawn
 them over safely from thence, surprise Rhætium; but, in considera-
 tion of two thousand Phocæan staters * paid immediately down, they * Above
 restored it again undamaged. This being done, they marched next 1800 l. ster-
 against Antandrus, and got possession of it by the treachery of a party ling.
 within the city, who betrayed it to them. It was farther their inten-
 tion to set at liberty those cities stiled the Actæan, which had formerly
 been

been possessed by the Mitylenæans, but were now in the hands of the Athenians. But their principal view was the possession of Antandrus, which once effectually secured (for it lay convenient for the building of ships, as it had plenty of timber, and mount Ida stood just above it) they would then be amply furnished with all the expedients of war, nay, might act offensively from thence, might terribly annoy Lesbos which lies near it, and reduce the Æolian fortresses along the coast. This was the plan, which now they were intent to put in execution.

*Conquest of
Cythera.*

The same summer the Athenians, with a fleet of sixty ships, and taking with them two thousand heavy-armed, a few horsemen, the Milesians, and others of their confederates, made an expedition against Cythera. The command was lodged with Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmæus. Cythera is an island: it lies upon the coast of Laconia over-against Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedæmonians, resorting thither from the neighbouring coast. A magistrate was sent over yearly from Sparta by the stile of *Judge of Cythera*; the garrison of heavy-armed established there was regularly relieved; and no care omitted in the good government and management of the place. It was the port which their trading ships first entered, in their return from Egypt and Libya. It was the chief security of Laconia against those piratical parties which might infect it from the sea, from whence alone they are capable of doing them any mischief: for by its situation it hath intirely the command of the seas of Sicily and Crete. The Athenian armament therefore arriving here, with a detachment of ten ships and two thousand heavy-armed, surprize a maritime town which is called Scandéa. With the rest of their force they made a descent on that part of the island which is opposite to Malea, and advanced toward the city of Cythera situated also on the sea, and they found immediately that all the inhabitants were drawn out into the field in readiness to receive them. An engagement ensued, wherein the Cytheréans

Cytheréans maintained their ground for a small space of time, but then turning about, fled again into their citadel. They soon afterwards capitulated with Nicias and his colleagues, submitting to the Athenians at discretion, barring only the penalty of death. Some of the Cytheréans had before-hand obtained a conference with Nicias. This rendered the capitulation more easy and expeditious, and not only the present, but all future points were by this means speedily and satisfactorily adjusted. For the Athenians insisted that they should evacuate Cythera, because they were Lacedæmonians, and because the island lay so conveniently on the Laconic coast. The accommodation being once perfected, the Athenians, having secured Scandea the fortress situated upon the harbour, and fixed a garrison in Cythera, stood away for Asine and Helas, and most of the adjacent places on the coast. There they made descents, and reposing themselves in the nights at the most convenient of those places, they spent about seven days in ravaging the country.

The Lacedæmonians, tho' they saw the Athenians had possessed themselves of Cythera, and expected further that they would proceed to make more such descents upon their territories, yet no where drew together in a body to repulse them. They only stationed their parties of guard in such posts as were of greatest importance. In other respects they exerted their utmost vigilance, being under apprehensions that the very form of their government was in danger of subversion. Their loss in Sphaacteria was unexpected and great indeed. Pylus was now in the hands of the enemy, as was also Cythera. War was bursting in upon them on all sides with irresistible impetuosity. This compelled them, contrary to their usual maxims, to form a body of four hundred horse and archers. If they were ever dejected by the prevalence of fear, at this juncture they were more feelingly so, when they saw the necessity of entering the lists, contrary to all that practice of war to which they had been inured, in a naval contest.

*Low state of
the Lacedæ-
monians.*

contest, and in this against the Athenians, whose passion it was to compute as so much loss whatever they left unattempted. Their general misfortunes besides, which so suddenly and so fast had poured in upon them, had thrown them into the utmost consternation. They excessively dreaded the weight of such another calamity, as they had been sensible of in the blow at Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they durst no longer think of fighting; nay, whatever measures they concerted, they at once desponded of success, as their minds, accustomed 'till of late to an uninterrupted career of good fortune, were now foreboding nothing but disappointments. Thus, for the most part, whilst the Athenians were extending their devastations all along their coasts, they remained inactive. Each party on guard, tho' the enemy made a descent in the face of their post, knowing themselves inferior in number and sadly dispirited, made no offer to check them. One party indeed which was posted near Cortyta and Aphrodisia, perceiving the light-armed of the enemy to be straggling, ran speedily to charge them; but when the heavy-armed advanced to their support, they retreated with so much precipitation, that some (tho' few) of ~~them~~ were killed, and their arms rifled. The Athenians, after erecting a trophy, re-embarked and re-passed to Cythera.

*The Athenians
attack Thyrea.*

From thence they sailed again along the coast to the Limerian Epidaurus; and, after ravaging part of that district, they arrive at Thyrea, which, tho' it lies in the district called Cynuria, is the frontier-town which parts Argia and Laconia. This place belonged to the Lacedæmonians, who had assigned it for the residence of the exiled Æginetæ, in requital of the services they had done them at the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots, and further because, tho' subject to the Athenians, they had ever firmly abided in the Lacedæmonian interest. The Æginetæ, thus again invaded by the Athenians, abandoned the fortification upon the sea-side which they

they were busy in throwing up, and retreated into the city, which was the place of their residence, seated higher up at the distance of about * ten stadia from the shore. A party of Lacedæmonians had ** About a mile.* been posted there, to assist those who were employed in the new fortification; and yet, tho' earnestly pressed by the Æginetæ, they refused to accompany them within their walls, being averse to run the risk of a new blockade. They chose rather to retreat towards the eminences, as they judged themselves disabled by the inferiority of their numbers from facing the enemy, and remained there in a state of inaction.

By this time the Athenians, having compleated their landing and *They take and burn it.* advanced with their whole force, take Thyrea by storm. They set the city in flames and destroyed whatever was within it. Such of the Æginetæ as survived the instant carnage, they carried prisoners to Athens; and with them Tantalus son of Patrocles, who commanded there as general for the Lacedæmonians. He had been wounded, and so taken prisoner. They also carried thither some few persons whom they had taken in Cythera, such as for its security it was expedient to remove. These the Athenians after a consultation decreed "to be disposed of in the islands, but the rest of the Cytheræans still "to occupy their own lands subjected to the yearly tribute of * four ** 775 l. Sterling.* talents; but the Æginetæ, as many as had been taken prisoners, "to be all instantly put to death," (to gratify that eternal rancour they bore them;) "and Tantalus to be kept in prison along with his "countrymen taken in Sphaacteria."

The same summer, a suspension of arms was agreed on in Sicily; *A congress in Sicily.* first, between the Camarinæans and Geloans: and then, the other Sicilians, holding a general congress at Gela, whither the ambassadors from the several States resorted, entered into conferences about the terms of a general reconciliation. Many different expedients were proposed on all sides and many disputes arose, each insisting on a reparation suitable to their own private sense of grievance.

But

But Hermocrates ⁹ the son of Hermon a Syracusan, who laboured most of any at a firm re-union, delivered his sentiments thus :

*Speech of
Hermocrates.*

“ I AM here the representative, ye men of Sicily, of one and
“ not the meanest of the Sicilian states, nor yet the most exhausted
“ by war ; and what I am going to propose is calculated for, and
“ will, I am convinced, most effectually secure the welfare of our
“ common country. And what need is there now to run over in
“ minute detail the calamities inseparable from war, in the hearing
“ of men who have experienced them all? None ever plunge head-
“ long into these, through an utter ignorance of them ; nor, when
“ the views are fixed on gratifying ambition, are men used to be de-
“ terred by fear. The acquisitions proposed, in the latter case, are
“ generally imagined to overbalance dangers : and the former choose
“ rather to submit to hazards, than suffer diminution of their pre-
“ sent enjoyments. Yet, where the parties, actuated by these dif-
“ ferent views, embroil themselves at a juncture when it is impossible
“ to succeed, exhortations to a mutual agreement are then most
“ highly expedient.

“ To be influenced by such exhortations must at present be highly
“ for the advantage of us all. For it was the strong desire of fixing
“ our own separate views on a firm establishment, which at first
“ embroiled us in this war, and which at present raiseth such mutual
“ altercations even during our endeavours to effect an accommoda-

⁹ This great and accomplished Syracusan seems to be ushered into this history with peculiar dignity, as the very mouth of Sicily, exhorting them all to concord and unanimity, and teaching them the method of securing the welfare and glory of their common country, upon the noblest plan. This is noted merely to draw upon him the attention of the reader. He will

act afterwards in the most illustrious scenes, and shew himself on all occasions a man of true honour and probity, a firm and disinterested patriot, an excellent statesman, and a most able commander. The Athenians never had a more determined or a more generous enemy. But that will not hinder our historian from representing him in all his merit.

“ tion :

" tion: and in fine, unless matters can be so equally adjusted as to
 " satisfy all parties, we shall again have recourse to arms. But then,
 " we ought to recollect, that not merely for securing our separate
 " interests, if we would act like men of sense, is this present con-
 " gress opened; but, to concert the best measures within our reach
 " to preserve (if possible) our country from falling, and as I judge,
 " in great danger of falling, a sacrifice to Athenian ambition. It is,
 " to convince you how necessary a re-union is, not so much from
 " what I can urge, as from the light these very Athenians themselves
 " hold out before you. Possessed of a power far superior to any other
 " Grecians, here they lie amongst us with a few ships, to note down
 " our indiscretions; and, under the plausible pretext of alliance, tho'
 " with malice lurking in their hearts, they are studying to improve
 " them in a specious manner to their own advantage. For should
 " war be again our option; and in it, should the assistance of men
 " be accepted, who tho' uninvited would be glad to invade us;
 " whilst we are harassing and exhausting one another, and cutting
 " open for these Athenians a road to our subjection, it is much to be
 " apprehended that, when once they behold our strength at the
 " lowest ebb, they will pay us a visit with more formidable ar-
 " maments, and exert their utmost endeavours to compleat our
 " destruction.

" It becomes each party amongst us, provided we know what is
 " really our interest, to form alliances and to launch into hazardous
 " attempts, rather to acquire what belongs to others than to preju-
 " dice what themselves at present possess; and to rest assured that
 " sedition must ruin our several *States*, nay Sicily itself, of which
 " we the joint possessors are ready, are all of us ready to be sup-
 " planted by hostile treachery, whilst mutually embroiled in our do-
 " mestic quarrels. It is high time we were convinced of this, that
 " every individual might be reconciled with his neighbour, and com-
 " munity with community, and all in general combine together to

“ preserve the whole of Sicily ; that our ears be deaf to the mischievous suggestions, that those amongst us of Doric descent are enemies to every thing that is Attic, whilst those of Chalcidic, because of their Ionian affinity, are sure of their protection. The Athenians invade us not from private enmity, because we are peopled here from these divided races, but to gratify their lust after those blessings in which Sicily abounds, and which at present we jointly possess. Nay, this they have already clearly declared, by their ready compliance with the invitation of those of the Chalcidic race. For tho’ they have never claimed assistance from hence by virtue of their natural attachments here, yet they have shewn a greater readiness in support of those than any compact between them required. Yet tho’ the Athenians be in this manner rapacious, in this manner politic, by me at least they ought to be forgiven ; since I blame not men who are greedy of empire, but such as are too eager to bend their necks to their yoke : Because, it is the constant never-failing turn of the human temper, to control who will submit, but to make head against more powerful incroachments. As for us, who know these things, and yet will not timely provide against them, tho’ each in this assembly be separately convinced, that it demands our greatest attention to unite in dissipating a storm which threatens us all, we err strangely in our conduct ; especially, when its diversion might be so readily effected, would we only bring our private quarrels to an amicable determination : For it is not from quarters of their own, that the Athenians rush thus to annoy us ; but from ground which belongs to those who invited them. Thus of course, without any intervening trouble, one war will not be terminated by another, but dissension will at once subside in peace. And these new-comers, who under specious colours are here for our ruin, must return again with a disappointment, which they may as speciously palliate.

“ So

“ So desirable a benefit will at once infallibly accrue from proper de-
 terminations in regard to the Athenians.

“ That peace is the greatest of human blessings, is a truth which
 all the world alloweth ; — what hindereth us then, why we should
 not firmly establish it with one another ? or, do you rather imagine,
 that if the condition of one man be happy and that of another be
 wretched, tranquillity will not contribute sooner than warfare to
 amend the state of the latter, and to preserve the state of the for-
 mer from a sad reverse ? or, that peace is not better calculated to
 preserve unimpaired the honours and splendors of the happy, and
 all other blessings, which, should we descend to a minute detail,
 might largely be recounted, or might be set in the strongest light
 by opposing to them the calamities which ensue from war ? Fix
 your minds therefore on these considerations, that you may not
 overlook my admonitions, but in compliance with them look out
 respectively in time for expedients of prevention.

“ In case it be presumed, that success must result from power,
 without taking into debate the justice or violence of the cause,
 let me detect the dangerous fallacy of such a sanguine hope, which
 must be blasted in the end. Many are they, it is well known,
 who would have gratified their revenge on violent oppressors, and
 many who have exerted their utmost force for their own ag-
 grandisement ; yet the first, so far from accomplishing their re-
 venge, have met destruction in its pursuit ; and it hath been the
 fate of the latter, instead of enlarging, to suffer the loss of what
 they already possessed. For revenge is not certain, because justly
 sought after to retaliate violence ; nor is power assured of its end,
 because invigorated with sanguine expectation. Events are for the
 most part determined by the fallible unsteady balance of futurity ;
 which, tho’ deceivable as deceit can be, yet holds out before us
 the most instructive hints. For thus, armed equally beforehand
 with needful apprehension, we embark into mutual contests with

“ wise premeditation. Now therefore, checked by the gloomy
“ dread of the yet invisible event, and awed on all sides by the terrors
“ which the presence of these Athenians spreads amongst us ; deterred
“ further by those hopes already blasted, which assured us alternately
“ of success against one another, had not they interfered to obstruct
“ and control us ; let us send far away from Sicily these enemies that
“ are hovering about us ; let us enter into firm and lasting union
“ with one another ; at least, let us conclude a truce for so long a
“ time as can possibly be agreed, and defer our own private disputes
“ to a remote decision. In a word, let us acknowledge, that, if
“ my advice takes place, we shall continue free in our respective
“ communities, where, masters of ourselves and accountable to none
“ besides, we shall be enabled to recompence both our friends and
“ our foes according to their deserts. But, in case it be obstinately
“ rejected, and the mischievous insinuations of others prevail, why
“ then adieu henceforth to the just vindication of our own wrongs ;
“ or, if we are violently bent upon effecting it, we must strike up a
“ friendship with unrelenting foes, and must range ourselves in op-
“ position there, where nature hath most closely attached us.

“ For my own part, who now (as I observed at setting out) re-
“ present the greatest of the Sicilian states, and in this character am
“ more accustomed to attack another than to defend myself, I here,
“ in her name, conjure you to make use of conviction and unite to-
“ gether in a speedy accommodation, nor so eagerly to thirst after
“ the damage of our foes as to plunge ourselves into irreparable mis-
“ chiefs. I am not conscious to myself of that foolish haughtiness
“ of heart, which expects to be absolute in its own private will ;
“ or that fortune, whose master I am not, should attend my orders ;
“ but I am ready to give way to good sense and reason. And I re-
“ quire you all respectively thus to give way to one another, and not
“ to wait till you are compelled to do so by your enemies. It can
“ argue no baseness, for kinsmen to give way to kinsmen, a Dorian
“ to

“ to a Dorian, or a Chalcidæan to others of his own race. Nay,
 “ what is most comprehensive, we are all neighbours, all joint-inha-
 “ bitants of the same land, a land washed round by the sea, and all
 “ styled by the same common name of Sicilians. Wars indeed in
 “ the course of time I foresee we shall wage upon one another, and
 “ future conferences will again be held, and mutual friendship shall
 “ thus revive. But when foreigners invade us, let us be wise enough
 “ to unite our strength, and drive them from our shores: For to be
 “ weakened in any of our members, must endanger the destruction
 “ of the whole; and to such confederates and such mediators we
 “ will never for the future have recourse.

“ If to such conduct we adhere, we shall immediately procure a
 “ double blessing for Sicily. We shall deliver her from the Atheni-
 “ ans, and a domestic war. For the future we shall retain the free
 “ possession of her in our own hands, and more easily disconcert any
 “ projects that hereafter may be formed against her.”

THE Sicilians acknowledged the weight of these arguments thus
 urged by Hermocrates, and all the several parties joined in one com-
 mon resolution “ to put an end to the war, each retaining what they
 “ were at present possessed of; but that Morgantina should be re-
 “ stituted to the Camarinæans, upon the payment of a certain sum of
 “ money to the Syracusans.” Such also as were confederated with
 the Athenians, addressing themselves to the Athenian commanders,
 notified their own readiness to acquiesce in these terms, and their re-
 solution to be comprehended in the same peace. These approving
 the measure, the last hand was put to the accommodation.

*All their quar-
rels made up.*

The Athenian fleet, which had no longer any business there, sailed
 away from Sicily. But the people at Athens manifested their dis-
 pleasure against the commanders at their return home, by passing a
 sentence of banishment against Pythodorus and Sophocles, and sub-
 jecting Eurymedon, who was the third, to a pecuniary mulct; as if,
 when

*The command-
ers fined at
Athens.*

when able to have perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been bribed to desist. They had enjoyed so long a career of good fortune, that they imagined nothing could disconcert their schemes; that enterprizes of the greatest as well as of small importance, no matter whether adequately or insufficiently supported, must be ended to their wish. This was owing to the unexpected good luck with which most of their projects had of late succeeded, and now invigorated all their expectations.

Megara.

The same summer, the Megaræans of the city of Megara, pressed hard by the Athenians, who constantly twice a year made an inroad into their territory with their whole united force; harassed at the same time by their own outlaws, who having been ejected by the *popular* party in the train of a sedition had settled at Pegæ, and from thence were continually plundering them, began to have some conference about the expediency of recalling their outlaws, that the city might not doubly be exposed to ruin. The friends of these exiles, perceiving such a design to be in agitation, insisted more openly than ever that the affair should be regularly considered. The leaders of the *people* being convinced that their own and the strength of the *people* united in their present low condition could not possibly overrule it, were so far influenced by their fears as to make a secret offer to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Aripbron and Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, "to put the city into their hands;" concluding, they should be less endangered by such a step than by the restoration of the exiles whom they themselves had ejected. It was agreed, that in the first place the Athenians should take possession of the *long walls* (these were * eight stadia in length, reaching down from the city to Nisæa their port) to prevent any succour which might be sent from Nisæa by the Peloponnesians, since there alone they kept their garrison for the security of Megara. After this, they promised their endeavours to put them in possession of the upper city. And this they would be able to effect more easily, when the former point was once secured.

The

* About $\frac{3}{4}$ of
a mile.

The Athenians therefore, when all was fixed and determined on both sides, crossed over by night to Minoa the island of the Megaræans with six hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Hippocrates, and sat themselves down in a hollow, whence the bricks for the walls had been taken, and which lay near enough for their purpose: whilst another body, under Demosthenes the other commander, consisting of light-armed Platæans, and the Athenian patrols, concealed themselves near the temple of Mars, which lies still nearer. Not a soul within the city knew any thing of these motions, excepting those whose vigilance it concerned this night to observe them. When the morning was ready to break, the plotters of Megara proceeded thus —

Through a series of time they had established a custom to have the gates of *the long-walls* opened to them in the night, by carrying out a wherry upon a carriage, which they persuaded the officers posted there, they conveyed nightly down the ditch into the sea, and so went upon a cruize. And before it was light, bringing it back again to the walls upon the carriage, they conveyed it through the gates, that it might escape the notice of the Athenian watch on Minoa, who by this means might be eluded, as they never would descry any boat in the harbour. The carriage was now at the gates, which were opened as usual for the reception of the wherry. This the Athenians observing (for this was the signal agreed on) came running from their place of ambush to take possession of the gates before they could be shut again. The very moment the carriage was between, and obstructed the closing them together, both they and the Megaræan coadjutors, put the watch which was posted at the gates to the sword. The Platæans and patrolling parties under Demosthenes rushed in first to that spot where the trophy now stands, and having thus gained an entrance (for the Peloponnesians who were nearest had taken the alarm) the Platæans made good their ground against those who attacked them, and secured the gates till the heavy-armed Athenians, who were coming up with all speed, had entered. Each of these

these Athenians afterwards, so fast as he got in, advanced along the wall. The Peloponnesian guards, tho' few in number, made head against them for a time; some of them soon dropped; and then the rest ran speedily off. They were dismayed at such an attack from their enemies in the night; and, as the treacherous Megaræans fought against them, they concluded that all the Megaræans were combined together in betraying them. It happened farther, that an Athenian herald had proclaimed of his own accord that "such Megaræans" as were willing to side with the Athenians should throw down their "arms." When the Peloponnesians heard this, they at once quitted their posts; and, seriously believing that all the Megaræans had combined to betray them, fled again into Nisæa.

It miscarries. At the time of morning's dawn, the *long-walls* being thus surpris'd, and the Megaræans within the city thrown into a tumult, the agents for the Athenians, in concert with all their accomplices in the plot, insisted on the necessity to throw open the city-gates, and march out to battle; since it had been agreed between them, that so soon as ever the gates were thus opened, the Athenians should rush in. There was a method to be observed on their side, in order to be distinguished; this was to besmear themselves with ointment, that they might receive no harm. Their security would have been greater, had they opened the gates at once; for now four thousand heavy-armed Athenians and six hundred horsemen, who had marched in the night from Eleusis, according to a prior disposition, were at hand. But whilst the accomplices, properly besmeared, stood ready at the gates, one of their own party, who was privy to the whole plot, discovereth it to the other Megaræans. These drawing up together, came forwards in a body, and denied "the expediency of marching out, (since formerly, when stronger than now, they durst not hazard such a step) or running such a manifest risk of losing the city: and, should any one affirm the contrary, the point should be instantly determined by blows." They gave not the least hint as if they had
"discovered

discovered the design, but strenuously insisted that their own measure was most advisable, and stood firm together for the security of the gates. Thus it was no longer possible for the conspirators to put their plot in execution.

The Athenian commanders, being sensible that the project had been <sup>Nisæa sur-
rendered.</sup> some how crossed, and that they were not able themselves to take the city by storm, immediately run up a wall to invest Nisæa; concluding, that could they carry it before any succours came up, it would be impossible for Megara to hold out much longer. Iron and workmen, and all proper materials, were quickly supplied them from Athens. They begun at the wall which they had lately surprised, they ran it along for some time parallel with Megara, and then down to the sea on both sides of Nisæa. The work, both of ditch and wall, was divided amongst the army. They made use of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled some trees and wood, they strengthened what was weak with an additional palisade. The houses of the suburbs, being topped with battlements, served the use of turrets. This whole day they plied hard at the work; and about the evening of the succeeding day it was only not completed. The garrison within Nisæa was in great consternation. They laboured already under a scarcity of provisions, which they had been used to fetch daily from the upper city. Thus concluding that the Peloponnesians could not succour them with sufficient expedition, and imagining the Megaræans were combined against them, they capitulated with the Athenians on the following terms:

“ To be dismissed every man at a certain ransom, after delivering up their arms.”

“ But as for the Lacedæmonians, their commander, and every other person in that number, ~~these~~ to be disposed of by the Athenians at discretion.”

These terms being agreed to, they evacuated Nisæa. And the Athenians, having thus cut off their long-walls from the city of the Megaræans, and possessed themselves of Nisæa, were preparing to accomplish what was yet to be done.

*Activity of
Brafidas.*

But Brafidas son of Tellis, the Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, levying forces to march for Thrace. He was no sooner informed of the surprisal of the walls, than he trembled for the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be taken. He summons the Bæotians to attend him expeditiously with their forces at Tripodiscus (the place so named is a village of the Megaris under the mountain Geranéa) whither he was marching himself with two thousand seven hundred heavy-armed Corinthians, four hundred Phliansians, six hundred Sicyonians, and what levies he had already made upon his own account. He imagined he might come up before Nisæa could be taken. But hearing the contrary (for he came up in the night to Tripodiscus), with a picked body of three hundred men, before the news of his march could be spread, he approached to the city of Megara, undescried by the Athenians, who were posted near the sea. He intended to declare that he was ready to attempt, and in fact would have been glad to have effected, the recovery of Nisæa. But it was principally his view to get admission into Megara, and provide for its security. He demanded admission, assuring them he had great hope of recovering Nisæa. But the factious in Megara, perplexed at this step of Brafidas — on one side, lest he meant to reinstate the exiles by ejecting them; the other, lest the *people* with such an apprehension might at once fall upon them, and their city thus plunged into a tumult of arms might be lost, if the Athenians, who lay ready in ambush, should seize it; — refused him admittance, and both factions thought proper, without any stir, to await the event. For it was feverally their full expectation, that a battle must ensue between the Athenians and these new-comers; and then, without plunging themselves
into

into unnecessary hazards, they might join their own favourite party if victorious.

Brasidas, when he could not prevail, withdrew again to the main ^{*An engagement.*} of his army. By the succeeding dawn the Bœotians joined him, who had resolved to succour Megara, even previous to the summons sent by Brasidas, since they regarded the danger that place was in as their own. They were actually advanced with their whole force as far as Platæa; and, the messenger having met with them here, they became much more eager than before. They sent forwards a detachment of two and twenty hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred horsemen, but dismissed the multitude to their own homes. When the whole force was thus united, consisting of at least six thousand heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians stood drawn up in order near Nisæa and the sea-shore, whilst their light-armed were straggling about the plain, the Bœotian cavalry made an unexpected sally against those stragglers, and chaced them to the shore: For hitherto no aid whatever had taken the field in behalf of the Megaréans. The Athenian cavalry clapped spurs to repel the Bœotian, and a battle ensued. The horse were a long time thus engaged, and both sides claimed a victory. For the general of the Bœotian cavalry, and a small number of his party, the Athenians drove before them to Nisæa, where they put them to the sword and rifled them. They remained masters of the dead bodies, gave them up afterwards by truce, and erected a trophy: But neither side so keeping their ground as to render the action decisive, they retreated as it were by consent; the Bœotians to their main-army, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

Brasidas, after this, advanced nearer to the sea and to the city of ^{*He secures Me-*} Megara with his army. Having occupy'd there some advantageous ^{*gara.*} ground, they drew up in order and stood still, imagining the Athenians would attack them; and assured, that the Megaréans were intently observing for whom the victory might declare. In both these respects, they judged their present posture the most judicious; be-

cause it was not their own business to attack, or voluntarily to run into conflict and danger; and thus, having manifestly exhibited their alacrity to act defensively, a victory might justly be ascribed to them without the expence of a battle. In regard further to the Megaræans the consequence could not but be fortunate: For, in case the latter had never beheld them thus prompt in their succour, they would have stopped all farther risk, and so undoubtedly they should have lost the city, as men completely vanquished: But now, should the Athenians decline an engagement, the points for which they themselves came thither must be secured without a blow; which proved to be the result. For the Megaræans, — when the Athenians came out and drew up in order close to the *long-walls*, and then, as the enemy did not advance to attack them, stood quiet in their ranks; their commanders also judging the hazard by no means equal, and themselves, who had so far been successful, not at all concerned to begin an engagement against superior numbers, in which, should they prevail, they could only take Megara, but, should they miscarry, must lose the flower of their domestic strength; especially as their opponents would act in probability with more daring resolution; since, as the large strength they had now in the field consisted only of quota's from several constituents, they hazarded but little; thus facing one another for a considerable space, and neither side presuming to make an attack, till each at length wheeled off, the Athenians first towards Nisæa, and the Peloponnesians again to their former post. — Then, I say, the Megaræans in the interest of the walls, regarding Brasidas as victor, and animated by the refusal of attack on the Athenian side, open the gates of Megara to Brasidas himself, and the several commanders from the auxiliary states; and, having given them admission, proceed with them to consultation, whilst the partizans of the Athenian interest were in the utmost consternation.

Soon afterwards, the confederates being dismissed to their respective cities, Brasidas also himself returned to Corinth, to continue his preparations

parations for that Thracian expedition, in which before this avocation he had been intensely employed.

The Athenians also being now marched homewards, the Megareans in the city, who had acted most zealously in favour of the Athenians, finding all their practices detected, stole off as fast as possible. The others, after concerting the proper steps with the friends of the exiles, fetch them home from Pegæ, having first administered to them the most solemn oaths "to think no more on former injuries, " and to promote the true welfare of the city to the utmost of their " power."

But these, when re-invested with authority, and taking a review of the troops of the city, having previously disposed some bands of soldiers in a proper manner, picked out about a hundred persons of their enemies, and who they thought had busied themselves most in favour of the Athenians. And having compelled the people to pass a public vote upon them, they were condemned to die and suffered an instant execution. They farther new-modelled the government of Megara into almost an *oligarchy*. And this change, tho' introduced by an inconsiderable body of men, nay, what is more in the train of sedition, yet continued for a long space of time in full force at Megara. *And a massacre*

The same summer, the Mitylenæans being intent on executing their design of fortifying Antandrus, Demodocus and Aristides, who commanded the Athenian squadron for levying contributions, and were now at Hellespont (for Lamachus the third in the commission had been detached with ten ships towards Pontus), when informed of what was thus in agitation, became apprehensive that Antandrus might prove of as bad consequence to them as Anæa in Samos had already done; wherein, the Samian exiles having fortified themselves, were not only serviceable to the Peloponnesians at sea, by furnishing them with pilots; but farther, were continually alarming the Samians at home, and sheltering their deserters. From these apprehensions they

they assembled a force from amongst their dependents, sailed thither, and having defeated in battle those who came out of Antandrus to oppose them, gain once more possession of that town. And no long time after, Lamachus, who had been detached to Pontus, having anchored in the river Calix in the district of Heraclea, lost all his ships. A heavy rain had fallen in the upper country, and the land-flood rushing suddenly down, bore them all away before it. He himself and the men under his command were forced to march over land through Bithynia (possessed by those Thracians who are seated on the other side of the strait in Asia) to Chalcedon, a colony of the Megaréans, in the mouth of the Euxine sea.

Project of a revolution in Bœotia.

This summer also Demosthenes, immediately after he had quitted the Megaris, with the command of forty sail of Athenians, arrives at Naupactus. For with him, and with Hippocrates, some persons of the Bœotian cities in those parts had been concerting schemes how to change the government of those cities, and introduce a *democracy* on the Athenian model. The first author of this scheme was Ptoëdorus an exile from Thebes, and matters were now ready for execution.

Some of them had undertaken to betray Siphæ: Siphæ is a maritime town in the district of Thespiæ, upon the gulf of Crissa. Others of Orchomenus engaged for Chæronéa, a town tributary to that Orchomenus which was formerly called the Minyeian but now the Bœotian. Some Orchomenian exiles were the chief undertakers of this point, and were hiring soldiers for the purpose from Peloponnesus. Chæronéa is situated on the edge of Bœotia towards Phanotis of Phocis, and is in part inhabited by Phocians. The share assigned to the Athenians was the surprisal of Delium, a temple of Apollo in Tanagra, looking towards Eubœa. These things farther were to be atchieved on a day prefixed, that the Bœotians might be disabled from rushing to the rescue of Delium with all their force, by the necessity of staying at home to defend their respective habitations.

Should

Should the attempt succeed, and Delium once be fortified, they easily presumed that, tho' the change of the Bœotian governments might not suddenly be effected, yet, when those towns were in their hands, when their devastations were extended all over the country, and places of safe retreat lay near at hand for their parties, things could not long remain in their former posture; but in process of time, when the Athenians appeared in support of the revolters, and the Bœotians could not unite in a body to oppose them, the designed revolution must necessarily take place. This was the nature of the scheme at present in agitation.

Hippocrates, having the whole force of Athens under his command, was ready at the proper time to march into Bœotia. But he had dispatched Demosthenes beforehand to Naupactus with forty ships, that after he had collected a sufficient force in those parts from the Acarnanians and their other confederates, he should appear with his fleet before Siphæ, which was then to be betrayed to him. A day also was fixed upon between them, in which both of them were at once to execute the parts assigned them.

Demosthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, found the Oeniadæ already compelled by the united Acarnanians into an association with the confederates of Athens. He marched away therefore, at the head of the whole confederacy in those parts, and invaded first Salynthius and the Agræans; and having carried some other points, got all in readiness to shew himself before Siphæ at the time appointed.

About the same time this summer, Brasidas at the head of seventeen hundred heavy-armed, began his march towards Thrace. When he was come up to Heraclea in Trachis, he dispatched a messenger beforehand to his correspondents in Pharsalus, to beg a safe conduct for himself and his army. And as soon as he was met at Melitia of Achæa by Panærus, and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, and Strophacus, who had been formerly the public host of the Chalcidæans,

*Brasidas begins
his march for
Thrace.*

cidæans, he continued his march forwards. Others also of the Thessalians assisted in conducting him, and from Larissa Niconidas the friend of Perdiccas. The passage through Thessaly without proper guides is always difficult, and must be more so to an armed body. Besides, to attempt such a thing through a neighbouring dominion without permission first obtained, hath ever been regarded by all the Grecians with a jealous eye, and the bulk of the Thessalians had been ever well-affected to the Athenians. Nor could Brasidas have possibly effected it, had not the Thessalian been rather despotic than free governments. For upon his route he was stopped at the river Enipeus by some of contrary sentiments to the rest of their countrymen, who ordered him to proceed at his peril, and taxed him with injustice in having come so far without the general permission. His conductors told them in return, that "without such permission" he should not proceed; but, as he had come amongst them on a sudden, they thought themselves obliged in friendship to conduct him." Brasidas also gave them strong assurances, that "he was come thither for the service of Thessaly and of them; that his arms were not intended against them, but against the common enemy, the Athenians; that he never suspected any enmity between Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, why they might not tread upon one another's ground; that even now, should they withhold their consent, he was neither willing nor indeed able to proceed; but" he conjured them "however to give him no molestation." Having heard these declarations, they acquiesced and withdrew. Brasidas now, by the advice of his conductors, advanced with the utmost speed without ever halting, in order to anticipate fresh and more potent obstruction. Nay, the very same day that he left Melitia, he advanced as far as to Pharsalus, and encamped upon the banks of the Apidanus. From thence he proceeded to Phacium, and from thence into Peræbia. Being so far advanced, his Thessalian guides received their dismissal; and the Peræbians, who are tributaries to the

the Thessalians, escorted him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas: it is a fortress of Macedonia situated under mount Olympus on the Thessalian side. In this manner Brasidas, advancing so expeditiously as to prevent all obstruction, completed his passage through Thessaly, and arrived in the dominions of Perdiccas and the region of Chalcis. For those in Thrace, who revolted from the Athenians, had joined with Perdiccas in procuring this auxiliary force out of Peloponnesus, because the great success of the Athenians had struck a terror amongst them. The Chalcidæans were persuaded, that they should be first attacked by the Athenians: and in truth their neighbour-states, who yet persevered in their obedience, were secretly instigating them to it. Perdiccas indeed had not yet declared himself their enemy; but he dreaded the vengeance of the Athenians for former grudges; and now he had a scheme at heart for the subjection of Arribæus king of the Lyncestians.

Other points concurred to facilitate the procurement of such a succour from Peloponnesus, such as the misfortunes by which the Lacedæmonians at present were afflicted. For, the Athenians pressing hard on Peloponnesus, and not least of all on Laconia, they hoped in case they could equally annoy *them* in this quarter, by thus marching an army against their dependents, to effect a diversion. And they were more encouraged by the offers of maintenance for their troops, and solicitations to support revolts. They were at the same time glad of a pretext to rid themselves of their Helots, left, in the present state of affairs, now that Pylus was in hostile hands, they might be tempted to rebel. This farther gave rise to the following event; — Dreading the youth and number of these slaves (for many precautions have ever been put in practice by the Lacedæmonians to curb and awe their Helots) they made public proclamation, that “so many of them, as could claim the merit of having done signal service to the Lacedæmonians in the present war, should enter

The Lacedæmonians inbmanly make away with 2000 Helots.

VOL. II.

K

“ their

“ their claims, and be rewarded with freedom.” The view in this was to sound them, imagining that such, who had the greatness of spirit to claim their freedom in requital of their merit, must be also the ripest for rebellion. About two thousand claimants were adjudged worthy, and accordingly were led about in solemn procession to the temples, crowned with garlands, as men honoured with their freedom. But, in no long time after, they made away with them all, nor hath the world been able to discover, in what manner they were thus to a man destroyed.

Brasidas. Now also with alacrity they sent away seven hundred of their heavy-armed under the orders of Brasidas. The rest of his body were mercenaries, whom he had hired in Peloponnesus. And it was, in compliance with his own particular desire, that Brasidas was employed in this service by the Lacedæmonians.

*His excellent
conduct.*

The Chalcidéans however were highly satisfied with a person, who had ever passed in Sparta for one of the most active and accomplished citizens; and who, in his foreign employments, had performed very signal services for his country. From his first appearance amongst them, his justice and moderation so instantly recommended him to the adjacent cities, that some voluntarily submitted, and others were by intrigue put into his possession. By him the Lacedæmonians were actually impowered, if the accommodation they wished for took place, which it afterwards did, to make exchange and restitution of towns, and so relieve Peloponnesus from the hardships of the war.

*He does honour
to his country.*

Nay more, even in succeeding time, upon the breaking out of the Sicilian war, the virtue and prudence of Brasidas exerted at this juncture, which some attested by their own experience, others upon sound and unsuspected report, imprinted a zeal on the confederates of Athens to go over to the Lacedæmonians. For, having been the first sent out to a foreign trust, and approved in all respects as a
worthy

worthy man, he left behind him a strong presumption, that the rest of his countrymen are like himself¹.

So soon therefore as it was known at Athens, that he was arrived to take upon him the conduct of affairs in Thrace, the Athenians declare Perdiccas their enemy, ascribing this expedition to his cabals, and by strengthening their garrisons kept a strict watch over all their dependents in that quarter.

Perdiccas proclaimed an enemy at Athens.

But Perdiccas with his own forces, and accompanied by the body under Brasidas, marcheth against a neighbouring potentate, Arribæus son of Bromerus, king of the Macedonian Lyncestians: Enmity was subsisting between them, and the conquest of him was the point in view. When he was advanced with his army, and in conjunction with Brasidas, to the entrance of Lyncus, Brasidas communicated his intention to hold a parley with Arribæus, before he proceeded to act offensively against him; and (if possible) to bring him over to the Lacedæmonian alliance: For Arribæus had already notified by a herald, that he was willing to refer the points in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas. The Calcidæan ambassadors also, who followed the camp, were continually suggesting to him, that "he ought not to plunge himself rashly into difficulties for the sake of Perdiccas," designing to reserve him more intire for their own service. And besides this, the ministers of Perdiccas had declared it at Lacedæmon to be their master's intention, to bring over all the neighbouring States into this alliance: So that it was entirely with public views, that Brasidas insisted upon treating with Arribæus. But Perdiccas urged in opposition, that "he had not brought Brasidas to be the judge of his controversies, but to execute his vengeance on the enemies he should point out to him; that it would be unjust in Brasidas to

He joins Brasidas.

¹ When Brasidas was beginning his march for Thrace, he wrote this letter to the Ephori at Sparta; — "I will

“ treat with Arribæus, when *he* supported half the expence of his
 “ troops.” Yet, in spite of such remonstrances and in open defiance
 of him, Brasidas parleyed. And being satisfied with the offers of
 Arribæus, he drew off his troops, without so much as entering his
 dominions. But henceforth Perdiccas, looking upon this step as an
 injury to himself, reduced his contribution of support from a moiety
 to a third.

Brasidas re-
 ceived at
 Acanthus.

Brasidas however the same summer, without loss of time con-
 tinued the operations of war; and, a little before the vintage, being
 attended by the Chalcidæans, marched towards Acanthus, a colony
 of the Andrians. The inhabitants of this place were embroiled in
 a sedition about his reception; a party, who co-operated with the
 Chalcidæans were for it; but *the people* opposed. Yet, fearing the
 loss of their fruit which was not quite got in, the *people* were at last
 prevailed upon by Brasidas, to grant entrance to himself without
 any attendants, and after giving him audience to resolve for them-
 selves. Brasidas is admitted; and standing forth in the presence of
 the *people*, for tho’ a Lacedæmonian he was an able speaker, he ha-
 rangued them thus:

Speech of
 Brasidas.

“ MY commission from the Lacedæmonians and the march of
 “ their troops hither under my command verify, O ye Acanthians,
 “ the declaration made by us, when first we began this war against
 “ the Athenians, that we were going to fight for the liberties of
 “ Greece. But if our appearance here hath been too long deferred,
 “ it should be ascribed to the unexpected turns of war nearer home,
 “ *where*, as we hoped to demolish the Athenians speedily without
 “ endangering you; we ought to be exempted from any censure
 “ *here*. For now, you behold us opportunely at hand, and intent in
 “ conjunction with you to pull these tyrants down.

“ I am surprized indeed that your gates should be barred against
 “ me, or that my presence should any way chagrin you. For we
 “ Lacedæmonians,

“ Lacedæmonians, imagining we were going to confederates, whose
“ wishes were fastened upon us before their eyes could behold us,
“ and from whom we might depend upon the most cordial recep-
“ tion; we, I say, have pierced forwards through a series of dangers,
“ marching many days together through hostile territories, and sur-
“ mounting every obstacle by a zeal for your service. If therefore
“ your affections are alienated from us, or if you act in opposition to
“ your own, and to the liberty of the rest of Greece, your conduct
“ must terribly distress us. And that, not only because you your-
“ selves reject us, but may by such a step deter all others, to whom
“ I shall afterwards apply, from co-operating with me. Such ob-
“ stacles you will raise before me, if you, to whom first I have ad-
“ dressed myself, you who are masters of a city of great importance,
“ and are in esteem for your good-sense and discretion, should re-
“ fuse to receive me. I shall be utterly unable to put a plausible co-
“ lour upon such a refusal, and shall be exposed to reproach, as if I
“ meant injustice under the cloke of liberty, or came hither too weak
“ and impotent to make head against the Athenian strength, should
“ it be exerted against me.

“ And yet with that force, of which at this very moment I am
“ honoured with the command, I marched myself to the succour of
“ Nisæa, and openly defied a superior number of Athenians who de-
“ clined the encounter. It is not therefore probable, that they can
“ send hither a force to our annoyance equal to that armament they
“ employed at Nisæa: Nor am I sent hither to execute the schemes
“ of oppression, but to further the deliverance of Greece. I have
“ the security of most solemn oaths, sworn by the magistrates of
“ Lacedæmon, that whatever people I bring over to their alliance
“ shall remain in free possession of their own liberties and laws. And
“ farther, we are forbid the use of violence and fraud as the means
“ of rendering you dependent on us; but, on the contrary, are to
“ act in support of you who are oppressed with Athenian bondage.
“ Upon

“ Upon reasons so valid do I insist upon it, that I am no longer
“ suspected by you, having given you the strongest assurances, that
“ I am no impotent avenger, and that you may boldly abet my
“ cause.

“ If there be any person in this assembly, who hesitates upon the
“ apprehension that I may betray the city into the hands of a private
“ cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and distinguish himself in
“ open confidence. I came not hither to be the tool of faction;
“ I am convinced that liberty can never be re-established by me, if
“ disregarding ancient constitutions, I inflame the *multitude* to the
“ *few*, or the *few* to the *crowd*. Such things would be more grie-
“ vous than the yoke of foreign dominion. And should we Lace-
“ dæmonians proceed in this manner, our labours could never merit
“ a return of gratitude, but instead of honour and glory, foul re-
“ proach would be our portion. The crimes, on which we have
“ grounded this war against the Athenians, would then appear to be
“ our own, and more odious in us for having made parade of disin-
“ terested virtue, than in a *State* which never pretended to it. For
“ it is more base in men of honour to enlarge their power by specious
“ fraud, than by open force. The latter, upon the right of that su-
“ perior strength with which fortune hath invested it, seizeth at once
“ upon its prey; the other can only compass it by the treachery of
“ wicked cunning.

“ It is thus that in all concerns of more than ordinary importance,
“ we are accustomed to exert the utmost circumspection. And be-
“ sides the solemn oaths in your favour, you can receive no greater
“ security of our honest intention than the congruity of our actions
“ with our words, from whence the strongest conviction must result,
“ that with what I have suggested you are obliged in interest to com-
“ ply. But if all my promises are unavailing, and you declare such
“ compliance impossible; if professing yourselves our sincere well-wish-
“ ers, you beg that a denial may not expose you to our resentments; if
“ you

“ you alledge that the dangers through which your liberty must be
 “ fought overbalance the prize ; that in justice it ought only to be
 “ proposed to such as are able to embrace the offer, but that no one
 “ ought to be compelled against his own inclinations ; — I shall be-
 “ seech the tutelary gods and heroes of this island to bear me witness,
 “ that whereas I come to serve you, and cannot persuade, I must
 “ now, by ravaging your country, endeavour to compel you. And,
 “ in acting thus, I shall not be conscious to myself of injustice, but
 “ shall justify the step on two most cogent motives : — For the
 “ sake of the Lacedæmonians ; lest whilst they have only your af-
 “ fections, and not your actual concurrence, they may be prejudiced
 “ through the sums of money you pay to the Athenians : — For
 “ the sake of all the Grecians ; that they may not be obstructed by
 “ you in their deliverance from bondage. This is the end we pro-
 “ pose, and this will justify our proceedings. For without the pur-
 “ pose of a public good, we Lacedæmonians ought not to set people
 “ at liberty against their wills. We are not greedy of empire, but
 “ we are eager to pull down the tyranny of others. And how could
 “ we answer it to the body of Greece, if, when we have undertaken
 “ to give liberty to them all, we indolently suffer our endeavours to
 “ be traversed by you ?

“ Deliberate seriously on these important points, and animate your-
 “ selves with the glorious ambition of being the first who enter the
 “ lists for the liberties of Greece, of gaining an eternal renown, of
 “ securing the uninterrupted possession of your private properties, and
 “ investing the *State* of which you are members with the most * ho- * *Fru.*
 “ nourable of all titles.”

Here Brasidas concluded. And the Acanthians, who had already ^{Acanthus} ~~revolts.~~ heard this affair largely discussed on both sides, and secretly declared their votes — the majority, because the arguments of Brasidas were prevailing, and because they dreaded the loss of their fruit, resolved to

to revolt from the Athenians. Then they required of Brasidas himself to swear the oath of their security, which the Lacedæmonian magistrates had at his departure enjoined him to take, that "what-ever people was brought over into their alliance by him should remain in possession of their own liberties and laws," and this done, they receive his army. Not long after, Stagyrus also, another colony of the Andrians, revolted. And thus ended the transactions of this summer.

Bœotia.

Very early in the succeeding winter, when the strong places of Bœotia were to have been betrayed to Hippocrates and Demosthenes the Athenian commanders, preparatory to which Demosthenes was to shew himself with his fleet before Siphæ, and the other to march to Delium, there happened a mistake about the days prefixed for execution. Demosthenes indeed, who steered towards Siphæ, and had on board the Acarnanians, and many of the confederates of that quarter, is totally disappointed. The whole scheme had been betrayed by Nicomachus the Phocian of Phanotis, who gave information of it to the Lacedæmonians, and they to the Bœotians. All Bœotians now taking up arms to prevent consequences, (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to distress them on that side) Siphæ and Chæronœa are secured in time. And so soon as the conspirators perceived that things went wrong, they gave up all farther thoughts of exciting-comotions in the cities.

*The whole
force of Athens
marches to De-
lium.*

Hippocrates, having summoned into the field the whole force of Athens, as well citizens as sojourners, not excepting even foreigners who chanced at that time to be there, arriveth too late before Delium, not before the Bœotians were returned home again from Siphæ. He incamped his forces, and set about fortifying Delium, the temple of Apollo, in the following manner. — Round about the temple and its precincts they sunk a ditch: Of the earth thrown up they formed a rampart instead of a wall. They drove into the ground on each side a row of stakes, and then threw on the vines they cut from
within

within the precincts of the temple. They did the same by the stones and bricks of the adjacent buildings which had been demolished, and omitted no expedient to give height and substance to the work. They erected wooden turrets upon such spots as seemed most to require it. No part of the old pile of the temple was now standing: The portico, which stood the longest, had lately fell down. They began the work the third day after their marching out from Athens. That day they plied it, and the following, and continued it on the fifth till the time of repast. Then, the work being for the most part compleated, they drew off their army to the distance of about * ten ^{• About an English mile.} stadia from Delium, in order to return home. Their light-armed indeed, for the most part marched off directly, but the heavy-armed halting there sat down upon their arms.

Hippocrates stayed behind for the time necessary to post the proper ^{That of Bœotia assembled.} guards, and to put the finishing hand to those parts of the fortification which were not yet perfectly compleated. But during all this space, the Bœotians had been employed in drawing their forces together to Tanagra. When the quotas from the several cities were come up, and they perceived the Athenians were filing off towards Athens, the other *rulers* of Bœotia (for they were eleven in all) declared their resolution not to engage, since the enemy is no longer on Bœotian ground: for the Athenians, when they grounded their arms, were within the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas the son of Æoladas, one of the Bœotian *rulers* in the right of Thebes, and at this time in the supreme command, in concert with Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas, declared for fighting. He judged it expedient to hazard an engagement; and addressing himself to every battalion apart, lest calling them together might occasion them to abandon their arms, he prevailed upon the Bœotians to march up to the Athenians, and to offer battle. His exhortation to each was worded thus:

*Speech of Pa-
gondas.*

" IT ought never, ye men of Boeotia, to have entered into the
 " hearts of any of your *rulers*, that it is improper for us to attack
 " the Athenians, because we find them not upon our own soil. For
 " they, out of a neighbouring country, have rushed into Boeotia,
 " and have fortified a post in it; from whence they intend to ravage
 " and annoy us. And our enemies in short they are, in whatever
 " place we find them, from what place soever they march to execute
 " hostilities against us. Now therefore let him, who hath judged
 " this step we are taking hazardous and insecure, acknowledge and
 " forego his error. Cautious and dilatory measures are not to be ad-
 " hered to by men who are invaded, and whose all is at stake; they
 " are expedient only for those whose properties are secure, and who
 " bent on rapine exert their malice in the invasion of others. But it
 " is eternally the duty of you Boeotians to combat such foreigners as
 " presume to invade you, either upon your own or your neighbours
 " ground, no matter which. And this above all must be done against
 " Athenians, not only because they are Athenians, but because they
 " are the nearest borderers upon us. For it is a maxim allowed, that
 " no *State* can possibly preserve itself free, unless it be a match for its
 " neighbouring powers.

" Let me add farther, that when men are bent on enslaving not
 " neighbouring only, but even such people as are more remote, how
 " can it be judged improper to encounter such, so long as we can
 " find ground whereon to stand? Call to mind for your present in-
 " formation the Euboeans situated in yon island opposite to us; call
 " to mind the present disposition of the bulk of Greece in regard
 " to these Athenians. Why should we forget, that neighbouring
 " *States* so often battle one another about settling their various boun-
 " daries; whereas, should we be vanquished, our whole country
 " will be turned merely into one heap of limitation, and that never
 " again by us to be disputed? For when once they have entered upon
 " it, they will remain the masters of it all, beyond control. So
 " much

“ much more have we to fear from these neighbours of ours, than
 “ any other people.

“ Those again, who in all the daring insolence of superior strength
 “ are wont to invade their neighbours, as these Athenians now do us,
 “ march with extraordinary degrees of confidence against such as are
 “ inactive, and defend themselves only on their own soil. His schemes
 “ are more painfully compleated, when men sally boldly beyond their
 “ borders to meet the invader, and if opportunity serveth attack him
 “ first. Of this truth our own experience will amply convince us.
 “ For ever since the defeat we gave these very men at Coronea, when
 “ taking the advantage of our seditions they had possessed themselves
 “ of our lands, we have kept Boeotia quiet from every alarm till the
 “ present. This we ought now to remember, that the seniors among
 “ us may proceed as they then begun; that the juniors, the sons of
 “ those fires who then displayed such uncommon bravery, may exert
 “ themselves to preserve unblemished their hereditary virtues. We
 “ ought all to be confident, that the God will fight on our side,
 “ whose temple they pollute by raising ramparts, and dwelling within
 “ its verge. And, as the victims we have offered are fair and auspi-
 “ cious, we ought at once to advance to the charge of these our foes,
 “ and make them know, that their lust and rapine they only then can
 “ gratify, when they invade such cowards as abandon their own de-
 “ fence: but from men, who were born to vindicate their own coun-
 “ try for ever by the dint of arms, and never unjustly to enslave ano-
 “ ther; — that from such men they shall not get away without that
 “ struggle which honour enjoins.”

In this manner Pagondas exhorted the Boeotians, and persuaded them *Preparations for battle.*
 to march against the Athenians. He put them instantly in motion,
 and led them towards the enemy: For it was now late in the day.
 When he had approached the spot on which they were posted, he
 halted in a place from whence, as an eminence lay between, they
 L 2 could

could have no view of one another. There he drew up his men, and made all ready for the attack.

When the news was brought to Hippocrates, who was yet at Delium, that "the enemy is advancing to the charge," he sendeth orders to the main-body to form into the order of battle. And not long after he himself came up, having left about three hundred horse at Delium, to guard that place in case an attempt should be made upon it, or seizing a favourable opportunity to fall upon the rear of the Bœotians during the engagement. Not but that the Bœotians had posted a party of their own to watch their motions, and find them employment. When therefore the whole disposition was perfected, they shewed themselves on the top of the eminence, and there grounded their arms, remaining still in the same order in which they designed to attack; being in the whole about seven thousand heavy-armed, more than ten thousand light-armed, a thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The right wing was composed of Thebans and those who ranked with them; the centre of the Haliartians and Coronéans and Copiensians, and others that live about the lake (Coppais); and the left of Thespiensians, Tanagréans, and Orchomenians. In the wings were posted the cavalry and light-armed. The Thebans were drawn up in files of twenty five; the others variously, as circumstances required. And such was the order and disposition of the Bœotians.

On the Athenian side, the heavy-armed, being in number equal to their enemies, were drawn up in one entire body of eight in depth. Their cavalry was posted on either wing. But light-armed soldiers, armed as was fitting, the Athenians had none at this juncture neither in the field nor in the city. The number which had taken the field at first to attend this expedition exceeded many times over the number of the enemy; but then most of them had no arms at all, since the summons had been extended to all who resided in Athens, both citizens and foreigners. The crowd of these, so soon as ever the
route

route was pointed homewards, were, excepting a few, gone speedily off. But, when they were drawn up in the order of battle, and were every moment expecting the charge, Hippocrates the general shewing himself in the front of the Athenians, animated them with the following harangue :

“ THE admonition, Athenians, I intend to give you will be
 “ very concise, but such an one is sufficient to the brave : I pretend
 “ not to encourage Athenians, but merely to remind them of their
 “ duty. Let the thought be a stranger to every heart amongst you,
 “ that we are going to plunge into needless hazards in the territory of
 “ a foe. Be it the territory of a foe, yet in it you must fight for the
 “ security of your own. And, if we conquer *now*, the Peloponne-
 “ sians will never again presume, without the aid of the Bœotian
 “ horse, to repeat their inroads into Attica. By one battle therefore
 “ you acquire this, and secure your own land from future annoy-
 “ ance. Charge therefore your enemies, as you ought, with a spirit
 “ worthy of the *State* of Athens, that *State* which every soul
 “ amongst you boasts to be the first of Greece ; and worthy of your
 “ great forefathers, who formerly at Oenophyta, under the conduct
 “ of Myronides, defeated these people in the field, and possessed for
 “ a time all Bœotia as their prize.”

*Speech of Hip-
pocrates.*

Hippocrates had not gone along half the line encouraging them in this manner, when he was compelled to desist and leave the greater part of his army unaddressed. For the Bœotians, to whom Pagon- das also had given but a short exhortation and had this moment finished the pœan of attack, were coming down from the eminence. The Athenians advanced to meet them, and both sides came running to the charge. The skirts of both armies could not come to an engagement, as some rivulets that lay between stopped them equally on both sides. The rest closed firm in a stubborn fight, and with
 mutual

*Battle of De-
lium.*

mutual thrusts of their shields. The left wing of the Bœotians, even to the centre, was routed by the Athenians, who pressed upon those who composed it, but especially on the Thespians. For, the others who were drawn up with them giving way before the shock, the Thespians were inclosed in a small compass of ground, where such of them as were slaughtered defended themselves bravely till they were quite hewed down. Some also of the Athenians, disordered in thus encompassing them about, knew not how to distinguish, and slew one another. In this quarter therefore the Bœotians were routed, and fled towards those parts where the battle was yet alive. Their right wing, in which the Thebans were posted, had the better of the Athenians. They had forced them at first to give ground a little, and pressed upon them to pursue their advantage. It happened that Pagondas had detached two troops of horse (which motion was not perceived) to fetch a compass round the eminence and support the left wing which was routed. These suddenly appearing in fight, the victorious wing of Athenians, imagining a fresh army was coming up to the charge, was struck into consternation. And now being distressed on both sides by this last turn, and by the Thebans who pursued their advantage close and put them into a total disorder, the whole Athenian army was routed and fled. Some ran towards Delium and the sea, others to Oropus, and others towards mount Parnes; all, to whatever place they hoped was safe. But the Bœotians, especially their horse, and the Locrians who had come up to the field of battle just as the rout began, pursued them with great execution. But the night putting an end to the chase, the bulk of the flying army preserved themselves more easily.

*Won by the
Bœotians.*

The day following, such of them as had reached Delium and Oropus, leaving behind a garrison in Delium, which still remained in their possession, transported themselves by sea to Athens. The Bœotians also, having erected a trophy, carried off their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and having posted a guard upon the field of battle

battle, retired to Tanagra, and called a consultation about the method of assaulting Delium.

A herald, farther, dispatched by the Athenians about their dead, meets upon his way a herald of the Bœotians, who turned him back by assuring him that his errand would be fruitless till he himself should be again returned. The latter, being come to the Athenians, declared to them in the name of the Bœotians; *Dispute about the dead.*

“ THAT by their late proceedings they had enormously violated
 “ the laws of the Grecians, amongst whom it was an established
 “ rule, that amidst their mutual invasions religious places should be
 “ ever spared, whereas the Athenians had not only fortified, but
 “ had made Delium a place of habitation, and whatever profanations
 “ mankind can be guilty of had been there by them committed :
 “ That the water, which it would even be impious for the Bœotians
 “ themselves to touch, unless by way of ablution, before they sacri-
 “ ficed, had been profanely drawn by them for common use : That,
 “ for these reasons the Bœotians, in the cause of the God and in
 “ their own, invoking the associated Dæmons and Apollo, gave them
 “ this early notice to evacuate the sacred place, and clear it of all in-
 “ cumbrances.

This message being thus delivered by the herald, the Athenians returned this answer to the Bœotians by a herald of their own :

“ THAT they were hitherto guilty of nothing illegal in regard
 “ to the holy place, nor would willingly be so for the future. They
 “ had no such intention when they first entered into it, and their
 “ view was merely to give an ejection from thence to persons who
 “ had basely injured them. It was a law among the Grecians for
 “ those who were masters of any district, whether great or small,
 “ to be also proprietors of its temples, which are to be honoured by
 “ them

“ them with the usual forms, and with what additional ones they
“ may be able to appoint. Even the Bœotians, as well as many
“ other people, who this moment were possessed of lands from
“ which they had ejected the old proprietors, made a seizure first of
“ those temples which had belonged to others, and continued in the
“ free possession of them. For their own parts, could they conquer
“ more of their territory, they should manfully retain it; and as to
“ the spot they now occupied, their position there was voluntary,
“ and as it was their own they would not quit it. It was necessity
“ alone made them use the water, which ought not to be ascribed to
“ any insolent or profane motive, but to the preceding invasions their
“ enemies had made, self-preservation against which laid them un-
“ der a present necessity of acting as they did. It might with reason
“ be hoped, that every proceeding to which war and violence indis-
“ pensably obliged, would obtain forgiveness from the God: For the
“ altars are a refuge to involuntary offences, and transgression is im-
“ puted only to those who are bad without compulsion, and not to
“ such as urgent necessities may render daring. The guilt of impiety
“ belonged more notoriously to such as insisted on the barter of
“ temples for the bodies of the dead, than to those who are content
“ to lose their just demands rather than submit to so base an ex-
“ change.” They farther enjoined him in their name to declare,
that “ they would not evacuate Bœotia, since the ground which they
“ occupied in it belonged to no Bœotians, but was now their own
“ property acquired by dint of arms. All they required, was a truce
“ for fetching off their dead, according to the solemn institutions of
“ their common country.”

The Bœotians replied thus—— “ If they are now in Bœotia, let
“ them quit the ground which belongeth to us, and carry off what
“ they demand. But, if they are upon ground of their own, they
“ themselves know best what they have to do.” They judged indeed
that Oropia, on which it happened that the bodies of the dead were
lying,

lying, as the battle had been fought upon the lines of partition, belonged to the Athenian jurisdiction, and yet that it was impossible for them to be carried off by force; and truce farther they would grant none, where the point related to Athenian ground; that it was therefore the most proper reply — “they should quit their territory, and so ob-
“tain their demands.” The herald of the Athenians having heard this, departed without effect.

Immediately after, the Bœotians, having sent for darters and sling-^{Delium re-}
ers from the Melian bay, and being reinforced by two thousand ^{taken.} heavy-armed Corinthians, and the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisæa, and a party of Megaræans, all which had joined them since the battle, marched against Delium, and assaulted the fortification. They tried many methods, and took it at last by the help of a machine of a very particular structure. — Having split asunder a large sail-yard, they hollowed it throughout, and fixed it together again in a very exact manner, so as to resemble a pipe. At its extremity they fastened a caldron by help of chains, into which a snout of iron was bent downwards from the yard. The inside, farther, of this wooden machine was lined almost throughout with iron. They brought it from a distance to the fortification on carriages, and applied it where the work consisted chiefly of vines and timber. And when near enough, they put a large bellows to that extremity of the yard which was next themselves, and begun to blow. But the blast, issuing along the bore into the caldron, which was filled with glowing coals and sulphur and pitch, kindled up a prodigious flame. This set fire to the work, and burnt with so much fury, that not a soul durst any longer stay upon it, but to a man they abandoned it and fled away amain: and in this manner was the fortress carried. Of the garrison, some were put to the sword, but two hundred were made prisoners. The bulk of the remainder, throwing themselves on board their vessels, escaped in safety to Athens.

It was the seventeenth day after the battle that Delium was taken. And not long after, a herald dispatched by the Athenians came again, but quite ignorant of this event, to sue for the dead, which were now delivered by the Boeotians, who no longer laid any stress upon their former reply.

In the battle, there perished of the Boeotians very little under five hundred; of the Athenians, few less than a thousand, and Hippocrates the general; but of light-armed and baggage-men a considerable number indeed ².

Demosthenes. Somewhat later in time than this battle, Demosthenes, who, on his appearance before Siphæ, had been disappointed in his hope of having it betrayed to him, having the land-force still on board his fleet, consisting of four hundred heavy-armed Acarnanians and Agræans and Athenians, made a descent on Sicyonia. But before all his vessels could land their men, the Sicyonians had marched down to make head against them. They defeated those that were landed, and chased them again on board. Some they killed, and some they took alive;

² The Athenians received in truth a terrible blow on this occasion. The Boeotians, a people heavy and stupid to a proverb, continued ever after the terror of the Athenians, the politest and most enlightened people upon earth. Nay, that gross and stupid people had, this day, well nigh completed the destruction of all that was pre-eminently wise and good at this time upon earth; and done an irreparable mischief to sound reason and good-sense for ever after. When the two troops of horse, after fetching a compass round the hill, had completed the rout of the Athenians, who were now flying away with the utmost speed, the divine Socrates was left almost alone, facing the enemy, and fighting and retreating like a lion overpowered. Alcibiades, who served in the

cavalry, was making off on horseback; but, seeing Socrates in such imminent danger, he rode up to him, covered his retreat, and brought him off safe. He thus repaid him the great obligation he had formerly received from him at Potidæa. Strabo relates further (Geog. l. 9.) that Xenophon also the same day owed his life to Socrates. Having fallen from his horse, and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took him upon his shoulders, and carried him to a place of safety. Upon the whole, brutal strength and mere bodily merit were never so near getting a total conquest over all the light and understanding which human nature hath to boast of, that did not come directly down from heaven.

and

and after erecting their trophy, they delivered up the dead by truce.

During the former transactions at Delium, Sitalces also king of the ^{Sitalces.} Odrysians was killed in an expedition he had formed against the Triballians, who encountered and vanquished him. And Seuthes the son of Sparodocus, his nephew by the brother, succeeded him in the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of Thrace over which he had reigned.

The same winter, Brasidas, in conjunction with the allies of ^{Brasidas.} Thrace, marched against Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, upon the river Strymon.—

The spot of ground on which this city now standeth, Aristagoras ^{Amphipolis.} the Milesian formerly, when he fled from king Darius, had endeavoured to plant, but was beat off by the Edonians. Two and thirty years after, the Athenians made the same attempt, having sent thither a colony consisting of ten thousand of their own people and such others as voluntarily came in, all of whom were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus. But after an interval of twenty nine years, the Athenians came hither again with a fresh colony led by Agnon the son of Nicias, who having drove away the Edonians built this city upon that spot of ground which had formerly been called the *nine-roads*. They rushed to the seizure from Eion, a maritime emporium situated at the river's mouth, and belonging to them. Eion is distant * twenty stadia from the spot where the city now standeth, ^{* About two English miles.} and which by Agnon was named Amphipolis, because it is almost surrounded by the Strymon which floweth along it on both sides. Running therefore a wall from the river to the river, he planted his colony on a spot conspicuous both to the land and to the sea.

Against this place, Brasidas, decamping from Arne of Chalcidica, ^{Brasidas endeavours to surprise it.} advanced with his army. About sun-set he arrived at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbé issueth into the sea. From hence, after taking the evening-repast, he continued his march by night. It

was winter, and a snow was falling. This favoured and encouraged his enterprize, as he intended to surprize the people of Amphipolis, except such as were privy to his design. For there resided in the place a body of Argillians, who are an Andrian colony, and others who acted in combination with him, some of them at the instigation of Perdiccas, and others at that of the Chalcideans: But in a more particular manner the Argillians, who had a place of residence very near it, who farther had ever been suspected by the Athenians, and were really intent on the ruin of the place when now a fair opportunity was within their reach, and Brasidas at hand (who long before had been tampering with these inhabitants of foreign mixture) in order to have the city betrayed to him. The Argyllians at this juncture received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians led his army forwards that very night to the bridge laid over the Strymon. The city is seated at some distance from this pass; and it was not then defended by a fort as it is now, but was only the station of a small party of guards. Brasidas therefore easily forced the guard, being favoured in some degree by treachery, not a little also by the season and his own unexpected approach. He then passed the bridge, and was immediately master of all the effects of those Amphipolitans who reside in all the tract without the walls. This passage was so sudden, that those within the city had no notice of it; and as to those without, many of them being seized, and others flying for preservation within the wall, the Amphipolitans were thrown into vast confusion, increased by their mutual suspicions of one another. And it is said, that if Brasidas, instead of permitting his troops to disperse for plunder, had advanced directly against the city, it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands. But he on the contrary, having ordered them to halt, employed himself in the ravage of what lay without; and, finding nothing effectuated in his favour by accomplices within, he for the present desisted. But those his accomplices were overpowered in number by the opposite party, who prevented their

their opening the gates immediately to Brasidas; and, acting in concert with Eucles their commandant, who resided there by the orders of the Athenians to guard the place, they dispatch a messenger to the other commander in Thrace, THUCYDIDES the son of Olorus, who compiled this history, and was then in Thasus (Thasus is an island, a colony of the Parians, and distant about half a day's sail from Amphipolis), pressing him to come instantly to their relief.

Thucydides no sooner received this notice, than with the utmost expedition he put to sea with seven ships that happened to be at hand. He designed nothing so much as to prevent if possible the loss of Amphipolis; or, if that was impracticable, to throw himself into Eïon, and secure it in time. *Thucydides to save it.*

Brasidas in the mean while, fearing at the approach of this succour from Thasus, informed besides that Thucydides drew an ample revenue from the working of his gold-mines in this quarter of Thrace, and was on this account of great credit amongst the principal persons of this part of the continent, tried all possible expedients to get possession of the city before his arrival, lest his appearance amongst them might animate the Amphipolitans with the hope of succour by sea and from Thrace, which the credit of Thucydides might easily obtain for their effectual preservation, and in pursuance of this they might refuse to capitulate. He sent them therefore very moderate terms, ordering his herald to proclaim that "the Amphipolitans and Athenians within the city should, if they desired it, be continued in the free possession of their property, and of all their rights and liberties whatever: But those, who refused to stay, should have the space of five days allowed them to quit the town and remove their effects." *He is too late.*

This proposal was no sooner heard, than the inclinations of the many took a new turn. The Athenian interest had but a few supporters in the city: The bulk of the inhabitants were a mixture of foreign nations. There were also *within* many persons, relations of those

those who had been made prisoners *without*. And thus, in their present consternation, the proposal was generally received as mild and gentle. The Athenians for their part, who thought themselves more exposed to danger than the rest, and had besides no hope of speedy relief, were delighted with the offer of quitting the place. So also were all the rest, that they were not to lose their rights and liberties as citizens, and should thus escape the danger they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes. Upon this, the agents of Brasidas expatiated only on the mildness and generosity of the terms he had offered, because now they perceived that the multitude had altered their sentiments, and would no longer hearken to the Athenian commandant. In short, an accommodation was perfected, and they opened the gates to Brasidas, upon the conditions he had proposed by his herald. And in this manner did the inhabitants deliver up Amphipolis.

*But secures
Eion.*

But in the evening of the same day, Thucydides and the squadron came over to Eion. Brasidas was already in possession of Amphipolis, and designed that very night to seize Eion also. And unless this squadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost.

Thucydides instantly took care to put Eion in a posture of defence, in case Brasidas should attack it; and to provide farther for its future security, when he had opened a refuge there for such as were willing to remove thither from Amphipolis, according to the articles of the late surrender.

*Brasidas in
vain attempts
it.*

But Brasidas on a sudden fell down the river with a large number of boats towards Eion, designing if possible to seize the point of land that juts out from the walls, which would have given him the command of the river's mouth. He endeavoured at the same time also to assault it by land, but was repulsed in both attempts. And now he effectually employed his care in resettling and securing Amphipolis.

Myrcinus

Myrcinus also, a city of Edonia, revolted to him upon the death of Pittacus king of the Edonians, who was killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Braures. Gapselus soon after did the same, and Oesyme: They are colonies of the Thasians. These events were owing to the practices of Perdiccas, who came thither in person immediately after the surrender of Amphipolis. *Myrcinus revolts.*

The loss of that city cast the Athenians into great consternation, and with reason, because it was a place of great importance to them, since from thence they had materials for building ships and a pecuniary revenue; and farther, because, after a safe conduct through Thessaly, the route was now open to the Lacedæmonians as far as the Strymon, to annoy their dependents. Yet had they not possessed themselves of the bridge, the large lake formed above by the river, and the check given by the triremes stationed at Eion, would have hindered the Lacedæmonians from penetrating further. But all obstacle appeared to the Athenians now quite easy to be surmounted; and their apprehensions, that their dependents would revolt, alarmed them much. For Brasidas in the rest of his conduct gave constant proofs of an excellent temper; and the declaration was ever in his mouth, that "he had been sent thither to restore the liberty of Greece." Accordingly the cities, which were subject to the Athenians, had no sooner heard of the surrender of Amphipolis together with the brave exploits and the mild engaging deportment of Brasidas, than they conceived the most ardent inclination to shake off the yoke. They secretly dispatched their agents to him, earnestly desiring a visit from him, with respective assurances from each, that *they* would be the first to revolt. They judged, there was no longer room to apprehend any bad consequences from such a step; falsely estimating the Athenian power to be much less considerable than it afterwards appeared. But this their judgment was founded more upon uncertain presumption than deliberate prudence. It is the turn of mankind when their passions are warm, to give themselves up to blind.

blind and sanguine hope, and to throw aside with despotic scorn whatever seemeth to be counter to their wishes. It was but lately that the Athenians had been vanquished by the Bœotians ; and Brasidas had been making such recitals as might persuade, tho' in fact they were collusive, that at Nisæa with his single force he offered battle to the Athenians and they declined it. This made them confident, and they became perfectly convinced, that there was no longer a strength sufficient to chastise them. But what had the greatest influence on their thoughts, and disposed them entirely to run all hazards, was the immediate pleasure they promised themselves in a change, and that now they were going for the first time to experience the sweets of Lacedæmonian friendship.

*But secured by
garrisons.*

These inclinations were perceived by the Athenians, who sent garrisons into each of these cities in order to curb them, with as much expedition, as the shortness of time and the wintry season would permit.

Brasidas also had sent to Lacedæmon, soliciting a speedy reinforcement, and was busy himself in providing materials to build triremes in the Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians neglected to supply him, partly through the envy which the leading men at Sparta had conceived against him, and partly because their attention was principally confined to the recovery of their people made prisoners in Sphacteria, and to bring the war to a conclusion.

The same winter, the Megaréans having recovered their *long-walls*, which were in the possession of the Athenians, levelled them with the ground.

*Brasidas
marcheth into
Acté.*

Brasidas thus master of Amphipolis gathereth together the allies, and leadeth them into the district called Acté. It is the tract, which stretcheth out into the sea from the canal which was dug by Xerxes, and Athos the highest mountain in Acté is its utmost verge upon the Ægean sea. The cities in it are ; Sane, a colony of Andrians, seated close to the canal and on that part which faceth the sea towards Eubœa ;

bœa ; Thyffus farther, and Cleone, and Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Dium, which are promiscuously inhabited by various sets of Barbarians, who speak both languages. There is also a small number of Chalcidéans amongst them, but the bulk are Pelasgians (the issue of those Tyrrhenes who formerly inhabited Lemnos and Athens), and Bisaltians, and Crestonians, and Edonians : They reside in small fortresses. Most of them went over to Brasidas ; but Sane and Dium stood out. He therefore made his army halt on their lands, and laid them waste. Yet as this had no effect, he marched from thence to Torone of Chalcidica then possessed by the Athenians. He hastened thither at the invitation of a small party, who were ready to betray the city to him. Being arrived whilst yet it was dark, he sat down about break of day with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, which lieth not at most above * three stadia from the city. The bulk of the Toronéans and the Athenian garrison were ignorant of his approach : But the accomplices, who knew he would be punctual, sent some of their body unperceived to observe his approach. When these were thus certainly assured he was at hand, they conducted back with them to their friends seven men armed only with daggers. Twenty had at first been selected for this service, but only seven of *them* now had the courage to proceed : Lyfistratus the Olynthian was the person who commanded. They got in by the wall towards the sea without causing an alarm, and ascending from thence slaughtered the guard in the citadel which is seated upon the most eminent spot, the whole city being built on the declivity of a hill, and burst open the postern toward Canastræum. Brasidas, having since advanced a little with the rest of his force, halted again. But he ordereth a hundred targeteers to go before, that, when the gates should be opened and the signal given which was before agreed on, they might break in first. These after an interval of time wondered at the delay, and by gradually advancing were got close to the city. Such of the Toronéans within, as acted in concert with those who had

* Above $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile.

entered, when once the postern was burst, and the gates leading to the *forum* were thrown open after bursting the bar, in the first place conducting some of them about led them in at the postern, that they might strike a sudden panic on the ignorant inhabitants when attacked in rear and in flank and on all sides. This done they lifted up the appointed signal of fire, and gave instant admittance to the rest of the targeteers through the gates which led to the *forum*.

*Surprisal of
Torone.*

Brasidas, when once he saw the signal, roused up his army and led them running towards the place, shouting all at once aloud, and thus striking the greatest consternation into the inhabitants. Some immediately rushed in at the gates; others mounted over the square wooden machines, which, as the wall had lately fallen down and was now rebuilding, lay close to it for the raising of stones. Brasidas, with the bulk of his force, betook himself immediately to the upper parts of the city; intending to seize the eminence, and possess himself effectually of the place. The rest dispersed themselves equally through every quarter.

Amidst this surprisal, the majority of the Toronéans, quite ignorant of the plot, were in vast confusion. But the agents in it and all their party were quickly ranged with the assailants. The Athenians, (for of them there were about fifty heavy-armed asleep in the *forum*,) when they found what was done, some few excepted who were slain instantly on the spot, fled away for preservation; and some by land, others in the guard-ships stationed there, got safe into Lecythus, a fort of their own. They kept this in their own hands, as it was the extremity of the city towards the sea stretched along on a narrow isthmus. Hither also those of the Toronéans, who persevered in their fidelity, fled to them for refuge.

It being now broad day and the city firmly secured, Brasidas caused proclamation to be made to those Toronéans who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, that "such as were willing might return to their old habitations, and should enjoy their rights without any
"molestation."

“molestation.” But to the Athenians a herald was sent expressly, commanding them “to evacuate Lecythus which rightfully belonged to the Chalcidæans, and a truce should be granted them to remove themselves and their baggage.” An evacuation they absolutely refused, but requested one day’s truce to fetch off their dead: He solemnly accorded two. During this space he was very busy in strengthening the houses adjacent to Lecythus, and the Athenians did the same within.

He also convened the Toronæans to a general assembly, and harangued them very nearly in the same manner, as he had done at Acanthus, — that “it was unjust to look upon those, who had been his coadjutors in the surprisal of the city, as men worse than their neighbours, or as traitors; they had no enslaving views, nor were biassed to such a conduct by pecuniary persuasions; the welfare and liberty of the city had been their only object. Neither should they, who had no share in the event, be more abridged than those who had. He was not come thither to destroy the city, or so much as one private inhabitant of it. For this very reason he had caused the proclamation to be made to those who had sheltered themselves amongst the Athenians, because such an attachment had not in the least impaired them in his esteem, since it was entirely owing to their ignorance that they had thus undervalued the Lacedæmonians, whose actions, as they were always more just, would for the future entitle them much more to their benevolence; their terror hitherto had been merely the result of inexperience.” He then exhorted them in general “to take care for the future to be steady and firm allies, since should they henceforth offend, they would be made answerable for the guilt. They were not chargeable for the past, as they had rather been sufferers themselves from superior force; the preceding opposition therefore deserved forgiveness.”

Brasidas harangues the Toronæans.

*He attacks
Lecythus.*

Having spake thus and revived their spirits, when the truce was expired, he made assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from a paltry rampart and the battlements of the houses. One whole day they effectually repulsed them. But on the following, when a machine was to be planted against them by the enemy, from whence they intended to throw fire upon their wooden fences, and the army was now approaching to the spot which seemed convenient for lodging their machine and whence it might be played off with effect; they raised for prevention a wooden turret, the base of which was an edifice that lay ready at hand, and carried up many buckets and tubs of water and heavy stones; and upon it also many defenders were mounted. But the edifice, too heavily laden, on a sudden was crushed by the weight. The crash with which it fell was great; and those of the Athenians, who stood near and saw it, were rather concerned than terrified. But those at a distance, and especially such as were most remote, imagining the place was already taken in that quarter, fled again to the sea and to their vessels.

And carries it.

When Brasidas perceived they were quitting the battlements, and had himself beheld the accident, he led his army to the assault, and immediately carrieth the fortress. Such as were found within it were instantly destroyed. And the Athenians in boats and ships, after having thus abandoned it to the enemy, crossed over to the Pallene.

* 96 l. 15 s.
Sterling.

But Brasidas, (for in Lecythus there is a temple of Minerva; and before he proceeded to the assault he had publicly proclaimed, that a reward of thirty * *minæ* of silver should be given the man who first mounted the rampart,) concluding now that it was taken less by human than some other means, repositied the thirty *minæ* in the temple, as an offering to the Goddess. And having demolished Lecythus and cleared all away, he consecrated the whole spot as sacred to her. During the remainder of the winter, he provided for the security of the places already in his possession, and was planning future

future conquests. And with the end of this winter the eighth year of the war expired.

YEAR IX.

VERY early in the spring of the ensuing summer, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians made a truce to continue for a year. The motives on the Athenian side were these — That “ Brasidas might no longer seduce any of their towns to revolt, before they were enabled by this interval of leisure to act against him; and besides, that if they reaped any advantage from this truce, they might proceed to a farther accommodation.” On the Lacedæmonian side it was imagined that “ the Athenians were under such terrors as in fact they were; and, after a remission of calamities and misfortunes, would more eagerly come into some expedients for a future reconciliation; of course, would deliver up to them their *citizens*, and come into a truce for a larger term.” The recovery of *these* Spartans was a point on which they layed a greater stress than ever, even during the career of success which attended Brasidas. They foresaw, that in case he extended his conquests, and even brought them to a balance with their foes, of *those* they must for ever be deprived, and the conflict then proceeding upon equal advantages the dangers also would be equal, and the victory still in suspense.

Upon these motives, both parties and their allies agreed to a truce of the following tenor:

“ AS to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it seemeth good unto us, that access be granted to all who desire it, without fraud and without fear, according to the laws of our country. The same is approved of by the Lacedæmonians and their allies now present; and they promise to send heralds on purpose, and to spare no pains to procure the consent of the Bœotians and Phocians.

“ As:

“ As to the treasure belonging to the God, care shall be taken by
 “ us to find out those who have presumed to embezzle it; and this
 “ fairly and honestly, according to the laws of our country, both
 “ by you, and by us, and by all others who are willing; all pro-
 “ ceeding respectively according to the laws of their several con-
 “ stitutions.

* In which
 stood the fort
 of Pylus.

“ It hath farther seemed good to the Lacedæmonians and their
 “ other allies, if the Athenians agree to the truce, that both parties
 “ shall keep within their own bounds, and hold what we are at pre-
 “ sent respectively possessed of: that is to say; the former to keep in
 “ Coryphasium *, within the mountains of Boupbras and Tomeus;
 “ the latter in Cythera; without enlarging the communication for
 “ the procuring of alliance, neither on our side against you, nor on
 “ your side against us. That those in Nisæa and Minoa pass not
 “ beyond the road that leads from the gates of Megara adjacent to
 “ the temple of Nisus towards the temple of Neptune, and from
 “ the temple of Neptune carrieth directly to the bridge laid across to
 “ Minoa: That neither the Megaræans nor their allies pass beyond
 “ the same road, nor into the island which the Athenians have
 “ taken; both keeping within their bounds, and upon no occasion
 “ whatever to have any intercourse with one another: The Mega-
 “ réans still to retain what they possess in Trœzen, and whatever they
 “ hold by compact with the Athenians; to have farther the free use
 “ of the sea upon their own coasts, and those of their alliance.

* A ship of war
 † Five and
 twenty tons.

“ That the Lacedæmonians and allies shall not navigate the sea in
 “ a long ship *, but in any other vessels rowed with oars, and of
 “ no larger burden than † five hundred talents.
 “ That by virtue of this truce, safe-conduct be granted both of
 “ passage and repassage, either by land or sea, either to Peloponnesus
 “ or to Athens, to all heralds and ambassadors, and their whole re-
 “ tinue how numerous soever, commissioned to negotiate the deter-
 “ mination of the war, or to get controverted points adjudged.

“ That

" That so long as this truce be in force, no deserters be entertained,
" neither by you, nor by us, whether they be freemen or slaves.

" You shall do justice in our causes, and we shall do the same
" for you, according to the laws of our respective constitutions, to
" the end that all controversies may be judicially settled without
" a war.

" These articles have the approbation of the Lacedæmonians and
" their allies. But, if any thing more honourable or more just oc-
" curs to you, you are to repair to Lacedæmon, and propose it
" there. For whatever points you may demonstrate to be just, will
" in no degree whatever be rejected, neither by the Lacedæmonians
" nor by their allies: Provided the persons charged with these new
" commissions be sent with full powers to put to them the finish-
" ing hand, in the same manner as you require the same conditions
" from us.

" This truce shall be in force for a year."

Ratified by the People.

The Acamantine Tribe presided. Phanippus was the Notary public. Niciades was in the chair. Laches pronounced — " Be it
" for the welfare and prosperity of the Athenians, that a suspension
" of arms is granted upon the terms offered by the Lacedæmonians
" and allies."

Agreed in the public assembly of the people,

" That this suspension shall continue for a year.

" That it shall take place this very day, being the fourteenth day
" of the month Elaphebolion.

" That during this interval, ambassadors and heralds shall pass be-
" tween them, to adjust the terms upon which the war should be de-
" finitively concluded.

" That

“ That the generals of the *State* and the presidents in course shall
 “ first at Athens convene an assembly of the *people*, to adjust the terms
 “ upon which their embassy should be impowered to put an end to
 “ the war. And
 “ That the ambassadors, who were now present in the assembly,
 “ shall give a solemn ratification that they will punctually abide by
 “ this truce for a year.”

The Lacedæmonians and their allies agreed to these articles, and pledged their oath for the observation of them to the Athenians and their allies at Lacedæmon, on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius.

The persons who settled the articles and assisted at the sacrifice were,

For the Lacedæmonians — Taurus the son of Echetimidas, Athenæus the son of Periclidas, Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaïdas. For the Corinthians — Æneas the son of Ocytus, Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus. For the Sicyonians — Damotimus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Megacles. For the Megaréans — Nicæus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. For the Epidaurians — Amphias the son of Eupæidas. For the Athenians — Nicostratus the son of Diotrophes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Autocles the son of Tolmæus, Generals of the *State*.

In this manner was a suspension of arms concluded, during which they continued without interruption to hold conferences with one another, about settling the terms of a firm and lasting peace.

Brasidas goes
to Scione.

During the interval these matters were thus in agitation, Scione a city in the Pellene revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scionæans indeed in the Pellene give out that they are of Peloponnesus; that their ancestors who settled in these other seats were driven there

there originally by a storm, which in their return from Troy dispersed the Achæans. When they had notified their revolt to him, Brasidas passed over to Scione by night. A party of his friends sailed before him in a trireme, and he followed at some distance in a fly-boat, to the end that if he should fall in with any vessel larger than this boat, the trireme might make head against her; but if another trireme of equal strength should come up to them, he judged she would neglect his smaller boat, and would attack the ship, which would give him time to complete his passage in security.

When he was safely landed, and had convened an assembly of the Scionæans, he harangued them as he had done before at Acanthus and Torone. But he added farther that "they were a people most deserving of applause, since tho' the communication with the Peloponnese, as being an isthmus, was cut off by the Athenians who were masters of Potidæa, and they were by this means become islanders to all intents and purposes, yet they had, without prior solicitation, advanced boldly towards liberty, nor could bear to lie in cowardly inactivity till necessity forced them to such measures as tended to their manifest welfare. This was ample proof that they were ready to undergo any other the greatest perils, to obtain the wished-for settlement of their State. He therefore regarded them, as in truth the most gallant friends of the Lacedæmonians, and would in all respects do proper honour to their worth."

The Scionæans were elevated by these handsome commendations. All of them became full of spirits, not even those excepted to whom the prior steps had been by no means agreeable. They cheerfully determined to sustain all future war, and in every shape gave Brasidas honourable entertainment. By public vote they placed upon his head a golden crown as the deliverer of Greece, whilst every single Scionæan was busy in adorning him with ribbands, and caressing him like a victor in the solemn games. His stay at present was short; he only placed a small party in the town to secure it, and then

His honourable reception.

then repassed to Torone. But soon after, he transported thither the greater part of his force, designing with the aid of the Scionéans to make attempts upon Mende and Potidæa. He concluded however that the Athenians would lose no time in throwing in a succour as into an island, and so he endeavoured to be beforehand with them.

His farther projects.

He had already formed an intelligence to the prejudice of those cities to get them betrayed: And he was now intent on executing his schemes against them. But during this pause, Aristonymus dispatched by the Athenians, and Athenæus by the Lacedæmonians to circulate the news, arrive in a trireme, and notify to him the suspension of arms. His forces were then transported back to Torone.

The truce notified to him.

The persons employed communicated the articles of the truce to Brasidas, and all the Lacedæmonian confederates in Thrace declared their acquiescence in what had been done. Aristonymus was well satisfied in other respects, but finding, by computing the days, that the revolt of the Scionéans was too late in point of time, he protested against their being intitled to the benefit of the truce. Brasidas on the other hand urged many arguments to prove it prior in time, and refuseth to restore that city. When therefore Aristonymus had reported this affair at Athens, the Athenians in an instant were ready to take up arms again for the reduction of Scione. But the Lacedæmonians, by an embassy purposely dispatched, remonstrated that "they should regard such a proceeding as a breach of the truce," and asserted "their right to the city as they reposed entire credit on Brasidas; however, they were ready to refer the dispute to a fair arbitration." The others refused to abide by so hazardous a decision, but would recover it as soon as possible by force of arms. They were irritated at the thought, that persons seated as it were upon an island should presume to revolt from them, and place such confidence in the unprofitable land-power of the Lacedæmonians. There was farther more truth in the date of the revolt than at present the Athenians could evince: For, in fact, the Scionéans revolted

two days too late. But at the instigation of Cleon they immediately passed a decree, that "the Scionéans should be reduced by force, and then put to the sword." And their attention was recalled from all other points, to expedite the needful preparations for the execution of this.

In the mean time, Mende also a city in the Pallene, and a colony of Eretrians, revolted from them. Brasidas received them into his protection, thinking himself justified, as they had openly come over to him in the time of truce. Besides, he had himself some reasons to recriminate upon the Athenians, as violators of the articles. Upon this account the Mendéans were more encouraged to the step, as they saw Brasidas was determined to support them; and were convinced, by the affair of Scione, that he would not abandon them. The design farther had been originally set on foot by the *few*; who, tho' they delayed it for a time, were resolved to push it into execution: for they apprehended that a discovery might prove fatal to themselves; and so forced the bulk of the *people* to act against their inclination. But the Athenians, who had a quick intelligence of it, were now exasperated much more than before, and redoubled their preparations against both those places.

Brasidas, who soon expected the arrival of their armament, conveyed away the wives and children of the Scionéans and Mendéans to Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them escorted thither by five hundred heavy-armed Peloponnesians and three hundred Chalcidic targeteers: The commander of the whole escorte was Polydamidas. Those left behind, expecting soon to be visited by the Athenians, united their endeavours to get things in good order for their reception.

In the interval, Brasidas and Perdiccas march together a second time into Lyncus against Arribæus. They commanded their separate bodies; one, the forces of the Macedonians subject to himself, and the heavy-armed Grecians who dwelled amongst them; the other,

*Revolt of
Mende.*

*Brasidas and
Perdiccas in-
vade Lyncus.*

other, the remainder of his own Peloponnesians reinforced by Chalcideans and Acanthians, and quotas from other cities such as they were able to furnish. The number of heavy-armed Grecians computed together amounted to about three thousand: The cavalry that attended, both of Macedonians and Chalcideans, was upon the whole little less than a thousand: And the remaining crowd of Barbarians was great.

An engagement. Breaking thus into the territory of Arribæus, and finding the Lyncestians already in the field to oppose them, they also sat down and faced them. The infantry on each side were posted on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. This yielding room for the excursions of the horse, the cavalry of both began a skirmish first. But then Brasidas and Perdiccas, so soon as the Lyncestian heavy-armed were moving first from the eminence to the aid of their cavalry, and were ready to engage, marched also down into the plain to oppose them, where they charged and routed the Lyncestians. A large number of the latter were slain, the rest fled for preservation to the eminences, and there stood quiet.

They jar. The victors after this, having erected a trophy, continued for two or three days in the same post, waiting for the Illyrians who were coming up to join Perdiccas for a stipulated pay. And then Perdiccas intended to advance farther against the villages of Arribæus, and sit no longer inactive. Mende however was still uppermost in the care of Brasidas: — That place must be lost, should the Athenians arrive before it in the interval: — The Illyrians besides were not yet come up. He relished not the project, and was more inclined to go back. This engendered some disputes between them, in the midst of which the news was brought, that the Illyrians had deserted Perdiccas, and joined themselves with Arribæus. Upon which it was soon resolved between them to retire, as there was reason to dread the accession of men so renowned for military valour. Yet the disagreement between them prevented their fixing on any certain time for filing off.

Night

Night came on, in which the Macedonians and the crowd of Barbarians being struck with a sudden panic (as numerous armies are apt to be, without any certain cause,) and imagining that much larger numbers were coming against them than in fact was true, and that they were only not near enough to attack them, they instantly took to their heels and hurried homewards. Perdiccas for a time knew nothing of the matter, and when informed of it, was compelled by the flying troops to dislodge in their company, without being able to get a fight of Brasidas. For they were encamped at a distance from each other.

At the dawn of day, Brasidas perceived that the Macedonians had dislodged, and that the Illyrians and Arribæus were approaching to attack him. He therefore drew his forces together, forming a square with his heavy-armed, in the centre of which he disposed all the croud of light-armed; and in this form he intended to retreat. He appointed the youngest men to sally out, in case the enemy anywhere attacked them: And he himself with a picked body of three hundred determined to bring up the rear in person, in order to sustain and make good their retreat against the van of the enemy who should press upon their rear. And before the enemy came near, as well as the hurry would admit, he animated his soldiers thus:

*The retreat of
Brasidas.*

“ DID I not suspect, ye men of Peloponnesus, that thus abandoned as you are and ready to be attacked by Barbarians, and those numerous too, you were in some consternation, I should judge it needless to instruct or to encourage you. But now, against this desertion of our friends, and this multitude of our enemies, I shall endeavour by a short admonition and exhortation to raise within you the full grandeur of your souls. Upon you it is incumbent to behave with gallantry in every martial scene, upon the account, not merely of acting in the open field in the presence of so many confederates, but of your own hereditary valour. Your souls ought

*Speech of
Brasidas.*

“ ought

“ ought not to be dismayed at a multitude of foes, since you were
“ not born under governments where the *many* control the *few*, but
“ where the *few* command the *many*. And the only means, by
“ which you acquired this noble privilege, was victorious perseverance
“ in the fields of battle. Yet of these Barbarians, your fears of
“ whom are the result of your ignorance, you ought to be informed,
“ from what you have learned yourselves in former conflicts against
“ them with the Macedonians, as well as from what I conjecture, and
“ what I depend upon from the accounts of others, that in action
“ they will be by no means terrible. For when an hostile force,
“ tho’ in reality weak, carrieth with it the appearance of strength, a
“ true discovery of its state is no sooner obtained, than it redoubleth
“ the courage of their opponents. But men, in whom valour is
“ firmly implanted, none can assault with extraordinary spirit but
“ such as know them not. These enemies of yours are dreadful for
“ a while, merely till brought to trial. Their multitude rendereth
“ them terrible to the sight; the loudness of their shouts is insup-
“ portable to the ear. Their weapons, brandished about and clashing
“ in the air, have a frightful and menacing look. But their
“ spirit will not answer their shew, when charging against such as
“ will sustain their shock. They are not drawn up with skill, nor
“ will they blush when compelled to quit their ground. To fly
“ from or to fly after an enemy is equally a matter of glory to
“ them: By such things is their valour established and rescued
“ from reproach. For a battle, where every combatant is his own
“ commander, leaveth a specious and handsome opportunity to each
“ of providing for his safety. They this moment judge it more safe
“ to intimidate us at a distance than to run to the charge: for other-
“ wise, before this they had attacked us. And you plainly see, that
“ all the terror which now runs before them, will vanish at the on-
“ set, as terrible only to sight and hearing. When therefore they
“ advance to the charge, sustain it and repulse them; and when
“ opportunity

“ opportunity serveth, fall back into your ranks again with regularity
 “ and order. You shall thus the sooner secure your retreat, and be
 “ convinced for the time to come, that such rabbles, to men who
 “ can stand the first fury of their onset, have only made, at a distance
 “ and by their pausing, a vain and menacing parade of valour ;
 “ but such, as will give ground and fly before them, they pursue
 “ with eagerness ; and are excellently brave, when there is no
 “ resistance.”

After this exhortation, Brasidas caused his army to file leisurely off. The Barbarians perceiving it pressed forwards with great noise and clamour, supposing that he fled, and that they might intercept and cut him off. But when the appointed parties sallied out from all quarters to receive them, and Brasidas himself with his picked body sustained their charge, they repulsed them at their first assault, to the great surprize of the enemy. Afterwards, receiving every repeated attack, they beat them off continually ; and then during the intervals of pause, retreated in good order ; till at length, the bulk of the Barbarians discontinued their efforts in the plain against the Greeks under Brasidas, and leaving only a part of their body to follow and annoy them in their retreat, the rest wheeled speedily off to pursue the flying Macedonians, and such as they overtook they slaughtered. To the narrow pass farther between two hills, which was the entrance into the territories of Arribæus, they hurried before in order to secure it, knowing it to be the only route by which Brasidas could retreat. He was now drawing near it, and in the most difficult part of the passage they were spreading themselves circularly to encompass him on all sides. But Brasidas, perceiving their design, ordered the three hundred that marched with him to advance full speed up that hill which he thought was most practicable and possess themselves of it, and this with the utmost expedition, each as he was able without regarding form, and endeavour to drive the Barbarians thence,

thence, who were already posting themselves upon it, before they were joined by larger numbers and could invest him on all sides. They did so, attacked, and made themselves masters of the hill, which enabled the main body of the Grecians to march up without obstruction. For now the Barbarians were thrown into consternation, when their detachment had in this manner been beat off from the eminence. And here they discontinued the pursuit, imagining the enemy had already passed the frontier, and secured their retreat.

Brasidas, when once he was master of the eminences, marched on without molestation; and the very same day reached Arnissa, the first place within the dominions of Perdiccas. His soldiers indeed, who were exasperated against the Macedonians for having thus precipitately abandoned them, whatever yokes of oxen they met with on their route, or whatever baggage lay dropped upon the ground, (as such things it was likely should happen in a retreat by night and confused by fear,) the former they unyoked and cut to pieces, and secreted the latter as lawful plunder. Here, Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as his enemy, and ever after forced himself against his inclinations to hate the Peloponnesians; not indeed in his judgment preferring the Athenians, but prevailed upon by the exigencies of his own affairs, he cast about for the means of being again reconciled to the latter, and disentangling himself from the former.

Mendé reduced.

Brasidas, having retreated through Macedonia to Torone, findeth the Athenians already in possession of Mendé. Judging it impossible now to pass over into the Pallene and drive out the enemy, he chose to remain there and securely to garrison Torone. For, during the time of the expedition into Lyncus, the Athenians had put to sea against Mendé and Scione with the armament they had provided, consisting of fifty ships, ten of which were Chian, of a thousand heavy-armed of their own citizens, six hundred archers, a thousand mercenary Thracians, and a body of targeteers furnished by their adjacent

adjacent dependents: Nicias the son of Niceratus and Nicostratus the son of Diotrophes had the command of the whole. They weighed from Potidæa, and landing at the temple of Neptune marched directly for Mende. The Mendæans, with their own force and three hundred Scionéans who were come to their succour, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, in all seven hundred heavy-armed under the command of Polydamidas, were encamped without the city upon a strong eminence. Nicias taking with him a hundred and twenty light-armed Methonéans and sixty picked men of the heavy-armed Athenians, and all the archers, attempted to mount by a path that led up the eminence; but, being galled by the enemy, was not able to force the ascent. Nicostratus, with all the rest of the force, having fetched a compass about, in order to mount in a remote quarter, where the ascent was impracticable, was quite thrown into disorder; and thus the whole Athenian army narrowly escaped a total defeat. As therefore the Mendæans and allies maintained their post the whole day, the Athenians drew off and encamped. And, when night came on, the Mendæans withdrew into the city.

The next day, the Athenians sailing round to the Scione-side possessed themselves of the suburbs, and spent the whole day in ravaging the country, as not a soul sallied out to obstruct them: For some bustles now were on foot in the city inclining to a sedition. The three hundred Scionéans departed also in the succeeding night to their own home: And the day following Nicias, advancing with a moiety of the force within their frontier, ravaged the district of the Scionéans, whilst Nicostratus, with the remainder, sat down before the upper gates of Mende, from whence the road leadeth to Potidæa. But Polydamidas, as the Mendæans and the auxiliaries had chanced to ground their arms in this quarter within the wall, drew them up in order of battle, and exhorted the Mendæans to sally out. It was replied in a seditious manner by one of the popular faction, that "they would not sally, and would have nothing to do with the war."

At such a refusal Polydamidas having layed hands upon the person, a tumult at once ensued, in which the *people* ran immediately to arms, and, furious with anger, made towards the Peloponnesians, and all those of the opposite faction who sided with them. They fell upon and routed them in an instant, terrified as they were at this sudden assault; and the gates were thrown open at the same time to the Athenians. They supposed this insurrection had been made against them in consequence of some previous combination; and as many as escaped out of the scuffle with life, fled away to the citadel, which was before in their possession.

But the Athenians (for Nicias was now returned before the city) bursting into Mende, for it was not opened by composition, with their whole united force, plundered it as tho' taken by storm; nay, the generals had some difficulty to restrain their soldiers from putting the inhabitants to the sword. And after this they issued their commands to the Mendéans to continue their government in the usual form, and to proceed judicially against those of their body whom they esteemed the principal authors of the revolt. Those in the citadel they shut up with a wall extending on both sides to the sea, and posted a guard to secure the blockade.

*Blockade of
Scione.*

When in this manner they had possessed themselves of Mende, they marched against Scione. The inhabitants, with the Peloponnesian aids, coming out to receive them, posted themselves on a strong eminence before the city; which, unless the enemy could take it, would infallibly prevent their walling them about. But the Athenians stormed the post, and after an engagement forcing them to dislodge, they formed their camp, and having erected a trophy, got every thing in readiness for the circumvallation. And no long time after, whilst they were busied in this work, the auxiliaries blocked up in the citadel at Mende, having forced the guard posted near the sea, get away by night; and the major part of them, escaping privily through the Athenian camp before Scione, got safe into that town.

When

When the circumvallation of Scione was in hand, Perdiccas, having dispatched a herald for the purpose to the Athenian generals, strikes up a new treaty with the Athenians. He took this step out of pure enmity to Brasidas, arising from the retreat out of Lyncus; and had begun from that time to act in their favour. For it happened, that at this very juncture of time Ischagoras the Lacedæmonian was bringing up by land a reinforcement to Brasidas. But Perdiccas, as well to oblige Nicias, who, as he had renewed his alliance, commanded him to give some conspicuous proof of his attachment to the Athenians, as to gratify his own resentment in refusing the Peloponnesians a passage through his dominions, had gained the concurrence of his Thessalian friends, since with the chief persons of that country he had ever been closely united by the hospitable ties, and so stopped the reinforcement and their convoy that they durst not attempt to pass through Thessaly. Ischagoras however, and Aminias and Aristeus reached Brasidas in person, being commissioned by the Lacedæmonians to inspect the posture of their affairs, and brought with them some young men of Sparta, tho' contrary to their laws, who were to take upon them the government of the cities which were no longer to be trusted to their former managers. In effect, Clearidas the son of Cleonymus they place as governor in Amphipolis, and Epitelidas the son of Hegesander in Torone.

This same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespiensians, alledging as the reason, that they were practising with the Athenians. This demolition had ever been intended, but its execution was now become more easy, as the flower of their youth had perished in the late battle fought against the Athenians.

This summer also, the temple of Juno at Argos was destroyed by fire. Chrysis the priestess had placed a burning torch too near the

Thespiæ dismantled.

The temple of Juno at Argos burnt down.

the garlands, and unawares fell fast asleep. The flames broke out and were raging all around before they were perceived. Chrysis indeed instantly, for fear of the Argives, flies away by night to Phlius. They, according to the law enacted for that purpose, appointed another priestess in her room, whose name was Phæinis. Eight years of this war were elapsed, and it was the middle of the ninth when Chrysis fled.

Scione;

The circumvallation of Scione also was completed about the close of this summer; and the Athenians, leaving behind a sufficient body to guard it, drew off the rest of their army.

Battle of Laodicea.

In the ensuing winter, things were quiet between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, because of the suspension of arms. But the Mantinéans, and Tegeatæ, and the confederates on both sides, engaged at Laodicæa of Orestis: But the victory was doubtful. Each party routed a wing of their opponents, and both sides erected trophies, and sent the spoils to Delphi. Many however were slain on both sides, and the battle was drawn, the night putting an end to the contest. The Tegeatæ indeed passed the night upon the field, and immediately erected a trophy. But the Mantinéans withdrew to Bucolion, and afterwards erected their trophy in opposition.

Attempt of Brasidas on Potidæa.

In the close of this winter, and when the spring was already approaching, Brasidas farther made an attempt upon Potidæa. For having approached it in the night, and applied his ladders, so far he proceeded without causing an alarm. For the bell being passed by, during that interval, before he that carried it forwards could return, the moment was seized for applying them³. However

³ The officers regularly went their rounds to see that all the centinels were at their posts. When they approached any of them, a little bell was rung to which the centinel was to answer, in proof that he was at his post and awake. The interval between the rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of the centinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relaxed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme.

the

the alarm was taken before he could possibly scale, upon which he drew off his army without loss of time, not caring to wait for the return of day. And thus ended the winter; and with it the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the History.

THE
HISTORY
OF
The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE FIFTH.

C O N T E N T S.

Year X. *The truce endeth. Cleon sent commander into Thrace; his proceedings there. The battle of Amphipolis, in which Brasidas and Cleon are killed. A general peace, styled the Nician. An alliance offensive and defensive between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.*

Year XI. *The peace merely nominal; and Thucydides proceedeth in his history of the Peloponnesian war. The Corinthians practise against the Lacedæmonians. An Argive league. No confidence between the principal States. A train of negotiations. A separate alliance between the Lacedæmonians and Bæotians contrary to article. Panactum demolished.*

Year XII. *The demolition of Panactum and the separate alliance highly resented at Athens. Many are scheming a rupture, but especially Alcibiades. By his means a negotiation is brought on at Athens, and an alliance formed with the Argives. The Lacedæmonians forbidden to assist at the Olympic Games.*

Year XIII. *War between the Argives and Epidaurians. The Lacedæmonians throw a garrison into Epidaurus; and the Athenians replace the Helots and Messenians in Pylus.*

Year XIV. *The Lacedæmonians take the field against the Argives. Two large armies face one another within sight of Argos, yet part without engaging. The Lacedæmonians take the field a second time. The battle of Mantinea. The Argives enter into league with the Lacedæmonians.*

Year XV. *Fresh stirrs at Argos in favour of the Athenians.*

Year XVI. *Expedition of the Athenians against the isle of Melos. The conference in form, by way of dialogue. The Athenians become masters of that island.*



T H E
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

B O O K V.

Y E A R X.

IN the following summer, the truce made for a year expired of course at the time of the Pythian Games. And during this relaxation from war, the Athenians caused the Delians to evacuate the isle of Delos; imagining that, upon the taint of some crimes long since committed, they were not sufficiently pure to perform due service to the God, and that *this* yet was wanting to render that work of purgation compleat, in which, as I have already related, they thought themselves justified in demolishing the sepulchres of the dead. The Delians settled again, so fast as they could remove themselves thither, at Atramyttium, bestowed upon them for this purpose by Pharnaces.

*Before Christ
422.
The truce ex-
pires.*

V O L. II.

Q

Cleon,

Cleon goes
commander into
Thrace.

Cleon¹, having obtained the commission from the Athenians, went by sea into the Thracian dominions, so soon as the suspension of arms expired, having under his command twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred horsemen, and larger numbers of their allied forces. His whole armament consisted of thirty sail. Touching first at Scione, yet blocked up, he drew from thence the heavy-armed stationed there as guards; and, standing away, entered

¹ Cleon is now grown perfectly convinced that he is a very hero, and hath prevailed upon a majority of the people of Athens to be of the same mind, since seriously and deliberately they intrust him with a most important and delicate commission. He now imagines he can carry all before him, and pluck all the laurels of Brasidas from the head of that accomplished Spartan, even without having Demosthenes for his second. We may guess to what an height of insolence he was now grown from the *Knights* of Aristophanes. And to set it in the most ludicrous view, the poet opens his play with Nicias and Demosthenes, whom he paints in a very injurious manner: and, no doubt, it must have been very grating to them, to see themselves represented in so low Buffoonery upon the stage at Athens. Demosthenes begins with a shower of "curses on that execrable Paphlagonian," Cleon. Nicias seconds him; and then, "both of them howl together in a most lamentable duetto. They next lay their heads together about some means of redress. Demosthenes proposeth getting out of their master Cleon's reach. *Let us go then*, says Nicias. *Ay; let us go*, cries Demosthenes. *Say more*, says Nicias, *let us go over to the enemy*. *Ay, over to the enemy*, adds the other. *But*

first, says Nicias, *let us go and prostrate ourselves before the images of the Gods*. "What images? says Demosthenes; dost thou think then there are any Gods? I do. Upon what grounds? Because I am unworthily the object of their hatred. — Such are the daring misrepresentations Aristophanes makes of characters that by no means deserved it! Demosthenes, afterwards, describes the arrogance of Cleon thus: — *He hath one foot fixed in Pylus, and the other in the assembly of the people. When he moves, he struts and stretches at such a rate, that his bum is in Thrace, his hands in Ætolia, and his attention amongst the tribes at home.* — Nicias then proposeth poisoning themselves by drinking bull's blood like Themistocles; — Or rather, says Demosthenes, a dose of good wine. This is agreed upon in order to cheer up their spirits, and enable them to confront Cleon and play off against him the seller of black-puddings. Nicias accordingly goes and steals the wine." — Yet, in spite of the most outrageous ridicule, and the opposition of all wise and honest men at Athens, we see Cleon now at the head of an army, to stop the rapid conquests of Brasidas.

the

the haven of the Colophonians, lying at no great distance from Torone. Being here informed by the deserters, that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor the inhabitants able to make head against him, he marched his forces by land towards that city, and sent ten of his ships about to stand into the harbour. His first approach was to the new rampart, which Brasidas had thrown up quite round the city in order to inclose the suburbs within its cincture, and thus by the demolition of the old wall had rendered it one intire city. When the Athenians came to the assault, Pasitelas the Lacedæmonian (who was commandant) and the garrison under his command, exerted themselves in its defence. But when they could no longer maintain it, and at the same time the ships sent round on purpose had entered the harbour, Pasitelas fearing lest the ships might take the town now left defenceless, and, when the rampart was carried by the enemy, he himself might be intercepted, abandons it immediately, and retired with all speed into the town: But the Athenians were already disembarked and masters of the place. The land-force also broke in instantly at his heels, by rushing along through the aperture, in the old wall. And some, as well Peloponnesians as Toronæans, they slew in the moment of irruption. Some also they took alive, amongst whom was Pasitelas the commandant. Brasidas was indeed coming up to its relief, but receiving intelligence on his march that it was taken, he retired; since he was * forty stadia off, too great a distance to prevent the enemy. *He carrieth Torone.*

But Cleon and the Athenians now erected two trophies; one upon the harbour, the other at the rampart. They farther doomed to slavery the wives and children of the Toronæans. The male-inhabitants together with the Peloponnesians and every Chalcidæan that was found amongst them, amounting in all to seven hundred, they sent away captives to Athens. The Peloponnesians indeed were afterwards released by virtue of the subsequent treaty; the rest were fetched away by the Glynthians, who made exchanges for them, body for body.

Panaetum. About the same time the Bœotians by treachery got possession of Panaetum, a fort upon the frontier belonging to the Athenians.

Cleon. As for Cleon, having established a garrison at Torone, he departed thence and sailed round Athos, as bound against Amphipolis.

Sicily. But two vessels about this time, bound for Italy and Sicily, sailed out of the harbour of Athens, having on board Phæax the son of Erasistratus, with whom two other persons were joined in commission, to execute an embassy there. For the Leontines, after the departure of the Athenians from Sicily, in consequence of the joint-accommodation, had inrolled many strangers as denizens of their city, and the *populace* had a plan in agitation for a distribution of the lands. The *noble*, alarmed at this, gain the concurrence of the Syracusans and eject the *commons*. They were dispersed and wandered up and down as so many vagabonds: whilst the *noble*, striking up an agreement with the Syracusans, abandoned and left in desolation their own city, settling at Syracuse as free citizens of that place. And yet soon after, some of this number, dissatisfied even here, forsook Syracuse again, and seize upon Phœcæ a quarter of the old city of the Leontines, and upon Bricinnia, which is a fortress in the Leontine. Hither the greater part of the ejected *commons* resorted to them, and adhering firmly together, from these strong holds they annoyed the country by their hostilities.

When the Athenians had intelligence of this, they send out Phæax, to persuade by all proper methods their old allies in that country, and to gain, if possible, the concurrence of the other Sicilians, to take up arms for the preservation of the people of Leontium against the incroaching power of the Syracusans. Phæax, upon his arrival, recommendeth the scheme successfully to the Camarinæans and Agrigentines. But his negotiations meeting with some obstacles at Gela, he desisted from addressing himself to the rest, since he was assured he could not possibly succeed. Retiring therefore through the district of the Siculi to Catane, and calling on his road at Bricinnia, and
having

having encouraged the malecontents there to persevere, he departed. Not but that in this Sicilian voyage, both passing and repassing, and also upon the coast of Italy, he had urged to several cities, "how expedient for them was the Athenian friendship."

He met also in his course with those Locrians, who were going to another settlement, after expulsion from Messene. They had been driven to this necessity by seditious factions at Messene, one of which had invited them thither since the joint-accommodation among the Sicilians; and now they were forced to shift again, tho' Messene had for a time been entirely in their power. Phæax therefore, meeting with these in their removal, gave them no annoyance: For the Locrians had been at a conference with him, to concert the measures of an agreement with the Athenians. These however were the only party of all the confederates, who, when the Sicilians had amicably ended their disputes, refused to treat with the Athenians, and were brought to such submission since merely by a war, in which they were embroiled against the Itonians and Meléans, who bordered upon them, and were colonies of their own. And some time after this Phæax truly returned to Athens.

But Cleon, who from Torone was gone about by sea against Amphipolis, marching away from Eion, maketh an assault upon Stagirus a colony of Andrians, but without success: Yet, Galepsus a colony of the Thasians he taketh by storm. He sent farther ambassadors to Perdiccas, to summon his attendance in the expedition, according to the tenour of the new alliance. He sent others into Thrace to Polles king of the Odomantians, that he would hire as large a body of Thracians as could be got, and bring them up under his own orders. And during this interval he himself lay quiet at Eion.

But Brasidas, informed of these proceedings, placed himself in an opposite post at Cerdylum. This place belongeth to the Argilians, and is seated on an eminence on the other side of the river and at no great

great distance from Amphipolis. From hence he had a perfect view of all Cleon's motions; so that now it was impossible for the latter to make any approach with his army from thence to Amphipolis, without being discovered. Brasidas however suspected that Cleon would approach, and from a contempt of his opponents would certainly advance thither without waiting for reinforcements.

He had at the same time provided himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and had assembled all the Edonian targeteers and horsemen. Of the Myrcinians and Chalcidéans he had a thousand targeteers, besides those in Amphipolis. But his whole force of heavy-armed of all sorts amounted to about two thousand; and he had three hundred Grecian horsemen. With a detachment, consisting of fifteen hundred of these, Brasidas had posted himself at Cerdylum; the rest were left in Amphipolis, under the orders of Clearidas.

He appears before Amphipolis.

Cleon remained without stirring for the present, but was soon forced to such a step as Brasidas expected. The soldiers were chagrined at their inactivity, and were disparaging his conduct by invidious parallels "against how much skill and courage, with how much unskilfulness and cowardice he was matched;" and that "with the highest regret they had attended him from Athens, on this expedition." Sensible of their discontent, and unwilling to disgust them more by too long a continuance in the same post, he drew them up and led them on. He acted now upon the vain conceit, with which his success at Pylus had puffed him up, as a man of great importance. It could not enter his heart, that the enemy would presume to march out against and offer him battle. He gave out, that "he was only advancing in order to view the place; he waited indeed the arrival of additional forces, not as if they were needful to his security should the enemy attack him, but to enable him compleatly to invest the city and to take it by storm." Being advanced, he posted his troops upon a strong eminence before Amphipolis,

Amphipolis, and went in person to view the marshes of the Strymon, and the situation of the city on the side of Thrace, *how* it really was. He judged he could retreat at pleasure, without a battle. Not so much as one person appeared upon the works, or issued out at the gates: for they were all shut fast. He now concluded himself guilty of a mistake in coming so near the place without the machines, "as the town must infallibly have been taken, because abandoned."

Brasidas however had no sooner perceived that the Athenians were in motion, than descending from Cerdylum, he marcheth into Amphipolis. He there waved all manner of sally and all shew of opposition against the Athenians. He was afraid of trusting too much to his own forces, as he judged them inferior to the enemy, not truly in numbers, for so far they were nearly balanced, but in real worth. For the Athenian force appointed for this service was composed of the very flower of Athens, and the choicest troops of the Lemnians and Imbrians. For this reason, he prepared to assail them with art: because, in case he gave the enemy a view of his numbers and of the sorry manner in which they were armed, he judged he should be less likely to gain a victory, than by concealing them till the moment of action and avoiding that contempt which their real state would have inspired. Picking out therefore a party of one hundred and fifty heavy-armed for himself, and appointing Clearidas to command the rest, he designed to fall suddenly upon the Athenians in their retreat; concluding, he should never again find them in this forlorn manner, when the reinforcements they expected were come up. Calling therefore all his soldiers around him, as he was desirous of animating them and letting them into his scheme, he harangued them thus:

*Brasidas
throws himself
into Amphipolis.*

"YE men of Peloponnesus, let it suffice that I briefly put you in mind, that we are natives of that country which hath ever by
"valour

*Speech of
Brasidas.*

“ valour preserved itself free, and that *you* of the Doric are now
“ going to attack your opponents of the Ionic descent, whom you
“ are inured to defeat. My words are chiefly designed to inform
“ you, in what manner I have planned the method of attack, lest
“ hazarding the event with so small a party, and not with our intire
“ force, may seem unequal to the work, and may too much dispirit
“ you. The enemy, I conjecture, from an utter contempt of us
“ and a strong presumption that we durst not come out into the field
“ against them, have shewn themselves before this city; and, this
“ very moment disorderly scattered as they are to view the situation,
“ they heartily despise us. The leader therefore, who hath the most
“ acuteness in detecting such blunders in a foe, and then seizeth the
“ proper moment to fall upon them, as best enabled by his own
“ strength; not so much in the open and regular manner of a me-
“ thodical fight, as with a surprise most advantageous in the present
“ juncture, — such a leader may for the most part be assured of
“ success. Such stealths as these draw after them the highest glory:
“ By these, the man, who over-reacheth his enemy the most, per-
“ formeth the most substantial service for his friends. Whilst there-
“ fore, haughtily presuming on their own worth, they remain thus
“ disordered, and by what appeareth to me are bent more on draw-
“ ing off than remaining here, — during this their intermission of
“ purpose, and before their resolutions can be regularly adjusted, I
“ myself at the head of my chosen party will be amongst them, if
“ possible, and will rush with vigour into the centre of their army.
“ And then, Clearchus, when once you perceive that I am engaged,
“ and, as in probability it must be, have thrown them into disorder;
“ then, at the head of yours accompanied by the Amphipoli-
“ tans and the rest of the confederates, throw open the gates on a
“ sudden for your sally, and advance with your utmost speed to the
“ charge. And thus, it may confidently be hoped, the enemy must
“ be thrown into the utmost consternation: because, a second body,
“ thus

“ thus running to the charge, is more terrible to foes than the present which is already engaged. — And shew yourself now, Clearchidas, that gallant man, which in honour, as a Spartan, you ought to be.

“ You in general, ye confederates, I exhort to follow with manly resolution, and to remember that good soldiers are bound in duty, to be full of spirit, to be sensible of shame, and to obey commanders; that, this very day, if you behave with valour, you are henceforth free, and will gain the honourable title of *Lacedæmonian allies*: Otherwise, must continue to be the slaves of the Athenians; where the best that can befall you, if neither sold for slaves nor put to death as rebels, will be a heavier yoke of tyranny than you ever yet have felt, whilst the liberty of the rest of Greece must by you for ever be obstructed. But so dastardly behaviour I conjure you to scorn, as you know for what valuable prizes you are to enter the lists. I myself shall convince you, that I am not more ready to put others in mind of their duty, than personally to discharge my own through the whole scene of action.”

Brasidas, having ended his harangue, prepared to sally out himself, and placed the main body under the orders of Clearchidas at the gates which are called the Thracian, to be ready to rush out at the appointed time.

To Cleon now — For Brasidas had been plainly seen coming down from Cerdylum; and, as the prospect of the city lay open to those without, had been seen also when sacrificing before the temple of Minerva and forming the proper dispositions — To Cleon, I say, who was now in a remote quarter to view the posts, advice is brought, that “ the whole force of the enemy was visibly drawn up within the city, and that under the gates many feet of horses and men might be discerned, as ready for a sally.” Upon hearing this,

this, he went to the place, and was convinced by his own sight. He determined however not to hazard a battle before his succours were arrived; and, tho' he knew his motions could not be concealed, he went off and ordered the signal to be given for a retreat; commanding farther that the *left* wing should file off first, which indeed was the only method of drawing off securely to Eion. But as they seemed to him to be long about it, he wheeled off himself at the head of the *right*, and thus exposing his men to the missile weapons of the enemy, was drawing off his army.

*Battle of
Amphipolis.*

At this instant Brasidas, perceiving it was time to attack since the army of the Athenians was already in motion, says to those about him and to all that were near — “These gentlemen wait not for us: that plainly appeareth by the shaking of their spears and heads: For those who make such motions are not used to stay for the enemy’s approach. But, let some body throw me open the appointed gates, and let us boldly and with all speed sally out against them.” In effect Brasidas, issuing at the gates of the intrenchment and the first of what was then the *long-wall*, advanced with all speed directly along the road, where now standeth the trophy to be seen by those who pass along by the strongest part of the town, and falling upon the Athenians, dismayed not only at their own irregular situation but also terrified at his bold attack, in the very centre of their army, he putteth them to the rout. And now Clearchus, sallying out according to order at the Thracian gates, was advancing to second him. The consequence was, that by such an unexpected and sudden assault on both sides, the Athenians were thrown into the highest confusion. Their left wing, which inclined the most towards Eion as having filed off first, was instantly broke, and fled. These were no sooner dispersed in flight, than Brasidas, advancing to the attack of the right, is wounded: — He dropped; — but the Athenians are not sensible of it. Those who were near him took him up, and carried him off. This accident however enabled the
right

right wing of the Athenians to maintain their ground the longer, tho' Cleon, who from the first had never intended to stand an engagement, flies instantly away; and, being intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, is slain. But his heavy-armed, embodying together Cleon slain, and gaining an eminence, repulsed Clearidas who twice or thrice attacked them, and maintained their ground 'till the Myrcinian and Chalcidic cavalry and the targeteers, surrounding and pouring in their darts upon them, compelled them to fly. Thus the whole Athenian army was distressed in a laborious flight: They ran different ways amongst the mountains: Numbers had been destroyed in the charge; others by the Chalcidic horse and targeteers: But the remainder escaped in safety to Eion.

Those who took up Brasidas, when he dropped in the action, and ^{Brasidas dies,} bore him off, carried him into the city yet alive. His senses remained 'till he heard his party were victorious, and soon after that he expired ².

The rest of the army with Clearidas, being come back from the pursuit, rifled the dead and erected a trophy,

This done, all the confederates assisted under arms at the funeral ^{The funeral of Brasidas.} of Brasidas, whom they interred at the public expence within the city near the place where the *forum* now standeth. And afterwards, the Amphipolitans, having inclosed his monument, performed sacrifice to him as a Hero. They also enacted solemn games in his honour and annual sacrifices. Nay, they ascribed their colony to him as founder, after demolishing the edifices of Agæon and defacing every memorial, which might continue the memory of his foundation.

² The first embassy, which came from the Grecians in Thrace to Sparta after the death of Brasidas, made a visit to his mother Argileonis. The first question she asked them was, *Did my son die bravely?* And when the ambassadors expatiated largely in his praise, and said at last, There was not such another Spartan left alive. — *You mistake, gentlemen,* said the mother, *my son was a good man; but there are many better men than he in Sparta.* Plutarch's Laconic Apothegms.

They acted thus, partly out of real gratitude to Brasidas, whom they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at this juncture to shew their high respect for the Lacedæmonian alliance, as they stood in great dread of the Athenians. For, considering their hostile embroilments with the Athenians, they thought it neither for their interest nor satisfaction to continue the honours of Agnon.

To the Athenians they also delivered the bodies of their dead. The number of them on the Athenian side amounted to six hundred, whereas the enemy lost but seven men. This was owing to the nature of the fight, which had not been carried on in a regular manner, but was rather a slaughter in consequence of a surprize and sudden consternation. After the reception of their dead the Athenians sailed away for Athens: But those under the orders of Clearidas applied themselves to re-settle and secure Amphipolis.

About the same time in the close of this summer, Ramphias and Autocharidas and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, were conducting up for the Thracian service a reinforcement consisting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being arrived at Heraclea in Trachis, they regulated there such things as seemed to require an amendment: And during the season they halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was fought, and the summer ended.

But early as possible in the succeeding winter, the reinforcement under Ramphias proceeded on their route as far as Pierium of Thessaly. But, the Thessalians opposing their farther passage, and Brasidas being now dead to whom they were conducting this Supply, they returned home. They imagined that their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athenians, in consequence of their overthrow, had quitted that country; and themselves had not sufficient ability to carry the plans into execution which Brasidas had been meditating. But the principal motive of their return was their own consciousness at setting out, that the Lacedæmonians were more inclined to peace.

It so fell out indeed, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the return of Ramphias from Thessaly, that neither of the parties meddled any longer with the operations of war, but were more inclined to a peace. The motives on the Athenian side were these— They had received a terrible blow at Delium, and a second lately at Amphipolis: Hence, they no longer entertained that assured confidence of their own strength, which had formerly occasioned them to reject all accommodations, as they imagined in their then career of success they should soon give law to their enemies. Now also they were under apprehensions of their dependents, lest buoyed up by the late misfortunes of Athens, they might the sooner be induced to revolt. And they heartily repented now, that they had neglected the fine opportunity which their success at Pylus gave them, of bringing the dispute to a happy determination.

Both sides inclined to peace.

On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians acted on these motives.— They found themselves strangely mistaken in the events of war. At its commencement, they imagined that in the space of a few years they should intirely have demolished the power of the Athenians, by laying their territory waste: But they had suffered a terrible calamity in the affair of Sphacteria, such as never before had been the lot of Sparta. Devastations now were extended over all their country from Pylus and Cythera. Their Helots had also in numbers deserted to the foe: And they lived in constant expectation, that those, who yet persevered in their allegiance, gained by the solicitations of those who were fled, might in the present low ebb of Sparta attempt to subvert their constitution, as had formerly been the case. It happened farther, that the thirty-years truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring; and the Argives were unwilling to renew it, unless the Cynuria was previously restored. They judged it therefore a plain impossibility, to make head at the same time against both Argives and Athenians. They had also a suspicion that some cities of Pelopon-

Peloponnesus would revolt from them to the Argives, which proved afterwards true.

Both parties then being respectively influenced by such considerations, an accommodation was judged to be expedient. The anxiety of the Lacedæmonians about it was not the least, as they were eagerly bent on recovering their prisoners that had been taken at Sphacteria : For they were all citizens of Sparta of the first rank, and allied to the most honourable families. They had begun to solicit their liberty so soon as ever they were taken : But the Athenians, flushed with conquest, at that time disdained to treat. Yet after the blow received at Delium, the Lacedæmonians, knowing then they were become more tractable, laid hold of the favourable juncture, and obtained a cessation of arms for a year, in which space they were by article to hold mutual conferences, in order to settle an accommodation for a longer time. And since the Athenians had now again more lately been totally defeated at Amphipolis, and as well Cleon as Brasidas were dead, both of whom had most strenuously opposed an accommodation ; the latter, because he was successful and reaped glories in war ; the former, because in a season of tranquillity his villainies must needs be detected, and his bold calumniations lose all credit ; the persons, who at present were chief in the management of either State, were more strongly disposed than ever to adjust disputes. These were, Pleistionax the son of Pausanias king of the Lacedæmonians, and Nicias the son of Niceratus by far the most successful general of that age. Nicias desired it, as hitherto he had never been defeated, and was bent on securing his own prosperity on a lasting foundation, on obtaining a relaxation of toils for himself, and of their present burdens for his fellow-citizens, and on leaving his name illustrious to posterity as one who had never involved his country in calamity. These views, he judged, could only be accomplished by vacuity from danger, by exposing himself as little as possible to the uncertainties of fortune ;

fortune; and vacuity from danger was compatible solely with peace. Pleistionax had been calumniated by his enemies on the account of his restoration; and they invidiously suggested to his prejudice, upon every loss whatever which the Lacedæmonians sustained, that such was the consequence of transgressing the laws in the repeal of his banishment. For they laid to his charge, that, in concert with his brother Aristocles, he had suborned the priests of Delphi to give one general answer to all the deputations sent by the Lacedæmonians to consult the oracle, that "they should bring back the seed of the
 " demi-god son of Jove from a foreign land into their own country;
 " if not, they should plow with a silver plow-share;" and thus at length so seduced the Lacedæmonians in the favour of an exile residing at Lycæum, upon account of his precipitate retreat out of Attica, as though purchased by bribes from the enemy, and from a dread of his countrymen dwelling in a house one half of which was part of the temple of Jupiter, that nineteen years after they conducted him home with the same solemn processions and sacrifices as those, who were the original founders of Lacedæmon, had appointed for the inauguration of their kings. Repining therefore at these calumniations, and judging that as peace giveth no room for miscarriage, and that farther if the Lacedæmonians could recover the prisoners, his enemies would be debarred of a handle for detraction; whereas, whilst the chances of war subsist, the persons at the helm of government must be liable to reproaches for every disaster; he was earnestly desirous to bring about an accommodation.

This winter therefore they proceeded to a conference; and, at the approach of spring, great preparations were openly in hand on the Lacedæmonian side, and a scheme for fortifying in Attica was circulated through all the *States*, in order to render the Athenians more compliant. Many meetings were held, and many demands with large justifications were urged on both sides, till at length it was agreed that "a peace should be concluded, each party restoring
 " what

*Conference
about a peace.*

“ what they had conquered in the war, but Nisæa to remain in the
 “ hands of the Athenians.” Platæa was redemanded by the latter,
 but the Thebans urged that it had not fallen into their hands by force
 or by treachery, but they possessed it in pursuance of a free and volun-
 tary surrender. And upon the same plea the Athenians kept Nisæa.

Things being so far adjusted, the Lacedæmonians called together
 their confederates; and all their voices, excepting those of the Bœo-
 tians and Corinthians and Eléans and Megaréans, who were not at all
 satisfied with these proceedings, concurring for a peace, they ratify the
 accommodation, and solemnly pledged the observance of it to the
 Athenians, who in exchange swore the same to the Lacedæmonians,
 in effect as followeth —

*The Nician
 peace.*

“ THE Athenians and Lacedæmonians and their Allies have
 “ made peace on these terms, and every *State* hath sworn to their
 “ observance.

“ In regard to the common temples — permission is granted to all
 “ who desire it, to sacrifice, to visit, to consult the oracles, to send
 “ public deputations, in the prescribed forms of every people, both
 “ by land and sea, without any molestation.

“ That the sacred soil and the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and
 “ Delphi itself, be ruled after its own model, be taxed at its own
 “ discretion, and be administered by its own magistrates, whose deter-
 “ minations to be final both in regard to life and property, according
 “ to the primitive laws of the place.

“ That this peace continue for the space of fifty years, between
 “ the Athenians and the confederates of the Athenians on the one
 “ side, and the Lacedæmonians and the confederates of the Lacedæ-
 “ monians on the other, without fraud and without molestation, both
 “ at land and sea.

“ Be it farther unlawful for either party to take up arms to the
 “ detriment of the other — neither the Lacedæmonians and their
 “ allies

“ allies against the Athenians and their allies — nor the Athenians
 “ and their allies against the Lacedæmonians and their allies — with-
 “ out any fraud or evasion whatsoever. And, if any difference in-
 “ tervene between the contracting parties, let it be adjusted ac-
 “ cording to equity and upon oath, in such manner as they shall
 “ agree.

“ Agreed farther — That the Lacedemonians and allies deliver
 “ up Amphipolis to the Athenians.

“ That whatever cities the Lacedæmonians deliver up to the Athe-
 “ nians, leave be given to the inhabitants to remove at their own dis-
 “ cretion, with all their effects.

“ That the cities which pay the assessments rated by Aristides, en-
 “ joy all their rights and privileges whatever.

“ And — be it unlawful for the Athenians and their allies to take
 “ up arms to the annoyance of those cities which pay that assess-
 “ ment, from the time that this treaty be in force. Those cities are
 “ Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus. — These
 “ cities to observe a strict neutrality, forming no engagements with
 “ either Lacedæmonians or Athenians. — Provided, that if the Athe-
 “ nians can by fair means prevail upon these cities, it be lawful
 “ for the Athenians to admit them confederates at their own free
 “ choice.

“ That the Mecybernéans and Sanéans and Singéans shall inhabit
 “ their own cities in the same manner as the Olynthians and Acan-
 “ thians.

“ Agreed farther — That the Lacedæmonians and allies restore Pa-
 “ nactum to the Athenians.

“ That the Athenians restore to the Lacedæmonians * Corypha-
 “ fium, and Cythera, and Methone, and Pteleum, and Atalanta;
 “ and all the Lacedæmonians now prisoners of the State at Athens;
 “ or public prisoners in any quarter soever within the dominions

* This includes the fort of Pylus seated on the cape of Coryphæfium.

“ of Athens; and, to give leave of departure to all the Peloponne-
 “ sians blocked up in Scione, and to all the confederates of the Pe-
 “ loponnesians whatever in Scione, and to all persons whatever
 “ whom Brasidas placed there. — This article also to extend to
 “ any confederates of the Lacedæmonians now public prisoners at
 “ Athens, or public prisoners in any other quarter of the Athenian
 “ dominions.

“ That, in return, the Lacedæmonians and allies release all the
 “ prisoners, both Athenians and confederates, which are now in their
 “ hands.

“ That in regard to the Scionéans, Toronéans, and Sermýlians,
 “ and any other city belonging of right to the Athenians, the Athe-
 “ nians to proceed with the cities specified, and all the others, at
 “ their own discretion.

“ That the Athenians shall swear observance to the Lacedæmo-
 “ nians and their allies separately, according to their cities. Let both
 “ sides swear in the most solemn manner, according to the forms of
 “ each separate *State*; and the oath to be conceived in these words
 “ — *I abide by my compacts and the present articles, honestly,*
 “ *and without equivocation.* — Be an oath taken to the Athenians
 “ by the Lacedæmonians and allies to the same purport.

“ Be this oath renewed annually by the contracting parties:

“ Be pillars erected at Olympias, at Pythus, at the Isthmus, and
 “ at Athens in the Citadel, and at Lacedæmon in the Amycléum,
 “ with this treaty inscribed upon them.

“ If any point be in any manner or degree for the present, through
 “ forgetfulness on either side, omitted; or, if any thing, upon a se-
 “ rious consultation held, be judged more proper; the Lacedæmo-
 “ nians and Athenians are impowered, with all due regard to
 “ their oaths, to make additions and alterations, at their joint dis-
 “ cretion.

“ *Philotas*

" Pleistolas presiding in the college of Ephori, putteth this treaty
 " in force at Sparta on the twenty seventh day of the month Artemi-
 " sius: At Athens, Alcæus the Archon, on the twenty fifth day of
 " the month Elaphebolion.

" Those who took the oath and sacrificed, were

" On the Lacedæmonian side — Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Me-
 tagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischa-
 goras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, An-
 thippus, Telles, Alcidas, Empe-
 dias, Menas, Lamphilus.

" On the Athenian — Lampo, Isthmionicus, Nicias, La-
 ches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pytho-
 dorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasy-
 cles, Theagenes, Aristocætes, Iol-
 cius, Timocrates, Leo, Lamachus,
 Demosthenes."

This treaty was perfected upon the close of the winter, in the first commencement of the spring, immediately after the Bacchanalian festivals at Athens. Ten complete years, and some few days over, were elapsed since the first irruption into Attica and an open commencement of the war. And let him, that would be assured of the truth, compute only by the seasons of the year, and not by those who in the contending *States* were either Archons, or by the offices they bore had events distinguished by an enumeration of their names. For it cannot be exactly known in what determinate part, whether in the beginning or middle or any other portion of a magistracy, any important event occurred. But if the computation proceed by summers and winters, which method I have observed, such an inquirer will find, that these two halves being equivalent to a whole year, ten

*The author ad-
justs the time.*

complete summers and the same number of winters elapsed in the course of this first part of the war.

Lacedæmonians begin the restitutions.

The Lacedæmonians, for to them it fell by lot to make the first restitutions, released immediately what prisoners they had in their hands; and, having dispatched Ischagoras and Menas and Philocharidas in the quality of their ambassadors to the cities of Thrace, ordered Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and all the confederates there to submit to the terms of the treaty, according to the stipulation given for them. But this they positively refused, as they judged the treaty prejudicial. Clearidas also, to ingratiate himself with the Chalcideans, would not deliver up Amphipolis; alledging that without their concurrence he could not possibly do it. He himself returned in person soon after with the ambassadors, in order to make his defence at Lacedæmon, should Ischagoras accuse him there of disobeying orders. His view was farther to try, if the accommodation could by any means be evaded. But when he found it fast confirmed, he posted back with all speed to his government, having express orders from the Lacedæmonians to deliver up Amphipolis; or, if that was beyond his power, to cause all the Peloponnesians within that garrison instantly to evacuate the place.

Clearidas refuses to restore Amphipolis.

The confederates dissatisfied.

The confederates happened at this juncture to be at Lacedæmon, where such of them as had hitherto refused to accept the treaty were ordered by the Lacedæmonians to accede to it. But this they positively refused, alledging the same reason as before; and plainly affirming that "they would not come in, till better terms than the present were obtained for them." Their remonstrances had no effect upon the Lacedæmonians, who sent them away without redress, and struck up forthwith an alliance offensive and defensive with the Athenians. They had reason to conclude, that "the Argives would come to no agreement with them," since they had lately declared a negative to their ambassadors Ampelidas and Lichas; "and yet, these Argives," they judged, "could be no dreadful foe without the Athenians;

“ Athenians ; and that the rest of Peloponnesus would not now presume to interfere, who without this method of prevention would certainly have gone over to the Athenians.” An Athenian embassy therefore being at this crisis resident amongst them, a conference was held, and the terms completely adjusted. The ratification was made by solemn oath, and the articles of this alliance offensive and defensive were these :

“ THE Lacedæmonians enter into this alliance for the term of fifty years. — Provided that,

Alliance between Lacedæmonians and Athenians.

“ If any enemy enter the territories of the Lacedæmonians, and commit any manner of hostilities to their prejudice, the Athenians march forthwith to their succour, with all the possible means of redress, and with their whole united force.

“ And in case such invaders shall have withdrawn themselves, that the *State* under which they acted be declared an enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, both which are to join in acting offensively against that *State*, nor to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both the contracting *States*.

“ These terms to be observed with honour, with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever.

“ Provided farther — That if any enemy enter the territories of the Athenians, and commit hostilities to the prejudice of the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians march forthwith to their succour, with all the possible means of redress, and with their whole united force.

“ And in case such invaders shall have withdrawn themselves, that the *State* under which they acted be declared an enemy both to Lacedæmonians and Athenians, both which are to join in acting offensively against that *State*, nor to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both the contracting *States*.

“ These

" These terms also to be observed with honesty, with alacrity,
 " and without any fraud whatever.

" Provided farther — That if there happen any insurrection
 " among the Helots, the Athenians march to the succour of
 " the Lacedæmonians with their whole strength, to the full extent
 " of their power,

" The same persons on both sides shall swear to the observance of
 " these articles, who swore to the former treaty.

" The oaths to be annually renewed ; for which purpose, the
 " Lacedæmonians shall give their attendance at Athens, at the Bac-
 " chanal festival ; and the Athenians theirs at Lacedæmon, at the
 " Hyacinthian.

" Both parties to erect their pillar ; one at Lacedæmon, near
 " Apollo's in the Amyclæum ; the other at Athens, near Minerva's
 " in the citadel.

" And, in case the Lacedæmonians and Athenians think proper to
 " make any additions or alterations in the terms of this alliance,
 " the same lawfully to be done by both, at their joint-discretion.

" The oath of observance was sworn,

" On the Lacedæmonian side, by * Pleistionax, * Agis, Pleistolas,
 Damagetus, Chionis, Metage-
 nes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischa-
 goras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas,
 Anthippus, Alcinas, Tellis,
 Empedias, Menas, Laphilus.

" On the Athenian side, by Lampo, Isthmionicus, Laches,
 Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles,
 Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus,
 Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristo-
 crates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo,
 Lamachus, Demosthenes."

* The kings sign this alliance, but did not sign the former treaty.

This

This alliance was concluded in a very little time after the treaty of peace. And the Athenians now released to the Lacedæmonians their *Spartans*, who were made prisoners at Sphacteria. The summer also of the eleventh year was now begun. And so far the transactions of these first ten years of this war closely carried on have been regularly compiled.

Y E A R XI.

AFTER the treaty of peace and the alliance offensive and defensive between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians; both which were concluded after the ten years war, at the time when Pleistolas presided in the college of *Ephori* at Sparta and Alcæus was *Archon* at Athens, the peace became in force amongst the acceding parties. But the Corinthians and some of the Peloponnesian *States* were endeavouring the overthrow of all these proceedings. And immediately there arose another great combustion amongst the confederates against Lacedæmon. More than this, as time advanced, the Lacedæmonians became suspected by the Athenians, as they shewed no great punctuality in executing the conditions of the peace. For the space of six years and ten months they refrained indeed from entering one another's territory in an hostile manner; but, during such a correspondence which abounded in suspicions, they were in all other respects active in a reciprocal annoyance. And at length, necessitated to dissolve the treaty concluded at the ten years period, they engaged afresh in open war.

The same THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, hath also compiled an account of these latter transactions in a regular series, according to the summers and winters, down to that period of time when the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the *long-walls* and the Piræus. The whole continuance of the war to this period was twenty-seven years. And, if any

Before Christ
421.

Jealousies on
all sides.

The war in
fact goes on.

any man be inclined to think that this intervening accommodation should not be reckoned as war, he will find no arguments to support his opinion. For let him only survey the transactions as they are distinctly related, and he will find it an absurdity to pronounce *that* an interval of peace, in which neither all the restitutions were made nor the benefits obtained which the mutual stipulations required. And setting these considerations aside, in the Mantinéan and Epidauric and other wars, transgressions were committed on both sides. The confederates also of Thrace continued still to be as great enemies as ever. And the Bœotians never agreed to more than a bare cessation of arms, renewable every tenth day.

Thucydides. Including therefore the first war which lasted ten years, and that suspicious interval which ensued and ended at last in a second open rupture, the whole continuance, if computed by summers and winters, will turn out upon enquiry to have been so many years, and some few additional days. And such as laid stress upon the predictions of oracles, can assent only to this computation as genuine. For my own part, I perfectly well remember, that not only at the commencement, but even during the whole course of the war, many such predictions were given out, that “ it must needs continue three times nine years.” I also lived through its whole extent, in the very flower of my understanding and strength, and with a close application of my thoughts to gain an exact insight into all its occurrences. It was farther my lot to suffer a twenty years exile from my country, after my employment in the business of Amphipolis ; and to be present at the transactions of both parties, and not the least at those of the Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banishment ; by which means I had leisure to gather more ample informations about them. I shall relate therefore the quarrel and breach of the treaty subsequent to the first ten years, and the incidents of the war which afterwards ensued.

UPON

UPON the conclusion of the treaty of peace for fifty years and the subsequent alliance, the embassies from the different *States* of Peloponnesus, who had been summoned thither to give their concurrence, withdrew from Lacedæmon. The rest of them indeed went directly home: But the Corinthians, stopping in their return at Argos, began first at a conference with some of the magistracy there to insinuate, "that, since the Lacedæmonians, not in order to
Continuation of the history.
 "serve but to inflave Peloponnesus, had entered into a treaty and an
 "alliance offensive and defensive with their once most inveterate foes
 "the Athenians, it highly behoved the Argives now to watch over
 "the preservation of Peloponnesus, and to form a publick resolution—That any Grecian *State* which is free and uncontroled, which
 "enjoyeth and supporteth an equal share of rights and privileges,
 "might enter into an alliance offensive and defensive with the Argives, for the guard of their mutual properties against their common foes:—This to be communicated only to the *few* who were
 "absolute masters of the decisions of each *State*, and every where
 "to shun all conference with the bulk of the *people*, lest the scheme
 "might be detected in case the *multitude* should refuse their concurrence." They assured them that the majority of the *States* were so exasperated against the Lacedæmonians, that they would infallibly come in. And, after suggesting such a course, the Corinthians also returned home.
The Corinthians in fresh schemes.

The persons at Argos, who had listened to these insinuations, reported the scheme in the next place to the whole magistracy and people of Argos. The Argives resolved *accordingly*, and elected a committee of twelve, with whom such Grecians as desired it might agree upon an alliance, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians excepted. Neither of these *States* were permitted to treat with the Argives, without the public consent of the whole *people*.
The Argives.

The Argives were the more readily persuaded to such a measure, as they plainly saw a war was unavoidable between themselves and

the Lacedæmonians : for the truce between them was on the point of expiring. They were also animated by the hope of gaining into their hands the sovereignty of Peloponnesus. For, at this juncture of time, Lacedæmon lay under the greatest discredit, and was fallen into utter contempt upon account of their late disasters : whereas, the Argives were in the high vigour of their strength in all respects, as they had never interfered in the Attic war ; and, having observed an exact neutrality with both, had been thriving in peace and plenty. The Argives therefore in this manner invited those Grecians who were willing to enter into their alliance.

Mantineans. The Mantinéans and allies were the first who, out of a dread of the Lacedæmonians, accepted the proposal. For these Mantinéans, in the heat of the war against the Athenians, had seized and appropriated to themselves a certain district of Arcadia subject to Lacedæmon, and now concluded that the Lacedæmonians would never leave them in the quiet possession of it, when they were at liberty to act for its recovery. This readily induced them to have recourse to the league of Argos, regarded by them as a powerful *State*, which had ever been at variance with Lacedæmon, and like their own was democratical.

No sooner had the Mantinéans revolted, than the rest of Peloponnesus began to mutter that “ they ought also to take the same step ; ” imagining that revolt to have been founded upon some stronger reasons than yet appeared ; exasperated also against the Lacedæmonians for sundry reasons, and above all for this article in the peace with Athens — that “ in case the two *States* of Lacedæmon and Athens “ think proper to make any additions or alterations, the same to be “ lawful.” For this was the clause which gave the greatest alarm to Peloponnesus, and inspired a jealousy that the Lacedæmonians might strike up a bargain with the Athenians to enslave the other *States* ; since, in justice, no alteration ought to be made without the concurrence of the whole confederacy. Alarmed therefore at these

these proceedings, many of them made instant application to the Argives, exerting their several endeavours to obtain their alliance.

But the Lacedæmonians, perceiving what a combustion was arisen in Peloponnesus, principally owing to the insinuations of the Corinthians, who were also going to enter into this league with Argos, they dispatch ambassadors to Corinth from a desire to prevent what might ensue. Here they represented to them — “ how criminal “ their conduct had been in having thus originally fomented the “ present tumult ; and that, in case they abandoned the Lacedæ- “ monians and went over to the Argive league,” they assured them that “ by such a step they must break the most sacred oaths ; in- “ justice they had already committed in refusing to accede to the “ Athenian peace, since pursuant to old stipulations between them, “ *whatever a majority of the confederates resolved was to be binding* “ *on all, unless some God or Hero enjoined a dissent.*” But the Corin- thians, in the presence of all those of the confederacy who had not accepted the peace and whose attendance they had previously invited, replied to the Lacedæmonians, without entering into a particular de- tail of the injuries they had done them in not covenanting with the Athenians for the restitution of Solium, or Anacltorium, or any other point, in which they thought themselves aggrieved, but speciously pretending, that “ they could never abandon their allies in Thrace, “ whom by solemn oaths they were bound to support ; oaths, “ which they had severally sworn when they first revolted in con- “ cert with the Potidæans, and had on other occasions since re- “ newed ;” arguing from hence, that “ they could not have violated “ the common oath of the confederates in refusing their accession to “ the Athenian peace, since as they had sworn upon the faith of “ the Gods to the former, they could not betray them without the “ guilt of perjury ; the stipulation indeed ran thus, *unless some God “ or Hero enjoined a dissent* ; their present dissent therefore appeared “ to them to be a divine injunction.” So far they argued from their

Lacedæmoni-
ans send to
Corinth.

former oaths. And in regard to the alliance offensive and defensive with Argos — “ they would hold consultations with their friends, “ and take such steps as were expedient and just.” And with this answer the Lacedæmonian ambassadors departed home. An Argive embassy happened also at the same time to be at Corinth, who pressed the Corinthians to enter into their league, without any farther hesitation. They desired them to attend, at the next public meeting they held, for a final answer.

Eléans.

* 193 l. 15.
Sterling.

There arrived soon after an embassy from the Eléans, who made in the first place an alliance offensive and defensive with the Corinthians; and then, from Corinth, repairing to Argos, became allies of the Argives, according to the scheme pre-established for this purpose: For a misunderstanding had arose between them and the Lacedæmonians about Lepréum. In a former war of the Lepreatæ against a province of Arcadia, the Eléans had been prevailed upon to join the Lepreatæ for a moiety of the land that should be conquered; and, at the conclusion of the war the Eléans left all the land in the management of the Lepreatæ, subject to the annual tribute of a * talent to Olympian Jove. This was regularly paid 'till the Athenian war. But that war being then made a pretence of its discontinuance, the Eléans would have exacted it by force. The others had recourse to the Lacedæmonians. The dispute was referred to the Lacedæmonian arbitration: But the Eléans, taking up a suspicion that they should not have justice, would not abide the reference, but began to ravage the territory of the Lepreatæ. The Lacedæmonians notwithstanding this proceeded to a sentence — that “ the Lepreatæ were masters of their own conduct, and that the Eléans “ were guilty of injustice;” and, as the latter would not abide by their arbitration, they threw a garrison of heavy-armed into Lepréum. But the Eléans, regarding this step as the reception of a city by the Lacedæmonians which had revolted from them, and alledging the treaty in which it was stipulated — that “ of whatever “ places

“ places the parties were possessed upon the commencement of the Attic war, the same they should continue to hold at its expiration,” — as if they had met with injustice, they revolt to the Argives: And the Eléans entered into that league offensive and defensive, as hath been already related.

The Corinthians soon followed their example, and, with the Chalcidæans also of Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But the Bœotians and Megaréans, tho’ they had threatened the same thing, thought proper to drop it. They had been ill-used by the Lacedæmonians, but judged however that the democracy of the Argives would be less compatible with their interests, whose form of government was oligarchical, than the polity of the Lacedæmonians.

About the same time of this summer, the Athenians becoming *The Athenians get Scione;* masters of the Scionéans after a long blockade, put all who were able to bear arms to the sword, and made their wives and children slaves; and gave the land to be cultured by the Platæans.

They also again brought back the Delians to Delos, induced to it *Delos.* by the many defeats they had suffered in battle, and the express oracle of the God at Delphi.

The Phocians also and Locrians began about this time to make war upon one another.

And now the Corinthians and Argives, united in league, go together to Tegea, to persuade its revolt from the Lacedæmonians. They *The Corinthian politics.* saw it was a large district; and, in case they compassed its accession, they imagined the whole of Peloponnesus would be at their beck. But, when the Tegeatæ declared that “ they would in no shape oppose the Lacedæmonians,” the Corinthians, who till now had acted with great alacrity, slackened in their zeal for contention, and began to fear that no more of the *States* would come in. They proceeded however to the Bœotians, and solicited them “ to accede to the league between themselves and Argives, and to co-operate with them for the common welfare.” — And, as there were truces for ten

ten days between the Athenians and Boeotians, which were agreed upon soon after the peace for fifty years was made, the Corinthians now pressed the Boeotians "to accompany them to Athens, and so-
 "licit for truces of the same nature for them; but in case the Athe-
 "nians refused to grant them, to renounce the suspension of arms;
 "and for the future never to treat without their concurrence." The Boeotians, thus solicited by the Corinthians, desired a longer time to consider about their accession to the Argive league. To Athens indeed they bore them company, but could not obtain the ten-days truces: For the Athenians answered — "The Corinthians have a
 "peace already, if they are confederates of the Lacedæmonians." And upon the whole, the Boeotians absolutely refused to renounce their own truces, tho' the Corinthians insisted upon it, and urged with some warm expostulations that it had been so covenanted between them. So there was only a mere cessation of arms between the Corinthians and Athenians, without any solemn ratification.

*The Lacedæ-
 monians take
 the field.*

This same summer, the Lacedæmonians took the field with their whole united force, under the command of Pleistionax the son of Pausanias king of the Lacedæmonians, and marched to the Parrhasians of Arcadia. These were subject to the Mantinéans, and in consequence of a sedition had invited this expedition. But it was also designed, if possible, to demolish the fortress of Cypselæ which the Mantinéans had erected, and, as it was situated in Parrhasia towards the Skiritis of Laconia, had placed a garrison in it. The Lacedæmonians therefore ravaged the territory of the Parrhasians. But the Mantinéans, leaving their own city to the guard of the Argives, marched themselves to the support of their dependents. But finding it impossible to preserve the fortress of Cypselæ and the cities of the Parrhasians, they retired. The Lacedæmonians also, when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortress, withdrew their forces,

The

The same summer also, upon the return from Thrace of those soldiers who had served under Brasidas, and who came home after the peace under the conduct of Clearidas, the Lacedæmonians decreed "those Helots who had served under Brasidas to be free, and to have permission to reside wherever they pleased." And no long time after, they placed them together with such persons as were newly enfranchised, at Lepræum: It is situated between Laconia and Eléa: and they were now at variance with the Eléans. As for those *Spartans* who had been made prisoners in Sphacteria, and had delivered up their arms, conceiving some fears about them, lest should they lay their late disgrace too much to heart, as they were persons of the greatest rank, they might introduce some innovations in the *State*, they declared them *infamous*, even tho' some of the number were at this time possessed of posts in the government. But this *infamy* extended no farther than to disqualify them from offices, and from buying and selling. Yet, in a short time afterwards, they were again restored to their full privileges.

The same summer also the Dictidæans took Thyssus, a town seated upon the Athos, and confederate with the Athenians.

Through the whole course of the summer, the communication was open between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Not but that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians began to be jealous of one another immediately after the peace, as the reciprocal restitution of places was not punctually performed. For tho' it had fallen to the Lacedæmonians lot to begin these restitutions, yet they had not restored Amphipolis and other cities. They had compelled neither their confederates in Thrace, nor the Bœotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept the peace, always pretending that "should they refuse it, they were ready to join with the Athenians in their compulsion;" nay, they limited to them a time, tho' not by a regular written notice, "in which such as did not accede were declared enemies to both." The Athenians therefore, seeing none of these points were put in actual

Jealousy between Lacedæmonians and Athenians.

actual execution, became jealous of the Lacedæmonians, as men who acted insincerely in every step: insomuch that when Pylus was demanded, they refused its restitution, and heartily repented that they had released the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. They also kept possession of other places, and intended to do so, till the other side had performed their engagements. But the Lacedæmonians alledged "they had done every thing in their power; that, for instance, they had released such Athenians as were prisoners amongst them, had recalled their soldiers from Thrace, and wherever they were masters of the execution had performed it. As to Amphipolis," they said "they were not so far masters of it as to make an actual surrender. They had omitted no endeavours to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians to a compliance, to recover the disposal of Panactum, and to obtain the dismissal of those Athenians who were prisoners of war in Bœotia. Pylus however," they insisted, "should be immediately restored to them, at least that the Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn, as their people had been from Thrace; and then the Athenians, if they pleased, might continue to garrison that fortress themselves." Many meetings were held, and much argumentation passed between them this summer; and at last, they prevailed upon the Athenians to withdraw from Pylus the Messenians and others, as well Helots as all deserters whatever out of Laconia. These they transplanted to Crania of Cephallene. This summer therefore was a season of inaction, and the intercourse was open between them.

*A political
turn at La-
cedæmon.*

In the ensuing winter — For other Ephori were in office, as the authority of those under whom the peace was made was now expired, and some who were averse to the peace had succeeded — embassies attending from the whole confederacy, the Athenians and Bœotians and Corinthians also being present, and after much reciprocal altercation, coming to no regular agreement; the rest of them separated to their own homes without effect. But Cleobulus and Xenares, those two
of

of the *Ephori*, who were most inclined to dissolve the peace, detained the Bœotians and Corinthians for a private conference. In this they exhorted them “ to act unanimously in promotion of their scheme, “ in pursuance of which the Bœotians should first make themselves a “ party in the Argive league, and then employ their good offices to “ form an alliance between the Argives and Lacedæmonians. For by “ these methods, the Bœotians could least of all be necessitated to “ take part in the Attic peace ; as the Lacedæmonians would prefer “ the renewal of friendship and alliance with the Argives to the en- “ mity of the Athenians and the dissolution of the peace ; since, to “ their certain knowledge, the Lacedæmonians had ever been de- “ sirous to have the friendship of Argos consistently with their ho- “ nour ; knowing it would facilitate the success of their war without “ Peloponnesus.” — They also requested the Bœotians “ to deliver “ up Panactum to the Lacedæmonians, that exchanging it if possible “ for Pylus, they might get clear of the main obstacle to a fresh “ rupture with the Athenians.”

The Bœotians and Corinthians, instructed by Xenares and Cleo- Bœotians.
bulus and the party in their interest at Lacedæmon, departed *both* to report this scheme to their principals. But two persons of the greatest authority in the *State* of Argos were attending upon the road for their return. They met and conferred with them “ about the “ means of gaining the concurrence of the Bœotians in this league, “ upon the same footing with the Corinthians and Eléans and Man- “ tinéans. For they were confident, were this point once com- “ pleated, they might easily become the arbiters of war or peace, “ either in relation to the Lacedæmonians (if they so determined, “ and would act together with firm unanimity) or to any other *State* “ whatever.”

The Bœotian ambassadors were highly delighted with this dis- course. The solicitations of these Argives happened to coincide with the instructions recommended to them by their friends at Lacedæ-

mon. And the Argives, finding them satisfied with their motion, assured them they would send embassadors to the Bœotians, and so they parted.

But the Bœotians, at their return, reported to the *Rulers* of Bœotia the proposals from Lacedæmon, and those from the Argives upon the road. The Bœotian-Rulers were delighted, and grew now more zealous than ever; because, on both sides, from their Lacedæmonian friends and also from the Argives the solicitations were concurrent. And very soon after the Argive embassadors arrived to forward the dispatch of the treaty. The Bœotian-Rulers however at present gave only a verbal approbation of the scheme, and then dismissed them, promising to send an embassy of their own to Argos, to perfect the alliance.

But in the mean time, it was judged to be previously expedient, that the Bœotian-Rulers and the Corinthians and the Megaréans and the embassadors from the allies of Thrace should mutually interchange their oaths "to act in support of one another, if upon any occasion such support might be requisite, and to enter neither into war nor peace without joint-consent;" and then the Bœotians and Megaréans (for these acted in union) to form a league with the Argives. But before such exchange of oaths, the Bœotian-Rulers communicated the whole of the plan to the four Bœotian *councils*, in whom the sovereignty is lodged; recommending it, as worthy their confirmation, that "whatever cities were willing might mutually interchange such oaths for their reciprocal advantage." Yet the Bœotians, who composed the councils, refused a confirmation; apprehensive, it might tend to embroil them with the Lacedæmonians, should they pledge such an oath to the Corinthians, who were now abandoning the Lacedæmonian interest. For the *Rulers* had not made them privy to the scheme from Lacedæmon, how "Xenares and Cleobulus of the college of *Ephori* and their friends advise them, to enter first into league with the Argives and Corinthians, " and

“ and then to extend it to the Lacedæmonians :” They had presumed that the supreme council, tho’ they secreted these lights, would not resolve against a plan which *themselves* had pre-digested and recommended to them. But now, as this affair took so wrong a turn, the Corinthians and embassadors from Thrace went home without effect. And the Bœotian-Rulers, who had all along intended, in case their scheme had passed, to perfect an alliance with the Argives, made no farther report to the *councils* in relation to the Argives, sent no embassy to Argos in consequence of their promise, but suffered the whole plan to sink away in careless and dilatory unconcern.

In this same winter, the Olynthians after a sudden assault took Mecyberne. Mecyberne, which was garrisoned by Athenians.

After the former proceedings — For conferences were still continued between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians about those places they held from one another — the Lacedæmonians, conceiving some hope, that if the Athenians could recover Panactum from the Bœotians, they also might regain Pylus, addressed themselves in solemn embassy to the Bœotians, and importuned them to deliver up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, that they in return might get Pylus from *them*. But the Bœotians persisted in a refusal, unless they would make a separate alliance with them, as they had done with the Athenians. Upon this, the Lacedæmonians, tho’ convinced that such a step would be injustice to the Athenians, since it had been stipulated that “ without joint-consent they should neither make peace nor war ;” yet bent on the recovery of Panactum that they might exchange it for Pylus ; the party at the same time amongst them, who were meditating a fresh rupture, inclining to the Bœotian interest ; made the requisite alliance in the very close of this winter, on the approach of spring. The consequence was, that Panactum was immediately levelled with the ground ; and the eleventh year of the war was brought to a conclusion.

YEAR XII.

Before Christ

420.

Argives.

EARLY in the spring of that summer which was now approaching, the Argives --- when the expected embassy from Bœotia was not arrived in pursuance of promise; when they found that Panactum was demolished, and a separate alliance struck up between the Bœotians and Lacedæmonians; --- began to fear they should be totally abandoned; and that their whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedæmonians. They concluded that, through the prevalence of the Lacedæmonian arguments, the Bœotians had been persuaded to level Panactum and accede to the treaty made with Athens, and that the Athenians were privy to all these steps; and so, of consequence, they themselves were now utterly excluded from an alliance with the Athenians, and their former hopes entirely blasted that, in case disputes should arise and their treaty with the Lacedæmonians not be renewed, they might at worst depend on gaining the Athenian alliance. The Argives therefore, amidst these perplexities, and the dread of being attacked at once by the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the Bœotians and Athenians, as they had formerly refused an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians, and had grasped in thought at the sovereignty of Peloponnesus; --- the Argives, I say, had no longer one moment to lose, but dispatched instantly Eustrophus and Æson, whom they judged to be persons most agreeable there, in embassy to Lacedæmon. They now judged it their interest to procure the best peace which the present posture of affairs would allow from the Lacedæmonians, and then quietly to attend the event of things. In this view, the ambassadors on their arrival had a conference with the Lacedæmonians about the terms of a peace. And at first, the Argives insisted, that "to some State or private person should be referred for equitable arbitration the controversy between them about the district of Cynuria," concerning which, as it is frontier to both,

both, they are eternally at variance : in this district stand the cities of Thyrea and Anthena ; and the possession of it is in the hands of the Lacedæmonians. But at length, when the Lacedæmonians would not suffer any mention to be made of this, declaring only that “ were they willing to renew the former truce, they should find “ them complying ;” the Argive embassadors however prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to agree to these proposals, that “ for the “ present a peace should be concluded for the term of fifty years ; “ provided notwithstanding, that liberty remain to either party to “ send a challenge, when neither was embarrassed by plague or war, “ and the right of this district be then decided by arms between Lacedæmon and Argos, as had formerly been done ³ when the victory was equally claimed on both sides ; and that in this case it be “ not lawful to carry the pursuit beyond the boundaries of either “ Argos or Lacedæmon.” These proposals, it is true, appeared at

³ Herodotus relates this remarkable piece of history, in *Clio*. “ They had a conference (says he) and came to an agreement, that three hundred men on each side should decide the point by combat, “ and the land contested should remain “ the property of the victors ; that both “ armies in the mean time should retire “ within their respective dominions, nor “ be present at the combat, lest by being “ spectators of it either of them, seeing “ their countrymen defeated, might run “ to their assistance. When articles were “ settled, both armies drew off. Those “ selected on each side for the combat stood “ behind, and engaged. They fought it out “ with equal resolution and fortune. Of “ six hundred men only three were left “ alive ; two of them Argives, Alcino- “ and Chromius ; and one Lacedæmo-

nian, Othryades. These were all the “ survivors, when night came on. The “ Argives, as victors, ran in haste to “ Argos ; but Othryades, for the Lacedæmonians, having stripped the dead “ bodies of the Argives, and carried off “ their arms to the place where his own “ side had encamped, continued upon the “ field of battle. Next morning both “ parties came to learn the event. And “ then truly each party also claimed the “ victory ; one averring, that a majority “ survived on their side ; the other maintaining, that even those had fled whilst “ their own combatant had kept his “ ground and spoiled the dead. In short, “ from wrangling they came again to blows “ and a general engagement ; in which, after great slaughter on both sides, the Lacedæmonians obtained the victory.”

first

first to the Lacedæmonians to be foolish ; but at length, as their necessary interest made them vastly desirous of the Argive friendship, they complied with the demand, and the terms agreed on were digested into writing. But the Lacedæmonians, before they put the last hand to the treaty, insisted on their previous return to Argos and reporting it to the *people*, and in case the ratification was given, to repair again to Lacedæmon at the Hyacinthian festival and swear observance. And upon this they returned to Argos.

Lacedæmo-
nians and
Athenians.

Whilst the Argives were employed in this negotiation, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromenes and Phædimus and Antimenidas, who were commissioned to receive Panactum and the prisoners of war from the Bœotians and deliver them over into the hands of the Athenians, found upon their arrival that Panactum was already demolished by the Bœotians, upon pretext that “ in former times, “ upon occasion of some dispute about it, an oath had been taken by “ the Athenians and Bœotians *that* neither should inhabit that place “ excluding the other, but should jointly possess it ;” ---- but what Athenian prisoners of war were in the hands of the Bœotians, were delivered up to Andromenes and his colleagues, who carried and released them to the Athenians. They also reported the demolition of Panactum, declaring this to be equivalent to a restitution, as no enemy to Athens could occupy that post for the future.

These words were no sooner heard than the Athenians conceived the deepest resentments. They thought themselves injured by the Lacedæmonians, not only in the demolition of Panactum which ought to have been restored standing ; but also, in the separate alliance made lately with the Bœotians, of which now they had notice, in open contradiction to their own declaration “ of joining them to “ compel by force such as would not accede to the treaty.” They reflected also upon other points, in which the engagements of the treaty had been in no wise fulfilled, and concluded themselves over-
reached.

reached. For these reasons, they gave a rough answer to the ambassadors, and an instant dismissal.

Upon so much umbrage taken by the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians, such persons at Athens, as were willing to dissolve the peace, set themselves instantly at work to accomplish their views. Others were labouring the same point, but none more than Alcibiades the son of Clinias⁴; a person, in respect of age even then but a youth, at least he would have passed for such in other States, tho' for the dignity of his birth he was much honoured and carested. It seemed to him the most expedient step, to form a good understanding with the Argives. Not but that his opposition to other measures was the result of his ambition and a study of contention, because the Lacedæmonians had employed their interest in Nicias and Laches to

Alcibiades
schemes a
rupture.

⁴ Alcibiades is here beginning his political intrigues, to open the field for his own soaring and enterprising genius to dilate itself more at large. Pericles was his near relation and guardian; Socrates was his friend and guide, so long as virtue was his care. Warmer passions soon gained the ascendant over him; and he plunged into all the busy scenes of life, with that intense application and flexible address to all persons and all occasions as surprised the world; "more changeable than a camelion; (as Plutarch expresseth it,) since that creature cannot put on a fair or white appearance." His character is thus drawn in miniature by the neat and masterly pen of Cornelius Nepos. "Nature (says he) seems to have exerted her utmost power in Alcibiades. It is agreed by all writers, who have made him the subject of their pens, that a more extraordinary man never lived, either for virtues or vices. Born in a

"most noble republic, of a most honourable family, by far the handsomest person of his age, fit for every thing, and full of address. He was a commander that made the greatest figure both by land and sea; an orator, whom none could surpass; nay, his manner and matter when he spoke were quite irresistible. Exactly as occasions required, he was laborious, persevering, indefatigable, generous, splendid in all his outward appearance and at his table; full of affability, profuse of civility, and of the utmost dexterity in adapting himself to the exigences of time. And yet, in the seasons of relaxation, and when business no longer required him to keep his faculties on the stretch, he was luxurious, dissolute, lewd, and intemperate. The whole world was astonished that so vast an unlikeness and so different a nature should be united in the same person."

perfect

perfect the treaty, slighting his assistance upon account of his youth, nor paying him the deference he expected from the ancient hospitality between that *State* and the family from which he was descended. This indeed his grandfather had renounced; but he himself, in the view of renewing it, had shewn extraordinary civilities to the *Spartans* who were made prisoners at Sphacteria. Thinking himself therefore in all respects slighted, at this crisis he began openly to oppose them. He affirmed that "the Lacedæmonians were a people who could not be trusted; that they had treacherously entered into the peace, in order to divert the Argives from their alliance, that again they might attack the Athenians when left alone." Nay farther, upon the first dissatisfaction between them, he secretly dispatcheth his emissaries to Argos, exhorting them "at his invitation to come to Athens in company with the Mantinéans and Eléans and solicit an alliance, since opportunity favoured, and his whole interest should be exerted in their support."

The Argives, having heard these suggestions; and being now convinced, that the Bœotian separate alliance had been made without the privity of the Athenians, who on the contrary were highly discontented at the Lacedæmonian proceedings; took no farther notice of their embassy at Lacedæmon, tho' sent expressly there to negotiate an accommodation, but recalled all their attention from thence to the Athenians. They reflected, that Athens, a *State* which from long antiquity had been their friend, which was governed by a *democracy* in the same manner as their own, and which was possessed of a great power at sea, could most effectually support them in case a war should break out against them. In short, they lost no time in dispatching their ambassadors to the Athenians to propose an alliance, who were accompanied by embassies from the Eléans and Mantinéans.

A Lacedæmonian embassy also arrived in great haste, composed of Philocharidas and Leon and Endius, persons who were judged most acceptable

acceptable at Athens. They were afraid, lest the Athenians in the heat of their resentments should clap up an alliance with the Argives. They sent also by them a demand of the restitution of Pylus in lieu of Panactum, and excuses for the separate alliance they had made with the Bœotians, "which had been concluded without any "design of prejudicing the Athenians." Upon these points they spoke before the senate⁵, notifying at the same time that "they were come
" with

5. The Lacedæmonian embassy have on this occasion their first audience from the *Senate*. The business of this history hath been hitherto transacted in the *assembly of the people*. For, as the Generals of the *State* were the chief ministers in time of war, and had a power of convening the people at their own discretion, all points that required a speedy determination were brought before the people in the first instance; and the influence of the senate, which operated on *ordinary* occasions, was checked and suspended in time of war, which starts many *extraordinary* occasions; or left it in the will of the Generals of the *State* to call and treat as *extraordinary* whatever they pleased. By this means the people had ingrossed the power; the balance which Solon designed always to preserve was in a great measure lost, and the *aristocratical* influence was quite suspended.

As therefore the *popular assembly* had its *note* at first setting out, the form and constitution of the *senate* now requires an explanation.—At this time it consisted of five hundred persons; and, for that reason is often styled The council of *five hundred*; and sometimes by Thucydides The council of the *bean* from the manner of their election. Every year, on an appointed day, each tribe returned the names of their mem-

bers, who were qualified and stood candidates for this honour. The names were engraved on pieces of brass, and cast into a vessel: The same number of beans were cast into another vessel, fifty of which were white and the rest black. They then proceeded to draw out a name and a bean; and the persons, to whose names the white beans were drawn, became the senators of the year. Each senator had a drachma, that is, seven pence three farthings a day for his salary.

In the next place, the names of the tribes were thrown into a vessel, and into another nine black beans and one white one. The tribe, to whose name the white bean was drawn, took the first course of *presidency* for a tenth part of the year; and the order of the succeeding courses was determined in the same manner by the bean. How the fifty in course were again subdivided into *tens*, and from these *tens* a chairman chose for a day hath been already explained in the *note* on the popular assembly, Book I.

The *senate* sat every day in the *prytæneum* or *state-house*, where the *presidents* had also their diet. They were the grand council of state, took into consideration all the affairs of the commonwealth, debated, and voted by beans: And whatever determinations were thus made in the *senate*
were

"with full powers to put an end to all disputes," by which they gave some alarm to Alcibiades; lest, should they make the same declaration before the assembly of the *people*, it might have an influence upon the *multitude*, and an alliance with the Argives might prove abortive.

*A finesse of
Alcibiades.*

But Alcibiades now contriveth to baffle them by art. He prevaileth upon the Lacedæmonians, by solemnly pledging his faith to them, that "in case they would disown before the *people* the full powers "with which they were invested, he would engage for the restitution of Pylus: For he himself would then persuade the Athenians "to it with as much zeal as he now dissuaded, and would get all "other points adjusted to their satisfaction." His view in acting thus was to detach them from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of inveighing against them in the assembly of the *people* as men who had nothing sincere in their intentions, and whose professions were dissonant with themselves, and so to perfect an alliance with the Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans. And this artifice in the sequel took effect. For when they were admitted to an audience before the *people*, and replied to the demand when put, contrary to what they had said in the senate, that "they had no such powers," the Athenians in an instant lost all patience. And now, Alcibiades roaring out aloud against the Lacedæmonians with much more vehemence than he had ever done before, they listened greedily to all he said, and were ready instantly to call in the Argives and their companions, and to make them confederates. But the shock of an earthquake being felt,

were afterwards carried down to the *assembly of the people* to be ratified and passed into laws. By Solon's original constitution, nothing was to be proposed to the people, before it had been canvassed and approved in the senate. But this seems to have been eluded by the Generals of the state, who had all military business in their depart-

ment, and a power to convene the people at their pleasure, and lay matters before them in the first instance. To restore the *aristocratical* power, and reduce that of the *people*, occasioned an usurpation and sad confusion in Athens, as will be seen in the eighth book of this history.

before

before any thing could be formally concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

At the next day's assembly, Nicias — tho' the Lacedæmonians had been thus overreached, and he himself ensnared by their public acknowledgment that they had no full powers — spoke however on the Lacedæmonian side, insisting "on the necessity of maintaining a good correspondence with them, and deferring all agreement with the Argives, till they could send to the Lacedæmonians, and be distinctly informed of their final resolutions." — "It maketh, said he, for your credit but for their disgrace, that a war should be averted. For as your affairs are in a happy posture, it is above all things eligible for you, to preserve your prosperity unimpaired; but they, in their present low situation, should put all to hazard in the hopes of redress." He carried it in short, that ambassadors should be dispatched, he himself to be one in the commission, earnestly to require of the Lacedæmonians, that if their intentions were honest, they should surrender Panactum standing and Amphipolis; and should farther renounce the alliance with the Bœotians in case they still refused to accede to the peace — this in pursuance of the article that *Neither should make peace without joint-consent.* They ordered it to be added farther, that "they themselves, could they have deigned to act unjustly, had concluded before this an alliance with the Argives, as they were already attending and soliciting such a measure." And having subjoined their instructions, in relation to all other points in which they thought themselves aggrieved, they sent away the ambassadors in commission along with Nicias. These, being arrived and having reported their instructions, added in conclusion, that "unless they would renounce their alliance with the Bœotians if still refusing their accession to the peace, they would admit the Argives and their associates into league;" — the Lacedæmonians replied, "They would never renounce their alliance with the Bœotians:" For the party of Xenares

the *Ephorus*, and all who acted in the same combination, had still the majority : However, at the request of Nicias they renewed the oaths. Nicias was afraid of being forced to depart without settling any one point of his commission, and of falling under public censure (which really came to pass) as undoubted author of the peace with the Lacedæmonians. And when, upon his return, the Athenians had heard that no one point was adjusted at Lacedæmon, they immediately conceived the warmest indignation : And looking upon themselves as highly abused, Alcibiades introducing the Argives and their associates, who were still at Athens, they entered into treaty and an alliance offensive and defensive with them, as followeth :

*Alliance be-
tween Argos
and Athens.*

“ THE Athenians and Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans for themselves and their respective dependents on all sides, have made a peace, to continue for the term of a hundred years, without fraud and without violence, both at land and at sea.

“ Be it unlawful to take up offensive arms — either by the Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans, or their dependents, against the Athenians and dependents of the Athenians — or, by the Athenians and their dependents against the Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans and their dependents, without any artifice or evasion whatsoever. — On these conditions the Athenians and Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans to be confederates for one hundred years.

“ Provided, that in case an enemy invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans march to the succour of the Athenians, in strict conformity to a summons received from Athens, in the most vigorous manner they may be able, to the fulness of their abilities.

“ But if the enemy after ravaging be again withdrawn, the State under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the Argives

“ Argives and Mantinéans and Eléans and Athenians, and to be
“ pursued with the offensive arms of all those confederate *States*.

“ And farther, that it be not lawful for any of the contracting
“ *States* to lay down their arms against that *State* which hath so of-
“ fended, without the consent of all the rest.

“ The Athenians also to march to the succour of Argos and Man-
“ tinea and Elis, in case an enemy invade the territory of the Eléans
“ or that of the Mantinéans or that of the Argives, in strict con-
“ formity to a summons received from any of those *States*, in the
“ most vigorous manner they may be able, to the fulness of their
“ abilities.

“ But if the enemy after ravaging be again withdrawn, the *State*
“ under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the Athenians
“ and Argives and Mantinéans and Eléans, and to be pursued with
“ the offensive arms of all these confederate *States*.

“ And farther, that it be not lawful to lay down arms against the
“ *State* which hath so offended, without the joint-consent of all these
“ contracting *States*.

“ That no armed force be admitted to pass in order for war
“ through any of their respective dominions, or those of their re-
“ spective dependents; nor along their sea; unless such a passage be
“ granted unanimously by all the contracting parties, by the Athe-
“ nians and Argives and Mantinéans and Eléans.

“ Agreed farther, that when the auxiliaries attend, the *State*
“ which summoned them supply them with thirty days provi-
“ sion so soon as they shall have entered the territory of the *State*
“ which summoned their attendance, and the same at their de-
“ parture.

“ And, if there be occasion for the attendance of such an auxi-
“ liary force for a larger space, that the *State* which sent for it
“ maintain that force by paying to every soldier heavy-armed and
light-

“ light-armed and every archer, three *oboli* of Ægina⁶ a day, and a
 “ *drachma* of Ægina to every horseman.

“ But the *State* which sent for auxiliaries to have the supreme
 “ command, so long as the war continueth within its district.

“ If farther, it be agreed by the contracting *States* to act offensively
 “ with their united forces, the command then to be equally divided
 “ among all the *States*.

“ That the Athenians swear to observe these articles, in their own
 “ names and those of their dependents; but the Argives and Manti-
 “ néans and Eléans and the dependents of these are to swear sepa-
 “ rately, each *State* for itself.

“ Each party to take the oath in the most solemn fashion of their
 “ own country, in the most sacred manner, with the choicest vic-
 “ tims. The terms of the oath to be thus conceived, — *I will stand*
 “ *by the alliance according to covenant, justly, honestly, and sincerely;*
 “ *and I will not transgress its obligation by any fraud or evasion*
 “ *whatsoever.*

“ To be sworn —

“ At Athens, by the senate and city-magistrates: The Presidents
 “ in course to administer the oath.

“ At Argos, by the senate and the eighty and the Artynæ: The
 “ eighty to administer the oath.

“ At Mantinea, by the Demiurgi and the senate and the other ma-
 “ gistrates: The Theori and Polemarchs to administer the oath.

“ At Elis, by the Demiurgi, and the officers of state and the six
 “ hundred: The Demiurgi and the keepers of the sacred records to
 “ administer the oath.

⁶ The value of three oboli of Ægina is about six pence, and the drachma of Ægina nearly one shilling *Engl^h*. For, according to Dr. Arbuthnot, the talent of Ægina

consisted of a hundred Attic *mina*, and therefore was larger than the Attic talent, in the proportion of one hundred to sixty.

“ These

" These oaths to be renewed. — For which purpose, the Atheni-
 " ans to repair to Elis and to Mantinéa and to Argos thirty days be-
 " fore the Olympic games. But the Argives and Eléans and
 " Mantinéans are to repair to Athens ten days before the great
 " Panathenæa.

" The articles relating to this peace and these oaths and this alli-
 " ance to be inscribed on a column of stone,

" By the Athenians, in the citadel :

" By the Argives, in the forum, in the temple of Apollo :

" By the Mantinéans, in the temple of Jupiter in the forum :
 And,

" All jointly to erect, by way of memorial, a brazen pillar at
 " Olympia, at the Olympics now approaching. :

" If it be judged expedient by any of the contracting *States* to
 " make any additions to these articles already agreed, whatever in pur-
 " suance of this be deemed proper by the joint-determination of all
 " parties, the same to be valid."

A peace and alliance offensive and defensive was in this man-
 ner concluded. And those subsisting between the Lacedæmoni-
 ans and Athenians, were not, upon this account, renounced by
 either side.

The Corinthians however, who were confederates of the Argives, *Corinthians*,
 refused to accede ; but, what is more, they had never sworn to the
 alliance made previous to this between the Eléans and Argives and
 Mantinéans — " to have the same foes and the same friends." They
 pretended, that the defensive league already made was quite suffi-
 cient — " to succour one another, but not to concur in an offensive
 " war." In this manner the *Corinthians* were drawing off from
 the league, and again warped in their inclinations towards the Lacedæ-
 monians.

The

Lacedæmonians forbid to be present at the Olympic games.

The Olympics were solemnized this summer, in which Androsthenes the Arcadian was for the first time victor in the *pancrace*, and the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple by the Eléans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor enter the lists. They had not discharged the fine set upon them by the Eléans, by virtue of the Olympic laws, who had charged them with a conveyance of arms into the fort of Phyrcon and with throwing some of their heavy-armed into Lepréum, during the Olympic cessation. The fine imposed was * two thousand *minæ*, at the rate of two *minæ* for every heavy-armed soldier, agreeably to the letter of the law.

The Lacedæmonians upon this dispatched an embassy to remonstrate against the injustice of the sentence, that "the cessation had not been notified at Lacedæmon, when they threw in their heavy-armed."

The Eléans replied, that "the cessation was already in force: For they proclaim it first amongst themselves; and so, whilst they were quiet, and expected no such usage, they had been wronged by a surprise."

The Lacedæmonians retorted, that "if so, it was needless for them to proceed to a publication of it in Lacedæmon, if the Eléans had already judged themselves wronged. But the fact was far different in the light they saw it, and trespass had not been committed in any shape whatever."

But the Eléans adhered to their first charge, that "they could not be persuaded the Lacedæmonians had not wronged them; yet in case they are willing to surrender Lepréum to them, they are ready to remit their share of the fine, and to pay for them that part of it which was due to the God."

But when this would not content, it was urged again by the Eléans, that "if they were unwilling to part with it they should by no means surrender Lepréum; but then, as they were desirous to

* 2000 *minæ* = 6458 l. 6 s. 8 d. Sterling.

" have

“ have the use of the temple, they must go up to the altar of ;
“ Olympian Jupiter, and swear in the presence of the Grecians that
“ they would hereafter pay the fine.” — But, as they also refused to
comply with this, the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple, the
sacrifice, and the games, and performed their own sacrifices at home.
Yet the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreatæ, were admitted to
assist at the solemnity.

The Eléans however, apprehensive they would sacrifice by force,
set a guard of their armed youths around the temple. These were
reinforced by the Argives and Mantinéans, a thousand of each, and
a party of Athenian horse who were at Argos in readiness to attend
the festival. But a great consternation had seized the whole assembly
of united Greece, lest the Lacedæmonians should return with an
armed force ; more especially, when Lichas the son of Arcefilaus a
Lacedæmonian was scourged in the course by the under-officers ;
because, when his chariot had gained the prize and the chariot of
the Bœotian *State* was proclaimed victor, pursuant to the exclusion of
the Lacedæmonians from the race, he stepped into the midst of the
assembly and crowned the charioteer, desirous to make it known
that the chariot belonged to him. Upon this, the whole assembly
was more than ever alarmed, and it was fully expected that some
strange event would follow. The Lacedæmonians however made no
bustle ; and the festival passed regularly through its train.

After the Olympics, the Argives and their confederates repaired to
Corinth, in order to solicit the concurrence of that *State*. A Lace-
dæmonian embassy happened also to be there. Many conferences
were held, and nothing finally determined ; but upon feeling the
shock of an earthquake they parted each to their respective cities.
And here the summer ended.

In the ensuing winter, a battle was fought by the Heracleots of *Heraclea*.
Trachis against the Ænians and Dolopians and Meliensians and
some of the Thessalians. For the bordering nations were enemies to

the city of Heraclea ; as this latter place had been fortified for their more especial annoyance. From its foundation they had ever opposed it, preventing its growth to the utmost of their power ; and at this time they defeated the Heracleots in a battle, in which Xenares the son of Cnïdis, the Lacedæmonian commandant, was slain : A number also of the Heracleots perished. And thus the winter ended : And the twelfth year of the war came also to an end.

Y E A R X H I.

Before Christ
419.

THE succeeding summer was no sooner begun than the Bœotians, viewing the low estate to which it had been reduced by the late battle, took into their own hands the city of Heraclea, and discharged Hegesippidas the Lacedæmonian commandant, as guilty of male-administration. They took this city into their own hands, from the apprehension that, during the embroilments of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, the Athenians might seize it. The Lacedæmonians however were chagrined at this step of the Bœotians.

Alcibiades.

This same summer also, Alcibiades the son of Clinias being general of the Athenians, with the concurrence of the Argives and their allies, entered Peloponnesus with a small party of heavy-armed Athenians and archers ; and enlarged his forces upon his route by the aids of the confederates in those quarters ; where, he not only made such a disposition of affairs as might best answer the views of the alliance, but also traversing Peloponnesus with his force, he both persuaded the Patreans to continue their works quite down to the sea, and intended also to execute a plan of his own for erecting a fort upon the Rhium of Achaia⁷. But the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and

⁷ This was a grand project indeed. of Corinth, and putting an end to all it aimed at no less than the total ruin the navigation of that trading and opulent

and all such as were alarmed at the annoyance this fort might give them, rushed out to prevent him, and obliged him to desist.

The same summer, a war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. The pretext was grounded on a victim due from the Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an acknowledgment for their pastures: For the Argives were now the chief managers of the temple. But, this pretended grievance set apart, it had been judged expedient by Alcibiades and the Argives to get possession if possible of Epidaurus, in order to prevent molestation on the side of Corinth, and to render the passage of Athenian succours more expeditious from Ægina than by fetching a compass about Scyllæum. The Argives therefore were intent on their preparations, as resolved to take the field and act against Epidaurus, in order to exact the victim by force of arms.

War between the Epidaurians and Argives.

But about the same time, the Lacedæmonians also marched out with their whole force as far as to Leuctra, upon their own frontier, towards Lycæum, under the command of Agis the son of Archidæmus their king. Not a man was privy to the design of their thus taking the field, not even the States from which the quotas were furnished out. But when the victims they sacrificed for a successful campaign, proved inauspicious, they again marched home; and circulated fresh orders to their confederates to be ready to take the field again after the next month, which was the month Carneius⁸; the grand

The Lacedæmonians take the field and soon retire.

ident city through the bay of Crissa. The Athenians were already intire masters of the sea on the other side of the isthmus.

⁸ This festival was observed by most cities in Greece, but with the greatest pomp and solemnity at Sparta, where it began the thirteenth of the month Car-

neius according to the Lacedæmonian stile, and lasted nine days. A camp was formed for its celebration, in which they continued during the whole solemnity, and observed strict military discipline. By this means, as we find a little lower, the Argives, in this instance no slaves to superstition, attended to the festival and warfare at the same time, and annoyed the Epidaurians,

*The Argives
take the field.*

grand festival of the Dorians. But when they were thus withdrawn, the Argives, taking the field on the twenty-seventh day of the month preceding Carneius, and tho' celebrating their own festival that very day, continued all this intermediate time to make incursions and ravages upon Epidauria. The Epidaurians sent about to solicit the succours of their allies, some of whom excused themselves as bound to observe the approaching festivals; tho' others advanced as far as the frontiers of Epidauria, and then refused to act. And, during the space of time that the Argives were in Epidauria, embassies from the several *States* held a congress at Mantinéa, at the request of the Athenians; and proceeding to a conference, Ephamidas the Corinthian remonstrated, that "their words were by no means
" consistent with their actions. For whilst they were here sitting
" together upon the terms of peace, the Epidaurians and allies, and
" the Argives were opposing one another in arms: That, consequently, the first thing to be done, was to send deputations on both
" sides to disband those armies, and then orderly to proceed to treat
" of peace." Yielding therefore to the justice of such a remonstrance, they fetched the Argives out of Epidauria; and returning to the congress, they were not able even then to agree together; upon which the Argives once more entered Epidauria, and resumed the ravage.

*And the Lacedæmonians
again, but
again retire.*

The Lacedæmonians now had taken the field, and were advanced to Caryæ. But, as now again the victims sacrificed portended no success to a campaign, they once more withdrew.

*The Argives
retire.*

The Argives also, after ruining about a third of the territory of Epidauria, were returned home. In this incursion they were assisted by one thousand heavy-armed Athenians with Alcibiades at their head, who having heard that the Lacedæmonians had now left the

Epidaurians, whilst religious awe restrained the friends of the latter from acting in their defence. See *Potter's Archaeologia*, vol. i. p. 408.

field,

field, as their service now was no longer needful, marched away. And in this manner the summer passed.

In the beginning of the next winter, the Lacedæmonians, un-^{Epidaurus.} known to the Athenians, threw a body of men, to the number of three hundred with Agefippidas as commandant, into Epidaurus by sea. Upon this, the Argives repaired instantly to Athens with remonstrances, that “ tho’ it was explicitly mentioned in the treaty “ that no enemy should be suffered to pass through their respective do- “ minions, yet they had permitted the Lacedæmonians to make this “ passage by sea without molestation⁹: Unless therefore they would “ replace the Messenians and Helots in Pylus to annoy the Lacedæ- “ monians, they should deem themselves aggrieved.” Upon this the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, underwrote this charge upon the Laconic column, that “ the Lacedæmonians were “ guilty of perjury,” and removed the Helots from Crania into Pylus to resume their depredations, but refrained from any other act of hostility.

In the course of this winter, tho’ the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, yet no regular battle was fought between them. The hostilities consisted of ambuscades and skirmishes, in which according to the chance of action, some persons perished on both sides.

But in the close of winter when the spring was now approaching, the Argives, provided with ladders for scale, came under Epidaurus, hoping to take it by surprise, as insufficiently manned by reason of the war: But failing of success, they soon withdrew. And then the winter ended; and with it ended also the thirteenth year of the war.

⁹ The Argives in this remonstrance even on the coast of Peloponnesus, to be-
acknowledge the dominion of the sea, long to Athens.

YEAR XIV.

Before Christ
418.

The Lacedæ-
monians
march out
again.

ABOUT the middle of the ensuing summer, when their confederates the Epidaurians were sadly distressed, when some of the Peloponnesians were already revolted and others shewed plainly a spirit of discontent, the Lacedæmonians were clearly convinced, that unless expeditiously prevented the mischief would spread abroad. Upon this they took the field against Argos with their whole force, both themselves and their Pelots : and Agis the son of Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians commanded in chief. They were attended in the field by the Togeata, and all the other Arcadians whatever confederated with the Lacedæmonians. But the allies of the other parts of Peloponnesus, and those without the Isthmus, were assembled at Phlius ; — The Boeotians, consisting of five thousand heavy-armed, and the same number of light-armed, five hundred horsemen each attended by a soldier on foot ; — The Corinthians, of two thousand heavy-armed ; — The other confederates, with their several quotas ; — but the Phliasians, with the whole of their force, because the army was assembled in their district.

And the Ar-
gives.

The Argives, who had some time before intelligence of the Lacedæmonian preparations and that *since* they were filing towards Phlius in order to join the forces assembled there, now took the field themselves. They were joined by a succour of the Mantinians, strengthened by the addition of their dependents, and three thousand heavy-armed Eleans. Upon their march, they fell in with the Lacedæmonians at Methydrium of Arcadia. Each party posts itself on a rising ground. The Argives got every thing in readiness to attack the Lacedæmonians, whilst yet they were alone. But Agis, dislodging by night and stealing a march, completed his junction with the body of confederates at Phlius. When this was perceived by the Argives, they drew off early the next dawn, first of all to Argos, and then to the

the pass upon the route of Nemea, by which they expected the Lacedæmonians with their confederates would fall into their country. Yet Agis took not that route which they expected ; but, having communicated his design to the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians and Epidaurians, he took a different route tho' much less practicable, and descended into the plains of Argos. The Corinthians and Pellenians and Phliasians followed, by another more direct route. And orders had been given to the Bœotians and Megaréans and Sicyonians, to take the route that leadeth to Nemea, on which the Argives were posted, that in case the Argives should march into the plain to make head against the Lacedæmonians, the last with their cavalry might press upon their rear.

After these dispositions and such a descent into the plain, Agis ravaged Saminthus and other places ; upon intelligence of which the Argives, so soon as it was day, dislodged from Nemea to stop the depredations, and on their march met with the body of Phliasians and Corinthians ; and, encountering, slew some few of the Phliasians, while a not much greater number of their own men were destroyed by the Corinthians. The Bœotians also and Megaréans and Sicyonians took the route of Nemea conformably to orders, and found the Argives already dislodged. But the latter, upon entering the plain and a view of the ravage made upon their lands, drew up in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians stood regularly drawn up on the other side. And now the Argives were shut up in the middle of their enemies. For on the side of the plain, the Lacedæmonians and those in their body intercepted their return to the city : On the high ground above them were the Corinthians and Phliasians and Pellenians : On the other part towards Nemea, were the Bœotians and Sicyonians and Megaréans. Cavalry they had none : For the Athenians were the only party of their confederacy, who were not yet come up.

The

The bulk indeed of the Argives and confederates apprehended not the danger, which at present environed them, to be so great; but rather concluded they might engage with advantage, and that they had caught the Lacedæmonians fast within their territory and near to Argos itself. Two Argives however, Thrasylus one of the five in command, and Alciphron the public host of the Lacedæmonians, the very instant the armies were moving to the charge, had addressed themselves to Agis and proposed expedients to prevent a battle, giving their word that "the Argives were ready to do and to submit to justice, upon a fair and equitable arbitration, in case the Lacedæmonians had any charge against them; and for the future would live at peace, if a present accommodation could be effected."

In this manner these Argives presumed to talk, merely of themselves, and without the public authority. Agis also, by his own private determination, accepted the proposals; and, without reporting them to the council of war, without canvassing things maturely himself, or at least communicating only with one person of the number which had authority in the army, grants them a four months truce, "in which space they were to make good what engagements they had now made:" and then, instantly drew off the army, without imparting the reasons of his conduct to the other confederates. The Lacedæmonians indeed and confederates followed when he led them off, because their laws exacted such obedience; yet, amongst themselves were lavish of their censure against Agis, that when so fine an opportunity of engaging was in their power, when their enemies were hemmed in on all sides both by their horse and their foot, they were drawn off without performing any thing worthy of such mighty preparations: For, to this very day, a finer army of Grecians had never appeared in the field. A most gallant figure in truth it made, whilst they were all together at Nemea. The Lacedæmonians were there to be seen with the whole collected force of their *State*, accompanied

A truce.

accompanied by the Arcadians, and Bœotians, and Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Pellenians, and Phlians, and Megaræans. The troops which composed their several quotas were all picked men, and were judged a match in the field of battle, not only for the whole Argive alliance, but the addition of double strength. This great army however, laying all the time most heavy imputations on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and were disbanded to their several habitations.

On the other part also, the Argives were still much more exasperated against those, who had made this suspension without public authority. They imagined the Lacedæmonians had escaped them when they had the finest opportunity of striking a blow, inasmuch as the contest must have been decided under the very walls of Argos, and in company with a numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, upon their return, at the Charadrum, the place where the crimes committed in an expedition are adjudged before they enter the city, they were beginning to stone Thrasylus, who flying to an altar escapeth with life: His effects however they confiscated to public use.

But after this came up the Athenian succour, consisting of a *Truce broke.* thousand heavy-armed and three hundred horsemen commanded by Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, who after all were afraid to break the agreement with the Lacedæmonians, ordered them "to be gone forthwith;" and, tho' they requested a conference, refused to introduce them into the assembly of the people, till the Mantineans and Elæans, who were not yet departed, by great importunity obtained a compliance. Here the * Athenians, in the presence of Alcibiades their ambassador, assembled with the Argives and their allies, averred that "the suspension was not valid, since agreed to "without the consent of the body of the confederates; now therefore, as themselves were come up opportunely to their assistance, "they were obliged in honour to prosecute the war." The confederates allowed the force of this argument; and the whole alliance,

* Laches and
Nicostratus.

*Orchomenus
besieged.*

except the Argives, marched instantly away against Orchomenus of Arcadia. But even the Argives, tho' they stayed behind at first, were persuaded by such reasoning, and soon after went also to take part in the expedition. Thus united, they sat down before and besieged Orchomenus. They made several assaults upon it, desirous for other reasons to get it into their hands, but more particularly because the hostages from Arcadia were lodged in that city by the Lacedæmonians.

The Orchomenians, terrified at the weakness of their walls and the multitude of the besiegers, and lest as no relief appeared they should soon be exhausted, thought proper to capitulate on these conditions — “ to be received into the confederacy ; — to give hostages “ of their own body ; — and, to deliver up to the Mantinéans those “ whom the Lacedæmonians had lodged with them.”

Having thus got possession of Orchomenus, the confederates in the next place held a consultation, “ against what other city in their plan “ of conquest they should next proceed.” The Eléans exhorted them to march against Lepréum ; but the Mantinéans against Tegea : and the Argives and Athenians adhered to the Mantinéans. The Eléans upon this were offended, that they had not voted for the siege of Lepréum, and separated to their own home. But the rest of the confederates set about preparations at Mantinéa, as fully bent on the siege of Tegea. And even some of the citizens of Tegea were exerting their efforts within that city to betray it to them.

*Complaints
against Agis.*

But the Lacedæmonians, after they were withdrawn from Argos in pursuance of the suspension of arms for four months, laid heavy charges upon Agis for not conquering Argos at so fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they had reason to expect ; — “ since so numerous “ and so gallant a body of confederates could never again without “ greater difficulty be assembled together.” And when afterwards the news arrived that Orchomenus was taken, their indignation became more violent than ever. In such a ferment they instantly re-
solved,

solved, tho' not consistently with the calm Lacedæmonian temper, that " his house must needs be demolished and a fine of * one hundred thousand drachmas be imposed upon Agis." He earnestly pleaded against the execution of the sentence, that " in another expedition he would purge the charge by some notable service to the State; if not, they might then proceed to punish him at pleasure." Upon this they suspended the fine and demolition, but passed a law on the present occasion, such as never before had been made amongst them: For they elected a committee of ten Spartans to attend him as a council, without whose concurrence he was not permitted to lead out their army into the field.

* 3229l. 3s. 4d.
Sterling.

In the mean time a message is brought them from their friends at Tegea, that " unless they come thither with the utmost expedition, Tegea will revolt from them to the Argives and their confederates, and is only not revolted already."

To prevent this, the whole Lacedæmonian strength both of citizens and Helots is levied with more sharpness, than had ever been known before; and taking the field they marched to Orestæum of Mænalia. An order was sent beforehand to their Arcadian allies to assemble and follow them directly towards Tegea.

The Lacedæmonians take the field again.

But when the whole Lacedæmonian strength was thus marched to Orestæum, the sixth part of the number, consisting of the more aged and younger classes, was from thence again dismissed to Sparta to take upon them the guard of that place, whilst the rest of their military force marcheth to Tegea: and not long after their Arcadian confederates join them.

They sent also to Corinth, to the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, a summons of speedy aid into the Mantinéan. But for some of these the summons was too short; and for the rest it was by no means an easy task to take the field in separate bodies, and waiting for their mutual junction, to force their passage through an enemy's country; for such lay between to obstruct their advance: However,

they were earnestly bent to attempt it. The Lacedæmonians, in the mean time, enlarged with such Arcadian parties as were already come up, marched on and broke into the Mantinéan; and having formed their camp near the temple of Hercules, they ravaged the country.

*The armies in
fight of one
another.*

The Argives and their allies, when their enemy was thus in fight, having posted themselves on a spot of ground by nature strong and difficult of approach, drew up in order as ready to engage. The Lacedæmonians also immediately advanced towards them, and even approached so near as within the cast of a stone or a dart. But one of the old experienced *Spartans*, perceiving that they were to attack so difficult a post, roared out aloud to Agis¹ that "he was going to repair one evil by another;" as if by his present ill-judged eagerness, he was bent on making reparation for his censured retreat from Argos. Upon this, either struck with such an exclamation, or whether upon a sudden his own thoughts suggested to him a different conduct, he drew off his army again with all possible expedition before the battle could be joined. And wheeling from thence into the Tegeatis, he turned a stream of water into the Mantinéan, about which, as apt to do great damage to the lands on which side soever it flowed, the Mantinéans and Tegeatæ are eternally at blows. It was his scheme, to draw down the Argives and their allies from their strong post on the eminence in order to prevent the turning of this stream so soon as they knew it was in agitation, and thus to gain an opportunity of fighting in the plain. In pursuance of this, he halted the whole

¹ Plutarch says it was an apothegm of this Agis, that Lacedæmonians never ask concerning their enemies, "How many are they?" but, "where are they?" And, that when he was hindered from fighting at Mantinéa, he said, "They,

"who would rule over many, must fight against many:" And, being asked what was the number of the Lacedæmonians, he replied, "Enough to beat cowards."

day

day upon the stream, and accomplished its diversion. But the Argives and their allies, surprised at this sudden and precipitate retreat, had been at first unable to conjecture what it meant. At length, when the enemy was totally withdrawn, and quite out of their view, after lying inactively in their posts and no orders received for a pursuit, they began a second time to lay heavy imputations on their own commanders, — that “on the former occasion the Lacedæmonians, “when fairly caught near Argos, had been suffered to escape; that “now again, tho’ they were openly flying, not a soul must pursue “them, but through shameful indolence their enemies are preserved, “and themselves are treacherously betrayed.” The commanders, upon the first noise of these clamours were highly chagrined, but afterwards they marched them down from the eminence, and advancing into the plain incamped them there, as determined to fight the enemy. The day following the Argives and allies were drawn up to be in readiness for action should the enemy appear. And the Lacedæmonians, marching away from the stream to re-occupy their former camp near the temple of Hercules, on a sudden perceived that the whole body of their foes were ready drawn up in order of battle, and had quitted their strong post on the eminence.

At this crisis, the Lacedæmonians were struck with a greater astonishment than the memory of man could parallel. For now, in an interval of time exceeding short, they were bound to get every thing in readiness for fight: Yet, such was their diligence, that in an instant they were formed into a beautiful array, Agis their king issuing all the necessary orders according to the law: For, when a king leadeth their armies, all orders are given by him. He himself declareth what he willeth to be done to the * *General-Officers*: They carry his * *Polemarchs*, orders to the † *Colonels*: These, to the ‡ *Captains*; who afterwards † *Lochages*, forward them to the § *Subalterns*; by whom they are communicated. ‡ *Pentecontators*, to all the private men under their respective commands. The or- § *Enomataarchs*, ders, when any such are requisite, are in this method dispersed and circulated.

circulated with the greatest expedition. For in the Lacedæmonian armies, almost the whole soldiery, few only excepted, have a command assigned in regular subordination; and the care of executing orders is incumbent upon numbers.

In their present array, the left wing consisted of the Skiritæ, who of all the Lacedæmonians ever claim this post as their peculiar right: Next them were posted the Brasidéan soldiers who had served in Thrace, accompanied by those who had lately been honoured with the freedom of Sparta: Then along the line were regularly posted all the troops which were composed of pure Lacedæmonians: Next to them stood the Heréans of Arcadia; and beyond them the Mænalians. In the right wing were the Tegeatæ, but in the utmost extent of it some few Lacedæmonians. Their cavalry was equally posted on both the wings. And in this form was the Lacedæmonian disposition made.

On the side of the enemy, the Mantinéans had the right wing, because the business fell upon their ground: Next to them were the allies from Arcadia: Then a picked body of Argives, to the number of a thousand, who long had been exercised in the study of arms in the public school at Argos; and next to them stood the rest of the Argive forces: These were followed by their own confederates, the Cleonéans and Orneatæ. The Athenians were ranged in the outermost body, and composed the left wing, supported by their own cavalry. Such was the order and disposition on both sides.

The army of the Lacedæmonians had the appearance of superior numbers. But exactly to write the number either of the several bodies on each side, or of their whole force, I own myself unable. The amount of the Lacedæmonians was not known, because of the profound secrecy observed in their polity; and the amount of their enemies, because of the ostentation ordinary to mankind in magnifying their own strength, hath been still disbelieved. However from the following computation, an inquirer may discover the number
of

of the Lacedæmonians, who on this occasion were drawn up in the field.

Besides the Skiritæ, who were in number six hundred, seven *battalions* were in this engagement. Now in every *battalion* there were four *companies*; and in every *company*, four *platoons*. In the first rank of every *platoon* were four fighting soldiers. In regard to depth they were not equally formed, as every *colonel* determined the depth at his own private discretion, but generally they were drawn up eight deep. The front-line of their whole force, excepting the Skiritæ, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men ².

When both sides were ready, the small respite before the engagement was employed by the several commanders in animating the soldiers under their respective orders.

To the Mantinéans it was urged — That “the points, for which they were going to fight, were their country and their future fate, either rule or slavery; that of rule, whose sweets they had known, they might not be divested, and that they might never feel again what slavery is.”

To the Argives — It was “for their ancient sovereignty, and the equal share of dignity they had once enjoyed in Peloponnesus, now timely to prevent an eternal submission to such losses, and earn revenge for the many injuries a neighbouring *State*, unrelenting in its enmity, had done them.

² The Lacedæmonian *mora* or brigade consisted of four *lochi* or battalions = 2048 men. For a *labos* or battalion consisted of four *pentecosties* or companies = 512 men; a *pentecosty* or company of four *enomatia* or platoons = 128 men; and each *enomatia* or platoon consisted of 32. This is the account of Thucydides, who computes the platoon by 4 in front and 8 in depth. The platoon consisted therefore of 32, which \times by 4 = 128 the number of a company,

which also \times by 4 = 512 the number of a battalion. The number of battalions was seven, which shews the number of the Lacedæmonians to have been 3584; and then, with the addition of 600 *Skiritæ* who were posted on the left, to have amounted in the whole to 4184 men. Or again, the whole front line = 448×8 , the number in depth, is equal to $3584 + 600$ *Skiritæ* = 4184.

But,

But, to the Athenians — That “ in honour they were obliged to
 “ signalize their valour in a conspicuous manner, in the company of
 “ numerous and gallant allies : That, should they gain a victory over
 “ the Lacedæmonians on Peloponnesian ground, their own empire
 “ would be established and enlarged, and no enemy would ever again
 “ presume to invade their territories.”

And in this manner were the Argives and their confederates animated to the fight.

But the Lacedæmonians were encouraging one another, and during martial strains enjoined by their discipline, like men of bravery as they were, each animated his neighbour with a recital of the gallant acts they had performed together. They were persons who knew, that a long experience in the toils of war conduceth more to preservation than a short verbal harangue how finely so ever delivered.

And now the armies were mutually approaching. The Argives and their allies advanced in a brisk and angry manner ; but the Lacedæmonians moved slowly forwards to the sound of many flutes, the music which their laws ordain ; not from any religious motive, but for advancing with equal steps, keeping time with the notes to prevent all disorders in the ranks, accidents very frequent in large armies whilst drawing to an encounter ³.

But

³ *Milton* hath made use of this Lacedæmonian march to adorn and raise his own noble poetry. It was full and strong in his imagination, when he wrote the following lines. *Paradise Lost*, Book I.

— Anon they move
 In perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood
 Of flutes and soft recorders ; such as rais'd
 To height of noblest temper Heroes old
 Arming to battle ; and instead of rage,

Deliberate valour breath'd, firm, and unmov'd
 With dread of death to flight or foul retreat ;
 Nor wanting pow'r to mitigate and swage,
 With solemn touches, troubled thoughts and chace
 Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, and pain,
 From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they

Breathing

But during the approach, Agis the king bethought himself of making a new disposition. — It is the constant case with all armies, that upon the right their wings, whilst they approach one another, extend themselves too far, so that constantly on both sides the left wing is over-reached and flanked by the enemy's right. This proceedeth from the dread every soldier lieth under of being exposed on his unarmed side, which maketh him eager to get it covered by the shield of the next person on his right, and positive that a firm closing together in this manner will render them impenetrable to the shock of the enemy. This turn of the body is first begun by the right-hand man of the whole front, and is the result of his constant care to shift his defenceless side from the aim of the foe; and the dread of being in the same manner exposed obligeth all the rest to follow his motion. And thus, in the present approach, the Mantinéans in their wing had far over-reached the Skiritæ; but the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ had done so more in regard to the Athenians, in proportion as they exceeded them in numbers. — Agis therefore, fearing lest the left wing of the Lacedæmonians might be quite surrounded, and judging that the Mantinéans quite too far over-reached them, sent orders to the Skiritæ and Brasideans to wheel away from the spot where they were first posted, and fill up the extremity of the line so as to render it equal to the Mantinéans: And to supply the void thus made, he ordered from the right wing two *battalions*, commanded by *general-officers*, Hipponoïdas and Aristocles, to repair thither and falling

Breathing united force, with fixed thought	Of warriors old with order'd spear and
Mov'd on in silence to soft pipes, that	shield,
charm'd	Awaiting what command their mighty
Their painful steps o'er the burnt soil:	Chief
and now	Had to impose: he through the armed
Advanc'd in view, they stand, a horrid	files
front	Darts his experienc'd eye, and soon tra-
Of dreadful length, and dazzling arm, in	verse
guise	The whole battalion views their order due,
VOL. II.	As a

in to close up the ranks ; judging, that their own right would still be more than sufficient to execute their parts, and the wing opposed to the Mantinéans might by this disposition be properly strengthened. But as he issued these orders in the very onset and close of battle, it happened that Aristocles and Hipponoïdas absolutely refused to change their post (tho' for such disobedience, as apparently the result of cowardice, they were afterwards banished from Sparta); and, before the new disposition could be compleated, the enemy had begun to charge. Upon the refusal of these two battalions to change their post, Agis countermanded those marching to strengthen the Skiritæ to their former places, who now were unable to fall into the ranks or close together with those whom they had quitted : But on this occasion more remarkably than ever, the Lacedæmonians, tho' in all respects outdone in the military art, gave signal proofs of their superiority in true manly valour.

*Battle of
Mantineæ.*

For, to come to particulars, when once they were at blows with the enemy, the right wing of the Mantinéans routs their Skiritæ and Brasidéans. Then the same Mantinéans, supported by their confederates and the thousand picked Argives, falling in at the void in the Lacedæmonian line which was not yet filled up, did great execution upon them : For taking them in flank they intirely broke them, drove them for shelter among their carriages, and made a slaughter of the old men who were appointed for their guard. And in this quarter the Lacedæmonians were clearly vanquished.

But in the other quarters, and especially in the centre where Agis the king was posted, and round him the horse-guards stiled *The three hundred*, falling upon those troops, which were composed of the elder Argives and them which are called the *Penteloei*, and upon the Cleonéans and Orneatæ and those Athenians who ranked along with them, they broke them in an instant, so that many of them durst not stand to exchange a blow, but so soon as they felt the Lacedæmonian shock turned about at once, and others were trampled under foot in the great hurry they were in to secure their escape. But

But when the main body of the Argives and their allies was in this quarter routed, their foot on both the flanks were instantly discomfited. Now also the right of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the advantage of superior numbers, had over-reached and encompassed the Athenians. These now on all hands were beset with danger; in this quarter they were surrounded by their enemies, in another they were already vanquished: And they must have suffered the most of any part of the army, had it not been for the excellent support their own cavalry gave them. It happened also, that Agis, when he perceived that the Mantinéans and the thousand Argives had got the better on the left, commanded the whole army to wheel off to the support of the vanquished. And whilst this was executing, the Athenians laid hold of the interval, which this motion of the enemy and their drawing off from around them occasioned, to secure their own escape without any opposition, accompanied by the Argives who were also vanquished with them.

But the Mantinéans, and those who fought in company with them, and the picked band of Argives, were now no longer intent on pressing upon their adversaries; but, perceiving their own side to be completely vanquished, and the Lacedæmonians approaching to their attack, they turned about and fled. Yet numbers of them perished, and those chiefly Mantinéans; for the greatest part of the picked band of Argives completed their escape.

The flight however was not precipitate, nor the distance to a place of safety great. For the Lacedæmonians, till the enemy fled, maintain their combats with long and steady toil; but after a rout pursue them neither long nor far.

And thus, or very nearly thus, was the procedure of the whole battle, the greatest that for many ages had been fought amongst Grecians, and where the competition lay between most renowned and flourishing States. The Lacedæmonians, amassing together the arms of their enemies who had been slain, immediately erected a trophy,

*Victory on the
Lacedæmonian
side.*

and rifled the bodies of the dead. They also took up their own *dead* and carried them to Tegea, where they received the rights of sepulture; and also delivered upon truce the slain of their enemy. There fell of the Argives and Orneatæ and Cleonéans seven hundred, and two hundred of the Mantinéans; two hundred also of the Athenians including the Æginetæ and their several commanders. On the Lacedæmonian side — as the confederates were never hard pressed, what loss they suffered is scarcely deserving of notice; and the exact number of their own dead it is difficult to discover; but it was reported to have been about three hundred.

When a battle was certainly to be fought, Pleistionax the other king marched out to their support with the whole body of citizens, both old men and youths. But when he was advanced as far as Tegea, he received the news of a victory, and returned to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians also sent messengers to countermand their allies from Corinth, and from without the Isthmus. And, being themselves returned to Sparta, after giving dismissal to their allies, as the Carneian solemnities were at hand, they celebrate the festival. The imputation also of cowardice, at that time laid to their charge by the rest of Greece, because of their misfortune at Sphacteria, and some other instances of impolitic and dilatory conduct, by this one action they compleatly purged away. Now it was determined, that their depression had been merely the result of fortune, but that in inward bravery they were still themselves.

The day before this battle was fought, it happened that the Epidaurians, with the whole of their strength, had made an incursion into Argia as left defenceless, and had done great execution on the guards left behind at the general march of the Argives.

Epidaurus.

Three thousand heavy-armed Eléans, as auxiliaries to the Mantinéans, came up after the battle; as did also a thousand Athenians to join the former body; upon which the whole alliance marched immediately against Epidaurus, whilst the Lacedæmonians were solemnizing

lemnizing the Carneian festival. After an equal distribution of the work, they began to raise a circumvallation around that city. The rest indeed soon desisted, but the Athenians conformably to their orders completed theirs round the eminence, on which stood the temple of Juno. To guard this work the whole alliance left behind a sufficient number draughted from their several bodies, and then departed to their respective homes: And the summer was now at an end.

In the first commencement of the succeeding winter, and after the celebration of the Carneian festival, the Lacedæmonians immediately took the field, and advancing as far as Tegea sent from thence to Argos proposals for an accommodation. There was already in that city a party in their intelligence, who were also bent on overturning the popular government at Argos; and, since the event of the late fatal battle, they were enabled to use more cogent arguments to persuade the *many* into the accommodation. Their scheme was, first to enter into truce with the Lacedæmonians, as preparatory to an alliance offensive and defensive, which was next in agitation; and, this point carried, then immediately to execute their plot against the *people*.

Lichas son of Arcefilaps, the public host of the Argives, accordingly arriveth at Argos, charged to make two demands in the name of the Lacedæmonians: the one, "whether war be still their option?" the other, "how? if their choice be peace." Upon this a strong debate arose, for Alcibiades was present. But the party, who acted in the Lacedæmonian interest, prevailed with the Argives to accept their proposals of an accommodation, which were as followeth:

- "THUS resolved by the Lacedæmonian council to compound Preliminaries between Lacedæmonians and Argives.
 " with the Argives ———
 " These to restore their children to the Orchomenians, and their
 " men to the Mænalians; to restore also to the Lacedæmonians their
 " citizens.

" citizens now detained at Mantinéa, to evacuate Epidaurus and demolish their works.

" And the Athenians, if they will not quit Epidaurus, to be declared enemies to the Argives and to the Lacedæmonians, and to the confederates of the Lacedæmonians and to the confederates of the Argives.

" And if the Lacedæmonians have in their power any young men, to release them to all the *States*.

" In relation to the God ⁴, we consent that an oath be administered to the Epidaurians, and we grant the form to be prescribed by the Argives.

" The *States* of Peloponnesus, both small and great, to be, none excepted, free, according to their own primitive constitutions.

" And if any *State* without Peloponnesus shall enter offensively into the lands of Peloponnesus, succours to be united, in pursuance of a general consult of Peloponnesians about the determinate and most expedient methods.

" All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever without Peloponnesus shall enjoy the same privileges as those of the Lacedæmonians and those of the Argives enjoy, each remaining in free possession of their territories.

" These articles to be communicated to the confederates, and ratification to be made, if they approve. If different methods seem advisable to the confederates, all parties to desist and return directly home."

These proposals, by way of preliminary, the Argives accepted; and the army of the Lacedæmonians was drawn off from Tegea to their own home. And afterwards, in the course of mutual negotia-

⁴ The *Pythian* Apollo. This article- the victim, related in the transactions of seems designed to adjust the quarrel about the last year.

tion,

tion, the same party at Argos prevailed upon their countrymen to renounce their alliance with the Mantinéans and Eléans, and even with the Athenians, and to strike up a peace and an alliance offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians. The tenor of it was this :

“ RESOLVED thus by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives on *alliance be-*
 “ a peace and an alliance offensive and defensive for the term of *tween Argos*
 “ fifty years. *and Sparta.*

“ They shall do justice to each other reciprocally, with impartiality and equity, according to their several forms of law.

“ The other *States* in Peloponnesus, comprehended in this peace and alliance, shall continue in the enjoyment of their own laws, their own independence, holding the same territories, doing justice with impartiality and with equity, according to their several forms of law.

“ All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever without Peloponnesus shall enjoy the same privileges with the Lacedæmonians themselves; and the Argive confederates shall enjoy the same with the Argives themselves; each holding their respective territories.

“ If a joint-expedition be at any time requisite, a consultation to be held by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives about the determine and most expedient methods of issuing orders to the rest of the alliance.

“ But if any controversy arise between the *States*, either those within or those without Peloponnesus, either concerning their boundaries or any other point, it shall be determined by judges.

“ And if any confederate *State* have a dispute with another *State*, they shall go with a reference to that *State*, which to the contending *States* shall be thought most impartial : Private persons
 “ however

“ however to be judged by the laws of that *State* to which they are
 “ subject.”

This peace and such an alliance was now perfected ; and the reciprocal damages of war and all other offences were now buried in oblivion. And having already settled all points to general satisfaction, they concurred in a suffrage “ to receive no herald nor embassy
 “ from the Athenians, ’till they were withdrawn out of Pelopon-
 “ nesus, and had given up their fortifications at Epidaurus ;” and farther “ for the future to make neither peace nor war but with joint
 “ concurrence.” Their attention was also extended to objects more remote ; and in conjunction, they dispatched ambassadors to the cities in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and seduced Perdiccas to swear adherence to their league. Not that he instantly declared his revolt from the Athenians ; but he was bent on accomplishing it, ever since he saw the Argives had done it : For he was originally descended from Argos. They renewed also their ancient oaths to the Chalcidæans, and strengthened them by the addition of new.

Epidaurus.

The Argives also dispatched an embassy to the Athenians, requiring them to quit the works they had raised at Epidaurus. The latter, sensible that their soldiers there were but a handful of men when compared with those who were associated with them in that service, sent Demosthenes to draw them off. He, upon his arrival pretending to solemnize some martial game without the fortrefs, when the rest of the garrison was gone out to the spectacle, barred fast the gates. And afterwards the Athenians, having renewed the peace with them, surrendered the fortifications they had raised into the hands of the Epidaurians.

Mantinæans.

When the Argives had in this manner gone off from the alliance, the Mantinæans also, who at first stood out, finding at length that without the Argives they could do nothing of themselves, thought proper

proper to accommodate their disputes with the Lacedæmonians, and resigned their command over the cities of Arcadia. The Lacedæmonians also and Argives, to the number of a thousand each, marched in company to Sicyon; where, principally by the presence of the Lacedæmonians, the government was shifted into the hands of a smaller number. And after transacting such points in concert, they soon procured the demolition of the popular government at Argos, and an oligarchy, suited to the Lacedæmonian model, was erected in its stead. *Democracy overturned at Argos.*

As the winter was now in its close, these transactions ran out nearly into the spring; and the fourteenth year of the war expired.

Y E A R X V.

IN the following summer, the Dictidæans of Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidæans: And the Lacedæmonians re-settled the state of Achæa, which for a time had been under a management not agreeable to them. *Before Christ 417.*

The *people* of Argos also, combining gradually together and re-*Sedition at Argos.* summing their spirits, made an assault upon the *few*. They waited for a favourable opportunity, till the festival of the *naked games* was celebrating at Lacedæmon. A battle was fought within the precincts of Argos, in which the *people* was the victor. Some of their opponents they slew, and others they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedæmonians, when their adherents implored their succour, were too dilatory in moving; but at last they adjourned the games, and marched away to their support. And hearing when they were come to Tegea that "the *few* were vanquished," they determined to proceed no farther, maugre all the intreaties of the new exiles; but, retreating forthwith to Sparta, they resumed the celebration of the games. Yet, being afterwards attended by deputations from those in Argos, as well as by such as had been lately banished, in the presence of the whole

confederacy, after many arguments had been urged on both sides, they came to a resolution, that "the Argives in the city were guilty of injustice;" and a decree was passed that "they should march against Argos." But after all, their proceedings were dilatory and remiss.

In the mean time, the *people* of Argos, dreading the Lacedæmonian strength, and re-addressing themselves again to Athens for a renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute a plan which they thought the strongest expedient of preservation, built long walls quite down to the sea, that in case they should be blocked up by land, all proper supplies might be thrown into the city by sea, through the good offices of the Athenians. To this scheme of new fortifications some cities also of Peloponnesus were privy underhand. The whole body of Argives without distinction, the citizens, their wives and their servants, forwarded the work; and from Athens they were supplied with carpenters and masons. And here the summer ended.

The Lacedæmonians march against Argos.

Winter now succeeding, the Lacedæmonians, when advertised of these new fortifications, marched their forces against Argos, their own and all those of their allies, excepting the Corinthian. Some new projects in their favour were now also in agitation within Argos itself. The whole army was commanded by Agis the son of Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians. The new turns they expected for their service took not effect within the city: But they made themselves masters of the new-erected walls, and levelled them with the ground. They also took Hysie a town in Argia; and, having put all the freemen found within that place to the sword, they drew off and dispersed to their several cities.

After this the Argives marched their force into Phliasia; and, after ravaging that district, because the exiles from Argos had met with a reception there, they again retired: For many of those exiles had taken up their residence at Phlius.

In

In the same winter, the Athenians, exasperated against Perdiccas, ^{Perdiccas,} prevented all manner of importations into Macedonia. They charged him "with taking part in the late treaty confirmed by the "sanction of oaths between the Argives and Lacedæmonians; that "farther, when they had made great preparations against the Chalcidæans of Thrace and Amphipolis, and Nicias the son of Nicæratas was appointed to command in that service, he had violated "his obligations to act in concert, and *that* expedition came to nothing, purely through his secession: He was therefore an enemy "to Athens."

The winter expired in this manner; and with it the fifteenth year of the war came also to an end.

Y E A R : XVI.

WHEN summer came on, Alcibiades with twenty sail arrived ^{Before Chios} at Argos, where he seized three hundred of the citizens, whose fidelity to the Athenians, and adherence to the Lacedæmonian interest ^{416.} Alcibiades. was still suspected. And these the Athenians secured in the neighbouring islands, which were subject to their dominion.

The Athenians also undertook the reduction of Melos with a naval force, consisting of thirty sail of Athenians, six of Chians, and two of Lesbians, on board of which were transported twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred archers, and twenty who drew the bow on horseback. The number also of their dependents from the continent and islands which attended was about fifteen hundred heavy-armed. The Melians ^{Expedition} ^{against Melos.} are a colony of the Lacedæmonians;

⁵ The original of this colony is curious according to the account given of it by Plutarch—"When the Tyrrhenes were "masters of Lemnos and Imbrus, and "made a practice of ravishing the wives

"of the Athenians at Brauron, a mixed "breed was the consequence; whom, as "half-barbarians, the Athenians drove out, "of the isles. Thus exiled, they repaired "to Tænarus, and were useful to the Spartans

nians ; and had therefore refused to receive law from the Athenians, in the same manner as the inhabitants of the other islands received it. At first however they had observed a strict neutrality ; but in process of time, when the Athenians by ravaging their country would have obliged them to act offensively, they openly took part in the war against them.

With a force so strong as hath been described Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes and Tifias the son of Tifimachus landed and incamped upon the island. Yet, before they proceeded to hostilities, they sent a deputation from the army to demand a conference, whom the Melians refused to introduce into the assembly of the people, but in the presence only of the magistrates and the *few* commanded them to deliver their instructions. Upon this the Athenian deputation expressed themselves as followeth :

“ Spartans in their war against the Helots,
 “ They were afterwards rewarded for their
 “ good services with the freedom of Sparta
 “ and liberty of intermarriage. Yet, not
 “ being allowed the honour of serving the
 “ offices of the state or a seat in the council,
 “ they became afterwards suspected,
 “ as caballing together for bad designs and
 “ projecting to overthrow the constitution.
 “ The Lacedæmonians therefore apprehended
 “ them all, and throwing them
 “ into prison, kept them confined under a
 “ strong guard, till they could find out clear
 “ and incontestable evidence against them.
 “ The wives of the prisoners came in a
 “ body to the prison, and after much prayer
 “ and intreaty were at length admitted by
 “ the guard to the sight and discourse of
 “ their husbands. When once they had
 “ gained access, they ordered them immediately
 “ to strip and change clothes with
 “ them, to leave them their own, and

“ dressed in those of their wives to make
 “ their escape directly in that disguise.
 “ It was done ; the women staid behind,
 “ determined to endure whatever might
 “ be the consequence ; and the guards deceived
 “ by appearances let out the husbands
 “ instead of the wives. They
 “ marched off and seized Taygeta, then
 “ seduced the Helots to revolt and promised
 “ to support them, which struck a great
 “ terror amongst the Spartans. They sent
 “ to treat with them, and made up the
 “ matter on these conditions ; that they
 “ should have their wives restored safe to
 “ them, should be furnished with money
 “ and vessels for removal, and when settled
 “ in another country, should be reckoned
 “ a colony and kinsmen of the Lacedæmonians
 “ — A body of them settled soon
 “ after in the isle of Meles.” *Of the virtues of women.*

“ SINCE

“ SINCE to the people in full assembly we are precluded from speaking, lest the *many*, — hearing their true interest declared at once by us in a continued discourse, and proved by arguments fitted to persuade and too strong to be refuted — might be wrought into our views : For such, we are sensible, is the plain construction of this our guarded audience by the *few* : To you also, who now sit here, we recommend a method of making that point yet more secure, that to the reasons we offer you reserve not your objections for one formal deliberate reply, but in case we offer any seeming incongruity, you immediately interrupt us, and discuss the point. And tell us first, whether or no this proposal be agreeable.”

Conference at Melos.

The Melians, who composed the synod, answered thus :

“ THE candor of such leisurely debate for mutual information is not to be disapproved. And yet, there seemeth to be great inconsistency between such candor and those warlike preparations, with which you no longer intend hereafter but in present act have already beset us. For we perceive, that hither you are come to be authoritative judges of your own plea, and that the decision must needs prove fatal to us ; since, if superior in debate, we for that reason refuse submission, our portion must be war ; and, if we allow your plea, from that moment we become your slaves.”

ATHENIANS.

“ TO what purpose *this* ? If here you are met together to retail your suspicions of future events, or to talk of any thing but the proper means of extricating and preserving your *State* from the present and manifest dangers which environ it, we had better be silent. But, if the latter be your purpose, let us come to the point.”

MELIANS.

M E L I A N S.

“ T H E R E is reason for it ; and there ought to be forgiveness,
 “ when men, so situated as we are, are liable to much distraction
 “ both in speech and thought. The point for which we are assem-
 “ bled is, it is true, no less than our future preservation. If
 “ therefore it must be so, let the conference proceed in the method
 “ you require.”

A T H E N I A N S.

“ A S therefore it is not our purpose to amuse you with pompous de-
 “ tails—how, after compleatly vanquishing the Mede we had a right to
 “ assume the sovereignty ; or how, provoked by the wrongs received
 “ from you, we come hither to earn redress ; — we shall wave all
 “ parade of words that have no tendency towards conviction ; And
 “ in return insist from you, that you reject all hopes of persuading
 “ us by frivolous remonstrances — that, as a colony of the Lacedæ-
 “ monians you were incapacitated from accompanying our arms ;
 “ or, that wrongs in any shape you have never done us. But these
 “ things apart, let us lay all stress on such points as may really on
 “ both sides be judged persuasive ; since of this you are as strongly
 “ convinced as we ourselves are sensible of it, that in all human
 “ competitions equal wants alone produce equitable determination ;
 “ and, in what terms soever the powerful injoin obedience, to those
 “ the weak are obliged to submit.”

M E L I A N S.

“ I F this be so, we boldly aver — for as you have discarded
 “ justice from the question, and substituted interest in its place, we
 “ must follow the precedent — that you also it concerneth, we
 “ should not be deprived of the common privilege of men, but that
 “ to human creatures ever liable to so dangerous a loss the pleas of
 “ reason

“ reason and equity, even tho’ urged beyond their exact limitations,
 “ should be indulged and allowed their weight. And more to you
 “ than to others is this proper to be suggested, lest, after satiating
 “ revenge in all its fury, should you ever be overthrown, you may
 “ teach your enemies how you ought to be treated.”

ATHENIANS.

“ THAT affecteth us not: For, tho’ to our share an overthrow
 “ of empire fall, the event would render us neither abject nor de-
 “ sponding; because men inured to enlarged command, as the La-
 “ cedæmonians for instance, are never terrible to the vanquished.
 “ But our contest at present is not against the Lacedæmonians. *That*
 “ revenge alone is terrible, when subjects tumultuously rebel and
 “ gain the ascendant over such as were once their masters. And
 “ truly, to avert such dangerous extremities, be the care intrusted
 “ to us. But on the present occasion, that we are here for the in-
 “ largement of our own power, and that what we have to urge con-
 “ cerneth the preservation of the *State* of Melos, — these are the
 “ points we are to establish. We are desirous to have our power
 “ extended over you without obstruction, and your preservation to
 “ be amply secured for the common benefit of us both.”

MELIANS.

“ AND how can it turn out as beneficial for us to become your
 “ slaves, as it will for you to be our masters?”

ATHENIANS.

“ PLAINLY thus; — because instead of suffering the extre-
 “ mities of conquest, you may merely become our subjects; and
 “ we, by exempting you from a total destruction, shall gain your
 “ service.”

MELIANS.

MELIANS.

" BUT will not these terms content you — that, we be permitted to persevere in quiet, to be friends to you instead of enemies, but in regard to war to be strictly neutral?"

ATHENIANS.

" NO. For all your enmity cannot hurt us so much as the acceptance of such friendship from you. The latter to those over whom we rule would suggest intimations of our weakness: Your enmity is a proof of our power."

MELIANS.

" ARE your subjects then such sorry judges of equity and right, as to place upon the same level those, who are under no manner of tie and who were never indebted for their settlement to you, and those, who revolting from you have been again reduced?"

ATHENIANS.

" WHY should they not? They know such a sense of things may be well grounded in regard to both; inasmuch as those, who are exempted from our yoke, owe such exemption to their own superior strength, and if we attack them not, it is the pure result of fear. And hence, the reduction of you, besides enlarging our empire, will invest it with more ample security, especially when seated on an island you are bound to submit to the masters of the sea, and to remain henceforth too weak for resistance, unless you are victorious at the present crisis."

MELIANS.

" DO you then conclude that what we have proposed is incompatible with your own security? — For, since excluding us from
" the

“ the plea of justice you endeavour merely to persuade us into sub-
 “ servieney to your interest, we also are again necessitated to insist once
 “ more on the *profitable* to ourselves, and by shewing that with our
 “ welfare your own also coincideth, endeavour to prevail. — What
 “ think you of all *those* States, which now stand neutral in your dis-
 “ putes? How will you avoid their implacable hatred, when, terri-
 “ fied at such your usage of us, they must live in constant expectation
 “ of your hostilities? And whither can such conduct tend, but to en-
 “ large the number of your declared enemies, and to constrain others,
 “ who never designed to be your foes, to take up arms against you,
 “ tho’ to their own regret?”

A T H E N I A N S.

“ T H A T never can be : Since from *States* seated on the continent
 “ we have nothing to apprehend : they are under no immediate ne-
 “ cessity of guarding their liberty against attacks from us. Those
 “ alone we dread who are seated in islands, and who like you refuse
 “ our government, or who having felt the pains of subjection are ir-
 “ ritated against us. Such are most likely to have recourse to violent
 “ measures, and to plunge themselves and us into imminent dangers.”

MELIANS.

“ IF this be so ; and if you, ye Athenians, can readily embark
“ into so many perils to prevent the dissolution of your own empire ;
“ if *States*, by you enslaved, can do as much to throw off your
“ yoke ; must it not be wretchedly base and cowardly in us, who
“ yet are free, to leave any method, even to the last extremity, un-
“ tried of averting slavery ?”

ATHENIANS.

“ IF you judge of things as wise men ought, we answer — *Not.*
 “ For the point, in which you are at present concerned, is not a
 Vol. II. C c “ trial

“ trial of valour upon equal terms, in order to escape the reproach
 “ of cowardice ; but, your deliberations proceed at present about
 “ the means of self-preservation, that you may not be obliged to en-
 “ counter those who must by far overpower you.”

MELIANS.

“ BUT we on the contrary know, that the enterprizes of war
 “ have sometimes very different events to those which superiority of
 “ numbers gave reason to expect ; and, in regard to ourselves, that
 “ if we yield at once eternal despair must be our fate, but by acting
 “ resolutely in our own defence, we may yet entertain an hope of
 “ success.”

ATHENIANS.

“ HOPE in this manner is ever applied to be the solace of
 “ danger. And truly, in situations which can afford to be disap-
 “ pointed, tho’ ever prejudicial, it is not always fatal. But such as
 “ idly lavish their last resource their very *all* upon Hope (for it is
 “ prodigal by nature) are only by their own ruin convinced of its
 “ delusion ; nay, when its delusion is thus by sad experience disco-
 “ vered, and men should guard themselves against it, it will not yet
 “ let go its hold in the human heart. Chuse not therefore so fatal
 “ a resource for yourselves in your present destitute situation, hang-
 “ ing as you are on the very brink of ruin. Let not your conduct
 “ resemble the foolish behaviour of the mob of mankind, who,
 “ tho’ by human means their safety might be earned, yet when cala-
 “ mity hath chased away all visible hopes of redress, betake them-
 “ selves to others of a darker cast, to divinations and to oracles
 “ and all such vain expedients as hope suggesteth, to draw them to
 “ their destruction.”

MELIANS.

M E L I A N S.

“ DIFFICULT indeed, as we apprehend and you well know, the contest must prove to us against your strength and fortune, matched as we are so unequally together. Yet the confidence still supporteth us, that in fortune, since of divine disposal we shall not be inferior, as with innocence on our side we stand against injustice ; that farther, our deficiencies in strength will be amplified by the addition of Lacedæmonian aid, since it is incumbent upon them to support us, if from no other motive yet from the ties of blood and a sense of honour. And thus it is not intirely without good grounds that we can form the resolution to withstand your efforts.”

A T H E N I A N S.

“ NOR have we any reason to apprehend on our own account, that the divine benevolence will not equally exert itself for us, because neither our opinions nor our acts are worse than those of the rest of mankind, either in regard to the worship of the Gods, or an acknowledgment of their providence. For of the divine nature we think like the rest of the world ; and of men, that beyond a scruple they are impelled by the necessary bent of their nature, to seize dominion wherever they have power. As for ourselves, we were not the authors of this constitution ; nor were we the first who digested it into practice. We found it already in force ; we have accordingly applied it, and shall leave it behind us for the practice of every future age ; conscious, that you yourselves, and every other *State* invested with equal power, would make the same exertion of it. And truly, so far as relateth to the Gods, we have no more reason to distrust their protection than our neighbours. But your sentiments of the Lacedæmonians are such, that you are confident of support from them because it will

" base in them to refuse it. Here we bless your simplicity, but envy
 " not your folly. The Lacedæmonians, we allow, amongst one
 " another and in paying all due regard to the laws of their country,
 " give ample proofs of honour and virtue. But their behaviour to-
 " wards the rest of mankind, tho' it would open a large field of
 " censure, were it to be minutely examined, yet at present shall be
 " shewn by one concise declaration, that, according to the best
 " lights we have been able to collect, they repute as honourable the
 " things which please them, and as just the things which promote
 " their interest. Such maxims are not in the least conducive to your
 " preservation: It is all chimera.

M E L I A N S.

" N O. We ground our hopes of relief from them upon their
 " own clear conviction of what their interest injoineth them. This
 " never can suffer them to entertain a thought of abandoning the
 " Melians who are a colony of their own, of being faithless to the
 " *States* of Greece who wish them well, or of promoting the
 " schemes of the common foe."

A T H E N I A N S.

" O F consequence you imagine, that their interest is connected
 " with your security, that the duties of justice should in honour be
 " observed tho' attended with dangers. But these are maxims
 " which the Lacedæmonians, least of all men, have resolution
 " enough to observe in fact."

M E L I A N S.

" W E have the strongest grounds to imagine, that in our defence
 " they will hazard any dangers, from a sense, that their own pre-
 " servation dependeth more on us than any other people, as we
 " are finely situated for doing them service in Peloponnesus, and in
 " affection

“ affection are more faithfully attached to them through the bands
“ of consanguinity.”

ATHENIANS.

“ BUT the certainty of obtaining succour in the intervals of
“ need seemeth not to depend so much on the merit of those who
“ implore it, as on the consciousness of superior strength in those
“ who are implored to give it: A maxim this, to which no *State*
“ adheres so strictly as the Lacedæmonian. Hence ever, through a
“ diffidence of their own domestic force, they never dare even to
“ invade their neighbours, without the concurrence of numerous al-
“ lies. There cannot therefore be the least room to expect, that they
“ will transport an aid into an island, whilst we are masters of the
“ sea.”

MELIANS.

“ NOT perhaps of their own forces; but they have confederates
“ enow to employ in this service. The sea of Crete is wide and spa-
“ cious. A passage through it even the lords of the sea will find it
“ more difficult to obstruct, than those who are intent on stealing it
“ to effect with safety. Or, grant they miscarry in the attempt; at
“ worst, they can make a diversion upon your territory or against the
“ remainder of your dependants who escaped the efforts of Brasidas.
“ And then, your attention and your arms must be drawn from a
“ quarter where you have no right to fix them, for the necessary de-
“ fence of your own home and your own appendage.”

ATHENIANS.

“ THO’ such turns may intervene, your own experience should
“ teach you to distrust them: For you are not, cannot be ignorant
“ that the Athenians never yet would condescend to raise a siege
“ through hostile dread. But we cannot avoid observing, that in the
“ whole

“ whole course of this debate, tho’ declared by you to be held as
“ the means of your preservation, you have not so much as started
“ one single point, upon which wise men can presume to fasten the
“ least confidence of redress. Your firmest security is placed in the
“ faint hope of some distant contingencies ; but your present strength
“ is merely trifling against the extensive scope of your antagonists.
“ Nay victims you must fall to your own absurd presumptions, un-
“ less, when we are once withdrawn to give you time to consult, you
“ determine to try some other expedient. You will then no longer
“ be controlled by that sense of shame, which, when dishonour
“ glareth before and danger presseth on, precipitateth men into ruin.
“ For, tho’ they see with their eyes quite open into what an abyss
“ they are going to plunge, yet to avoid the imputation of what the
“ world stileth dishonour — so prevalent is the force of one bewitch-
“ ing sound ! — tho’ vanquished by it, they scorn to yield to reason,
“ wilfully embarrassing themselves with incurable calamities, and
“ contracting a more shameful weight of dishonour through their
“ own mad obstinacy than fortune could award them. Such conse-
“ quences you are now concerned by mature deliberations to avoid.
“ You are next to reflect, that no shame can attend your plying un-
“ der the force of a most formidable *State* ; a *State* which designeth
“ to make the moderate demands alone — that, you would accept
“ her alliance ; and, securely enjoy your territory upon the condi-
“ tion only to pay her tribute ; and, when war or safety are left to
“ your own option, that you would not peevishly prefer the worst.
“ For those are the men to maintain themselves in credit and pro-
“ sperity, who never suffer their equals to insult them, who pay pro-
“ per regard to their superiors, and towards their inferiors behave
“ with moderation. Reflect on these points whilst we withdraw ; and
“ remember again and again, that your country now calleth for all
“ your prudence, since by the single deliberation of this single day, as
“ either it taketh a prosperous or sinister turn, her fate will be deter-
“ mined.”

Here

Here the Athenians withdrew from the conference. And the Melians, after being some time alone, and resolving finally to reject what they had already refused, gave in their answer thus :

“ WE continue, Athenians, in the very same sentiments we have already declared. We shall not in an instant of time abandon that liberty, which, in the free possession of our own *State* we have enjoyed for the space of seven hundred years ; which still we shall spare no endeavours to preserve ; intrusting it to that fortune which by divine permission hath hitherto preserved it, and to that redress we expect from human aid and the Lacedæmonians. But, thus much again we offer — To be friends to you, enemies to neither, on condition you quit our lands, after an accommodation ratified between us to our reciprocal satisfaction.”

The Melians in this manner delivered their final answer. But the Athenians, the very moment they quitted the place of conference, uttered themselves thus :

“ YOU Melians alone of all mankind are the persons, so far as we can judge, who regard future contingencies as an over-balance for instant dangers, and through mad presumption value things yet invisible as really actual. But, the greater your dependence, the more rash your confidence upon Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon hope, the more abundantly fatal your delusions will prove.”

And this said, the Athenian deputation returned to their camp.

But the Athenian commanders, upon this refusal of submission from the Melians, applied themselves instantly to the acts of war ; and dividing the work in shares to the several parties in their army, compleatly shut up the Melians in a line of circumvallation. And, when

Hospitalities begin.

when this was perfected and a sufficient number both of the Athenians and their dependents were appointed to stay behind and continue the blockade both by land and sea, they departed with the bulk of their forces. Those farther, who were left for this service, staid behind and continued the blockade.

Argives. About the same time, the Argives, making an irruption into Phliasia and caught in an ambuscade laid for them by the Phliasians and their own exiles, were slaughtered to the number of eighty.

Pylus. The Athenians by their excursions from Pylus committed many depredations on the Lacedæmonians. But these had not influence enough upon the Lacedæmonians to cause a renunciation of the peace, or a renewal of the war. They only proclaimed, that "their people had free leave to make reprisals on the Athenians."

Corinthians. The Corinthians also had a war with the Athenians, on account of some private differences between them, but the rest of Peloponnesus interfered not in the quarrel.

Proceedings at Melos. The Melians, farther, assailing it by night, carried that part of the Athenian circumvallation which lay close to their market. They slew the guards who were posted there; and, having gained a conveyance into the town for provisions and all necessary stores they could procure by money, they afterwards withdrew and discontinued all efforts of resistance: But the Athenians took care for the future to place a stronger guard upon their works. And here the summer ended.

Lacedæmonians. In the winter which followed, the Lacedæmonians drew out their forces in order to begin an expedition into Argia; but, when the victims offered on the frontiers boded no success to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet the Argives, as such an invasion had been intended against them, suspected it was owing to the intrigues of a faction within their city; some of whom they immediately secured, but the rest escaped by flight.

About

About the same time also, the Melians carried another part of the Athenian circumvallation, as the party by which it was guarded was not numerous. But, upon such disturbances, a strong reinforcement was sent from Athens under the command of Philocrates the son of Demeas. The Melians were now closely invested on all sides, and some schemes to betray the town being in agitation amongst them, they thought proper to make a voluntary surrender. This they did "at the discretion of the Athenians," who put to death all they found within the place able to bear arms, and made the women and children slaves. The town they afterwards re peopled by sending thither a colony of five hundred.

TO NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY
ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS

TO NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY

ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS



THE
HISTORY
OF
The PELOPONNESIAN WAR
By THUCYDIDES.
BOOK THE SIXTH.

Dd 2

C O N T E N T S.

THE Athenians resolve on the expedition to Sicily. Description of that island.

Year XVII. The debate in the assembly of the people at Athens about the expedition. The generals nominated with full powers. The affair of the Mercuries. Departure of the grand fleet for Sicily. Proceedings at Syracuse. The Athenian fleet arrives on the coast of Italy. Alcibiades recalled to take his trial about the Mercuries and profanation of the Mysteries. A digression — containing the true account of a former revolution at Athens begun by Harmodius and Aristogiton. Alcibiades flies, and is proclaimed a traitor. The Athenians land at Syracuse. A battle ensues, in which the Athenians are victorious; but soon after they return to Catana. The negotiations at Camarina. Alcibiades at Sparta.

Year XVIII. The Athenians land again at Syracuse, take Epipolæ by surprize, and begin to invest Syracuse in form. Battles: The Athenians carry on their works: Counterwork of the Syracusans. Aid sent to Syracuse from Peloponnesus under the command of Gylippus: He arrives at Tarentum. The Athenians by openly joining the Argives against the Lacedæmonians violate the treaty of peace in Greece.



THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

B O O K VI.

IN the same winter, the Athenians come to a resolution, to make a second expedition against Sicily with a larger force than had been sent thither heretofore under Laches and Eurymedon, and to attempt its total reduction. The bulk of the people was in truth ignorant of the largeness of the island, and of the multitude of the Grecians and Barbarians by whom it was inhabited; ignorant further, that they were going to embark in a war not much less considerable than the Peloponnesian.

The compass of Sicily is little under eight days sail for a trading vessel; and, tho' it be so large, it is severed from the main-land, so as not to be part of the continent, by a gut in breadth but * twenty stadia. The manner in which it was inhabited in the earliest ages was *this*; and the several nations which possessed it, *these*.

The

Cyclops.

The Cyclops and Lestrigons are said to be the most ancient inhabitants of some part of this country : But from what stock they were derived, or from whence they came hither, or what is become of them since, I have nothing to relate. Poetical amusements must here suffice, or such information as every man picks up for his own use.

Sicanians.

The Sicanians appear to be the first people, who next to those inhabited this country : Tho', according to their own accounts, they are prior ; because they claim to themselves the original tenure. But, according to the truest discoveries, they are found to have been Iberians, who were compelled to remove from the banks of the Sicanus in Iberia by the Libyans. And from them at that time this island received the name of Sicania, having before been called Trinacria. They continue to this day to inhabit the western parts of Sicily.

Trojans.

After the taking of Troy, some of the Trojans, who had escaped the Achæans, arrive in their vessels upon the Sicilian shore, and forming a settlement adjacent to the Sicanians, they all took jointly the name of Elymi ; and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. They were also increased by the accession of some Phocians from Troy, who having first been driven to Libya by a storm, passed over afterwards from thence into Sicily.

Siculi.

The Siculi passed over first into Sicily from Italy ; for there they originally dwelled. They fled before the Opici ; and, as the story is told not without probability, having observed how the current set within the strait and seized a favourable gale, they crossed over upon rafts, and perhaps by some other methods. There are even to this very day a people in Italy called Siculi ; and that region in a similar manner obtained its name of Italy, from a certain Arcadian king who bore the name of Italus. These crossing into Sicily with formidable numbers, and vanquishing the Sicanians in battle, drove them into the southern and western parts, caused the name of the island to be changed from Sicania to Sicily, settled themselves in and kept possession

possession of the richest tracts in the country, since their passage hither was near three hundred years earlier than the landing of any Grecians in Sicily. Nay, they continue to this very day in possession of the midland and northerly parts of the island.

The Phœnicians also had settlements quite round the coast of Sicily. They secured the capes on the sea and the small circumjacent isles, for the sake of trafficking with the Sicilians. But when the Grecians in considerable numbers began to cross over and fix their residence here, the Phœnicians abandoned their other settlements, and uniting together seated themselves at Motya and Soloeis and Panormus, near to the Elymi; secure of their own continuance in these quarters from their friendship with the Elymi, and because from this part of Sicily the passage to Carthage is exceeding short. — So many were the Barbarians seated in Sicily; and such the order of their settlements. Phœnicians.

The first Grecians who came hither were the Chalcidæans of Eubœa. Thucles led the colony, which settled at Naxos, and erected the altar of Apollo the *Guide*, which is still to be seen without the city; and on which the *deputations*, sent from hence to the oracles, offer sacrifice, before they begin their voyage. Chalcidæans. Naxos.

In the year following, Archias a Corinthian, of the race of Hercules, founded Syracuse, having previously expelled the Sicilians out of that island on which the *inner-city* is seated, tho' now no longer washed round about by the sea. And in process of time, the *upper-city* also, being taken in by a wall, became exceeding populous. Syracuse.

In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Thucles and his Chalcidæans sallied forth out of Naxos, and having by force of arms drove away the Sicilians, they build Leontium, and afterwards Catana. But the Catanæans themselves declared Evarchus their founder. Leontium. Catana.

About the same point of time, Lamis also leading a colony from Megara arrived in Sicily, and planted them on a spot called Trotilus. Thapsus.

lus upon the river Pantacias. But removing afterwards from thence to Leontium, he associated himself a short time with the Catanéans for the protection of his party; yet being ejected by them, and then having founded Thapsus, he dies. His followers upon this removed from Thapsus; and, Hyblon a Sicilian king betraying another place into their hands, and becoming himself their conductor, they settled those Megaréans who are called Hyblæan; and after a continued possession of two hundred forty-five years, they were expelled out of their city and territory by Gelon tyrant of the Syracusans. Yet before this ejection, about an hundred years after their settlement there, they had sent out Pammilus and built the city of Selinus. Pammilus had come thither more lately from Megara their mother-city, and assisted them in making this new settlement at Selinus.

Megara.

Selinus.

Gela.

Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, each leading a separate colony, founded Gela in conjunction, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The name of this new city was taken from the river Gela. Yet the spot, where the city now stands, and which was first walled round, is called Lindii. But their polity was framed upon the Doric model.

Acragas.

In the hundred and eighth year, as near as possible, after this last settlement, the Geloans built Acragas, giving the city its name from the river Acragas. They declared Aristonous and Pysilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil institutions of Gela.

Zanclé.

Messene.

Zanclé was originally founded by a band of pirates, who arrived there from Cymé, a Chalcidic city in Opicia; tho' afterwards a numerous reinforcement from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa joined them, and possessed that district in community. The founders were Perieres and Cratæmenes; one of them, from Cymé, the other, from Chalcis. But the name of Zanclé was first of all given it by the Sicilians, because in shape it bears resemblance to a scythe, and the Sicilians call a scythe *zanchum*. But in process of time these people were driven from thence by the Samians and other Ionians, who flying from

from the Medes had landed in Sicily. And after a short interval Anaxilas tyrant of the Rhegians ejected the Samians, re-peopled the city with a number of mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to Messene, in honour of the country from whence he was originally descended. Himera also was founded from Zancle by Euclides and Himera. Simus and Sacon. Into this colony came also a very numerous body of Chalcidæans. Some exiles further from Syracuse, who had been worsted in a sedition and were distinguished by the title of Miletidæ, took up their residence amongst them. Hence their dialect became a mixture of the Chalcidic and the Doric; but the Chalcidic model obtained in their civil institutions.

Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae, Acrae. seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae, near twenty after Acrae. Casmenae. Camarina also was first founded by the Syracusans, very nearly one Camarina. hundred thirty five years after the building of Syracuse: Its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarinæans being afterwards driven out by the arms of the Syracusans because of a revolt, in process of time Hippocrates tyrant of Gela received the lands of the Camarinæans as a ransom for some Syracusan prisoners of war, and taking upon himself to be their founder replanted Camarina. Yet, once more again it was demolished by Gelon; and replanted a third time by the same Gelon. So many nations of Greeks and Barbarians inhabited Sicily.

An island so large and so populous the Athenians were passionately bent on invading. Their truest and final view was, to compass its total reduction; but the pretext alledged for a colour was, their readiness to succour such as by blood were related, or by prior alliances had been attached to them. An Egestean embassy, now residing at Athens, laboured the point with all possible industry, and with extraordinary earnestness pressed them to engage in it. For the Egestæans, who bordered upon the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in a war with the latter about some connubial points, and a certain tract

*Pretext and
real design of
this expedition.*

of land to which both laid claim. The Selinuntians further, assisted by their Syracusan allies, pressed hard upon them both by land and by sea. And hence, the Egestæans were now suggesting at Athens, that "they ought not to forget their alliance with the Leontines made by Laches in the former war;" requesting further, that a naval force might be sent thither for their succour. To this purpose many other arguments were alledged by them, but the principal was this; — "If the Syracusans, who have overthrown the Leontines, be left in the unmolested enjoyment of their conquest, and proceed still further to destroy the remaining parties of that alliance, they will get into their hands the whole power of Sicily. Such an event would be attended with the utmost danger, left in consequence of it, as they were Doric by descent, they might think themselves bound by the ties of blood to assist with a powerful armament their kindred Dorians, and in quality of colonies might succour those Peloponnesians by whom they were originally planted, and thus form a combination to demolish the Athenian empire. In policy therefore the Athenians were obliged to support the allies who yet remained, in order to make head against the Syracusans; and this the more readily, as they themselves would undertake to furnish them with sums of money equal to the exigencies of the war." With such discourse the Athenians were frequently entertained in their popular assemblies, as the Egestæan ambassadors, still urging their point, had gained many advocates to second their arguments. And at length it was decreed, that "ambassadors should be previously dispatched to Egesta, to inspect the state of their wealth, whether they had such sums as they talked of in the public treasury and the temples; and also to draw up a report of the present posture of their war against the Selinuntians." And in pursuance of this, the ambassadors from the Athenians were sent to Sicily.

The

The Lacedæmonians in the same winter joined by their allies, those of Corinth excepted, and marching into Argia, ravaged a small part of that territory and carried off the corn, having brought some carriages for that purpose. They also removed the Argive exiles to Ornea, and left them a small detachment from their main army, for the security of their persons. A temporary truce being also made, during which the Orneatæ and Argives were to abstain from all hostilities against one another, they drew off the army to their respective homes.

Argia invaded by the Lacedæmonians.

However, not long after this, the Athenians arrived with thirty sail of ships and six hundred heavy-armed. The Argives, in conjunction with the Athenians, took the field with all their strength, and besieged those in Ornea for the space of a day. But, as at night the besiegers removed to a distance in order for their repose, those of Ornea made their escape. On the day following, the Argives, when sensible of their escape, levelled Ornea with the ground, and then withdrew. And afterwards the Athenians re-embarked for Athens.

The Athenians also threw in by sea a party of horsemen into Methone, a frontier-town on Macedonia. With these, consisting of their own citizens and such Macedonians as had refuged amongst them, they harassed the country belonging to Perdiccas. But the Lacedæmonians sent a summons of aid for Perdiccas to the Chalcidæans of Thrace, who kept terms with the Athenians by truces renewed every tenth day: These however refused to march. Thus ended the winter, and with it the sixteenth year of the war of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

The Athenians seize Methone in Macedonia.

Y E A R XVII.

Before Christ 415.

IN the succeeding summer, very early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, accompanied by the Egestæans. They brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, being a month's pay

The grand debate at Athens about the expedition.

E c 2

for

for sixty sail of ships, the equipment of which for their succour they were instructed to solicit from the Athenians. Upon this an assembly of the people was called, and the reports of the Egeſtæan and their own embaffadors were received, conſiſting of many points, ſpecious indeed, but falſe in fact; and ſo far as related to their treasure, that “ ſums ample enough are already repoſited in their temples and their public treasury.” In conſequence of this a decree was made, that “ a fleet of ſixty ſhips ſhould ſail for Sicily; the commanders, Alcibiades the ſon of Clinias, Nicias the ſon of Niceratus, and Lamachus the ſon of Xenophanes, to be inveſted with full powers to act at their own diſcretion; the whole armament to act as an aid to the Egeſtæans againſt the Selinuntians; to replace alſo the Leontines in their former habitations, if the ſtate of the war gave them leiſure to execute that ſervice; and to manage all other points in Sicily, as they ſhould judge moſt beneficial for the Athenian intereſt.”

Lamachus, the third in this commiſſion, ſeems to have been picked out for the command, for the peculiar conſtitution of his own character, which was a proper mean between the cautious and phlegmatic diſpoſition of Nicias, and the fiery impetuous ardor of Alcibiades. He was now (according to Plutarch) a brave old experienced officer. In his youth he had been remarkable for heat and fire; a length of ſervice and years had mellowed him into the right temper, to deliberate beforehand, and then gallantly to carry a point into execution. But then, he wanted the means of properly ſupporting the authority and dignity of his poſt. He was now ranked with two of the moſt wealthy and noble Athenians; whereas his own condition was low; nay, he was (according to Plutarch) ſo exceed-

ingly poor, that, before he went to any foreign command, he was uſed to petition the *State* for a little money to furniſh him out and even to buy him ſome ſhoes. Mr. Waſſe, in his notes on Thucydides, refers us for his character to a comedy of Ariſtophanes (*The Acharnians*;) that is, to enquire after the character of a plain blunt officer from a profeſſed droll, or to ſeek truth from him who ridiculed all mankind. Ariſtophanes hath repreſented Lamachus, as a vain-glorious roaring bully, a mere thing of arms, a creature of verbal pomp and parade, contrary to all the truth of hiſtory. Writers, who live by turning great and good men into ridicule, ſhould never be reckoned good evidence as to the truth and reality of characters, when hiſtory diſſents.

But

But the fifth day after this, another assembly of the people was held upon the *ways* and *means* to expedite the equipment of the fleet; and by proper decrees to supply the commanders with what might yet be requisite to accelerate their departure. Nicias, who against his will had been named for a commander, was persuaded that the public determinations were rash and premature, since on short examination and motives merely specious they were bent on the total reduction of Sicily, an arduous undertaking! Now therefore he stood up, and having a mind to stop proceedings, he advised the Athenians as follows:

“ I AM aware that the present assembly is held, to concert the
 “ means of expediting our preparations, and to get all in readiness *Speech of*
Nicias.
 “ for the expedition to Sicily. But in my sentiments we ought once
 “ more to resume the consideration of the previous point, “ Whe-
 “ ther upon the whole it be adviseable to equip out such a fleet,”
 “ and not by rash and premature resolves on points of such vast im-
 “ portance, through too easy compliance with foreign solicitations, to
 “ embroil ourselves in an unnecessary war. For my own part truly,
 “ I am invested with honour by the present measures, and no man
 “ upon earth is so little anxious about his own personal safety. But
 “ at the same time I pronounce that person to be a valuable member
 “ of the public, who makes use of all his prudence to preserve his
 “ own life and property: For such an one, purely for his own pri-
 “ vate benefit, must be desirous that the public welfare flourish and
 “ abound. But however, neither in the preceding assemblies could
 “ the preeminence of honour awarded to me bias me to speak in
 “ contradiction to my judgment; nor shall it bias me at present;
 “ but, what I think tends most to the public good, that only shall
 “ I utter.
 “ I am also sensible, that what I can urge may have but little in-
 “ fluence on Athenian tempers, when I attempt persuading you to
 “ secure

“ secure what you already possess, and not to hazard the present for
 “ things invisible and future. But, that your eagerness is quite unsea-
 “ sonable; and, that the ends, which you too sanguinely propose,
 “ are not easy to be accomplished, — these things I shall clearly
 “ demonstrate.

“ To this purpose I aver, that if the intended expedition proceeds,
 “ you are going to leave many enemies behind you here, and to take
 “ the most certain method of fetching hither more numerous oppo-
 “ nents. You imagine perhaps, that the late peace will be firmly
 “ and constantly observed, tho’ it is merely a nominal peace, and
 “ that only so long as you remain inactive. Nay, such it hath been
 “ made by the conduct of some even of our own community.
 “ And should any considerable force of ours have the unhappiness to
 “ sink under hostile efforts, our old enemies will be suddenly upon
 “ us; since merely by calamities they were reduced to an accommo-
 “ dation; and in a manner, more disgraceful to themselves than to
 “ us, were necessitated to treat. In the next place; we have found
 “ that in the treaty itself many articles are still controverted. There
 “ are further diverse *States*, and those by no means the weakest,
 “ who have not yet accepted the accommodation, but on the con-
 “ trary are still in arms against us; whilst others are inhibited merely
 “ by ten-day truces, and that only because the Lacedæmonian mea-
 “ sures are hitherto pacific. But suddenly perhaps, when once they
 “ find our strength divided, the very measure into which we are now
 “ precipitating ourselves, they may fall upon us in general combina-
 “ tion, augmented by the strength of Sicily, whose accession to their
 “ former confederacy they would have been glad to purchase at any
 “ price. On these possibilities we are bound sedately to reflect, that
 “ we may not plunge a *State* so highly exalted into superfluous
 “ dangers, nor fondly covet to wrest their empire from the hands of
 “ others, before we have adequately insured our own; since the
 “ Chalcidéans of Thrace, tho’ so many years are now elapsed since
 “ they

“ they first revolted, are not yet reduced ; and some other *States* on
“ the continent render us only a precarious obedience.

“ Yet — “ to the Egeſtéans our old allies, who are injuriously
“ oppreſſed, we are bound in honour to ſend a moſt ſpeedy ſuc-
“ cour.” — And in the mean time we continue to defer avenging
“ ourſelves upon thoſe, whoſe revolt from us is of long ſtanding now,
“ and whoſe injuſtice we are ſtill obliged to ſuffer. Tho’ the latter,
“ could we once bring them back to their duty, we might eaſily
“ control for the future : But the former, ſhould we ever become
“ their maſters, remote and numerous as they are, we ſhould not
“ without difficulty be able to awe. It muſt be madneſs therefore
“ to invade that people, whom tho’ conquered you can never retain
“ in their obedience ; and who, in caſe the attempt againſt them
“ miſcarry, will for the future be much more diſaffected towards
“ you, than they were before that attempt was made.

“ But it is further my real opinion, that the Sicilians, as their af-
“ fairs are now circumſtantiated, would become leſs formidable to
“ us, if once reduced to the Syracuſan yoke. — And yet on this re-
“ mote contingency the Egeſtéans have chiefly inſiſted, in order to
“ alarm us. Perhaps *now* it may come to paſs, that its ſingle *States*
“ may combine againſt us to gratify the Lacedæmonians ; but, in the
“ other caſe, it is quite improbable, that an united empire would
“ hazard its own welfare to demolish another. For, if acting from
“ a political precaution, they may ſide with the Peloponneſians to
“ overturn our empire, thoſe very Peloponneſians may probably,
“ from the ſame principle, concur with us to demolish the Sicilian.
“ As for us, the Grecians there may have reaſon to dread us moſt,
“ if we go not at all amongſt them ; and what is next to that, if we
“ only give them a ſight of our power for a ſhort interval of time,
“ and then withdraw. But if acting offensively we incur miſcar-
“ riage, they will inſtantly deſpiſe us, and join our neighbouring
“ foes to annoy us here. For things that are placed moſt remotely
“ from

“ from us, as likewise those, which yield no opportunity of adjusting
“ our opinion of them by experience; such, it is universally
“ known, are most apt to excite admiration. Reflect, ye citizens of
“ Athens, that your present elevation of spirits is owing to your
“ success against the Lacedæmonians and allies. You crouched for
“ fear under their first attacks, ’till having gained the superiority over
“ them to their utter disappointment, you instantly despised them:
“ And now, nothing less than Sicily can content you. We by no
“ means ought to be too much buoyed up by the disasters of our
“ foes, but only to be so far confident as we are able to awe their
“ intriguing tempers. We ought to ascribe no other view to the La-
“ cedæmonians, than a vigilant care to seize the first opportunity of
“ wiping off their late disgrace by giving us a blow, and thus recover-
“ ing their former reputation; and that they are most earnest on ac-
“ complishing this, since from time immemorial the glory of mili-
“ tary valour hath been their warmest most prevailing passion. Our
“ welfare therefore, if we knew in what our welfare consists, by no
“ means summons us to enter the lists in behalf of the Egesteans of
“ Sicily, a people who to us are mere Barbarians, but to exert our
“ utmost vigilance to guard our own constitution from oligarchical
“ incroachments.

“ My duty obligeth me also to remind you, that we have had but
“ short respite to breathe from the havoc made amongst us by pesti-
“ lence and war, and to repair the prodigious waste of our fortunes
“ and our lives. These, according to all the rules of equity, should
“ be reserved for our own domestic exigencies, and not be la-
“ vished away on a set of fugitives, who implore our protection,
“ and are bound in interest to tell specious falsehoods; tho’, whilst
“ plunging their neighbours into hazards, they have nothing but
“ words to contribute; and, should we redress them, know not how
“ to be grateful; but, in case we miscarry in the attempt, must in-
“ volve their friends in their own destruction.

“ If

“ If there be further a *person*, who elevated with his own designation to the command, incites you earnestly to fail ; heedful of
 “ nothing but his own private views, nor qualified by his years for
 “ so important a trust ; if his passion be merely to excite admiration
 “ for his fine breed of horses, or by the gains of his commission to
 “ repair the havoc of his fortune caused by prodigality ; I conjure
 “ you, to afford no such person an opportunity to make a splendid
 “ figure at the expence of your country. But rest convinced, that
 “ men of such a turn will be corrupt in public office, as they are
 “ bad œconomists in private life ; that the enterprize in hand is a very
 “ arduous trust, far beyond such measures or such exploits as a strip-
 “ ling can devise or execute.

“ I own myself intimidated by that crowd of youths who sit by
 “ this *person* and abet his schemes. I am hence obliged to implore
 “ the men of years and experience who happen to sit near them, by
 “ no means to dread that appearance of pusillanimity, which, in case
 “ this decree of war be revoked, might be objected to them ; by no
 “ means to indulge the same raw passions by which boys are actuated,
 “ so as to dote upon remote contingencies. You, Gentlemen,
 “ by experience are convinced, that success exceedingly seldom results
 “ from hot and sanguine presumption, but most frequently from
 “ calm and prudent deliberation. In behalf therefore of your country,
 “ which is now on the brink of more critical dangers than ever
 “ it was known before, hold up your hands in opposition, and support
 “ what I am going to move, namely — That, “ the Sicilians
 “ confining themselves within their present limits which we do not
 “ pretend to abridge, with free navigation along the coast of the Ionian
 “ gulf, and transacting their own affairs at large through the whole
 “ extent of the Sicilian seas, be at liberty to take care of their own
 “ concerns without any molestation :” — And, in particular, to return
 “ the Egesteans the following answer — “ Since without the
 “ privity of the Athenians they have already involved themselves

Vol. II. F f “ in

“ in a war against the Selinuntians, let them also without the concurrence of the Athenians bring it to a conclusion : That, moreover, we shall form no alliance for the future, as hath formerly been the case, with men whose indirect behaviour we must be forced to abet, tho’ when we stand in need of reciprocal assistance from them, we shall get none at all.”

“ And you, Sir, who at present preside in this assembly, if you are conscious that it is your duty to superintend the public welfare, if you are desirous to behave like a worthy patriot, put the question, and call upon the Athenians once more to give their votes. And, in case you are afraid to act contrary to order, in proposing what is counter to a former decree; reflect, that when so great a crowd of witnesses are at hand to justify the step, you only act the part of a physician to your country, which hath swallowed down pernicious counsels; and, that he best dischargeth the duty of the first magistrate, who will render to his country all the service he is able; at least, with his eyes open will never suffer it to be hurt.”

In this manner Nicias delivered his sentiments. But the far greater part of the Athenians, who were present, declared for the expedition, and against the repeal of what had been already decreed. Some however there were, who made a fruitless opposition.

The person, who shewed most ardor and pressed them most earnestly to proceed, was Alcibiades the son of Clinias; partly from a resolution to oppose Nicias, with whom in other political points he generally clashed, and because he had calumniously glanced at him in his speech; but principally, because he was ambitious of being at the head of this expedition. He presumed, that not Sicily only but Carthage also might be reduced by himself; and when he should be the author of so great a success, that he must needs abound in wealth and glory. His credit was great at present amongst the citizens:

But

But the warmth of his passions threw him into larger expences than his fortune could support, being sumptuous in every article of life, and especially in horses. And it was chiefly by him that the final overthrow of Athens was at length occasioned. For the bulk of the city, alarmed at the great irregularity of his private life, the excessive luxury of his dress and his diet, as also at that greatness of spirit which he shewed in every single branch of his conduct, turned out enemies to him as a man who affected the tyranny. And tho' when in public commands, he conducted the war with the utmost bravery, yet at home each single citizen was chagrined at his manners, and displaced him to make room for others, which soon drew after it the subversion of the State. Upon this occasion therefore Alcibiades stood up, and advised the Athenians as follows :

“ YES, to me, ye citizens of Athens, in preference to others
 “ this command is due ; — for with this I must needs begin, since on *Speech of*
 “ this point Nicias hath attacked me — and I also judge myself de- *Alcibiades.*
 “ serving of the trust. In regard to those things which have caused
 “ me to be so loudly censured ; those very things give splendor to
 “ my ancestors and to myself, and are of public emolument also to
 “ my country. The great magnificence I displayed at the Olympic
 “ solemnities hath raised in the Grecians an idea of Athens far be-
 “ yond its actual strength ; tho' previous to this, they entertained
 “ the hope of being able totally to war her down. For I am the
 “ man, who brought seven chariots thither, more than any private
 “ person ever furnished out before ; who carried off the first and the
 “ second and the fourth prize, and in all other respects supported
 “ my quality as a victor. Such things, it must be owned, are de-
 “ clared to be honour by the laws of Greece ; and, whenever at-
 “ chieved, they leave an high opinion of power behind them. The
 “ splendid figure I have made at home, whether in exhibiting enter-
 “ tainments for the public or any other method of munificence, may
 F f 2 “ naturally

“ naturally excite the envy of Athenians, but are to strangers in-
“ stances of our grandeur. And that man's extravagant spirit is not
“ useless to the public, who at his own private expence does service
“ not merely to himself but to a whole community. Nor can it
“ imply injustice, for a person whose sentiments are generous and
“ exalted to soar above the ordinary level; since, should he after-
“ wards be reduced to a state of depression, no man is to share
“ in his reverse of fortune. As therefore in calamity we are not to
“ expect even civil salutations, let others in the mean time submit,
“ as in justice they ought, to that assuming behavior which prosperity
“ inspireth; or at least, let equality of demeanor be first shewn by
“ him, who demands it as a debt from another. I am indeed aware,
“ that persons of such uncommon elevation, and all in general who
“ in some splendid qualities outshine the crowd, must so long as they
“ live be the objects of spleen; chiefly to those who claim equality
“ with them; and, in the next place, to those amongst whom they
“ are conversant; and yet, to succeeding generations they leave an
“ ambition of claiming affinity to them, tho' quite groundless and
“ chimerical; and to their country, whatever it be, the haughty
“ boast, that they were not aliens, were not offenders, but citizens
“ of its own growth, and patriots of true renown and worth. Of
“ such reversionary honours I own myself ambitious; and, in order
“ to succeed in the pursuit, have ever rendered my name illustrious
“ in private life; and as to my public behaviour, reflect, Athenians,
“ whether I am inferior to any person whatever in performing good
“ services to my country. For I am the person, who without
“ throwing you into hazard or expence have brought the strongest
“ powers of Peloponnesus to act in your concurrence; who reduced
“ the Lacedæmonians to stake their *all* upon the fortune of one
“ day at Mantinéa. It is true, they came off victorious from the
“ contest; but have not even yet so far resumed their spirits, as to
“ dare to act offensively.

“ Such

“ Such are the exploits, which my greener years, nay even that
“ unnatural giddiness imputed to me hath achieved ; which by insi-
“ nuating language hath made the Peloponnesian strength to ply be-
“ fore it, and giving energy to my frantic humour hath now per-
“ suaded the world that it is no longer to be dreaded. Whilst there-
“ fore I flourish in this manner, whilst Nicias yet continues to be
“ esteemed *fortunate*, lay hold of that service we are each of us
“ able to perform : And by no means repeal the decree of our expe-
“ dition to Sicily, as if intended against a people we are not able to
“ encounter.

“ For in Sicily the cities swarm with crowds of promiscuous dis-
“ united inhabitants, inhabitants for ever used to sudden revolutions
“ and to perpetual fluctuations. And hence, not one of those
“ crowds is equipped with such arms, as are requisite to defend a na-
“ tive soil, or to secure even personal safety ; nor is the region sup-
“ plied with the needful stores of resistance. It is the habit of
“ each, either to execute his purpose by artful language, or to wrest
“ it from the public by sedition. These are all his resources ; and
“ if they fail, at the worst he barely shifts his habitation. It is
“ therefore improbable, that a rabble so jumbled together will ever
“ be unanimously guided by one concerted plan, or combine toge-
“ ther for its just execution. Each moment they will be veering
“ about to such expedients as happen most to sooth their caprice ;
“ and the more, upon account of these seditions, in which we are
“ informed they are already embroiled.

“ Their number of heavy-armed, it must also be observed, is not
“ so large as the pompous accounts of fame have made it ; nor does
“ the sum total of the Grecians amongst them turn out so considera-
“ ble, as each separate city hath computed for her own. But Greece,
“ in this manner ever addicted most terribly to belie her own num-
“ bers, hath been found in the present war scarce able to provide
“ herself with arms.

“ Such,

" Such, according to the best informations I have been able to col-
 " lect, is the present condition of affairs in Sicily. Nay, there are
 " means within our reach still more to facilitate its reduction. For
 " we shall obtain the concurrence of many Barbarians seated there,
 " who from inveteracy against the Syracusans will join us to attack
 " them. Neither can any obstacles accrue from the situation of
 " our affairs nearer home, if you only view it in the just and
 " proper light.

" The bravery of our fathers, tho' opposed by the very same ene-
 " mies, who at present, it is urged, should we sail for Sicily, must
 " be left behind us, tho' further opposed by all the power of the
 " Medes, erected this our empire by the sole resource of their supe-
 " riority in naval power. The Peloponnesians further have never
 " had less hopes of being a match for us than at this very juncture,
 " even tho' their strength be in all its maturity of vigour. It is true,
 " they have it ever in their option to make inroads into our domi-
 " nions, even tho' we waive this expedition; but, at sea, they never
 " can be able to hurt us: The fleet we shall leave behind will be
 " amply sufficient to make head against them,

" By what plausible arguments therefore can we excuse our be-
 " haviour, should we now pusillanimously desist? what evasion can
 " we find to deny our confederates the succour they demand? We
 " are bound in honour, by the oaths we have sworn, to undertake
 " their redress. Unavailing is the pretext, that they have never
 " done such good offices for us. Our alliance with them was not
 " made on the condition of their sailing hither to bring us succour,
 " but of giving such full employ to our enemies there, as might ef-
 " fectually deter them from coming hither. The ready road to em-
 " pire, as not Athenians only but every people who have risen to a
 " summit of power by experience know, is ever to succour those
 " who implore our protection, whether they be Greeks or Barbari-
 " ans. For had it been the constant method to cherish indolent in-
 " active

“ active measures, or minutely to litigate who in justice ought to be
“ protected, the enlargements of our empire had been but trifling,
“ or rather we had been liable to the loss of our original portion.
“ For a *State* invested with superior power is not only openly op-
“ posed in the field, but recourse is had to every precaution to pre-
“ vent their appearance in it. Neither is it in our power to pre-
“ scribe exact or arbitrary limitations to our own empire, but we are
“ by necessity compelled to cabal against some, and with a high hand
“ to keep others in subjection; because, should we relax our com-
“ mand over others, we endanger our own authority, and those we
“ will not awe may become our masters. Nor further ought peace to
“ be so much the object of regard to you as it is to other people,
“ unless you new-model your government, and render it conformable
“ to that of your neighbours.

“ Weigh therefore these arguments; and be convinced, that *thus*
“ only our interest is capable of any considerable advancement, if
“ we proceed against Sicily and execute the expedition in order to
“ defeat the haughty Peloponnesian spirit, by so plain an instance
“ how much we despise them, how little fond we are at present of
“ this inactive interval, and how eager to begin again with a Sicilian
“ voyage. And by acting thus, there is probability on our side,
“ that in case we subdue the people there, we may gain the sove-
“ reignty over all Greece, or at worst we shall depress the Syracusan
“ power: The latter point alone will be an important service to our-
“ selves and our allies. But in case any measure of success attends
“ us, our ships will enable us to secure our acquisitions, or at worst
“ our departure. For, tho’ the whole body of the Sicilians combine
“ together against us, we shall be absolute masters of our own
“ retreat.

“ Let not therefore the words of Nicias, calculated merely for the
“ service of sloth and to raise dissension between the young and the
“ old, disconcert your plan. But let the usual decorum take place,

“ observant

“ observant of which our forefathers, at whose consultations both
 “ the seniors and the youths assisted, exalted this *State* to its present
 “ height ; and do you now, adhering to the established practice, en-
 “ deavour its further exaltation. Remember also, that youth and
 “ age, if debar’d one another’s reciprocal assistance, lose all their in-
 “ fluence and weight ; that, on the other hand, from the wildness
 “ of youth, and the moderation of the middle-aged, and the con-
 “ summate prudence of the old, when tempered harmoniously to-
 “ gether, the most perfect strength must infallibly result ; that a
 “ *State*, which supinely gives way to sloth, like other things for
 “ want of exercise, must infallibly droop and pine away, and the
 “ whole of her skill grow old and obsolete ; but, when inured to
 “ uninterrupted conflict, it is continually improving by practice,
 “ and will gain a perfect habit of surmounting every obstacle, not
 “ by a parade of words but by active perseverance.

“ Upon the whole, I am firmly convinced that a *State*, which
 “ hath been accustomed to full employ, must soon drop into destruc-
 “ tion, if it resigns itself to the alternative of sloth ; and, that such
 “ persons take the best method of infallibly securing their welfare,
 “ who adhere most steddily to their present customs and laws, tho’
 “ possibly better might be substituted in their stead.”

In this manner Alcibiades spoke. And the Athenians, moved by
 his arguments, which were also seconded by the intreaties of the
 Egestean and Leontine exiles, who standing forth in the assembly
 implored their protection, and reminding them of their oaths adjured
 them to redress their wrongs, declared for the expedition with a
 warmer zeal than at any time before. Nicias was convinced by
 this, that whatever dissuasion he could alledge would be quite inca-
 pable to change their resolves : Yet, as possibly, by a minute detail of
 the immense preparations he was going to demand, he might cause
 them at once to change their sentiments, he stood up again, and re-
 addressed them as follows :

“ I

“ I PERCEIVE, Athenians, that your resolutions are fixed on this ^{*Speech of*}
 “ expedition beyond the power of dissuasion, and — may its event ^{*Nicias,*}
 “ be such as your wishes portend ! But I shall once more beg leave
 “ to communicate to you my own sense of the affair.

“ According to the best informations I have been able to procure,
 “ we are now going to invade a number of powerful cities, cities in-
 “ dependent one of another, nor standing in need of public revo-
 “ lutions, which people who cringe under the yoke of slavery
 “ might readily embrace, in order to render their condition more
 “ supportable. Nor is it further to be presumed, that they will readily
 “ exchange their own liberty for subjection to us, as they are nume-
 “ rous, at least for one island, and many of them inhabited by Gre-
 “ cians. For, without reckoning Naxos and Catana, which I hope
 “ upon account of their affinity to the Leontines will side with us,
 “ there are no less than seven provided in all respects with as good
 “ martial habiliments and stores as our own armies ; and more parti-
 “ cularly those against which we chiefly bend our course, Selinus and
 “ Syracuse. These cities abound with soldiers heavy-armed, with
 “ archers and with darters. They have a great number of triremes,
 “ and plenty of hands to man them. They possess a large quantity
 “ of wealth not only in private purses but in their public treasuries.
 “ So rich are even the Selinuntians. And to the Syracusans further
 “ a tribute is paid by several Barbarians. But the points, in which
 “ they most of all excel us, are that numerous cavalry of which
 “ they are possessed and corn of their own growth sufficient to an-
 “ swer all demands without foreign importations. An armament
 “ therefore simply naval will by no means be sufficient to cope with
 “ such a strength. A large land-force must accompany the naval,
 “ if we are desirous of performing such achievements as may be
 “ worthy of the greatness of our plan, and would not be debar’d an
 “ opportunity of landing by their numerous cavalry. And this will
 “ be yet more needful, should the cities alarmed at our approach

“ combine together against us, and no other friends but the Egesté-
“ ans join us, or supply us with a body of cavalry sufficient to
“ countenance our landing. It would be a terrible disgrace, should
“ we be compelled by force to give over our design, or to send for a
“ larger supply, as if our councils at first setting out were rash and
“ ill-concerted. We must steer at once against them with prepara-
“ tions in all respects well-proportioned to the design, since we know
“ that we are bound to a land far remote from our own, and are
“ under many disadvantages to grapple with our foes. It will not be
“ now your employment to march to the relief of your dependents
“ seated near to Athens against an hostile invasion, where all the
“ needful supplies would be brought to your camp out of the terri-
“ tories of friends; but you are to roam to a distant climate, where
“ you cannot call one inch of ground your own, and from whence
“ in the four winter months you will scarcely be able to send a mes-
“ senger to Athens.

“ In my opinion therefore it is incumbent upon us, to carry thi-
“ ther large numbers of heavy-armed, to be raised out of our own
“ citizens, our allies and our dependents, and an additional strength
“ of Peloponnesians, if we are able to procure it by persuasion or by
“ pay. Our archers and slingers must be also numerous, that we
“ may be able to make good our descent in spite of the Sicilian
“ horse. We must also be attended by supernumerary vessels, that
“ we may be enabled with greater ease to fetch in necessaries for our
“ army. We must also carry with us from Athens in our tenders,
“ a great quantity of corn, such as wheat and barley parched, with
“ bakers, some of whom for certain wages must be obliged to grind,
“ that if our armament lie any where weather-bound, we may not
“ stand in need of the necessaries of life. For, so numerous as we
“ must be, it will not be possible for every city to receive us. All
“ other provisions must be laid in by ourselves to the utmost of our
“ power, and we must trust for nothing to the care of others.

“ But

" But what concerns us most, is to carry from hence a fund of
 " money, as ample as we can raise. As for that, which the Egesté-
 " ans pretend is already laid up for our use, conclude it to be only so
 " far as words are current. For unless we set out from Athens, not
 " barely provided as well as those we are to encounter ; but, equa-
 " lity in strength for battle alone excepted, in all other respects far
 " surpassing them in every needful appointment, we shall hardly be
 " able to reduce who are to be reduced, or even to protect who are
 " to be protected. We should regard ourselves in the character of
 " people, who are going to seek a new settlement among aliens and
 " enemies ; and, as such, are necessitated to render themselves victors
 " of the spot the very day they land ; or, to rest assured, if they
 " then miscarry, that the whole of that region will be in arms
 " against them. Of this I own myself afraid ; against this I am con-
 " vinced that by repeated consultations we ought timely to provide ;
 " and after all, must trust still further to the goodness of our fortune,
 " hazardous as we are but men. Yet hence, I should be glad to set
 " out in this enterprize, with as little occasion as possible to rely on
 " uncertain fortune ; and to be amply provided with every expedi-
 " ent for a successful expedition. For these, to my apprehension, are
 " the readiest means to secure the public welfare, and the safety of
 " us who are destined for the voyage. But if any man thinks my
 " reasons chimerical, I am ready to resign my command to his su-
 " perior abilities."

In this manner Nicias delivered himself, with a view if possible
 to discourage the Athenians from proceeding by so vast a demand
 of articles requisite to the design ; or at least, that in case he must
 be obliged to undertake the service, he might set out with such ample
 expedients of security.

Yet all this bulky and embarrassing demand of appointments *The expedition*
 could not raise in the Athenians the least aversion to the expedition, *resolved upon.*

but rather fastened their eagerness upon it more intensely than ever : And Nicias prevailed on that side of the question where he hoped to have been defeated. It was now universally agreed, that his advice was just and proper ; and, if obeyed, the expedition must be attended with all imaginable security. All ranks of men were now equally seized with a fondness for the voyage. For such as were advanced in years, were confident that a career of success must attend the enterprise, and that so formidable an armament could not possibly miscarry. The younger sort were animated with the desire of seeing so remote a clime, and gratifying at large the curiosity of their tempers ; assured, that safety would attend their course. The bulk of the populace and the soldiery in general were pleased with their present assignment of pay, and the hope of enlarging dominion, which would afford them perpetual employ and subsistence. The passions of the generality were for these causes so vehemently elated with the project, that such as could by no means approve were afraid to oppose it by a vote, lest they might be censured as men who malevolently opposed the public glory. And by this all opposition was effectually quashed.

At length a certain Athenian, standing forth from amongst the crowd and calling aloud upon Nicias, told him — “ He must no longer cast about for evasions, nor meditate delays, but declare expressly now, in the presence of them all, the particulars of the preparations which the Athenians should vote him.”

Nicias demands the particulars.

Nicias, tho’ sorry at his heart, was obliged to reply — That “ in order to be exact, he ought to consult more leisurely with his colleagues. But so far as he could judge in this sudden manner, they ought to set out with a fleet consisting of at least one hundred triremes ; that the Athenians themselves ought to furnish as many transports for heavy-armed soldiers as was possible, and to send for an additional number from their dependents ; that the number of heavy-armed, both of Athenians and dependents, should at least

“ be

" be five thousand; and if possible, more; that, to these the rest of
 " their preparations should be proportioned, such as archers to be
 " levied at home and procured also from Crete, not forgetting
 " slingers; and in fine, that whatever should be judged in any de-
 " gree expedient should be provided in good time, and carried along
 " with them in the fleet."

This the Athenians had no sooner heard, than they instantly voted -- *They are voted.*
 " That the generals were invested with absolute authority, to deter-
 " mine the numbers of the expedition and the whole procedure of
 " the voyage at their own discretion, as might best promote the pub-
 " lic welfare."

In pursuance of this, the preparations were immediately in hand. *Preparations.*
 Summons for the quotas adjusted were sent to their dependents, and
 the levies at home went briskly forwards. Athens was now finely
 recovered from the pestilence and a long-continued destructive war,
 both in a multitude of young men now arrived at the vigor of their
 age, and an increase of the public revenues by favour of the peace.
 By this means all the needful supplies were more easily provided.
 And thus were the Athenians busied for the present in fitting out their
 armament.

But, at this very juncture, almost all the statues of Mercury, *The affair of the Mercuries.*
 wherever found within the precincts of Athens, and according to the
 established custom they were very numerous both in the porches of
 private houses and the public temples², * * * * * had their faces

² I have omitted two words in the original, because I cannot translate them with any precision or clearness. They are *ἡ τετραγώνος ἑργασία*; *opus quadratum*, says one Latin translator; *opus ex lapide quadrato*, says another. Mr. Hobbes hath it, *Mercuries of square stone*: How such a description can be applicable to a statue will be hard to conceive. Whether they allude

to the inclosure in which the statues were erected; or to the form of the pedestals; or whether a *Mercury* was carved on any or all the sides of a square-stone, I am not able to decide. The *Mercuries* were very numerous; and many of them, it is certain, were strange, uncouth, and very bungling performances.

disfigured:

disfigured in the space of one night. The authors of this outrage were not known. But large rewards were offered by the *State* in order to discover them, and a decree was also passed, that "if any person knew of the commission of any other impiety of the same nature, he should boldly inform the public of it, whether he were a citizen, or a foreigner, or a slave.

This accident in truth made a deep impression on their minds. For it was construed as a bad omen in regard to the expedition in hand, and as an evidence of some terrible combination to introduce innovations and an overthrow of the *democracy*.

Information
against Alci-
biades.

An information was at length given in by some sojourners and their footmen, relating indeed not at all to the *Mercuries*, but to the defacements of other images committed formerly by some young men in a frolicsome and drunken mood; and how further, "they had celebrated the *Mysteries* in private houses by way of mockery;" and amongst others they also accused Alcibiades. The party most inveterate against him caught readily at this charge. As he was the main obstacle to the advancement of their own popularity and credit, they concluded, that in case they could rid themselves of him, they might at once become leaders of the *State*. Hence they aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud that "those mystic frolics and the defacements of the *Mercuries* struck at the very foundations of the democracy; and, that none of these outrageous acts had been committed without his participation." They alledged, as a circumstance that corroborated the charge, the whole tenor of his behaviour, flagrantly licentious, and quite inconsistent with a democratical constitution.

§ The sacred *Mysteries* celebrated by the Athenians at Eleusis. *Plutarch* relates, that the informers were brought in by one Androcles a demagogue, a virulent foe of Alcibiades. They deposed, that one Theo-

dorus acted the part of the *Crier*, Polytion of the *Torch-bearer*, Alcibiades that of the *Hierophant*, and many of his intimates assisted and were initiated in solemn and formal mockery.

Alcibiades

Alcibiades endeavour'd forthwith to clear himself the best he *His plea.* could from all appearances of guilt, and declared himself ready, before he enter'd upon the voyage, to submit to a trial (for the armament was now almost compleated;) and, if proved to be guilty, to suffer the penalties of law; and only, if acquitted, to take upon him the command. He conjured them further, "to receive no calumnious accusations against him in his absence; but if he was really guilty to put him instantly to death; — that, in common prudence it could not be justified, to intrust a person, so heavily charged, with the command of so large an armament, before his innocence had been regularly explored."

But his enemies — apprehensive that in case he was brought to an immediate trial, he would be supported by all the favour of the soldiery; and, that the people, whose idol he was, might possibly relent, because in compliment to him the Argives and some of the Mantinéans accompanied the expedition, — opposed, and put off the prosecution. They put the management of this point into the hands of a set of orators, who urged that "for the present he might proceed in his voyage, that the expedition ought not to be deferred on his account, and upon his return a day should be assigned for his trial." Their design was to gather more heavy matter against him, which in his absence could be more easily effected, and then to recal him and force him to his trial. In short it was resolved that "Alcibiades should go the voyage."

Things being thus determined, and the year now advanced to the middle of summer, the fleet set sail for Sicily. Orders had been issued before for the bulk of the confederates, and victualling-ships, and small craft, and all the tenders in general, to repair to and assemble together at Corcyra; that, from thence, in a body they might cross the Ionian to the cape of Japygia. But such as were subjects of Athens, and such of the confederates as were then in the city, marching down to the Piræus on the appointed day by morning's dawn,

dawn, went on board the ships in order to weigh and be gone. They were conducted thither by a great crowd, it may be said, by the whole crowd of Athens, both citizens and strangers. The former attended, to perform the parting decorums where their several attachments claimed it; some to their friends, some to their relations, some to their own sons. The whole company moved along with a medley of hope and lamentation; with hope, that success would attend their course; with lamentation, lest they might never meet again. The sad recollection occurred — to how great a distance from their native soil they were going to be sent! And now that the hour of departure was come, and when this moment they were going to be dismissed into scenes of danger, the impressions of terror were felt with much keener sense than when the expedition was only decreed. However, at the sight of their present strength, of the numerous expedients of a prosperous enterprize which their eyes beheld, their spirits were again elated.

As for the strangers and bulk of the crowd, they attended merely for the pleasure of gazing at the means intended to accomplish a great and stupendous design. For never did any one *State* of Greece before this time equip by its own strength such a powerful armament. It was the finest and most glorious fleet, that to this day the world had seen. It is true, in number of ships and heavy-armed on board, *that* which sailed against Epidaurus under command of Pericles, and *that* also against Potidæa under Agnon, were by no means inferior. For those carried four thousand heavy-armed soldiers all native Athenians, with three hundred horsemen: The number of their triremes was a hundred; fifty more were furnished by the Lesbians and Chians, besides a large number of confederates who attended those expeditions. But then they were fitted for a voyage in comparison trifling, and in a slight and penurious manner.

On the contrary, the present equipment was calculated for a length of time, and compleatly fitted out for both services, as
occasion

occasion might demand, either of the sea or of the land. The shipping, at the great expence of the captains of the several triremes and of the *State*, was quite elaborate. The pay assigned by the public to every mariner was a * drachma a day. The number of new * 7d. $\frac{2}{3}$ ships for the battle and chace was sixty; that of transports for the heavy-armed, forty. The several captains of the triremes were very choice in making up their crews, and gave to such of the mariners as rowed on the uppermost bench, and to the sailors, a gratuity out of their own pockets over and above the public pay. They had further adorned their vessels with images and all kind of sumptuous decorations. It was the high ambition of every single captain, to have his own ship excel all the rest of the fleet in splendor and in swiftness.

The land-force was distinguished by the choiceness of their levies and their arms; and all the individuals vied with one another in the goodness of their accoutrements and equipage whatsoever. It happened also on the same account that a warm contention was kindled amongst them, under what officers they should be ranged; and opportunity afforded to the rest of Greece, to construe the whole into a mere ostentation of their power and opulence rather than an effective equipment against a foe. For were a computation to be formed, both of the public disbursements of the *State* on this occasion, and the private expences of the whole soldiery; — of the *State*, what prodigious sums they had already advanced, and what additional sums the generals were to carry along with them; — of the soldiery, what each had expended on his own equipage, every captain on the decoration of his vessel, and to how much greater charges he was still liable; — without taking into the account the vast list of necessities which over and above the public allowance each private person was obliged to lay in for so long a voyage, or the goods which a soldier or trader might take with him on board for the sake of traffic; —

the amount of talents now carried out of Athens would turn out exceeding large.

Nor was it merely for the strangeness of the enterprize or the splendor of its shew, that the armament was noised abroad, but also for the numerous force with which it was provided to attack the foe; for the remoteness of the voyage, great as ever they had undertaken from their native clime, and that prodigious expectation which was raised of the event; in order to which the *State* had now exerted itself quite beyond its strength.

When the whole force was got on board the fleet, when the stowage of all necessary stores and all baggage whatever was completely adjusted, silence then was proclaimed by sound of trumpet. But the solemn prayers for a successful expedition were not offered from every vessel apart, but in behalf of all united, by the voice of a herald. The goblets mingled with wine ran the circle of the whole armament, and every crew as well as the commanders poured out the libations and drank *success and happiness* out of gold and silver cups. The whole crowd that stood upon the beach, both of citizens and such strangers as were there and wished them prosperity, joined with them in the public prayer. And now the *psalm* being sung and the *libation* finished, they put out to sea *. After moving off at first in a line

* Many incidents are related by *Plutarch* in the life of *Nicias*, in regard to the denunciations of the priests against this expedition, the coining and wresting of oracles both for and against it, and omens which portended nothing but misfortune. Mere human foresight, and a consciousness, that the means were not equal to the end proposed, gave the wisest and stoddiest part of the Athenian community a sad apprehension of the event. Socrates constantly

declared against it; and assured his friends, it would draw after it the destruction of the *State*: This his pre-sentiment soon became the public talk. Meton the *Astronomer*, who was named to a post of high rank in the expedition, feigned himself mad and set his house on fire. Others deny that circumstance of his counterfeiting madness; and say, he set his house on fire by night, and appeared next morning on the forum in an abject manner, and begged of his fellow-

line a-head, each vessel made afterwards the best of her way to Ægina. And this armament made all possible haste to reach Corcyra, where the force of their allies by which they were to be joined was already assembled.

Tho' the intelligence of such an intended invasion had been brought to Syracuse from several quarters, yet for a long course of time they would yield no credit to its truth. Nay more, when an assembly was convened, such speeches as follow were made by different persons; some believing the accounts received in relation to this armament of the Athenians; others pronouncing them absolutely false. On this occasion Hermocrates the son of Hermon, standing forth in the assembly and as one convinced in his own mind that all such accounts were true, addressed and advised his countrymen thus:

Sicily.

A debate at Syracuse.

" I T will probably be my own fate, as it hath been the fate of others, to be disbelieved, when I speak of this intended invasion as a matter of truth and certainty. And I also know by experience, that both those who vent and those who retail such accounts of things as seem incredible, are so far from effectually persuading, that they generally incur the imputation of madness. Yet no such apprehensions shall intimidate or strike me dumb, when such a weight of danger hovers over my country; when in my own

Speech of Hermocrates.

low-citizens, in order to comfort him under so great a misfortune, to excuse his son, who was to have commanded a trireme, from going the voyage. An incident, further, at the very time of the departure of the grand fleet, gave many persons vast concern. The women were then celebrating the rites of Adonis, in which many representations of deaths and funerals were ex-

hibited all over Athens; and the women, according to custom, were making heavy moan and lamentation. This struck sad forebodings into people, who laid stress on such incidents, that this expensive and mighty armament, tho' now so vigorous and magnificent, would soon moulder into ruin.

H h 2

" heart

“ heart I am convinced, that I am more clearly enlightened on the
“ point than any other person whatever.

“ For I assert *that* to be a matter of the highest certainty, which
“ you hear only with a fit of stupid surprise, that the Athenians
“ have already set sail against us with a numerous force both for the
“ service of the sea and the land. The pretext alledged by them is
“ execution of treaties with the Egestæans, and the restoration of the
“ Leontines; but the true motive is their ambition to inflave Sicily,
“ and above all this our own Syracuse, which if once reduced, they
“ are well assured that nothing will be able afterwards to give a
“ check to their arms. Taking it therefore for granted that they
“ will be immediately upon us, deliberate in what manner you may
“ make the most gallant defence in the present posture of your
“ strength; careful, that thro’ contempt you be not taken unpro-
“ vided; nor thro’ incredulity abandon the means of preservation.
“ Nor further let those, who are convinced of their immediate ap-
“ pearance, be terrified at the boldness or strength of their under-
“ taking. For they will not be able to hurt us more than we shall be
“ enabled to retaliate upon them. Nor are they more beyond our
“ reach, because they invade us with so vast an armament; since
“ this, in regard to the other Sicilians, will plead more abundantly
“ in our cause; for, terrified at the foe, they will be disposed with
“ higher warmth of friendship to co-operate with us. And if thus
“ in the train of affairs, we are either enabled to defeat their arms,
“ or merely to force their return, their schemes unexecuted and their
“ ambition disappointed (for I am not in the least afraid that their
“ sanguine expectations can be glutted with success) such events
“ would reflect the highest glory upon you, and compleat what I
“ firmly hope.

“ It is a truth evinced by facts, that few considerable armaments of
“ either Grecians or Barbarians, which have been sent out on remote
“ expeditions,

“ expeditions, have returned successful. Nor, further, are our pre-
 “ sent invaders more numerous than the Syracusans themselves or
 “ their friends of the neighbouring *States*, whose strength mere
 “ hostile dread will cement and bind fast together. If therefore,
 “ tho’ merely for want of needful supplies, they incur miscarriage on
 “ a foreign shore; if they prove unsuccessful, tho’ chiefly thro’
 “ their own misconduct; the whole honour must however rest with
 “ us, as if we had ruined their projects by art and management.
 “ Even these very Athenians were indebted to a parallel coincidence of
 “ events for the vast enlargement of their strength and empire, when
 “ the *Mede* who gave out that he aimed the blow at Athens was,
 “ contrary to all human expectation, disconcerted by a series of er-
 “ rors that were purely his own. And some such fortunate coinci-
 “ dence in our own behalf we have at present all imaginable reason
 “ to expect.

“ Let us therefore with active resolution put our domestic affairs in-
 “ to a posture of defence, and dispatch our ambassadors to the Siculi,
 “ to keep firm in our friendship such as are already our friends, and to
 “ endeavour to procure the friendship and concurrence of the rest.
 “ Nay, let our embassies regularly compleat the whole circuit of Si-
 “ cily, where they may represent the common danger which equally
 “ threatens them all. Let them further cross over to Italy to pro-
 “ cure for us their defensive alliances, or at least to negotiate a denial
 “ of reception to the Athenians. I also judge it adviseable to send to
 “ Carthage: For even the Carthaginians are not exempted from the
 “ present dangers, but have been ever under apprehensions of re-
 “ ceiving from them a visit at Carthage. It may perhaps effectually
 “ occur to their thoughts, that should they now abandon us, the
 “ storm must soon extend itself to them; by which they may be de-
 “ termined either secretly or openly, by some expedient or other, to
 “ vindicate our cause. And were their inclination equal to their
 “ power, no people on the globe could so easily redress us. For
 “ they

“ they are possessed of an immensity of wealth, which gives an
“ easy and prompt completion to the schemes of war and to every
“ human enterprize. Let us send further to Lacedæmon and Co-
“ rinth, requesting the dispatch of immediate succours hither, and
“ the renewal of the war against the Athenians.

“ There is one point more, which in my opinion is more critical
“ and important than all the rest ; and which, tho’ perhaps, injured
“ as you are to domestic indolence, it may not gain your ready ap-
“ probation, I shall however boldly recommend. Would all of us
“ in general who are inhabitants of Sicily, or at least would only we
“ Syracusans, with what other people we can get to assist us, put
“ out instantly to sea with all the ships we have in readiness, and
“ victualled but for the space of two months ; — would we then
“ give these Athenians the meeting either at Tarentum or cape Ja-
“ pygia, and there convince them, that before they enter the lists of
“ war for the conquest of Sicily, they must fight for their passage
“ across the Ionian ; — we should then strike them with the utmost
“ terror, and infinitely perplex them with the thought “ that from
“ a friendly port we shall sally forth to guard our out-works (for
“ Tarentum will readily receive us,) whilst they have a long tract
“ of sea to pass with all their cumbersome train, and must find it
“ hard, through so long a voyage, to be always steering in the regu-
“ lar order.” As their course must thus be slow and must advance
“ only in exact conformity to orders, we shall have a thousand op-
“ portunities to attack them. If again they clear their ships for
“ action, and in a body bear down expeditiously upon us, they must
“ ply hard at their oars ; and, when spent with their toil, we can
“ fall upon them. Or, in case that may not be judged advisable,
“ we have it always in our power to retire into the harbour of Ta-
“ rentum. And thus the Athenians, if in constant expectation of
“ being fought with at sea they must make their passage with a small
“ portion only of their stores, will be reduced to great distress on
“ coasts

“ coasts which will afford them no supply. Should they choose to
“ continue in their station, they must infallibly be blocked up in it.
“ Should they venture a passage, they must unavoidably leave their
“ tenders and storeships behind ; and, as they have no assurance of a
“ hearty reception from the cities on the coasts, must be terribly
“ dismayed.

“ It is my firm opinion, that amidst that great perplexity of
“ thought which must result from these obstructions, they will never
“ presume to sail from Corcyra ; or at least, whilst they are agitating
“ the forms of procedure and sending out spy-boats to discover our
“ numbers and position, the season of the year must be protracted to
“ winter ; or, utterly dispirited at so unexpected a resistance, they
“ will give up the voyage. This I more readily expect, as I am in-
“ formed that their most experienced commander hath been forced
“ into office against his inclination, and would gladly lay hold of the
“ pretext to desist, if such a shew of resistance could be made by us
“ as would preserve his honour from suspicion. And I am perfectly
“ convinced that rumour will increase and aggravate our strength.
“ Now the sentiments of mankind are constantly adjusted by ru-
“ mours. Parity of danger is supposed, when an enemy declares he
“ is ready to begin the attack : And such an enemy is always more
“ dreaded than he, who betrays an intention merely to defend him-
“ self against an enemy’s assaults. Such excess of fear must now
“ fall to the lot of the Athenians. They are invading us, with the
“ fond presumption that we shall not fight. They think they have
“ grounds for such a presumption, because we have not concurred
“ with the Lacedæmonians in their demolition. But when, to their
“ bitter disappointment, they find we have the courage to act offen-
“ sively, the suddenness of our efforts will terrify them more
“ than all the reality of our expected strength could have done.

“ Determine therefore to execute with bold and ready resolution
“ the plan I have proposed ; or, if this must not prevail, with the
“ utmost

" utmost expedition to get all things at home in readiness for war.
 " And let each Syracusan be firmly convinced, that contempt of an
 " enemy ought never to be shewn but in the heat of action; that the
 " conduct of those men must tend most highly to the public pre-
 " servation, who alarmed by a decent fear judge it needful to pre-
 " pare with all caution and alacrity, as if the danger was instant at
 " our doors. But these our enemies are actually coming; they are
 " already (I know it well) upon the voyage; they are this mo-
 " ment only not in fight."

In this manner Hermocrates spoke his sentiments. But the popular assembly of the Syracusans was embroiled with much variance and contention. One party cried out, that " it was all a joke, the
 " Athenians durst not think of invading them." Another, " Her-
 " mocrates hath truth and reason on his side." A third, " let
 " them come, what damage can they do us which we are not able
 " heartily to repay them?" Others betrayed an open contempt at the whole account, and laughed at it as downright ridiculous. The party was but small, which gave credit to Hermocrates, and trembled for the future. At length, Athenagoras stood up, who being the first magistrate of the people, and whose credit at this time was highest with them, delivered himself as followeth:

*Speech of
 Athenagoras.*

" T H E man, who wisheth the Athenians may not be so mad as
 " to come hither and run themselves headlong into our subjection, is
 " either a coward or a traitor to his country. But for those, who
 " vent such news and endeavour to frighten you by the terrible re-
 " cital, at their audaciousness truly I am not in the least surprized;
 " but I am greatly so at their folly, if they imagine their views can
 " escape detection! Poor abject souls, quite dispirited within
 " through their own pusillanimity, are glad to spread consternation
 " throughout a whole community; that under the general panic
 " their

“ their own may lie veiled and undistinguished. And such is the effect, which the present informations may be able to produce; not from any grounds of truth and certainty, but the fictions and falsehoods of an iniquitous cabal, who are ever dabling in the practices of faction.

“ But you, Syracusans, I exhort, to apply your good-sense on this occasion, and search after probability; not by considering such accounts as these men have pompously detailed, but such enterprizes as a wise and abundantly enlightened people (for such I esteem the Athenians) are likely to undertake. For what probability is there, that leaving the Peloponnesians on their backs, when the war at home is not yet brought to any settled conclusion, they would wilfully embark into another of no less importance? For my part, I am persuaded they rest well contented, that, so many and so powerful *States* as we Sicilians are, we have not yet thought proper to invade them.

“ But, allowing these informations true, and that they are actually coming, — I am firmly persuaded that Sicily is better able than Peloponnesus to war them down, by how much in all respects it is better furnished with every resource of war; and that this our Syracuse alone is far superior in strength to that, nay double that armament, which by report now threatens its invasion. For I know assuredly, that no horse can follow in their train; that, farther, none can be procured for them in this country, if we abate an inconsiderable party which the Egestæans may furnish. And I know, that a body of heavy-armed equal in number to our own can never be transported by them across such a length of sea. The enterprize is bold indeed, to attempt so long a voyage hither with only light and nimble ships, and to bring all those military stores, the roll of which must be excessively large, in order to attack so great a city. Shall I therefore be terrified at vain reports? I, who am firmly persuaded, that if the Athenians were possessed

VOL. II. I i “ of

“ of a city on our coasts as considerable in all respects as Syracuse it-
 “ self, and should dare to provoke us ; if masters of the neighbour-
 “ ing territory, they should from thence make war upon us ; — even
 “ with such advantages they would with difficulty escape a total de-
 “ struction ? And what therefore in all human probability must be
 “ their fate, when all Sicily to a man will be combined to oppose
 “ them ? For now their war must issue from a camp on the beach
 “ of the sea, of which their ships must form the ramparts. They
 “ will not be able to make long excursions from their tents and ma-
 “ gazines of needful stores, as our cavalry will bridle and control
 “ them. But in short, it is my firm opinion that they never will
 “ be able to accomplish a descent, so far am I convinced that our
 “ force is in all respects superior.

“ I am well persuaded, that all those obstacles, which I have hi-
 “ therto recited, their own wise reflexions have suggested to the re-
 “ membrance of the Athenians and deterred them from hazarding
 “ their own ruin ; and that our own malecontents amuse us with
 “ fictitious accounts of things, that neither have nor can have exis-
 “ tence. This is by no means the first occasion, on which I have
 “ been able to detect their schemes. I am no stranger to their con-
 “ stant attempts of fomenting faction, ever intent as they are, by
 “ forgeries like these or more malicious than these, or even by the open
 “ efforts of sedition, to strike a panic amongst the Syracusan people,
 “ and to seize the helm of your government. And I have reason to
 “ apprehend, that amongst the many projects they attempt, some one
 “ at length may be fatally successful. But this must be charged to
 “ our own pusillanimity, who exert no precautions to avert impend-
 “ ing miseries, nor bravely oppose the storm, tho’ we perceive it to
 “ be gathering around us. And from hence it unavoidably results,
 “ that our State is seldom blessed with a season of tranquillity ; but
 “ feels the bitter lot of sedition on sedition, of more nume-
 “ rous struggles against factions within than public hostilities
 “ without ;

“ without; nay sometimes tyranny and despotic rule hath been
“ our portion.

“ To guard the present times from such disastrous contingencies
“ shall be my constant endeavour; and, if favoured with your con-
“ currence, my care shall be successful. To this end I must prevail
“ upon you, who are the *many*, to co-operate with me, whilst I in-
“ flict upon these artificers of faction the punishment they deserve,
“ not barely for overt commissions (for in these they are not easily
“ caught) but for all the treacherous plots which, how desirous so-
“ ever, they are not able to execute. For we ought not only to
“ award our vengeance on the open outrages of an enemy, but to
“ disarm his malice by wise precaution; because the man, who
“ will not thus in time disarm it, will feel its blow before he is
“ aware.

“ On the *few* I have also to bestow, partly some reproofs, partly
“ some cautions, and partly some instructions. For chiefly by these
“ methods I judge it feasible to deter them from their factious de-
“ signs. Let me therefore request from you, ye youths of Syracuse,
“ the solution of a point which hath frequently occurred to my own
“ imagination. — What is it you would have? — An immediate pos-
“ session of the government of your country? — Why, the very
“ laws of that country declare you incapable of it. And these very
“ laws were intended, rather to exclude you so long as you are un-
“ equal, than to give you a disgraceful rejection when you shall be
“ equal to the trust. But further — Are you not piqued in heart at
“ being placed upon the same rank and level with the bulk of your
“ fellow-citizens? And where would be the justice, in awarding
“ distinctions of honour and trust to those, who are in no respect
“ differenced from others? It may perhaps be urged, that a *demo-*
“ *cracy* is repugnant to the dictates both of wisdom and justice; that
“ the most opulent members of a *State* are intitled to its highest
“ honours, are best able to superintend the public welfare. But to

“ this I reply, that in the first place by the word *people* is signified a
 “ whole community, including its every individual ; but an *oligarchy*
 “ means only a party ; — in the next place, that men of opulence
 “ are the most suitable guardians of the public treasure ; that men
 “ of understanding and experience are best qualified to advise ; but
 “ the *many* after hearing are the best judges of measures. And thus
 “ by a *democracy* equality of right and of privilege is most fairly
 “ preserved, as well to the separate members as to the whole com-
 “ munity. An *oligarchy* indeed bestows an ample portion of dangers
 “ on the *many*, but in beneficial points it not only assumes the larger
 “ share to itself, but by an unbounded rapacity monopolizeth the
 “ public harvest. These are the ends, which the men of power
 “ and the raw unexperienced youths amongst you ambitiously pur-
 “ sue ; ends, incompattible with the welfare of a great and flourishing
 “ *State*. The accomplishment of these, I say, you have this very
 “ moment in agitation ; tho’ the world cannot furnish such a set of
 “ fools, if you perceive not the pernicious tendency of your schemes.
 “ Nor can any set of Grecians within my knowledge equal either
 “ your brutality or your villany, if with open eyes you dare proceed.
 “ Lay hold then at once of sound information, or repent if already
 “ informed, and unite in the infallible advancement of the general
 “ welfare of the whole community. And let the men of probity
 “ amongst you rest perfectly satisfied, that thus they shall obtain a pro-
 “ per share ; nay more than a share in those emoluments, which will
 “ equally redound to all their country. But in case you give into
 “ different schemes, the hazard is great ; the whole of your plan
 “ will be baffled and confounded.

“ Trouble us therefore no further with your informations, as we
 “ are privy to and shall certainly disconcert the views of their au-
 “ thors. For the Syracusan *State*, even tho’ the Athenians actually
 “ invade us, will repel their efforts with a magnanimity worthy of
 “ herself : And we have already a set of brave commanders, who
 “ will

“ will effectually manage the point. But if not one tittle of these
 “ intended invasions be true, which is my firm opinion, the *State*
 “ will not be struck into a panic by your rumours, will never place
 “ the command of her forces in your hands, so as to rivet a voluntary
 “ servitude upon herself. She on the contrary will exert her own
 “ vigilance and discretion; she will interpret the rumours you have
 “ spread as so many acts against her welfare, and will not give up her
 “ liberty to accounts expressly forged to terrify the ear; but aware in
 “ time, by no means to intrust herself into your management, will
 “ leave no possible method of defence untried.”

Thus spoke Athenagoras. But here one of the generals rising up prevented any other person from continuing the debate, and put an end to the present heats by delivering himself thus :

“ IT is contrary to all decorum, both for those who speak to
 “ pour forth calumniation against one another, or for those who *Speech of a*
 “ hear to receive them with attention. At present, we are rather *Syracusan ge-*
 “ concerned, to yield regard to the informations which are brought *neral.*
 “ us, that every individual and this community may be timely pre-
 “ pared to repel the invaders. And if this should prove at last to be
 “ mere superfluity of care, yet what harm can possibly accrue from
 “ such an equipment of the *State* with horses, and arms, and such
 “ other habiliments as are the glory of war? We ourselves shall take
 “ all proper care of the provisions of war and the levy of soldiers;
 “ and at the same time shall circulate our messengers to the cities
 “ around us, and to watch the appearance of the foe; and shall ex-
 “ pedite every point judged needful in the present emergence. Some
 “ care of these points hath already been taken, and what more we
 “ shall perceive to be expedient, we shall on the proper occasions
 “ communicate to you.”

When

When the general had expressed himself thus, the Syracusans broke up the assembly and departed.

*Proceedings of
the grand fleet.*

The Athenians, with the reinforcements of their allies, were by this time all arrived at Corcyra. And the first thing done by the commanders was, to take a review of the whole equipment, and to settle the order in which they were to anchor and form their naval station. They also divided it into three squadrons, and cast lots for the command of each; to the end that, in the course of the voyage, they might be well supplied with water, and harbours, and the proper necessaries wherever they might chance to put in; that, in other respects, a better discipline might be kept up, and the men be more inured to a ready obedience, as being under the inspection of an able commander in each several division. These points being settled, they dispatched three vessels to Italy and Sicily, to pick up informations, what cities on those coasts would give them a reception. And their orders were, to come back in time and meet them upon the voyage, that they might be advertised into what ports they might safely enter.

*Under sail from
Corcyra.*

*Account of its
force.*

These previous points being adjusted, the Athenians with an equipment already swelled to so great a bulk, weighing anchor from Corcyra, stood across for Sicily. The total of their trimemes was an hundred and thirty-four, to which were added two Rhodian vessels of fifty oars. One hundred of these were Athenian, and of this number, sixty were tight ships fit for service; the rest were transports for the soldiery. The remainder of the fleet consisted of Chians and the other allies. The total of the heavy-armed on board was five thousand one hundred men. Of these fifteen hundred were citizens of Athens inrolled; seven hundred were Athenians of the lowest class (called *Thetes*) who served by way of marines. The rest of the force consisted of the quotas of their alliance; some, of their own dependents; five hundred belonged to the Argives; the number of Mantinéans and mercenaries was two hundred and fifty; the archers

archers in the whole amounted to four hundred and eighty ; and of these eighty were Cretans. There were seven hundred Rhodian slingers, and an hundred and twenty light-armed Megaræan exiles. And one horse-transport attended, which carried thirty horsemen.

So great an equipment sailed out at first to begin the war. And in the train of this equipment, went thirty storeships laden with corn, and carrying on board the bakers, and masons, and carpenters, and all things requisite in the works of fortification ; and also an hundred sail of small vessels, which necessity demanded to attend the ships that carried the stores. A large number also of small craft and trading vessels sailed voluntarily in company with the fleet, for the sake of traffic. All which now, in one collected body, stood away from Corcyra across the Ionian gulf.

The whole armament being got over to cape Japygia or to Tarentum, as they severally could make the passage, sailed along the coast of Italy — where not one city would receive them, would grant them a market, or suffer them to land, barely permitting them to anchor and to water, tho' at Tarentum and Locri even that was denied them, — 'till they arrived at Rhegium a promontory of Italy. At Rhegium the whole fleet was now assembled ; and without the city (for an admission into it was refused them) they formed an incampment within the verge of Diana's temple, where also they were accommodated by the Rhegians with a market.

Here, having drawn their vessels ashore, they lay some time for refreshment ; and had a conference with the Rhegians, in which they pressed them, as they were of Chalcidic descent, to succour the Leontines who were also Chalcidéans. Their answer was that “ they should side with neither party, but whatever measures were judged expedient by the other Italians, they should conform to those.” The Athenians counsels were now solely bent on the affairs of Sicily, in what manner they might most successfully make their approaches. They also waited for the return of the three vessels from Egesta, which had previously

previously been dispatched thither; longing earnestly for a report about the state of their treasure, whether it was really such as their envoys at Athens had represented.

The news received at Syracuse.

To the Syracusans in the mean time, undoubted advice is brought from several quarters and by their own spies, that "the fleet of the enemy lies at Rhegium." The truth of this being uncontested, they prepared for their defence with the utmost attention, and were no longer duped by incredulity. They also sent about to the Siculi; to some places, their agents who were to keep a watchful eye upon their conduct; and to others, ambassadors. And into those towns upon the coast, which were exposed to a descent, they threw a garrison. In Syracuse, they examined if the city was provided with the proper means of a defence, by a careful inspection of the arms and the horses; and all other points were properly adjusted, as against a war coming swiftly upon them, and only not already present.

Disappointments from Egesta.

* 5812 l. 103.
Sterling.

The three vessels, detached beforehand to Egesta, rejoin the Athenians yet lying at Rhegium, with a report that "the great sums which had been promised them were quite annihilated, since they saw only * thirty talents in specie." Upon this the commanders were instantly seized with a dejection of spirit, because their first hope was thus terribly blasted; and the Rhegians had refused to concur with their attempts, upon whom they had made their first essay of persuasion, and with whom they had the greatest probability of success, as they were by blood allied to the Leontines, and had ever shewn themselves well-disposed to the Athenian State. The Egestean affair had indeed taken no other turn than what Nicias fully expected, but the other two commanders were quite amazed and confounded at it.

The trick of the Egesteans.

The trick made use of by the Egesteans, at the time that the first embassy went thither from Athens to take a survey of their treasures was this:—Having conducted them into the temple of Venus
at

at Eryx, they shewed them the offerings repositied there, the cups, the flagons, and the censers, and the other furniture of the temple, in quantity by no means small. These, being all of silver, presented to the eye a vast shew of wealth, far beyond their intrinsic value. Having also made entertainments in private houses, for those who came in the vessels of the embassy, they amassed together all the gold and silver cups of Egæta; they borrowed others from the adjacent cities, as well Phœnician as Grecian; they carried their guests about from one house of feasting to another; and each exhibited them as his own property. Thus, all of them displaying generally the same vessels, and great abundance appearing at every place, the Athenians who made the voyage were prodigiously surpris'd at the splendid shows. Hence it was that, on their return to Athens, they enlarged, with a kind of emulation which should magnify it most, on the immensity of wealth they had seen at Egæta. In this manner, being deceived themselves, they obtruded the same fallacy upon others; but now, when the true account was spread amongst them, that "there was no such wealth at Egæta," they were much censured and reproached by the soldiers.

The generals however held a consultation about the methods of proceeding. And here, it was the opinion of Nicias; "That with
 " their whole armament they should stand immediately against Seli-
 " nus, the reduction of which was the principal motive of the ex-
 " pedition; and, in case the Egæstæans would furnish the whole ar-
 " my with the proper supplies of money, their councils then might
 " be regulated accordingly: But otherwise, they should insist on
 " their maintaining the sixty sail of ships, which had been sent ex-
 " pressly at their own request; then, abiding by them, they should
 " reconcile their differences with the Selinuntians, either by force of
 " arms or negotiation: They afterwards might visit other cities, and
 " display before them the mighty power of the Athenian State;
 " and, having given such conspicuous proofs of their alacrity to sup-
 Vol. II. K k " port

“ port their friends and allies, might return to Athens; provided,
 “ that no sudden and unexpected turn of affairs might give them
 “ opportunity to do service to the Leontines, or bring over some
 “ other cities to their interest; ever intent not to bring their own
 “ *State* into danger by a needless profusion of blood and treasure.”

Alcibiades declared, “ That it could never be justified, if after
 “ putting to sea with so great an armament, they should return with
 “ disgrace, and no effectual service done to their country; that, on
 “ the contrary, they ought, by heralds dispatched expressly, to notify
 “ their arrival in these parts to all the cities except Selinus and Syra-
 “ cuse; that further, they should try what could be done with the
 “ Siculi, in order to persuade some of them to revolt from the Sy-
 “ racusans, and to strike up treaties of alliance and friendship with
 “ others, that so they might provide a resource of provisions and re-
 “ inforcements; that, the first trial of this kind should be made up-
 “ on the Messenians, (who lay in the finest situation for favouring
 “ their passage and descent into Sicily,) which must open to them
 “ the most convenient harbour and station for their armament:
 “ Thus gaining the concurrence of the cities, and certain from
 “ whom they might depend upon assistance, the way would then be
 “ open for them to make attempts upon Syracuse and Selinus, in case
 “ the former refused to make up the quarrel with the Egestæans,
 “ and the latter to suffer the replantation of the Leontines.”

The opinion of Lamachus was diametrically opposite, since he ad-
 vised it “ to be the most judicious measure to stand at once against
 “ Syracuse, and to try their fortune before that city with the utmost
 “ expedition, whilst they were yet not competently provided for re-
 “ sistance, and their consternation was still in its height: Because
 “ every hostile force is always most terrible on its first approach;
 “ and, in case it protract the time of encountering the eyes of its
 “ foes, they must recover their courage through familiarity with
 “ danger, and then the sight of an enemy is more apt to inspire
 “ contempt;

“ contempt ; — But, should they assault them on a sudden whilst yet
 “ their approach is with terror expected, the victory must infallibly
 “ be their own ; — In this case, all things would co-operate with
 “ them to terrify the foe ; such as, the sight of their numbers which
 “ now only could appear in their greatest enlargement ; the fore-
 “ bodings of their hearts what miseries were like to ensue ; and,
 “ above all, the instant necessity they must lie under of hazarding a
 “ battle : That moreover, it was likely, that numbers of the enemy
 “ might be surprised yet roaming abroad in the adjacent country, as
 “ still they were incredulous of the approach of the Athenians ; Or,
 “ even tho’ the Syracusans were safely retired with all their effects
 “ into the city, the army must needs become masters of prodigious
 “ wealth, if they should besiege the city and awe all around it ;
 “ That, by taking this step the other Sicilians would be more dis-
 “ couraged from succouring the Syracusans, and more easily inclined
 “ to concur with the Athenians, and all shifts and delays to keep clear
 “ of the contest, ’till one side was manifestly superior, would be pre-
 “ cluded.” He added further, that “ they should take care to pos-
 “ sess themselves of Megara, which was now deserted and not far
 “ from Syracuse either by sea or land, as it would afford a fine sta-
 “ tion for their ships to lie in, would shelter them upon a retreat, and
 “ give expedition to their approaches.”

But, tho’ Lamachus delivered his sentiments thus, he soon gave Alcibiades
 up his own opinion and went over to that of Alcibiades. And in ^{goes to Mes-} ~~ence.~~
 pursuance of this, Alcibiades with his own single ship passed over to
 Messene ; and having gained a conference with the Messenians about
 an alliance offensive and defensive ; when no arguments he brought
 could persuade, when on the contrary they returned this answer, that
 “ into their city they would not receive them, tho’ they were ready to
 “ accommodate them with a market without the walls,” he repassed
 to Rhegium. And immediately the generals, having manned out ^{They all go to}
 sixty ships with the choicest hands of the whole fleet and taken in a ^{Naxos.}

requisite stock of subsistence, steered away for Naxus, leaving the rest of the armament at Rhegium under the care of one of those in the commission.

To Catana.

After a reception granted them into their city by the Naxians, they stood away from thence to Catana. And when the Catanéans refused

To Syracuse.

to receive them, (for in that city was a party strongly attached to the Syracusans,) they put into the river Terias. After a night's continuance there, the next day they sailed for Syracuse; keeping the rest of the fleet ready ranged in a line of battle a-head. But they had detached ten beforehand, who were ordered to enter the great harbour of Syracuse, and to examine what naval force lay there ready lunched for service, and to proclaim from their decks as they passed along the shore — That “ the Athenians are come into those parts to
“ replace the Leontines in their own territory, as they were bound
“ in point both of alliance and consanguinity; that whatever Leontines therefore were now residing at Syracuse, should without fear
“ come over to the Athenians, as friends and benefactors.”

*Return to and
get masters of
Catana.*

When the proclamation had been made, and they had taken a view of the city and its harbours, and of the adjacent ground, what spots were most convenient for a descent and the commencement of the war, they sailed back again to Catana. A council of war had been held in that city, and the Catanéans were come to a resolution, “ not to receive the armament;” but however they granted an audience to the generals. At which, whilst Alcibiades harangued, and the inhabitants of Catana were all in the public assembly, the Athenian soldiers without giving any alarm pulled down a little gate of a very sorry structure, and then entering the city walked up and down in the market. But such of the Catanéans, as were of the Syracusan party, no sooner found that the army was got in, than struck into a sudden consternation, they stole presently out of the city. The number of these was but trifling. The rest of the inhabitants decreed an alliance with the Athenians, and encouraged them

them to fetch over the remainder of their armament from Rhegium.

This point being carried, the Athenians having repassed to Rhegium were soon with the whole of their fleet under sail for Catana, and on their arrival there they formed a proper station for their ships and men.

But now intelligence was brought them from Camarina, that "if they
 " would come to countenance them, that city would declare on their
 " side;" and that "the Syracusans are busy in manning their fleet."
 With the whole armament therefore they steered along the coast, touch-
 ing first at Syracuse. And when they found that no fleet was there
 in readiness to put to sea, they stood off again for Camarina; and
 there, approaching the shore, they notified their arrival by the voice
 of a herald. Admittance was however refused them, the Camari-
 néans alledging that "they were bound by solemn oaths to receive
 " only one single ship of the Athenians, unless of their own ac-
 " cord they should require a larger number." Thus disappointed,
 they put out again to sea; and, having made a descent on some part
 of the Syracusan territory, they picked up a booty, 'till the Syra-
 cusan cavalry making head against them and cutting off some of
 their light-armed who were straggled to a distance, they re-embarked,
 and went again to Catana.

*They go to Ca-
marina.*

*Return to Ca-
tana.*

On their return thither they find the *Salaminian* arrived from Athens, to fetch back Alcibiades, by public order of the *State* to
 take his trial for the crimes charged against him by his country, and
 also some others of the soldiery who attended him in the expedition,
 against whom informations had been given that they were guilty of
 impiety in the affair of the *Mysteries*, and against some of them in
 that of the *Mercuries*. For the Athenians, after the departure of
 the fleet, continued to make as strict an inquisition as ever into the
 crimes committed in regard to the *Mysteries*, and also in regard to
 the *Mercuries*. What sort of persons the informers were, was no
 part

*Alcibiades re-
called to take
his trial.*

part of their concern, but, in their height of jealousy, giving credit indiscriminately to all, through too great a deference to men of profligate and abandoned lives, they apprehended and threw into prison the most worthy citizens of Athens: esteeming it more prudent by pains and tortures to detect the fact, than that a person of irreproachable character, when once accused through the villany of an informer, should escape without the question. For the people, having learned by tradition, how grievous the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons became at last; and what is more, that it was not overthrown by themselves and Harmodius, but by the industry of the Lacedæmonians; lived in a constant dread of such another usurpation, and beheld all these incidents now with most suspicious eyes. But in fact the bold attempt of Harmodius and Aristogiton took its rise merely from a competition in love. The particulars of which I shall here unfold more largely, to convince the world, that no other people, no not even the Athenians themselves have any certain account, either relating to their own tyrants, or the transactions of that period.

*True story of
Harmodius
and Aristogiton.*

The truth is, that Pisistratus dying possessed of the tyranny in a good old age, not Hipparchus (as is generally thought) but Hippias the eldest of his sons was his successor in power. Harmodius being at this time in the flower of his youth and beauty, Aristogiton a citizen of Athens, nay a citizen of the middle rank, doted upon and had him in his possession. But some attempts having been made upon Harmodius by Hipparchus the son of Pisistratus, he rejected his solicitations, and discovers the whole affair to Aristogiton. The latter received the account with all that anguish which a warm affection feels; and, alarmed at the great power of Hipparchus, lest by force he might seize the youth, he instantly forms a project, a project as notable as his rank in life would permit, to demolish the tyranny. And in the mean time, Hipparchus, who, after making a second attempt upon Harmodius was equally unsuccessful in his suit, could not prevail

vail upon himself to make use of force; but however determined, upon some remote occasion which might cover his real design from detection, and was actually studying an opportunity, to dishonour the youth. — For the power he had was never exerted in such a manner as to draw upon him the popular hatred, and his deportment was neither invidious nor distasteful. Nay, for the most part, this set of tyrants were exact observers of the rules of virtue and discretion. They exacted from the Athenians only a *twentieth* of their revenue; they beautified and adorned the city; took upon themselves the whole conduct of the wars; and presided over the religious sacrifices. In other respects the *State* was governed by the laws already established, except that they always exerted their influence to place their own creatures in the first offices of the government. Several of their own family enjoyed the annual office of *Archon* at Athens; and amongst others, Pisistratus the son of Hippias the tyrant, who bore the same name with his grandfather, and in his *archonship* dedicated the altar of the twelve Gods in the public forum, and that of Apollo in the temple of *the Pythian*. The people of Athens, having since made additions to it in order to enlarge the altar in the forum, by that means effaced the inscription: But that in *the Pythian* is yet legible, tho' the letters are wearing out apace, and runs thus:

Pisistratus from Hippias born
Of Pythian Phœbus radiant God of day
Chose thus the temple to adorn,
And thus record his own superior sway.

But further, that Hippias succeeded in the government as the eldest son, I myself can positively aver; as I know it to be so, and have examined all the accounts of tradition with much greater accuracy than others. But any one may be convinced of the fact by
what

what I am going to subjoin. — Now we have abundant light to prove, that he was the only one of the legitimate brothers who had any sons. So much the altar attests, and the column erected for a perpetual brand, of the injustice of the tyrants in the citadel of Athens. In the latter, the inscription makes no mention of any son of either Theffalus or Hipparchus; but nameth five sons of Hippias, who were brought him by Myrrhine the daughter of Callias the son of Hyperochidas. It is certainly most probable, that the eldest son was married first; nay he is named the first after his father on the upper part of the column. And there were good reasons for this preference; because his seniority gave him this rank; and because he succeeded to the tyranny. Nor can it in any light seem probable to me, that Hippias on a sudden and with ease could have seized the tyranny, had Hipparchus died when invested with it, and he had only one day's time to effect his own establishment. The reverse is the truth; that, having for a length of time been familiarized to the expectation, having rendered himself awful to the citizens, and being supported by vigilant and trusty guards, he received and enjoyed his power with abundant security. He never had cause, as a younger brother must have had, to work his way through perplexities and dangers, as in that case he could not by practice have been made an adept in the affair of government. But it was accidental, and owing intirely to subsequent misfortunes, that Hipparchus got the title, and passed in the opinion of succeeding ages for one of the tyrants.

On Harmodius therefore, who was deaf to his solicitations, he executed his resentment in the manner pre-determined. For, a summons having been delivered to a sister of his, a young virgin, to attend and carry the basket in some public procession, they afterwards rejected her; alledging, she never had nor could have been summoned, because she was unworthy of the honour. This affront highly provoked Harmodius; but Aristogiton, out of zeal for him,

was far more exasperated at it. The points needful to their intended revenge were concerted with the party who concurred in the design. But they waited for the great Panathenæa to strike the blow; on which festival alone, without incurring suspicion, such of the citizens as assisted in the procession might be armed and gathered together in numbers. It was settled, that they themselves should begin; and then, the body of their accomplices were to undertake their protection against the guards of the tyrant's family.

The persons made privy to this design were but few, from a view to a more secure execution of it. For they presumed that even such, as were not in the secret, when the attempt was once in whatever manner begun, finding themselves armed would seize the opportunity, and readily concur to assert their own freedom. When therefore the festival was come, Hippias, repairing without the walls to the place called Ceramicus; and there attended by his guards, was prescribing and adjusting the order of the procession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, each armed with a dagger, advanced to execute their parts. But, when they saw one of their accomplices in familiar conversation with Hippias, (for Hippias was affable and courteous to all men,) they were struck with fear; they imagined the whole of their plot had been betrayed, and that already they were only not apprehended. Now therefore by a sudden turn of resolution, they determined if possible to snatch a timely revenge upon him by whom they were aggrieved, and on whose account they had embarked into so dangerous an affair. In this hurry of thought they rushed back into the city, and met with Hipparchus at the place called Leocorium; where, without any regard to their own safety, they made an instant assault upon him. And thus, in all the fury of passion, one actuated by jealousy, and the other by resentment, they wounded, and they kill him. As the people immediately ran together, Aristogiton by favour of the concourse escapes for the present,

but being afterwards seized, was unmercifully treated: But Harmodius is instantly slain on the spot.

The news of this assassination being carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus, he moved off immediately; not to the scene of action but towards the armed accomplices in the procession, before they could be informed of the fact as they were stationed at a distance. He artfully suppressed on his countenance all sense of the calamity; and, pointing to a certain spot, commanded them aloud, to throw down their arms, and file off thither. This command they obeyed, expecting he had something to communicate to them. But Hippias, addressing himself to his guards, orders them to take away *those* arms. He then picked out man by man from amongst them such as he designed to put to the question and all upon whom a dagger was found: For, by ancient custom, they were to make the procession with a spear and a shield.

In this manner truly, from the anguish^s of irritated love this conspiracy took its rise, and this desperate attempt was executed by Harmodius and Aristogiton, from the impulse of a sudden consternation. But after this, the tyranny became more grievous upon the Athenians. Hippias, who was now more than ever alarmed, put many of the citizens to death; and cast his thoughts about towards foreign powers, to secure himself an asylum abroad in case of a total

And yet so violently were tyrants detested at Athens, that the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton was ever after honoured there, as martyrs for liberty, and first authors of the ruin of tyrants. Their praises were publicly sung at the great *Panathenæa*. No slave was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was employed to cast their statues, which were afterwards set up in the forum: Xerxes indeed carried them

away into Persia, but Alexander afterwards sent them back to Athens. *Plutarch* hath preserved a smart reply of Antipho the Orator, who will appear in this history, to the elder Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse. The latter had put the question, which was the finest kind of brass? "That," replied Antipho, of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made."

reverse

reverse at home. To Æantidas therefore the son of Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampfacus, — to a *Lampfacene* tho' he himself was an *Athenian*, — he married his daughter Archedice, knowing that family to have a powerful interest with king Darius. And the monument of that lady is now at Lampfacus, and hath this inscription,

From Hippias sprung, with regal pow'r array'd,
Within this earth Archedice is lay'd ;
By father, husband, brothers, sons, allied
To haughty thrones, yet never stain'd with pride.

For the space of three years after this Hippias continued in possession of the tyranny at Athens: but, being deposed in the fourth by the Lacedæmonians and the exiled Alcæmonidæ, he retired by agreement to Sigæum; from thence, to Æantidas at Lampfacus; and, from thence, to king Darius: and, with a command under him, he marched twenty years after to Marathon; and, tho' much advanced in years, served in that war with the Medes.

The People of Athens, reflecting on these past transactions, and recollecting all the dismal narratives about them which tradition had handed down, treated with great severity and deep suspicions all such as were informed against in relation to the *myseries*: and they construed the whole procedure, as the dawning of a plot to erect an oligarchical and tyrannic power. And, as their passions were inflamed by such apprehensions, many worthy and valuable citizens were already thrown into prison. Nay, it seemed as if their inquisition was to have no end, since from day to day their indignation gave into more increasing severity, and numbers were constantly arrested. Here, one of those ⁶ who had been imprisoned on suspicion (and a suspicion too

*Athens in
alarm about
the plot.*

L 1 2

of

⁶ This person, according to *Plutarch* in *Alcibiades*, was Andocides the Orator, a man always reckoned of the *oligarchical* faction. And one Timæus, his intimate friend,

of being most deeply concerned in the crime) is persuaded by one of his Fellow-prisoners, to turn an evidence, no matter whether of truth or falsehood. Many conjectures have passed on both sides ; but no one, neither at that time nor since, hath been able to discover the men who were really concerned in the affair. The argument which prevailed upon this person was, “ the necessity for his taking such a
 “ step, even tho’ he had no hand in the commission, since by this he
 “ would infallibly procure his own safety, and deliver the city from its
 “ present confusions. For he must be much more secure of saving his
 “ life by such voluntary confession on a promise of indemnity, than
 “ he could possibly be should he persist in an avowal of his innocence,
 “ and be brought to a trial.” In short, this man became an evidence both against himself and against others, in the affair of the *Mercuries*.

Great was the joy of the Athenian people at this (as it was thought) undoubted discovery. And, as they had been highly chagrined before at their inability to detect the criminals, who had so outrageously insulted the *multitude* ; they immediately discharged this informer ; and all other prisoners, whom he did not name as accomplices. Upon such as he expressly named the judicial trials were held. Some of them they put to death, as many as were prevented by timely arrests from flying from justice ; but they pronounced the sentence of death against the fugitives, and set a price on their heads. Yet all this while it was by no means clear, that those who suffered were not unjustly condemned. Thus much however is certain, that by such proceedings the public tranquillity was restored.

In regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians were highly incensed against him, since the party, which were his enemies, and had made their attacks upon him before his departure, continued still to inflame them. And now, as they presumed the truth had been detected in

friend, who was a man of small consideration at Athens but remarkable for a penetrating and enterprising genius, was the person who persuaded him to turn informer.
 relation

relation to the *Mercuries*, it appeared to them beyond a scruple, that he must also have been guilty of the crimes charged against him about the *mysteries*, upon the same ground of a secret combination against the *democracy*.

At this critical period of time, when the public confusion was in all its height, it further happened, that a Lacedæmonian army, tho' by no means large, advanced as far as to the Isthmus, to execute some scheme along with the Bœotians. This was interpreted to the prejudice of Alcibiades, as if they had now taken the field at his instigation, and not on any account of obliging the Bœotians; and that, "had they not happily apprehended in time such as had been informed against, Athens had now been infallibly betrayed." Nay, for the space of a night, they kept guard under arms within the city, in the temple of Theseus.

About the same time also, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of a design to assault the *people*. And those hostages of the Argives, who were kept in custody among the islands, the Athenians on this occasion delivered up to the *people* of Argos, to be put to death on these suspicions.

Thus reasons flowed in from every quarter for suspecting Alcibiades. Desirous therefore to bring him to a trial and to execution, they accordingly dispatch the *Salaminian* to Sicily, to order him and such others as they had informations against to repair to Athens. But it had been given them in charge to notify to him, that "he should follow them home in order to make his defence," and by no means to put him under arrest. This management was owing to a desire of preventing all stirs in the army or in the enemy; and, not least of all, to their willingness that the Mantinéans and Argives should continue in the service, whose attendance in the expedition they wholly ascribed to the interest Alcibiades had with them.

In pursuance of this, Alcibiades on board his own ship, and accompanied by all those who were involved in the same accusation, ^{Alcibiades} ^{flies.} failed

failed away from Sicily with the *Salaminian* for Athens. And, when they were got to the height of Thuria, they no longer followed; but quitting their ship were no longer to be seen. Censured as they were, they durst not in fact undergo a trial. The crew of the *Salaminian* exerted themselves immediately in the search after Alcibiades and his companions: But, when they found the search was ineffectual, they gave it up, and steered away for Athens. And Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, passed over in a vessel soon after from Thuria ⁷ to Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, upon his thus abandoning his defence, pronounced the sentence of death against him, and his associates.

*Proceedings of
the fleet in
Sicily.*

After these transactions, the Athenian generals who remained in Sicily, having divided their whole armament into two squadrons and taken the command of each by lot, set sail with all their united force for Selinus and Egesta. They were desirous to know, whether the Egesteans would pay down the money; to discover also the present posture of the Selinuntians; and to learn the state of their quarrels with the Egesteans. In their course, keeping on the left that part of Sicily which lies on the Tyrrhene gulf, they arrived at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in this part of Sicily; and, when denied reception here, they resumed their course. Touching afterwards at Hyccara, a Sicanian fortress but an annoyance to the Egesteans, they surprise it; for it was situated close upon the sea; and having doomed the inhabitants to be slaves, they delivered the place into the hands of the Egesteans, whose cavalry was now attending

⁷ Some body at Thuria, who knew Alcibiades, asked him, why he would not stand a trial, and trust his country? "In other points I would; but when my life is concerned, I would not trust my own mother, lest she should make a mistake, and put in a black bean in-

stead of a white one." And, when he was afterwards told, that his countrymen had passed the sentence of death against him, he briskly replied — "But I'll make them know that I am alive."
Plutarch in Alcibiades.

on

on the Athenian motions. The land-forces marched away from hence through the territories of the Siculi, till they had again reached Catana; but the vessels, on board of which were the slaves, came back along the coasts.

Nicias had proceeded from Hyccara directly to Egesta, where after transacting other points and receiving * thirty talents, he rejoined the grand armament at Catana. And here they set up the slaves to sale⁸, and raised by the money paid for them * one hundred and twenty talents.

* 5812 l. 10 s. Sterling.

* 23250 l. Sterling.

They also sailed about to their Sicilian allies, summoning them to send in their reinforcements. With a division also of their force they appeared before Hybla, a hostile city in the district of Gela, but were not able to take it. And here the summer ended.

Winter now succeeding, the Athenians began immediately to get all things in readiness for an attempt upon Syracuse. The Syracusans were equally intent on making an attack upon them. For, since the Athenians had not thought proper, during their first panic and consternation, to fall instantly upon them, such a protraction re-inspired them day after day with new reviving courage: Since further, by cruizing on the other side of Sicily, they seemed to affect a remoteness from them; and, tho' shewing themselves before Hybla, and attempting the place they had not been able to carry it, the Syracusans began now to treat them with an open contempt. They even insisted, as might be expected from a populace who are high in spirits, "that their generals should lead out towards Catana, since the enemy durst not venture to march against them." The Syracusan horsemen also, sent daily out to observe their motions, rode boldly up to the camp of the Athenians, insulting them in other respects but especially with this sneering demand, "Whether they were not rather

The Athenians resolve on the attack of Syracuse.

⁸ Among the rest, Nicias sold at this sale Laïs the famous courtesan, at this time a very young girl; whom her pur-

chasers carried to Corinth, where she set up and drove a prodigious trade indeed. Plutarch in Nicias.

" come

“ come to gain a settlement for themselves on a foreign shore, than
 “ to replace the Leontines in their old possessions ? ”

*Schemes of the
 commanders.*

The Athenian generals, informed of these bravadoes, were desirous to seduce the whole strength of Syracuse to as great a distance as possible from that city, that they might snatch an opportunity of transporting thither their own forces by favour of the night, and seize a proper spot whereon to fix their incampment, without any obstruction from the enemy. They were well convinced, that their point could not be so easily accomplished, should they endeavour to force a descent in the face of the enemy, or by a land-march should give them an early notice of their design. For in such cases their own light-armed, and that cumbersome train which must attend, as they had no horse to cover their motions, must suffer greatly from the numerous cavalry of the Syracusans : But, by the other scheme, they might pre-occupy a spot of ground, where the cavalry could not give them any considerable annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracusan exiles, who followed their camp, had informed them of a piece of ground convenient for their purpose, near Olympæum.

Stratagem.

In order therefore to accomplish the point, the generals have recourse to the following artifice. — They dispatch an emissary, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and who might also pass with the generals of Syracuse as well affected to their cause. The person employed was a Catanéan. He told them “ he was sent by
 “ their friends in Catana ” with whose names they were acquainted and knew well to be of that number in Catana, which persisted in stedfast attachment to them : He said further, that “ the Athenians
 “ reposed themselves by night within the city, at a distance from
 “ their arms ; and that in case they (the Syracusans) on a day pre-
 “ fixed, would with all the forces of their city appear by early dawn
 “ before the Athenian camp, the Catanéans would shut up those
 “ within the city and set fire to their shipping, by which means they
 “ might

“ might force the intrenchments, and render themselves masters of
 “ the camp ; that further, the party of Catinéans, that would co-
 “ operate with them in this scheme was very large, and already
 “ prepared to execute these points he was now sent to propose.”

The Syracusan generals, whose ardor other contingencies had al- *It succeeds.*
 ready inflamed, and who had formed a resolution, even previous to
 such encouragement, to march their forces towards Catana, without
 the least reserve gave implicit credit to this emissary; and, having in-
 stantly pitched upon a day for execution, dismissed him. They also
 (for by this time the Selinuntian and some other auxiliaries had
 joined them) issued out their orders for the whole military strength
 of Syracuse to march out on the day appointed. No sooner there-
 fore were all the needful preparations adjusted, and the time at hand
 at which they were to make their appearance, than — on the march
 for Catana, they halted one night upon the banks of the Symæthus
 in the Leontine district. But the Athenians, when assured they had
 thus taken the field, decamping instantly with the whole of their
 force, and with all the Sicilian and other auxiliaries who had joined
 them, and embarking themselves on board their ships and transports,
 steered away by night for Syracuse. And, early the next dawn, *They land at*
 they landed on the intended spot near Olympiæum, intent on form- *Syracuse.*
 ing and securing their incampment. The cavalry of the Syracusans,
 in the mean time, came up first to Catana ; and discovering, that the
 whole Athenian army had put to sea by night, they return with this
 intelligence to their foot. Upon this, the whole army, soon wheel-
 ing about, returned with all speed to the defence of Syracuse.

In the mean time, the Athenians, as the enemy had a long way to *They incamp in*
 march, formed an incampment on an advantageous spot without the *a strong post.*
 least obstruction. On it, they were possessed of the advantage of
 fighting only at their own discretion ; and the Syracusan horse could
 give them the least annoyance, either during or before an engage-
 ment. On one side, they were flanked by walls, and houses, and

trees, and a marsh; and on the other by precipices. They also felled some trees that grew near; and, carrying them down to the shore, they piled them into a barricade for the defence of their ships, and to cover them on the side of Daseon. They also expeditiously threw up a rampart, on the part which seemed most accessible to the enemy, of stones picked out for the purpose and timber, and broke down the bridge of the Anapus.

*Return of the
Syracusan
army.*

Thus busied as they were on fortifying their camp, not so much as one person ventured out of the city to obstruct their proceedings. The first, who appeared to make any resistance, were the Syracusan cavalry; and, when once they had shewn themselves, the whole body of their infantry was soon in sight. They advanced first of all quite up to the Athenian works; but when they perceived that they would not fall out to fight them, they again retreated: And having crossed the road to Helorum, reposed themselves for the night.

*Both armies
prepare for
battle.*

The succeeding day, the Athenians and allies prepared for engagement, and their order of battle was formed, as follows:—The Argives and Mantinéans had the right, the Athenians the centre, and the rest of the line was formed by the other confederates. One half of the whole force, which was ranged in the first line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The other half, being posted near the tents, formed a hollow square, in which the men were also drawn up by eight. The latter were ordered, if any part of the line gave way, to keep a good look-out and advance to their support. And within this hollow square they posted all the train who attended the service of the army.

But the Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed, which body consisted of the whole military strength of Syracuse and all the confederates who had joined them, in files consisting of sixteen. Those, who had joined with auxiliary quotas, were chiefly the Selinuntians; and next, the horse of the Geloans, amounting in the whole to about two hundred. The horse also of the Cammarineans, about twenty

twenty in number, and about fifty archers. But their horsemen they posted to the right, being not fewer in number than twelve hundred; and next to them, the darters.

The Athenians being now intent on advancing to the charge, Nicias, addressing himself in regular order to the troops of the several States, animated them to the fight by the following harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army.

“ WHAT need, my fellow-soldiers, of a long exhortation, since
 “ we are here, determined, and resolute for action? For this our
 “ present arrangement seems to me a stronger confirmation of your
 “ courage, than any words could be how eloquently soever delivered,
 “ if we were inferior in strength. But when, Argives, and Man-
 “ tinéans, and Athenians, and the flower of the isles, we are here
 “ assembled together — how is it possible, when such brave and nu-
 “ merous allies are to fight in company, that we should not enter-
 “ tain a steadfast, nay the warmest hope that the victory will be our
 “ own? Nay more, as we have to do with a promiscuous crowd,
 “ the mob of a city, not selected for service, as we have had the
 “ honour to be; and who, it must be added, are but Sicilians; who,
 “ tho’ affecting to despise us, will never sustain our charge, because
 “ their skill is far beneath their courage.

“ Let every soldier further recal to his remembrance, that he is
 “ now at a vast distance from his native soil, and near no friendly
 “ land but what you shall render such by the efforts of your valour.
 “ Such things I am bound to suggest to your remembrance, the re-
 “ verse I am well convinced of what our enemies utter for their
 “ mutual encouragement. They undoubtedly are roaring aloud —
 “ It is for your country you are now to fight. But I tell *you*, that
 “ from your country you are now remote; and as such, must either
 “ conquer, or not without difficulty ever see it again, since the nu-
 “ merous cavalry of the enemy will press hard upon our retreat.

M m 2

“ Call

*Speech of
Nicias.*

“ Call therefore to mind your own dignity and worth ; advance
 “ with alacrity to assault your foes ; convinced, that your present ne-
 “ cessities and wants are far more terrible than the enemy you are to
 “ engage.”

The battle.

When Nicias had finished this exhortation, he led on his army towards the encounter. But the Syracusans were not yet prepared, as by no means expecting to be charged so soon ; and some of the soldiers, as the city lay so near, were straggled thither. These however came running with all eagerness and speed to gain their posts ; too late upon the whole ; but as each of them met with any number intent on action, he ranged himself in their company. The Syracusans, to do them justice, were not deficient in alacrity or courage, neither in the present battle, nor any of the following. They maintained their ground gallantly so long as their competence of skill enabled them ; but when that failed them, they were forced tho' with reluctance to slacken in their ardor. However, tho' far from imagining that the Athenians would presume to begin the attack, and tho' obliged in a hurry to stand on their defence, they took up their arms, and advanced immediately to meet their foe.

In the first place therefore, the flingers of stones with either the hand or the sling, and the archers on both sides began the engagement ; and alternately chaced one another, as is generally the case among the bodies of the light-armed. In the next place, the footslayers brought forwards and immolated the solemn victims ; and the trumpets summoned the heavy-armed to close firm together, and advance.

All sides now began to face ; the Syracusans to fight for their country ; each soldier amongst them for his native soil, to earn for the present his preservation, and for the future his liberty. — On their enemies side ; the Athenians to gain possession of a foreign country, and not to damage their own by a dastardly behaviour : The Argives,
 and

and voluntary part of the confederates, to procure for the Athenians a happy accomplishment of their schemes, and again to visit their own country, to which they were endeared, victorious and triumphant; and that part of the confederacy, which attended in obedience to the orders of their masters, were highly animated by the thought, that they must earn their safety now at once, or if defeated now must for the future despair, and then secretly actuated perhaps by the distant hope, that were others reduced to the Athenian yoke, their own bondage might be rendered more light and easy.

The business being now come to blows, they for a long time maintained the ground on both sides. It happened further, that some claps of thunder were heard attended with lightning and a heavy rain. This caused a sudden consternation in the Syracusans, who now for the first time engaged the Athenians, and had gained very little experience in the affairs of war. But by the more experienced enemy these accidents were interpreted as the ordinary effects of the season; and their concern was rather employed upon the enemy, whom they found no easy conquest. But the Argives having first of all defeated the left wing of the Syracusans, and the Athenians being afterwards successful in their quarter of the battle, the whole Syracusan army was soon thrown into disorder, and began the flight. The Athenians however did not continue the pursuit to any great distance: for the Syracusan cavalry, as they were numerous and unbroke, put a stop to the chase by assaulting those parties of heavy-armed, whom they saw detached for the pursuit, and driving them back into their own line. Having pursued only so far as they could in an orderly and secure manner, they again retreated and erected a trophy. *The Athenians gain the victory.*

But the Syracusans, who had rallied again in the road to Helorum, and were drawn up as well as the present posture of affairs would permit, send a strong detachment from their body for the guard of Olympæum; apprehensive, that the Athenians might otherwise seize the

the treasures that were repositèd there. And, this being done, with the remainder of their force they retired within the walls of Syracuse.

The Athenians in the mean time made no advances against Olympiæum; but, after gathering together the bodies of their slain, and laying them upon the funeral-pyre, they passed the night on the field of battle.

*They sail back
to Catana.*

The next day they delivered up their dead under truce to the Syracusans, of whom and their allies there had perished about two hundred and sixty men; and then gathered up the bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their allies about fifty in all were slain. And now with all the pillage they had made of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana.

*The reasons
why.*

This was owing to the season of the year now advanced to winter. It was no longer judged possible for them, to be able to continue the war in their present post, before they had procured a supply of horse from Athens, and had assembled others from their confederates in Sicily, that they might not be entirely exposed to the horse of the enemy. They were also intent on collecting pecuniary aids in those parts, and some were expected from Athens. — “ They might also “ obtain the concurrence of some other cities, which they hoped “ would prove more tractable, since they had gained a battle : They “ wanted, further, to furnish themselves with provisions and all “ necessary stores, which might enable them early in the spring to “ make new attempts on Syracuse.” Determined by these considerations, they sailed back to Naxos and Catana, in order to winter there.

*The Syracu-
sans assemble
in council.*

The Syracusans, after they had performed the obsequies of their slain, called a general assembly of the people. And on this occasion Hermocrates the son of Hermon (a man who was inferior to none, in all other branches of human prudence, who for military skill was in high reputation, and renowned for bravery) standing forth among them,

them, endeavoured to encourage them, and prevent their being too much dispirited by their late defeat.

He told them, " that in courage they had not been worsted, but
 " their want of discipline had done them harm : and yet, the harm
 " suffered by that was not near so great as they might justly have ex- *Advice of*
 " pected ; especially, when no better than a rabble of mechanics they *Hermocrates.*
 " had been obliged to enter the lists against the most experienced
 " soldiery of Greece : That what hurt them most was too large a
 " number of generals, and the multiplicity of commands which was
 " thence occasioned (for the number of those who commanded was
 " fifteen), whilst the bulk of their army observed no discipline, and
 " obeyed no orders at all : But, were only a few skilful generals se-
 " lected for the trust, would they only be intent this winter on train-
 " ing their bodies of heavy-armed, and furnish others with arms who
 " had none for themselves, in order to enlarge their number as much
 " as possible, and inure them to settled exercise and use, — he assured
 " them, *thus* in all probability they must upon the whole be too hard
 " for their foes, as their natural portion of valour was great, and
 " skill would be attained by practice : That both of these would pro-
 " gressively become more perfect ; discipline, by being exercised
 " through a series of dangers ; and inward bravery would merely of
 " itself increase in gallant confidence, when assured of the support
 " of skill : As to *generals*, that few only, and those invested with
 " absolute power, ought to be elected and confirmed by a solemn
 " oath from the *people*, — that they were permitted to lead the army
 " where and how they judged best for the public service. For by
 " this means, what ought to be concealed would be less liable to de-
 " tection, and all the schemes of war might be directed with order
 " and a certainty of success."

The Syracusans, who had listened to this discourse, decreed what-
 ever he proposed. They elected Hermocrates himself to be a general,
 and Heraclides the son of Lyfimachus, and Sthenus the son of Hec-
 cestus ;

cestus; these three. They also appointed ambassadors to go to Corinth and Lacedæmon, to procure the alliance of those *States*, and to persuade the Lacedæmonians to make hotter war upon the Athenians, with an open avowal that they acted in behalf of the Syracusans; that, by this means, they might either be obliged to recall their fleet from Sicily, or might be less able to send any reinforcements to the army already there.

*The Athenians
miskarry in
their attempt
on Messene.*

The Athenian forces, which lay at Catana, soon made an excursion from thence to Messene, expecting to have it betrayed into their power. But all the steps, taken previously for the purpose, were totally disconcerted. For Alcibiades, upon his quitting the command when recalled to Athens, being convinced within himself that exile must be his portion, betrayed the whole project (as he had been in the secret) to such persons at Messene as were attached to the Syracusans. The first step this party took was to put to death all the persons against whom he informed. And, at the time of this attempt being quite in a ferment and under arms, they carried their point, so that those who wished to give it were obliged to refuse admission to the Athenians. The Athenians therefore after thirteen days continuance on that coast, when the weather began to be tempestuous, when their provisions failed, and no hope of success appeared, returned to Naxos * *,⁹ where having thrown up an intrenchment round their camp, they continued the rest of the winter. They also dispatched a trireme to Athens, to forward a supply of money and horsemen to join them without fail by the beginning of the spring.

Syracuse fortified.

The Syracusans employed themselves this winter in fortifying their city. They inclosed Temenites within their new works, and carried their wall through all that length of ground which faceth Epipolæ,

⁹ In the original is added *εἰς ἑαυτάς*: it up, and own they can make nothing. But all the editors and note-writers give of it.

that,

that, in case they should be unable to keep the field, the enemy might have as little room as possible to raise counterworks of annoyance. They also placed a garrison at Megara, and another in Olympiæum. And all along the sea they drove rows of piles, wherever the ground was convenient for descents. Knowing also, that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched out with all their force against Catana. They ravaged the territory of the Catanéans; and after burning the tents and camp of the Athenians, they returned home.

Having also had intelligence, that the Athenians had sent an embassy to Camarina, under favor of a treaty made formerly with them by Laches, to try if it were possible to procure their concurrence; they also dispatched an embassy thither, to traverse the negotiation. For the Camarinéans were suspected by them, as if they had not cordially sent in their quota of assistance for the first battle, and, lest for the future they might be totally averse from acting in their support, as in that battle they had seen the Athenians victorious, and so, induced by the former treaty they had made with the latter, might now declare openly on their side.

*Both sides
apply to the
Camarinians.*

When therefore Hermocrates and others were arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and from the Athenians Euphemus and his colleagues in the embassy; an assembly of the Camarineans was held; in which, Hermocrates, desirous to give them a timely distaste against the Athenians, harangued them thus; —

“ OUR embassy hither, ye men of Camarina, hath not been occasioned by any fears we were under, that you might be too much terrified at the great equipment with which the Athenians have invaded us; but rather, by our knowledge with what kind of arguments they would impose on your understanding, by which, before we had an opportunity to remonstrate, they might seduce you into a concurrence. Sicily in fact they have invaded, upon

*Speech of
Hermocrates.*

VOL. II.

N n

such

" such pretext as you have heard them give out; but with such
 " intentions, as we have all abundant reason to suspect. And to me
 " it is clear, that their schemes have no tendency to replant the
 " Leontines, but rather to supplant us all. For how is it reconcil-
 " able with common-sense, that a people, who have ever been em-
 " ployed in the ruin of the *States* which are neighbouring to Athens,
 " should be sincere in re-establishing a Sicilian people; or, by the
 " bonds of consanguinity hold themselves obliged to protect the
 " Leontines who are of Chalcidic descent, whilst on the Chalcidians
 " of Eubœa from whom these others are a colony, they hold fast ri-
 " vetted the yoke of slavery? No; it is the same cruel policy, that
 " subjugated the Grecians in that part of the world, which now
 " exerts itself to glut their ambition in this.

" These are those very Athenians, who formerly having been
 " elected their common leaders by the well-designing Ionians and
 " that confederate-body which derived from them their descent, on
 " the glorious pretence of avenging themselves on the Persian Mo-
 " narch, abused their trust by enslaving those who placed confidence
 " in them; charging some, with deserting the common cause; others
 " with their mutual embroilments; and all at length, with different
 " but specious criminations. And, on the whole, these Athenians
 " waged war against the Mede, not in the cause of Grecian liberty,
 " as neither did the other Grecians in the defence of their own: The
 " former fought, not indeed to subject the rest of Greece to the Mede,
 " but to their own selves; the latter, merely to obtain a change of
 " master, a master not inferior in policy but far more abundant in
 " malice.

" But, tho' Athens on manifold Accounts be obnoxious to universal
 " censure and reproach, yet we are not come hither to prove how
 " justly she deserveth it, since your own conviction precludes the long
 " detail. We are much more concerned at present to censure and
 " reproach ourselves, since with all the examples before our eyes of
 " what

" what the Grecians in those parts have suffered, who for want of
 " guarding against their incroachments have sell victims to their am-
 " bition — since with the certain knowledge that they are now play-
 " ing the same sophistries upon us," — " the replantation of their
 " kindred Leontines," — " the support of the Egeſtæans their Allies,"
 " — we shew no inclination to unite together in our common de-
 " fence, in order to give them most signal proofs, that in Sicily are
 " neither Ionians nor Hellespontins nor islanders, who will be slaves,
 " tho' ever changing their master; one while, to the *Medæ*, and soon
 " after, to whoever will please to govern; — but on the contrary,
 " that we are Dorians, who from Peloponnesus, that seat of liberty
 " and independence, came to dwell in Sicily. Shall we therefore
 " protract our union, till city after city we are compelled to a sub-
 " mission? we — † who are convinced that thus only we can be con-
 " quered, and when we even behold that thus our foes have dressed
 " up their plan; amongst some of our people scattering dissensions;
 " setting others to war down each other for the mighty recompence
 " of their alliance; cajoling the rest, as may best sooth the pride or
 " caprice of each; and avail themselves of these methods to work
 " our ruin! We even indulge the wild imagination, that tho' a re-
 " mote inhabitant of Sicily be destroyed, the danger can never come
 " home to ourselves; and that he, who precedes us in ruin, is un-
 " happy only in and for himself.

" Is there now a man amongst you who imagines, that merely a
 " Syracusan and not himself is the object of Athenian enmity? and
 " pronounceth it hard, that he must be exposed to dangers in which
 " I only am concerned? Let such an one with more solidity reflect;
 " that, not merely for what is mine, but equally also for what is his
 " own, he should associate with me, tho' within my precincts; —
 " and, that this may be done with greater security now, since as yet
 " I am not quite destroyed, since in me he is sure of a stedfast ally,
 " and before he is bereaved of all support may hazard the contention.

N n 2

" And

“ And let him further rest assured, that it is not the sole view of the
 “ Athenian to bridle enmity in a Syracusan; but, under the colour
 “ of that pretext, to render himself, the more secure by gaining for
 “ a time the friendship of another.

“ If others again entertain any envy or jealousy of Syracuse, for
 “ to each of these great *States* are generally obnoxious, and would
 “ take delight in seeing us depressed in order to teach us moderation;
 “ tho’ not totally destroyed from a regard to his own preservation,
 “ — These are such sanguine wishes, as in the course of human
 “ affairs can never be accomplished: Because it is quite impossible,
 “ that the same person shall build up airy schemes to sooth his own
 “ passions, and then insure their success. And thus, should some
 “ sinister event take place, quite sunk under the weight of his own
 “ calamity, he would perhaps be soon wishing again, that I was so
 “ replaced as to excite his envy. Impossible this, for one who aban-
 “ doned my defence, who refused before-hand to participate my
 “ dangers; — dangers, tho’ not in name yet in reality, his own.
 “ For if names alone be regarded, he acts in the support of my
 “ power; but if realities, of his own preservation.

“ Long since, ye men of Camarina, it was incumbent on you;
 “ who are borderers upon us and must be our seconds in ruin, to
 “ have foreseen these things, and not to have abetted our defence
 “ with so much remissness as you have hitherto done it. You ought
 “ to have repaired to our support with free and voluntary aid; with
 “ such, as in case the Athenians had begun first with Camarina, you
 “ would have come with earnest prayers to implore from us. So
 “ cordial and so alert you should have appeared in our behalf, to
 “ avert us from too precipitate submissions. But these things never
 “ were; not even you, nor any other people, have shewed such
 “ affection or alacrity for us.

“ From timorousness of heart you will study perhaps a manage
 “ both with us and the invaders; and alledge, that there are treaties
 “ subsisting

“ subsisting between yourselves and the Athenians. Yet, these treaties
“ you never made to hurt your friends, but to repel the efforts of
“ your foes should they dare to attack you. By *them* you are bound,
“ to give defensive aid to the Athenians when attacked by others ;
“ and not, when they (as is the present case) injuriously fall upon
“ your neighbours. Remember that the Rhegians, tho’ even of
“ Chalcidic descent, have refused to concur with them in replanting
“ the Leontines, who are also Chalcidéans. Hard indeed is your
“ fate, if they, suspecting some bad design to lie lurking under a fair
“ justification, have recourse to the wary moderate behaviour which
“ appearances will not warrant ; whilst you, on the pretended ground
“ of a rational conduct, are eager to serve a people who are by na-
“ ture your foes ; and join with most implacable enemies to destroy
“ your own kindred, to whom nature hath so closely attached
“ you !

“ In such a conduct there is no justice : The justice lies in abetting
“ our cause, and not dastardly shrinking before the terror of their
“ arms. These arms are not terrible, would we only all combine in
“ our mutual defence. They are only so, if on the contrary we
“ continue disunited, the point which the Athenians labour with so
“ much assiduity. For, even when singly against *us* they entered the
“ lists and were victorious, yet they were not able to effectuate their
“ designs, but were obliged precipitately to re-embark. If united
“ therefore, what further can we have to fear ? What hinders us from
“ associating together with instant alacrity and zeal ? Especially as
“ we shall soon receive an aid from Peloponnesus, who in all the
“ business of war are far superior to Athenians. Reject, I say, the
“ vain presumption, that either it will be equitable in regard to us
“ or prudential in regard to yourselves, to *take part with neither side*,
“ on pretence that you have treaties subsisting with *both*. There is a
“ fallacy in it, which, tho’ veiled under plausible words, the event
“ will

" will soon detect. For, if through your determination to abandon
 " his support, the party already attacked be vanquished, and the as-
 " sailant be invigorated by success, what can such absencing of your-
 " selves avail, but to help forwards the ruin of the one, and afford
 " free scope to the pernicious schemes of the other? And how
 " glorious would the reverse of this conduct be, would you exert
 " your efforts to redress the injured, who also by the ties of consan-
 " guinity have a right to expect it from you, to guard the common
 " welfare of Sicily, and not suffer your friends, your good friends
 " the Athenians, to run out into a course of outrage?

" In a word; we Syracusans have now only this to add, that ar-
 " guments are superfluous either for the instruction of you or of
 " others in points, whose tendency you know as clearly as ourselves.
 " But we earnestly conjure you, and if prayers will not avail, we
 " boldly protest against you, that, as the worst designs are formed
 " against us by our eternal foes the Ionians, you would act as you
 " ought, — if not, that by you we are basely betrayed, Dorians by
 " Dorians. If such must be our fate, if by the Athenians we must
 " be destroyed, they will be indebted for their success to your deter-
 " minations; but the glory of it will be totally assumed by them-
 " selves. Nay, the chief reward they will reap from the victory
 " will be this, to enslave the persons who enabled them to gain it. But
 " then, should the victory rest with us, you are the men from whom
 " we shall exact revenge for all the dangers to which we have been
 " exposed. Examine things therefore, and declare your resolution,
 " either at once, without embarking into dangers, to put on the
 " Athenian chains, or with us to face the storm and earn your pre-
 " servation; not basely bending to the yoke of foreign tyrants, and
 " preventing an enmity with us, which will not quickly be
 " appeased."

In these words Hermocrates harangued the Camarinæans. And, when he had ended, Euphemus ambassador of the Athenians reply'd as follows :

“ OUR journey hither was intended for the renewal of a former alliance ; but as this Syracusan hath taken the liberty to be severe upon us, we lie under an obligation to shew the justice of our title to that share of dominion which we now possess. And the strongest evidence of this he himself hath been pleased to give, by affirming that Ionians have been eternal foes to Dorians. The fact is incontestibly true : Since we, who are Ionians, have been necessitated to stand ever upon our guard against the incroaching designs of the Peloponnesians, who are Dorians, who are our superiors in number, and are seated upon our borders. When therefore, in the close of the Persian invasion, we saw ourselves masters of a navy, we asserted our own independence from the government and guidance of the Lacedæmonians ; since no shadow of reason could be found, why we should be obedient to them any more than they to us, save only that in this critical period their strength was greater. We were afterwards appointed, by free election, the leaders of those Ionians who had formerly been subject to the *Monarch*. And the preference awarded to us we continue to support ; assured, that only thus we shall escape subjection to the Peloponnesian yoke, by keeping possession of a power, which can effectually awe all their incroachments. And further, (that we may come to particulars,) it was not with injustice that we exacted subjection from those Ionians and inhabitants of the isles, whom the Syracusans say we thought proper to enslave tho’ connected with us by the ties of blood. For they marched in company with the *Mede* against their mother-country, against us their founders. They had not the courage to expose their own homes to ruin and devastation by an honest revolt, tho’ we with magnanimity abandoned

Speech of
Euphemus.

“ donec

“ doned even Athens itself. They made slavery their choice, and
 “ in the same miserable fate would have been glad to envelope us.
 “ Thus solid are the grounds, on which we found our title to that
 “ extensive rule we now enjoy. We honestly deserve it; since, in
 “ the cause of Greece, we equipped the largest fleet, and exerted
 “ the greatest ardor without the least equivocation; and, since those
 “ others, acting with implicit obedience to the *Mede*, did all they
 “ could to distress us. To which let it be added, that we were at
 “ the same time desirous to obtain a strength sufficient to give a
 “ check to the ambition of Peloponnesians. Submissive therefore to
 “ their dictates we are not, will not be; because, either in return
 “ for the repulse of the *Barbarian* by our single efforts, or in re-
 “ quit of the dangers we bravely encounter’d in defence of the li-
 “ berty of those Ionians, greater than all the rest of Greece or even
 “ they themselves durst hazard for their own, we have an undoubted
 “ right to empire.

“ But further, to guard its own liberties and rights is a privilege
 “ which without either murmur or envy will be allowed to every
 “ *State*. And now, for the security of these important points to
 “ ourselves, have we ventured hither to beg your concurrence;
 “ conscious at the same time, ye men of Camarina, that your wel-
 “ fare too coincides with our own. This we can clearly demonstrate
 “ even from those criminations, which our adversaries here have la-
 “ vished upon us; and, from those so terrible suspicions, which you
 “ yourselves are inclined to entertain of our proceedings. We are
 “ not now to learn, that men, who with some high degrees of hor-
 “ ror suspect latent mischief, may for the present be soothed by an in-
 “ sinuating flow of words; but when summoned to action, will so
 “ exert themselves as is expedient for their welfare. And consonant
 “ to this, we have already hinted, that through fear alone we seized
 “ that power which we now possess in Greece; that, through the
 “ same motive we have ventured hither to establish our own security
 “ in

“ in concert with that of our friends ; so far from the view of in-
 “ slaving them to ourselves, that we are solely intent on preserving
 “ them from being inflaved by others.

“ Let no man here retort upon us — that all our solicitude for
 “ you is unmerited and superfluous. Such an one must know, that
 “ so long as you are safe, so long as you are able to employ the Sy-
 “ racusans, the less liable they will be to send reinforcements from
 “ hence to the Peloponnesians for our annoyance : And as this is the
 “ real state of things, our concern should most largely be bestowed
 “ upon you. By parity of reason it also highly concerns us to re-
 “ plant the Leontines ; not in order to render them vassals to our-
 “ selves as their relations of Eubœa are, but to make them as strong
 “ and powerful as we are able ; that, seated as they then will be on
 “ her confines, they may compensate our remote situation, in afford-
 “ ing a diversion to Syracuse. For if the view be carried back to
 “ Greece, we ourselves are there a match for our foes. The Chal-
 “ cidæan there, whom after unjustly enslaving we are taxed with ab-
 “ surdity for pretending to vindicate here, is highly serviceable to
 “ us ; because he is disarmed, and because he furnisheth us with a
 “ tribute. But here in Sicily, our interest demandeth, that the Le-
 “ ontines and the whole body of our friends be restored to the full
 “ enjoyment of all their liberty and strength.

“ Now to a potentate invested with superior power, or to a *State*
 “ possessed of empire, nothing that is profitable can be deemed ab-
 “ surd, nothing secure that cannot be safely managed. Incidents
 “ will arise, with which we must temporize, and determine accord-
 “ ingly our enmity or our friendship. But the latter makes most for
 “ our interest here, where we ought by no means to weaken our
 “ friends ; but, through the strength of our friends, to keep down
 “ and disable our enemies. Of this you ought not to rest incredu-
 “ lous, as you know that over our dependents in Greece we either
 “ hold tight or slacken the rein, as squares best with the public ser-
 VOL. II. O o “ vice.

“ vice. We permit to the Chians and Methymnéans the free use of
“ their liberties and laws for a quota of shipping; we do the same
“ to many for an annual tribute, exacted perhaps with somewhat of
“ rigor. Others amongst them, who fight under our orders, are ab-
“ solutely free, tho’ seated upon islands, and easy to be totally re-
“ duced, because they are commodiously situated to annoy the Pelo-
“ ponnesian coast. And hence it may be depended upon, that we
“ shall make such dispositions also here as are most expedient for
“ our own interest, and may best lessen the dread, which, as was
“ said before, we entertain of the Syracusans.

“ The point at which they aim is an extent of their rule over you;
“ and when by alarming your suspicions of us, they have wrought
“ you to their own purpose, either by open force or taking advan-
“ tage of your desolate condition, when we are repulsed and obliged
“ to abandon your defence, they intend to subdue all Sicily to their
“ yoke. Such the event will unavoidably prove, if at present you
“ adhere to them. For never again will it be easy for us to assemble
“ together so large an armament to give a check to their ambition; nor,
“ when we are no longer at hand for your support, will their
“ strength against you be insufficient. It is vain in any man to
“ indulge an opinion that this may not be the case, since the very
“ train of things evinceth its truth. For, when first you incited us
“ hither, it was not upon the suggestion of any other fear than this,
“ that should we suffer you to be subjected by the Syracusans, the
“ danger then would extend itself to us. And highly unjust it
“ would be now, if the argument you successfully enforced with us,
“ should lose all its influence upon you; or, should you ground suspi-
“ cions on our present appearance against them with a force superior to
“ theirs, when you ought much more to entertain an endless distrust
“ of them. The truth is this, that without your concurrence we
“ are not able to continue here. And in case, with perfidy open and
“ avowed, we make seizure of your cities; yet we are unable to re-
“ tain

“tain their possession, remote as they lie from Athens; as cities so
“large we never could garrison; and as they are further provided in
“all respects as well as any on the continent. But, on the contrary,
“the Syracusans will not rush upon you from a camp upon the
“beach; but, posted in a city more formidable in strength than the
“whole of our armament, they are ever meditating your ruin; and,
“when they have seized a proper opportunity, will strike the
“blow. They have afforded you instances of this already, and a
“flagrant one indeed in the case of the Leontines. And yet they
“have the effrontery now, by words, as if you were so to be deluded,
“to exasperate you against us, who have hitherto controled their
“views, and deterred them to this moment from making all Sicily
“their prey.

“Our arguments have a tendency directly opposite. We have
“nothing in view but your certain and assured preservation; when
“we earnestly conjure you, not wilfully to betray the means which
“at present will result from our union, which we can mutually exert,
“in one another’s behalf; —and strongly to represent to your own,
“reflexions, that even without the concurrence of allies, a road to
“your reduction will at any time be open to these Syracusans,
“through their own superior numbers; but an opportunity exceed-
“ingly seldom afforded you, to make head against them with so
“large an auxiliary body. And, if from groundless suspicions you
“suffer now so large a body to depart either unsuccessful or de-
“feated; yet, a time will come, when you will ardently wish to
“see them return tho’ in a much less proportion of strength, and
“they have it no longer in their power to cross the sea for your sup-
“port. Take care, therefore, Camarinéans, that neither yourselves
“nor others be deceived by a too credulous belief of the bold ca-
“lumnations these Syracusans utter. We have now laid before
“you the true ground of all those sad suspicions which are fo-
“mented against us; but shall again recal them to your re-
“membrance

“membrance by a short recapitulation, that they may have the proper influence upon you.

“We declare therefore, that we rule in Greece merely to prevent our being enslaved ; but are intent on vindicating liberty in Sicily, to suppress that annoyance, which might otherwise be given us from hence ; — that mere necessity obligeth us to embark in many undertakings, because we have many sinister incidents to guard against ; — that now, and formerly, we came hither to support those Sicilians who have been unjustly oppressed ; not uninvited, but solemnly conjured to take such steps. Attempt not therefore to divert our pursuits, either by erecting yourselves into censors of our proceedings, or into correctors of our politics, a point too difficult for you to manage. But so much of our activity or conduct as you can mould into a consistency with your own welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your best advantage. And never imagine, that our politics are equally prejudicial to all the world besides, but highly beneficial to the bulk of the Grecians. For through every quarter, even those which we cannot pretend to control, both such as dread impending mischiefs and such as meditate incroachments, — laying hold on both sides of the ready expectation ; the former, that redress may be obtained by our interposition ; the latter, that if we think proper to oppose them their own safety will be greatly endangered ; — both sides, I say, are hence obliged ; the latter, to practise moderation tho’ with regret ; the former, to enjoy tranquillity without previous embroilments of the public peace. The security therefore which now offers itself to your acceptance, and is always ready for those who want it, you are conjured by no means to reject ; but, relying like other communities on that quantity of support we are able to afford you, put the change for once on the Syracusans ; and, instead of being ever on the watch against them, force them at length to be watchful and alarmed for themselves.”

Such

Such was the reply of Euphemus. — In the mean time the real disposition of the Camarinéans was this. — At bottom they were well-affected to the Athenians, save only for the ambition they shewed of inflaving Sicily; but had ever been embroiled with the Syracusans, through that jealousy ever to be found in a neighbouring *State*. But as the dread of victory on the side of the Syracusans, who were close upon their borders, if earned without their concurrence, had influenced their measures, they sent a small party of horse to succour them on the former occasion; and looked upon themselves as obliged in policy to serve them underhand in future exigences, but with all possible frugality and reserve; and, at the present juncture, that they might not betray any the least partiality against the Athenians, as they were come off victorious from a battle, to return the same impartial reply to both. Determined therefore by these considerations, they answered — that “since a war had broke out between two *States*, each of which was in alliance with themselves, they judged “the only method of acting consistently with their oaths would be, “to observe a strict neutrality.” Upon this, the embassadors of both parties took their leaves and departed. And the Syracusans, within themselves, exerted their utmost applications to get all things in readiness for war.

The Camarinéans declare a neutrality.

The Athenians, who were now incamped at Naxos, opened negotiations with the Siculi, to draw over as many of them as was possible into their adherence. Many of these, who inhabited the plains and were most awed by the Syracusans, stood resolutely out: but the generality of those, who were seated in the midland parts, as they were now and had ever kept themselves uncontrolled, sided at once with the Athenians: They furnished them with corn for the service of the army; and there were some, who supplied them with money. And then the Athenians, taking the field against such as refused to accede, forced some to a compliance, and prevented others from receiving garrisons and aids from Syracuse: During winter also, they

Farther measures of the Athenians.

they removed again from Naxos to Catana ; and, having repaired their camp which had been burnt by the Syracusans, chose to pass the remainder of the winter there.

They also dispatched a trireme to Carthage, to ask their friendship and whatever assistance could possibly be obtained. They sent also to Tuscany, as some cities on that coast had made them voluntary offers of assistance. And further, they circulated their orders amongst the Siculi, and dispatched in particular one to the Egestæans, “ to send them as large a number of horses as they could possibly procure.” They busied themselves in collecting materials for circumvallation, such as bricks and iron, and all other necessary stores ; being determined to carry on the war with vigor on the first approach of spring.

*Success of the
Syracusan
embassy at
Corinth.*

The ambassadors, who from Syracuse were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, endeavoured in their passage to prevail with the Italians, “ not to look with unconcern on the Athenian proceedings, since they also were equally involved in the danger.” But when arrived at Corinth, they were admitted to an audience, in which they insisted on a speedy supply, upon the plea of consanguinity. And the Corinthians came at once to a resolution, by way of precedent to others, that, “ with all possible ardor they would join in their defence.” They even appointed an embassy of their own to accompany them to Lacedæmon, whose instructions were to second them in soliciting the Lacedæmonians “ to declare open war at home against the Athenians, and to fit out an aid for the service of Sicily.”

And at Lacedæmon, supported by Alcibiades.

At the time that these joint-embassies arrived at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there. He had no sooner made his escape, attended by his companions in exile, than in a trading-vessel he passed over from Thuria to Cyllene in Eléa ; and from thence he repaired to Lacedæmon. But, as the Lacedæmonians had pressed to see him, he went thither under the protection of the public faith. For he had with reason dreaded his reception there, since he had acted so large a part in the affair of Mantinéa.

It

It happened further, that when a public assembly was convened at Sparta, the Corinthians, and the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, all urged the same request, and were successful. Nay, tho' the College of Ephori and those who presided at the helm of the *State* had dressed up a plan, in pursuance of which they were only to send their ambassadors to Syracuse to hinder all accommodations with the Athenians, and were quite averse to the supplying them with real succours; yet Alcibiades standing up inflamed the Lacedæmonian fury, and wrought them to his purpose by the following harangue:

" I L I E under a necessity, in the beginning of my discourse, to
 " vindicate myself from the calumny, which hath been charged
 " against me: lest a jealousy of me might divert your attention
 " from those points which equally affect the common cause. My
 " ancestors therefore having, upon some reasonable grounds of com-
 " plaint, renounced the privilege of being the public hosts of your
 " embassies at Athens. I am the man, who again re-established this
 " hospitable intercourse; who in many other respects endeavoured
 " with great assiduity to oblige you, and particularly in the calamity
 " which fell to your share at Pylus. I cheerfully persevered in these
 " my favourable inclinations towards you, till you yourselves, bent
 " on accommodating your differences with the Athenians, employed
 " my adversaries to negotiate your affairs; and, as thereby you in-
 " vested *them* with authority, you of course reflected disgrace on
 " *me*. With reason therefore, after such provocations, you were
 " afterwards thwarted by me, when I supported the interest of the
 " Mantinéans and the Argives, and introduced new measures into the
 " *State*, in opposition to you. Let therefore such of your number,
 " as chagrined at what they suffered then, continue unjustly their
 " resentments against me, weigh now the force of those reasons
 " on which I acted, and return to better temper. If again I suffer
 " in the opinion of any man, because I have ever manifested an
 " attachment

*A grand council
at Sparta.*

*Speech of Al-
cibiades.*

“ attachment to the interest of the *people*, let him also learn that his
“ enmity to me on that account is not to be defended. We have
“ born from time immemorial a stedfast unrelenting aversion to
“ tyrants: Now, the whole of opposition to the despotic power of *one*
“ is expressed by this word the *people*, and on this principle alone,
“ our firm and constant adherence to the *multitude* hath been hitherto
“ carried on and supported. Besides, as the *State* of which I was a
“ Member was purely *democratical*, I lay under a necessity in many
“ respects of conforming my conduct to the established model; and
“ yet I endeavoured to give the public measures a greater share of
“ moderation, than the frantic humour of the Athenians was judged
“ capable of brooking. But incendiaries started up, such as not only
“ in earlier times, but even in our own, have driven the *people* to
“ more furious measures, and have at length effected — the exile of
“ Alcibiades. But so long as the *State* was in my own management
“ I thought myself justified, could I preserve it in that height of
“ grandeur and freedom and on the same model of government in
“ which I found it. Not but that the judicious part of our com-
“ munity are sensible what sort of a government a *democracy* is, —
“ and I myself no less than others, who have such abundant occa-
“ sion to reproach and curse it; — but for madness open and avowed
“ new terms of abhorrence cannot be invented — tho’ totally to
“ subvert it, we could in no wise deem a measure of security, whilst
“ you had declared yourselves our foes, and were in the field against
“ us. And all those proceedings of mine, which have proved most
“ offensive to you, are to be charged entirely to such principles as
“ these.

“ And now, in relation to these points, on which you are here
“ assembled to deliberate; and I also with you; and about which, if
“ I am able to give you a greater light, I am bound to do it, — attend
“ to what I am going to declare. Our principal view in the expe-
“ dition to Sicily was, if possible, to reduce the Sicilians to our yoke.

“ After

“ After them we intended to do the same by the Italians. We
 “ should next have attempted the dominions of the Carthaginians ;
 “ nay, Carthage itself. Had these our views been successful, either
 “ in the whole or the greater part, we should soon have given the
 “ attack to Peloponnesus ; assembling for that purpose the whole
 “ Grecian force, which the countries thus subdued must have added
 “ to our own ; taking also into our pay large bodies of Barbarians
 “ and Iberians, and other soldiers of those nations, which by general
 “ consent are famed for the most warlike of all Barbarians. We
 “ should have built also great number of triremes for the enlargement
 “ of our navy, as Italy would plentifully have supplied us
 “ with timber ; with which blocking up Peloponnesus on all sides,
 “ and with our land-forces at the same time invading it by land ;
 “ after carrying your cities, some by storm and some by the regular
 “ siege, we hoped without obstruction to have warred you down,
 “ and in pursuance of that to have seized the empire of universal
 “ Greece. With money and all needful stores, adequate to this extensive
 “ plan, the cities to be conquered in those remoter parts
 “ would with all proper expedition have supplied us, without any
 “ demands on our own domestic revenues. Such were to be the achievements
 “ of that grand armament which is now abroad ; such,
 “ you may rest assured upon the evidence of a person who was privy
 “ to every step, was its original plan. And the generals, who are
 “ left in the command, will yet if they are able carry it into execution.
 “ And I must further beg leave to tell you, that if with
 “ timely succours you do not interpose, nothing in those parts will
 “ be able to stand before them.

“ The Sicilians are a people unexperienced in war ; and yet,
 “ would they unite and combine together in their mutual defence,
 “ they might possibly even now be too hard for the Athenians. But
 “ then the Syracusans, abandoned as they are by the rest, and who
 “ already have seen their whole force defeated in battle, and who are

" blocked up in their own harbours by the enemy's fleet, will be
 " unable long to resist the great force of the Athenians which is al-
 " ready there. If therefore Syracuse be taken, all Sicily is van-
 " quished at a stroke, and Italy becometh instantly their prey. And
 " then the storm, which as I intimated before, was to be directed
 " against you from that quarter, will in a short time gather, and
 " come pouring down upon you.

" Let no one therefore imagine, that the end of your present de-
 " liberation is the safety of Sicily, when Peloponnesus itself will be
 " indangered, unless some measures of prevention be executed with
 " speed; — unless you send out a naval force for the preservation of
 " Sicily, so dextrously appointed, that the hands, who man the ships
 " and ply the oar, may on the instant of their landing become a
 " body of heavy-armed; and what in my judgment is better than
 " an army, a *citizen* of Sparta to take upon him the command, that
 " those who are ready he may discipline to service, and force such to
 " join as on choice would refuse their concurrence. For, by such a
 " step, those who are already your friends will be animated with
 " higher degrees of resolution; and those, who fluctuate at present,
 " will join you with a smaller sense of fear.

" It behoves you also to make war upon the Athenians at home
 " in a more declared and explicit manner, that the Syracusans, con-
 " vinced that you have their welfare at heart, may make a more ob-
 " stinate resistance, and the Athenians be rendered less able to send
 " reinforcements to their troops in Sicily.

" It behoves you further to raise fortifications at Decelæa in Attica;
 " a step, which the Athenians have ever most terribly apprehended,
 " and think that in that point alone you have not put their resolution
 " to its utmost trial in the present war. And *that* assuredly must be
 " pronounced the most effectual method of distressing an enemy, to
 " discover what it is he dreads most, and then know how to afflict
 " him in his most tender part. For it is a reasonable conclusion,
 " that

“ that they will tremble most at incidents which, should they take
 “ place, they are inwardly convinced must most sensibly affect them.
 “ As to the benefits, which you yourselves shall reap by fortifying De-
 “ cæa, and of what they shall be debarred, I shall pass over many,
 “ and only concisely point out the most important. — By this, all
 “ the natural commodities of the country will fall into your hands ;
 “ some, by way of booty ; the rest, by voluntary contributions.
 “ They will instantly be deprived of the profits of the silver-mines
 “ at Laurium, as well as of the rents of their estates, and the fees
 “ of their courts. The tributes from their dependents will also be
 “ paid with less punctuality ; since the latter shall no sooner perceive
 “ that you are earnestly bent on war, than they will shew an open
 “ disregard for Athens :

“ That those or any of these points be executed with dispatch and
 “ with vigour, dependeth, ye Lacedæmonians, upon yourselves
 “ alone. I can only confidently aver, that all are feasible ; and I
 “ think I shall not prove mistaken in my sentiments. I ought not to
 “ suffer in the opinion of any Lacedæmonian, tho’, once accounted
 “ the warmest of her patriots, I now strenuously join the most inve-
 “ terate foes of my country ; nor ought my sincerity to be suspected
 “ by any, as if I suited my words to the sharp resentments of an
 “ exile. I am driven from my country, through the malice of men
 “ who have prevailed against me ; but not from your service, if you
 “ hearken to my counsels. Your enmity is sooner to be forgiven,
 “ who have hurt your enemies alone, than theirs who by cruel
 “ treatment compel friends to be foes. My patriotism is far from
 “ thriving under the injustice I have suffered : it was merely an ef-
 “ fect of gratitude for that protection I once enjoyed from my
 “ country. Nor have I reason at present to imagine, that against
 “ my country I am now going to march, so much as to recover
 “ some country to myself, when at present I have none at all. And
 “ I judge the person to be a true lover of his country, — not him,

“ who exiled from it abandons himself without a struggle to his own
 “ iniquitous fate, but — who, from a fondness for it, leaves no pro-
 “ ject unattempted to recover it again.

“ As these are my sentiments, I may fairly, ye Lacedæmonians,
 “ insist upon your acceptance of my service without diffidence or
 “ fear, whatever dangers or whatever miseries may hereafter result.
 “ You well know the maxim, which universal consent will evince
 “ to be good ; that, if when an enemy I hurt you much, when I
 “ am now become your friend I can help you more. Nay, for the
 “ latter I am better qualified on this very account, that I am per-
 “ fectly acquainted with the state of Athens ; whereas, I was only
 “ able to conjecture at yours. And, as you are now met together to
 “ form resolutions on points of the highest importance, I conjure
 “ you without hesitation to carry your arms at once into Sicily and
 “ Attica ; to the end, that in the former, by the presence of a small
 “ part of your forces you may work out signal preservations, and at
 “ home pull down the present, and even the future growth of the
 “ Athenians ; that for ages to come yourselves may reap security
 “ and peace, and preside at the helm of united Greece, which will
 “ cheerfully acquiesce under your guidance, and pay you a free un-
 “ compelled obedience.”

*Resolved to
 succour the
 Syracusans.*

To this purpose Alcibiades spoke. And the Lacedæmonians, who
 had before some sort of intention to take the field against Athens, tho'
 hitherto they had protracted its execution, were now more than ever
 animated to it, when Alcibiades had given them such a detail of af-
 fairs whom they judged to have the clearest insight in them.
 Thereupon they turned their attention immediately on fortifying De-
 celæa, and sending out a body of succour for the present service of
 Sicily. They also appointed Gylippus the son of Cleandridas to go
 and take upon him the command at Syracuse, with orders, by concert-
 ing measures with the Syracusans and Corinthians, to draw up a
 plan

*Gylippus
 named for the
 command.*

plan for the most effectual and most ready conveyance of succours thither.

Gylippus accordingly issued out his orders to the Corinthians to attend him without loss of time at Asine with two ships, and also to expedite the equipment of the fleet which they designed for this service, and to keep them in readiness to sail when opportunity should require. Having so far concerted measures, the ambassadors departed from Lacedæmon.

The Athenian trireme also, dispatched from Sicily by the generals on that post to demand supplies of money and a body of horse, was by this time arrived at Athens. And the Athenians, on hearing their demands, drew up a decree, to send away supplies to that armament and a body of horsemen.

And here the winter ended; and the seventeenth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history, came also to an end.

Y E A R XVIII.

ON the earliest approach of the spring which led on the following summer, the Athenians in Sicily, hoisting from Catana, shewed themselves on the coast of Megara in Sicily, of which the Syracusans, having dispossessed the inhabitants in the time of Gelon the tyrant (as I have already related), continued masters of the soil. Having landed here, they ravaged the country; till approaching a fortress belonging to the Syracusans, and attempting it without success, they retired, some by land and the rest on board the fleet, into the river Tereas; from whence going again on shore, they ravaged the plains and set fire to the growing corn. They also fell in with a small party of Syracusans, some of whom they slew; and then erecting a trophy, went again on board. They next returned to Catana; and after victualling there, proceeded from thence with their whole force to the attack of Centoripa, a strong fort belonging to the Siculi; and having

Before Christ
414.

*Progress of the
Athenians in
Sicily.*

having made themselves masters of it by a capitulation, they stood away, burning down in their passage the corn of the Ineffæans and Hyblæans. Upon returning to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens, tho' without horses yet with all the proper furniture, as if they could be better supplied with the former in Sicily, — as also thirty archers mounted, and * three hundred talents of silver.

* 58125 l.

*Motions in
Greece.*

In the same spring, the Lacedæmonians also took the field against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonæ; but the shock of an earthquake being felt there, they again retired. — And after this, the Argives, making an irruption into the Thyreatis which borders upon themselves, took a vast booty from the Lacedæmonians, which was

† 4843 l. 15 s. fold for no less than * twenty-five talents.

And not long after in the same spring, the popular party at Thespiz assaulted those in power, but without success. And, tho' the Athenians marched away to their succour, some of them were apprehended, and others were obliged to take refuge at Athens.

*Defence
measures at
Syracuse.*

In the same summer, the Syracusans had no sooner received intelligence of the arrival of a body of horsemen amongst the Athenians, and the design of advancing immediately to assault them, than it occurred to their reflexions, that “ in case the Athenians could not
“ possess themselves of Epipolæ (a spot of ground which is only one
“ continued crag, and lies directly above the city of Syracuse) it
“ would be difficult to inclose them completely round with works of
“ circumvallation, even tho' they should be defeated in open battle.” They applied themselves therefore to the guard of all the approaches to Epipolæ, that the enemy might not on a sudden gain the eminence; for by other methods it was impossible for them to carry that post. Excepting those approaches, the rest of the tract is an impracticable steep, inclining gradually quite down to the city, and commanding the view of every thing within it. Hence therefore, because it riseth with a continual ascent, it was called by the Syracusans *Epipolæ*.

As

As Hermocrates and his colleagues had now formally taken upon them the command, the whole force of Syracuse marched out by break of day into a meadow on the banks of the Anapus to pass under review; where the first thing they did was to select seven hundred of the choicest men amongst the heavy-armed, to be commanded by Diomilus an exile from Andrus. These were appointed for the guard of Epipolæ, and to be ready for service, as they were always to keep in a body, on any sudden emergence. But the Athenians, who had mustered their forces on the preceding day, had stood away from Catana, and were come in the night undiscovered to the spot called Leon, which is distant * six or seven stadia from Epipolæ, where they disembarked their land-forces, and then sent their ships to lie in the station of Thapsus. Thapsus is a peninsula, joined to the main-land by a narrow isthmus and jutting out into the sea, at no great distance from the city of Syracuse, either by land or water. The naval force of the Athenians, having secured their station by raising a palisado across the isthmus, lay quiet in their posts. But the land-army, without loss of time, made a running march towards Epipolæ; and mounted by the pass of Euryalus, before the Syracusans, who were yet in the meadow busied in their review, discovered or were able to advance to prevent them. And now their whole force was in motion to dislodge them; each man with all possible alacrity, and more particularly the seven hundred commanded by Diomilus. But from the meadow to the nearest spot where they could come up with the enemy was a march of no less than * twenty-five stadia. To this it was owing, that the Syracusans came to the charge in a disorderly manner; and, being plainly repulsed in battle at Epipolæ, were forced to retire within the city. Diomilus also and about three hundred more lose their lives in this engagement.

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, having erected a trophy and given up the bodies of the slain under truce to the Syracusans, marched:

The Athenians land at Leon. Surprise Epipolæ. A battle.

Above half a mile.

** Two miles: and a half.*

The Athenians victorious.

marched down the next day in order of battle to the very gates of the city. But as the Syracusans refrained from sallying out against them, they again drew off; and raised a fort at Labdalum on the very steepest edge of Epipolæ looking towards Megara, which they intended as a repository for their baggage and money, whilst themselves might be called off either to fight or to carry on the works of a siege.

Soon after this they were joined by a body of three hundred Egestæan horse, and one hundred more consisting of Siculi and Naxians, and some others in their Alliance. The Athenian cavalry was in all two hundred and fifty. They had procured some horses from the Egestæans and Catanæans, and had purchased the rest: so that now they had got together a body of horse, amounting in all to six hundred and fifty.

The siege begins.

A garrison was no sooner settled in the fort of Labdalum than the Athenians approached to Tyche, where taking post they built a wall in *circle* with great expedition, and by the rapidity of their work struck consternation into the Syracusans. Upon this they sallied out, with a fixed design to hazard an engagement, as they saw the danger of dallying any longer. The armies on both sides were now beginning to face each other; but the Syracusan generals, observing that their own army was in disarray, and could not easily be formed into proper order, made them all wheel off again into the city, except a party of their horse. These, keeping the field, prevented the Athenians from carrying stones and straggling to any distance from their posts. But at length, one Athenian band of heavy-armed, supported by the whole body of their cavalry, attacked and put to flight these Syracusan horsemen. They made some slaughter amongst them, and erected a Trophy for this piece of success against the enemy's cavalry.

A skirmish.

The circumvallation begun.

On the day following, some of the Athenians began to raise a wall along the northern side of their *circle*; whilst others were employed

ployed in carrying stones and timber, which they laid down in heaps all along the place called Trogilus, near to the line marked out for the circumvallation, which was to reach by the shortest compass from the great harbour on one side to the sea on the other. But the Syracusans, who were principally guided by the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all thoughts of sallying out for the future with the whole strength of the city to give battle to the Athenians. It was judged more advisable to run along a wall in length, which should cut the line in which the Athenian works were designed to pass, and which (could they effect it in time) must entirely exclude the enemy from perfecting their circumvallation. Nay further, in case the enemy should come up in a body to interrupt the work, they might give them full employ with one division of their force, whilst another detachment might raise palisades to secure the approaches: at least, as the whole of the Athenian force must be drawn out to oppose them, they would be obliged to discontinue their own works. To raise therefore the projected work, they issued out of the city; and beginning at the foot of the city-wall from below the Athenian circle, they carried on from thence a transverse wall; cutting down the olive-trees in the sacred grove, of which they built wooden turrets to cover their work. The Athenian shipping was not yet come round from Thapsus into the great harbour, but the Syracusans continued masters of all the posts upon the sea; and consequently the Athenians were obliged to fetch up all necessary stores from Thapsus across the land.

*The Syracu-
sians raise a
counter-work.*

When it appeared to the Syracusans that all their palisades and the transverse wall were sufficiently compleated, in which the Athenians had given them no manner of interruption, as they were under apprehensions that should they divide their force they might be exposed to a defeat, and at the same time were ardently intent on perfecting their own circumvallation; — the Syracusans drew off

again into the city, leaving only one band of heavy-armed for the guard of their counter-wall.

*The Athenians
demolish it.*

In the next place, the Athenians cut off the pipes, which by subterraneous ducts conveyed the drinking-water into the city. And having further observed, that the Syracusans kept within their tents during the heat of the day, but that some had straggled into the town, whilst those posted at the palisades kept but a negligent guard; they picked out three hundred of their heavy-armed, and strengthening them with a choice party of their light-armed soldiers, ordered them to march with all possible speed and attack the counter-work. The rest of their force was to march another way, since headed by one of the generals it advanced towards the city, to employ the Syracusans in case they sallied; whilst the other detachment, headed by the other general, attacked the palisade, which covered the sally-port. Accordingly the three-hundred assault and carry the palisade, which those who were posted for its guard abandoned, and fled for shelter behind the works which inclosed Temenites. The pursuers however entered with them; but were no sooner got in, than they were again forcibly driven out by the Syracusans. And here some of the Argives, and a small number of Athenians were slain.

But now the whole army wheeling about demolished the counter-work, and pulled up the palisade. The piles of which it was composed, they carried off in triumph, and erected a trophy.

*And go on
with the cir-
cumvallation.*

The next morning the Athenians resumed their work of circumvallation, and continued it across the crag which is above the marsh and lies on the quarter of Epipolæ that looks towards the great harbour. This was the shortest cut for their circumvallation downwards, across the plain and the marsh, 'till it reached the harbour. Upon this, the Syracusans, issuing again, raised another palisade, beginning from the city, and stretching quite across the marsh. They also threw up an intrenchment along the palisade, intirely to prevent the Athenians

Athenians from continuing their works quite down to the sea. The latter, when they had perfected their work along the crag, are bent on demolishing the new palisade and intrenchment of the Syracusans. For this purpose, they had ordered their shipping to come about from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse. They themselves at the morning's dawn marched down from Epipolæ into the plain; and then crossing the marsh, where the mud was hardest and best able to bear, by the help of boards and planks which they laid upon the surface, they carry almost the whole length of the palisade and intrenchment early in the morning, and were soon after masters of the whole. This was not effected without a battle, in which the Athenians were again victorious. The routed Syracusans fled different ways; those, who had composed their right, towards the city; and those, who had composed their left, towards the river. But, with a view of intercepting the passage of the latter, the three hundred chosen Athenians marched with all speed to seize the bridge. The Syracusans, alarmed at this step, as this body consisted of the bulk of their horse, face about on *the three hundred*, and put them to flight, and then break in upon the right wing of the Athenians. By so unexpected a shock the first band in that wing was thrown into disorder. Lamachus, observing it, advanced to their support from the left, with a small party of archers that happened to be near him, and the whole body of the Argives. Having crossed a ditch which lay between, seconded only by a few, whilst the bulk of his party made a full stop, he is instantly slain¹, as were also five or six of those by whom he was accompanied. The Syracusans caught up

Another battle.

Lamachus killed.

¹ *Plutarch*, in the life of *Nicias*, circumstantiates the manner in which this old general lost his life in character. *Calli-* crates, a good soldier, but of great impetuosity, rode at the head of the Syracusan horse. Being challenged out by *Callicrates*, Lamachus alone engaged personally with him. Lamachus received the first wound; he then returned the blow, and dropped. His antagonist fell at the same time, and they both expired together.

their bodies with all possible expedition, and bore them off to a place of security on the other side of the river. They were in great measure obliged to make a precipitate retreat, since the rest of the Athenian army was now coming up to attack them.

But now, such of the Syracusans as had fled at first towards the city, having gained leisure to observe such turns in their favour, caught fresh courage from the sight; and forming again into order, stood their ground against that body of Athenians which faced them. They also send a detachment to attempt the *circle* on Epipolæ, concluding it to be unmanned for the present, and might at once be taken. This detachment in fact made itself master of the out-work, and demolished it for about ten *plethres* in length; but the *circle* itself was defended by Nicias from all their attempts. Nicias, being much out of order, had been left to repose himself within the *circle*. He therefore issued orders to his servants to set fire to all the machines and the timber which were lying before the wall: for he was convinced, that thus alone, in such a total want of hands for their defence any safety could be earned. The event answered his expectation; for, when the flames begun to mount, the Syracusans durst not any longer come near, but thought proper to desist and march away.

For now the Athenians, who by this time had chased the enemy from off the plain, were remounting the ascent to defend their *circle*; and, at the same instant of time, their fleet, conformable to the orders they had received, was standing into the great harbour. The Syracusans upon the high ground beheld the fight, which occasioned them and the whole Syracusan army to retire precipitately into the city; concluding themselves no longer able, without an augmentation of their present strength, to hinder the completion of the Athenian works quite down to the sea.

After

After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, and in pursuance of a truce delivered up their slain to the Syracusans, and received in exchange the body of Lamachus, and of those who fell with him.

The junction of their whole armament, both of their land and naval force, being now compleated, they began again, from Epipolæ and the crag, to invest the Syracusans with a double wall, which they were to continue quite down to the sea. The necessary provisions to supply their army, were brought in from all the coasts of Italy. Many also of the Siculi, who hitherto had stood aloof, declared now for the Athenians, and came into their alliance, who were further joined by three vessels of fifty oars from Hetruria.

The Athenians carry on their works.

All other points equally contributed to elevate their hopes. For the Syracusans had begun to despair of being able to sustain the siege, as they had no glimpse of any approaching succour from Peloponnesus. They were tossing to and fro amongst themselves some proposals for an accommodation, and had even sounded Nicias upon that head, who by the death of Lamachus was left invested with the sole command. Nothing definitive was however concluded, tho' (as might with reason be expected from men in high perplexity and besieged more straitly than ever) many proposals were made to him, and many more were agitated within the city. The distresses also, which environed them at present, struck into them mutual suspicions of one another. Nay, they even divested of their charge the generals who were in authority when these distresses came upon them, as if all was owing to their misconduct or treachery, and chose in their stead Heraclides and Eucles and Tellias.

The Syracusans are sadly distressed.

In the mean time, Gylippus the Lacedæmonian and the ships from Corinth were come up to Leucas, designing with the utmost expedition to pass over from thence to Sicily. But terrible accounts came thick upon them here; and all agreed in broaching the same untruth that "Syracuse was compleatly invested on all sides." Gylippus upon this gave up all hopes of saving Sicily; but, having the

Gylippus is coming to their succour.

the preservation of Italy still at heart, he and Pythen the Corinthian, with the small squadron at hand consisting only of two Laconic and two Corinthian vessels, crossed over the Ionian gulf with all possible dispatch to Tarentum. The Corinthians, besides their own ten now fitting out, were to man two belonging to the Leucadians, and three more belonging to the Ambraciots, and follow them as soon as possible.

*He arrives at
Tarentum.*

The first step of Gylippus now arrived at Tarentum, was, to go in quality of ambassador to Thuria, claiming privilege for it as his father had been a denizon of that *State*; but finding himself unable to gain their concurrence, he weighed from thence, and stood along the coast of Italy. But in the Terinéan gulf he met with a hard gale of wind, which in this gulf when in a northerly point blows generally with great and lasting violence, and now drove him from his course, and blew him out into the open sea; where he stood again the rebuff of another violent storm, but at length reached Tarentum. He there laid his vessels on ground which had been damaged in the foul weather, and refitted them for service.

*Nicias flights
him.*

When Nicias found that he was in his passage, he betrayed an open contempt of so trifling a squadron, as the Thuriens had already done before him. It appeared to him, that so petty a squadron could only be fitted out for piratical cruizes; and therefore he sent out no detachments to hinder his approach.


*Motions in
Greece.*

About the same time of this summer, the Lacedæmonians, with their own domestic forces augmented by the junction of their allies, made an irruption into Argos, and ravaged great part of that territory. The Athenians put out to sea with thirty sail to succour the Argives, which procedure was beyond all denial the clearest violation of the treaties between them and the Lacedæmonians. Hitherto, they had only exercised robberies upon them from Pylus; and making descents rather on any other coast of Peloponnesus than Laconia itself, had left it to the Argives and Mantinéans to make war against them.

Nay,

Nay, tho' the Argives had frequently pressed them, that with an armed force they would barely land on the Laconic coast, and after committing never so small ravage in their company, immediately to retire, they had positively refused. But now, under the command of Pythodorus and Læspodias and Demaratus, they made a descent at Epidaurus-Limera, and Prasia, committed large devastation on the adjacent country, and afforded the Lacedæmonians a most specious and justifiable pretext to act offensively against Athens.

When the Athenian fleet was sailed homewards from Argos, and the Lacedæmonians also were withdrawn, the Argives broke into Phliasia, where they laid waste part of the Lacedæmonian territory, and made some slaughter of the people, and then returned to Argos.



THE
HISTORY
OF
The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE SEVENTH.

VOL. II.

R r

C O N T E N T S.

THE siege of Syracuse is carried on so vigorously by Nicias, that the Syracusans think of a surrender. At this crisis arrive the Peloponnesian succours and Gylippus the Spartan, which giveth a new turn to the siege. A counterwork is raised to stop the Athenian circumvallation: Engagements ensue. Nicias is now in a bad situation. He sendeth home a succinct detail of affairs by letter: A reinforcement is ordered him from Athens under the command of Demosthenes. The Lacedæmonians resolve to renew the war at home.

Year XIX. Attica invaded, and Decelæa fortified. — A naval engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, in which the Athenians are superior. In the mean time Athens is sadly distressed by the enemy. — A massacre at Mycaleffus. — A sea-fight on the coast of Achaia. — A second engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, to the advantage of the Syracusans. The reinforcement arriveth from Athens. Demosthenes attempts Epipolæ, without success. Debates about raising the siege, which at length is resolved. The instant they are embarking the moon is eclipsed; upon which superstition detaineth them. The Syracusans attack them both by land and by water. The Athenians are worsted in every engagement; at length lose all their shipping. They retreat by land, are pursued, sadly distressed, and totally subdued. Nicias and Demosthenes are taken prisoners and put to death.



THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

B O O K VII.

GYLIPPUS and Pythen, when they had refitted their ships, *Gylippus sails*
 stood along the coast from Tarentum to Locri Epizephryi. *for Syracuse.*

Here they received more certain information, that Syracuse was not yet compleatly invested, and that a succour of force might be thrown into the town by the way of Epipolæ. They went next to consultation — whether “ keeping Sicily on the right they should
 “ endeavour at all hazards to enter Syracuse by sea ; — or, with Si-
 “ cily on their left should steer first to Himera ; from whence, at-
 “ tended by the forces of that *State* and whatever additional strength
 “ they could persuade to join them, should march thither over-land.”
 It was determined, to go first to Himera, especially as the four Athe-
 nian vessels were not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias at last,
 upon the certain intelligence that they were now at Locri, had

*Lands in
Sicily.*

detached to observe them. To be beforehand therefore with this detachment, they pass through the straits, and having touched only at Rhegium and Messene, arrive at Himera. Whilst in the latter place, they prevailed upon the Himeréans to concur with them in the war, and not only to intrust their troops under their command, but even to supply with arms such of the mariners as had navigated the vessels, and were therefore unprovided : For, their shipping they had drawn ashore, and laid up at Himera. The Selinuntians also, by a messenger dispatched on purpose, they had summoned to meet them with all their united strength at a determined place upon their route. The Geloans also and some of the Siculi promised to attend with a party, tho' by no means considerable. The latter of these were disposed better than ever to the service, since Archonides was lately dead (who reigning over some of the Siculi seated in these parts, and having a great influence over them, had declared for the Athenians ;) and since Gylippus appeared to them to be sent from Lacedæmon with a full purpose to do them service.

And now Gylippus, — having assembled an army, which consisted of about seven hundred of those who navigated or came on board his vessels, and for whom he had provided arms ; of heavy-armed and light-armed Himeréans amounting together to a thousand men, and one hundred horsemen ; of some light-armed Selinuntians ; a small party of Geloan horse ; and a body of Siculi, in all a thousand, — began his march for Syracuse.

The Corinthians, in the mean time, were sending out the other ships, as fast as they could equip them for the service, to follow with all possible expedition from Leucas : And Gongyplus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who with a single ship set out last from Leucas, is the first who arrives at Syracuse ; and that, but a small space of time before the approach of Gylippus. Finding therefore upon his arrival, that the Syracusans were going forthwith to hold a public assembly, in which the terms of putting an end to the war were de-
signed

signed to be adjusted ; he dissuaded them from so precipitate a step, and reanimated their drooping resolutions by strong assurances, that “ other ships would instantly arrive ;” and, that “ Gylippus the “ son of Cleandridas was sent thither by the Lacedæmonians to take “ upon him the command.” The Syracusans accordingly resumed their spirits, and immediately marched out of the town with the whole of their strength, in order to meet Gylippus : For by this time they had received intelligence, that he was actually approaching.

Gylippus, upon his route, had made himself master of Iëgas, a fortress belonging to the Siculi ; and now, at the head of his army drawn up in order of battle, he comes up to Epipolæ. Having ^{Arrives at Syracuse.} mounted by the pass of Euryalus, as the Athenians had done on their first approach, he marched in conjunction with the Syracusans toward the Athenian circumvallation. He happened to arrive in that critical juncture, when the Athenians had compleatly finished * seven ^{* About $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile.} or eight stadia of the double wall extending to the great harbour, when in consequence but a very small part remained incomplete, and on which they were labouring with their highest application. On the other side of their circle towards Trogilus, the stones for compleating their work had been laid ready in heaps almost down to the beach, and some parts of their work on that side stood but half compleated ; tho’ others had received the finishing hand. To such extremity of danger were the Syracusans now reduced.

Gylippus and the Syracusans coming thus suddenly upon them, the Athenians at first were struck with consternation, but formed however in order of battle to give them a reception. But Gylippus, having ordered his forces to halt, dispatcheth a herald to the Athenians, proclaiming that “ in case they would evacuate Sicily “ within the space of five days with their arms and baggage, he “ would readily grant them a truce.” Such offers they received in a contemptuous

contemptuous manner¹; and, disdaining to return an answer, ordered the herald to move off. And now both sides were busy in marshalling and disposing their men for battle.

But Gylippus, who had made an observation that the Syracusans were in great confusion, and could not easily be formed into proper order, made his army fall back into more open ground. Nicias gave them no disturbance whilst they were making this motion, but, without advancing, stood close under his works. And when Gylippus found, that the enemy would not move forwards to attack him, he made his forces wheel off to the high ground called Temenites, where they reposed themselves for the night.

The next morning he drew up the greatest part of his army before the works of the Athenians, to prevent their sending out succours to more distant posts. For he had detached a party to attack the fort of Labdalum, which he carried by storm, and put all the garrison found within it to the sword. Labdalum was so situated in regard to the Athenian posts, that *they* could have no view of what was transacting there. The same day also an Athenian trireme, as it was entering the harbour, is taken by the Syracusans.

*Counterwork
of the Syra-
cusans.*

After so much success, the Syracusans and allies set about raising a counterwork along Epipolæ. Beginning at the city, they carried it upwards towards the single wall which had an oblique inclination; and intended, that in case the Athenians could not stop its completion, it should intirely exclude them from perfecting their circumvallation. The Athenians, having perfected their works to the sea, had

¹ Nicias (says *Plutarch*) disdained to return an answer. But some of his soldiers laughed outright, and asked, "If at the arrival of a mantle and staff from Sparta the Syracusans were become so full of spirits, as to despise the Athenians, who

" had lately given up to the Lacedæmonians three hundred of their countrymen who had been their prisoners, all of them better soldiers, and who combed their hair too much better than Gylippus."

now

now remounted the eminence. And, as some parts of their work were but weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night, and was marching to demolish *those*. But the Athenians, who passed the night without their works, were no sooner aware of it, than they also marched away to defend them. Upon which, Gylippus finding them alarmed desisted, and made his army retreat to their former posts. This however occasioned the Athenians to raise those parts of their wall to a greater height, and to take the guard of it upon themselves, as amongst the body of their confederates they had divided the guard of the rest of their works, allotting a proper charge to each.

Nicias also judged it expedient to fortify the spot called Plemmyrium. Plemmyrium is a point of land over-against Syracuse, which jutting out before the great harbour, renders the mouth of it very narrow. Nicias fortifies Plemmyrium. "If this were fortified," he thought "the importation of necessaries for the army would be better secured: Because then, from a smaller distance, they could at any time command the harbour where the Syracusan shipping lay; and, should it be their ill-fortune to be straitned by sea, might easier fetch in supplies, than in the present station of their fleet at the bottom of the great harbour." Now also he began, with greater attention than before, to study how to distress them by sea; convinced, since the arrival of Gylippus, how little room he had to hope for success by land. To this spot therefore he ordered his fleet, and drew his land-forces down, and immediately erected three forts. In these the greatest part of the baggage was laid up; and the transports and tight ships were immediately stationed there. To this project however, the havoc that afterwards ensued amongst the seamen is principally to be ascribed. For as they suffered in this station under scarcity of water, and the mariners were frequently obliged to fetch both water and wood from a distance, since near at hand they were not to be had; the Syracusan horse, who were masters of the country, slaughtered them

them in abundance. The Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at their fortress of Olympiæum, to bridle the marauding excursions of the enemy at Plemmyrium.

Now also Nicias received intelligence that the other Corinthian ships were in their passage. To watch their approach he therefore detacheth twenty sail, who were appointed to cruize about Locri, and Rhegium, and the capes of Sicily, in order to intercept them.

*The active
proceedings of
Gylippus.*

Gylippus, in the mean time, was employed in building the counterwall along Epipolæ, making use of the stones which the Athenians had laid ready in heaps for the continuation of their own work. It was also his daily custom, to draw up the Syracusans and allies in order of battle, and lead them out beyond the point of the counterwall, which obliged the Athenians to draw up likewise to observe their motions. And when Gylippus judged he could attack them with advantage, he instantly advanced; and the charge being given and received, a battle ensued in the space between their respective works; but so narrow, that no use could be made of the Syracusan and confederate horse. The Syracusans and allies were accordingly defeated. They fetched off their slain by truce; and the Athenians erected a trophy. But Gylippus, having assembled the army round him, thought proper to make this declaration in the presence of them all;—that, “the defeat was not to be charged on their want of
“bravery, but on his own indiscretion: He had deprived them of
“the service of their own cavalry and darters, by ranging his battle
“in too confined a spot between the works: that he would now
“again lead them out in a more judicious manner.” He exhorted them therefore “to imprint it strong on their remembrance, that as
“in real strength they were not inferior, it would be intolerably disgraceful, if they, who to a man were Peloponnesians and Dorians,
“should not manifest themselves so resolutely brave, as to conquer
“and drive out of their country a parcel of Ionians, and islanders,
and

“ and a promiscuous rabble of hungry adventurers.” Having addressed them thus, he lay on the watch to seize a proper opportunity; and, as soon as he had gained it, led them on again to the charge.

It was the opinion of Nicias, and in general of all the Athenians, that “ tho’ it was not their own interest to bring on an engagement, “ yet it highly concerned them to put a stop to the counterwork, “ which the enemy was raising to hinder their progress:” For by this time the wall of the Syracusans had only not over-reached the extreme point, to which the Athenians had brought their circumvallation; “ And should it be extended further, it would give the “ enemy this double advantage; — a certainty of conquest, when- “ ever they thought proper to fight; and a discretionary power, not “ to fight at all.” Determined by these considerations, they drew out in order to give the Syracusans battle.

Gylippus soon began the engagement. *An engagement.* He had now drawn up his heavy-armed without the works, and at a greater distance from them than before. He had posted the cavalry and the darters on a wide and open spot, yet unoccupied by the works on either side, and posted them so that they flanked the Athenians. In the ardor of the engagement, the cavalry broke in upon the left wing of the Athenians, which was ranged against them, and intirely routed them. In consequence of which the remainder of the army was soon defeated by the Syracusans, and in the greatest disorder retired for shelter behind their works. And night no sooner came on, than the Syracusans without loss of time began to carry forwards their own work, which they soon extended beyond the Athenian circumvallation; by which they gained this great point, that they could no longer be invested on all sides by the Athenians: and the latter, tho’ masters in the field, were henceforwards effectually stopped from perfecting their circumvallation.

*More succours
arrive at Sy-
racuse.*

After this, twelve ships of the Corinthians, and Ambraciots; and Leucadians, the remainder of the squadron designed for this service, having given the Athenian guard-ships the slip, came into the harbour of Syracuse: They were commanded by Herafinides a Corinthian. By these the Syracusans were now assisted in carrying on their work, 'till it was compleatly joined to the transverse-wall.

Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily, in order to promote the common cause; and to procure additional forces for the services both of land and sea; and to solicit the concurrence of such *States*, as hitherto had manifested either no great inclination or an open repugnance to join in the present war. Other embassadors also were dispatched by the Syracusans and Corinthians to Lacedæmon and Corinth; instructed, to solicit a speedy reinforcement, to be transported into Sicily either in trading-vessels, or in boats, or by any other expeditious methods, since the Athenians had also sent for reinforcements from Athens. The Syracusans also assigned complements of men to their shipping, and sedulously trained them to the service of the sea, as designing on this element also to try their fortune; nay, they laboured with alacrity and application, to increase their strength in all respects.

*Nicias sends
his report to
Athens.*

Nicias being sensible of this and conscious that the strength of the enemy and his own inability became daily greater, dispatched his messengers also to Athens, a custom he had ever observed and upon all occasions, to report the particulars of his proceedings. But, in his present situation, it was more requisite than ever; since now he was convinced, that he was environed with dangers; and, unless with the utmost expedition they either recalled their troops, or sent them another and that a strong reinforcement, no hopes of preservation remained. Apprehensive further, that the persons he should send, either through want of proper address, or through defect of courage, or a passion to sooth the populace, might suppress the truth; he sent a true account of things in a letter wrote with his own hand.

By

By this method he concluded, that his own sentiments of things could not be concealed or invalidated by messengers ; that the Athenians would be informed of the truth, and might accordingly adjust their resolutions. These messengers therefore departed ; instructed, to deliver the letter which he intrusted to their care, and what further they were to add by word of mouth. Nicias in the mean time kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious to guard his shattered forces from annoyance, than to plunge into fresh and spontaneous dangers.

In the close of this summer, Euction an Athenian general marched, in conjunction with Perdiccas and a large body of Thracians, against Amphipolis ; yet could not render himself master of that city. But then, setting out from Imeréum, he brought his triremes about into the Strymon, and blocked it up on the side of the river. And here this summer ended.

In the beginning of winter, the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens, where they gave such accounts of things as he had charged them to give, and resolved such questions as were asked them. They also delivered his letter, which the clerk of the *State* stood up and read aloud to the Athenians. The contents were these :

“ ATHENIANS,

“ THE many letters from time to time received from me have Letter of Nicias.
 “ given you all proper information, so far as relates to past transactions. And it is now high time you should be made acquainted
 “ with our present situation, that your councils may be adjusted in a
 “ proper manner.

“ After therefore we had defeated in several engagements the Syracusans, against whom you sent us out ; and, when we had
 “ thrown up those works before their city, within which we are this
 “ moment lying ; Gylippus the Lacedæmonian came upon us at the
 “ head of an army brought from Peloponnesus, and augmented by

" the troops of some Sicilian *States*. In the first battle he is routed
 " by us ; but in the last, pressed hard by their numerous cavalry and
 " darters, we have been forced to retire within our intrenchments.
 " Being therefore obliged by the superior numbers of the enemy to
 " discontinue our circumvallation, we are this moment lying upon
 " the defensive. Nor indeed are we able to draw out our whole force
 " for action, as detachments of our heavy-armed are remotely em-
 " ployed in the guard of our works. They have further run up a
 " single wall to cut our lines ; so that there remains no longer a pos-
 " sibility for us to compleat the circumvallation, unless, reinforced
 " by a numerous body of troops, we are enabled to assault and de-
 " molish the counterwork. And in consequence of this, we, who
 " designed to besiege others, may with much more propriety be said
 " to suffer a siege ourselves, at least by land. For we dare not make
 " any distant excursions into the adjacent country for fear of the
 " horse.

" What is more ; they have sent ambassadors to Peloponnesus, to
 " solicit reinforcements. Gylippus also is making the tour of the
 " Sicilian *States*, with a view to obtain the concurrence of such as
 " are at present neutral, and to prevail with the rest to intrust their
 " additional levies for the service both of land and sea under his com-
 " mand. And, according to my present intelligence, they are fully
 " bent to attack at one and the same time our intrenchments with
 " their land-forces by land, and with their ships by sea. And, tho'
 " I say *by SEA*, let not the sound be too terrible in your ears. For
 " they know very well the present state of our navy ; which, tho' at
 " first a most compleat equipment for the cleanness of the ships and
 " the health and vigor of the seamen, yet, at present hath scarce a
 " ship which is not leaky, so long have they been necessitated to
 " keep the sea, whilst their hands have daily been mouldering away.
 " For, in fact, we have no opportunity to lay them dry and careen
 " them ; as we are under continual apprehensions of being attacked
 " by

“ by the ships of the enemy, equal nay superior in number to our
“ own. That they will attempt it, we have most certain grounds
“ to believe ; but, the seasons of doing it are intirely in their own
“ option ; which also enables them to preserve their vessels ever fit
“ for service, as they are not necessitated to be continually in action
“ to strike an awe into others. Nay, we should hardly be able to do
“ the like ; tho’ the number of our shipping was much larger than
“ it is ; or, tho’ we were exempted from the necessity we now
“ lie under of keeping guard with them all. For, in case we make
“ the least abatement of our vigilance, we should be distressed for
“ want of necessaries ; which even now we fetch in with difficulty
“ in the very teeth of the enemy. To this must be ascribed the
“ great waste of our seamen, which hath already been made ; and,
“ whose number lessens from day to day ; since, obliged to fetch in
“ wood and water and forage from remote places, they are inter-
“ cepted by the enemy’s horse. Even our servants, who have no-
“ thing to dread from our ruined condition, desert us daily. And
“ such foreigners, as were forced on board our fleet, depart with im-
“ punity to their own cities ; whilst others, who were allured to the
“ service by the greatness of our pay, and imagined they were ra-
“ ther come to plunder than to fight ; when, contrary to their hopes,
“ they behold the enemy possessed of a numerous fleet, and making
“ a brave resistance in every quarter ; some catch at the least pretext
“ to go over to the enemy, and others make shift to sculk away —
“ never again to be retrieved in so wide a country as Sicily. Nay,
“ some of those, who having attended us hither from Athens, and
“ since prevailed with the captains of triremes to accept of the ser-
“ vice of Hyrcanian slaves in redemption of their own, have by this
“ means subverted our naval discipline.

“ I am writing to men well-inlightened in naval affairs and per-
“ fectly convinced, that the flower of an equipment is but of short
“ duration ; and, how few of those on board are skilled at steering
“ the

“ the vessel, or managing the oar. But what gives me most acute
“ vexation is this—that, tho’ commander in chief, I am utterly
“ unable to put a stop to these disorders; since your tempers, Athe-
“ nians, are hard to be managed; and am quite at a loss, from
“ whence to repair the waste that hath been made of our seamen.
“ The enemy have abundant resources every where at hand, whereas
“ necessity points out only *one* to us—that place, from whence we
“ had who now remain, and who are for ever lost. For Naxos and
“ Catana, the cities which still persevere in our alliance, are unable
“ to recruit us. And should the enemy get one circumstance more
“ to take a turn in their favour, that the towns of Italy, which at
“ present supply us with food, deterred by the discovery of our low
“ condition and the non-appearance of a reinforcement from Athens,
“ go over to the Syracusans; the war will be finished to their hands
“ without costing them a blow, and we shall be left to the mercy
“ of the enemy.

“ I could have sent you much more pleasing accounts of things;
“ but none, so proper to give you a clear idea of the posture of your
“ affairs here; and such, as you ought to have, before you proceed
“ to deliberate upon them. And at the same time, as I am by no
“ means a stranger to Athenian tempers, since I know you to be fond
“ of hearing what will give you pleasure, but are afterwards inflamed
“ with anger if any article in event drops short of your expectation;
“ I thought it highly concerned my own safety, to tell you nothing
“ but the truth. And let me here conjure you, to entertain no re-
“ sentment against either the private soldiers or commanders; since,
“ in labouring those points, which were the principal ends of the ex-
“ pedition, they have fully done their duty.

“ But, since all Sicily is in arms against us; and, since our ene-
“ mies expect a reinforcement from Peloponnesus; resolve without
“ loss of time, that, as your forces are not sufficient to keep the
“ enemy in play, they must either be recalled, or be reinforced
“ with

“ with a body not inferior to the first equipment, with both a land
 “ and a naval force, and a large pecuniary supply. For myself, I
 “ must insist, that a successor be sent me ; since I am quite disabled
 “ by a nephritic disorder from continuing in the command. And I
 “ think I have just title to expect my dismissal from you ; since, in
 “ the vigor of my life, I have been intrusted by you with several
 “ commands, in which I did you some signal services.

“ Whatever you determine, put it in execution on the first ap-
 “ proach of spring ; and, above all things, keep clear of delays.
 “ For the ready supplies, given the enemy in Sicily, will soon enable
 “ them to act ; and those expected from Peloponnesus, tho’ they must
 “ be longer in coming up, yet depend upon it, that unless you exert
 “ your utmost vigilance, some of them will steal hither as be-
 “ fore through all your guards, and some will infallibly be here be-
 “ fore you.”

Such were the advices brought them by the letter of Nicias. The Athenians however, when they had heard it read, would not so far comply with the request of Nicias as to give him his dismissal ; but, that afflicted as he was in body the whole burden of affairs might not lie too heavily upon him, they appointed two persons already in Sicily, Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him in the command, ’till those, who by the public vote should be joined with him in the commission, can arrive. They also decreed him a reinforcement, consisting both of a land and naval force, to be levied amongst the Athenians upon the *roll* and their dependents ; and for colleagues to share in the command, Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon, by order, began his passage for Sicily about the winter-solstice, at the head of ten sail of ships and with a supply of * twenty talents of silver ; im-
 powered further, to assure them, that “ a large reinforcement will
 “ soon come up, as the *State* had seriously interested itself in their
 “ welfare.”

A reinforcement ordered him.

* 3875 l. Sterling.

"welfare." Demosthenes stayed behind to forward the equipment; and was intended to set out on the first approach of spring. He was busied, in assembling together their contingents from the dependent *States*, and in levying amongst them both money, and shipping, and soldiers.

The Athenians further send out twenty sail to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, and to take care that no one passed over from Corinth and Peloponnesus into Sicily. For the Corinthians, upon the arrival of the ambassadors, and the advice they brought, that "the face of affairs was much altered for the better;" priding themselves in the reflexion, that their former equipment had arrived in time to contribute to this turn, became now more alert than ever; and got transports in readiness to carry over a body of their own heavy-armed into Sicily, whilst the Lacedæmonians were intent on doing the same from other parts of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians, further, manned out five and twenty sail; designing to hazard an engagement with the guard-ships stationed at Naupactus, or to disable the Athenians who lay there from giving their transports the least molestation, by keeping their own triremes ready ranged in order of battle, in the very face of that squadron.

The Lacedæmonians resolve to prosecute the war in Greece.

The Lacedæmonians also were preparing for an invasion of Attica, in pursuance of a former resolution, and in compliance further with the pressing instances of both Syracusans and Corinthians. They had no sooner heard of the reinforcement intended to be sent by the Athenians to Sicily, than by making a diversion they designed to stop its execution. Alcibiades also continued warmly importuning them to execute his plan of fortifying Decelæa, and to proceed briskly with the war. But the motives, which at this present juncture animated the Lacedæmonians most, were, that the Athenians, if engaged in a double war both against themselves and against the Sicilians, must become a much more expeditious conquest; and further, the Athenians were the first aggressors in violating treaties. In the former war,

war, they were well convinced, the first offence was chargeable on their own heads; because the Thebans had surpris'd Plataea, whilst treaties were in fact subsisting. Nay, contrary to an express stipulation in a preceeding treaty, that "arms should never be taken up against the party which was willing to abide by a judicial determination," they themselves had refused to submit to a trial, tho' claimed by the Athenians. To a conduct so ungenerous they concluded that their ill success in the war ought fairly to be imputed; and reflected with self-accusations, not only on the calamity they had suffered at Pylus, but on all their other losses in every quarter of the war. But now, since the Athenians with an equipment of thirty sail had committed devastations at Epidaurus, at Prasæ, and at other places; and continued to infect their dominions by robberies from Pylus; nay, as often as disputes had intervened about the intent of articles in the last treaty, in which the Lacedæmonians appealed to a judicial determination, the others had haughtily refused it; — concluding hence, that the Athenians were become as guilty aggressors now as themselves had been on the former occasion; with chearful presages of success, they determin'd for war. In order to it, they demanded this winter from their allies their contingents of iron, and got all the needful materials in readiness to execute their plan of fortification. Resolved at the same time to transport an aid to Sicily in vessels of burden, they began to levy it at home, and exacted the quotas of augmentation from their confederates. And thus the winter ended; and the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history, came also to an end.

Y E A R XIX.

The following spring no sooner approach'd, than at an earlier date than on any former occasion the Lacedæmonians and allies invaded Attica; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæ-

*Before Christ
413.
Attica invaded.*

Vol. II.

T t

monians,

*Fortifications
at Decelæa.*

** About twelve
miles.*

*More forces
sent to Sicily.*

monians, had the command of the army. At first they ravaged the country, particularly the plains; and this being done, having allotted out the work in portions to the several States, they set out about fortifying Decelæa. Now Decelæa is distant at most but * one hundred and twenty stadia from the city of Athens, and lies at the same distance or very little more from Bœotia. But in the plain, and on the finest spot of ground, from whence effectually to annoy them, was their fortress raised; and might be seen from the very walls of Athens.

In this manner the Peloponnesians and allies erected a fortress within Attica itself; whilst, in the same portion of time, their friends in Peloponnesus embarked a body of heavy-armed on board their transports, and sent them off for Sicily. For this service the Lacedæmonians picked out from the very best of the Helots and of those citizens of Sparta who were newly enfranchised, from both together six hundred heavy-armed; and appointed Heccritus, a *Spartan*, to command them. And the Bœotians sent three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xeno and Nikon of Thebes, and Hegesander of Thespiæ. These were *first* embarked at Tænarus in Laconia, and thence put out to sea.

Soon after these, the Corinthians sent away five hundred heavy-armed; some, from Corinth itself; others, hired from the Arcadians; and appointed Alexarchus a Corinthian to command them. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred heavy-armed along with the Corinthians, and at their head Sargeus a Sicyonian.

But the five and twenty sail of Corinthians, which lunched out to sea in the depth of winter, lay ranged in an opposite station to the twenty Attic at Naupactus, to give leisure for the embarkation of the heavy-armed on board the transports from Peloponnesus. On this account, principally, they were manned and fitted out to sea; that they might divert the attention of the Athenians from the transport-fleet that was now putting out, and fasten it wholly upon the hostile appearance of these triremes.

In

In the mean time the Athenians, even during the fortifications in hand at Decelæa and at the earliest approach of spring, sent out thirty sail to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus. His instructions were further, to touch at Argos, and to summon them, in conformity to the treaty of Alliance, to embark a body of heavy-armed on board the fleet. *Athenian proceedings.*

Demosthenes also, according to promise, they sent away for Sicily, with a numerous fleet, consisting of sixty ships of Athens and five of Chios, on board of which were twelve hundred *enrolled* Athenians, and as large a number of islanders as with the utmost industry they had been able to draw together. They had also amassed, from their other confederates subject to Athens, all manner of supplies they were able to furnish for carrying on the war with vigour. But Demosthenes was further instructed, to sail at first in company with Charicles, and assist him in the cruize on the coasts of Laconia. Demosthenes therefore, having stood over to Ægina, continued there; till the remainder of his force, which was yet behind, had compleatly joined him, and Charicles had taken on board the Argive auxiliaries. *Demosthenes sails with the reinforcement.*

About the same time in this spring, Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, at the head of as large a force as he had been able to collect from the several *States*, with whom his persuasions had been effectual; and, having convened the Syracusans, he told them that — “ they ought to man out as large a number of shipping as they possibly could, and try their fortune in a naval engagement: such a step, he had reason to hope, might be attended with consequences which would amply compensate the danger, and invigorate the war.” *Gylippus.*

These instances of Gylippus were well seconded by Hermocrates, who took uncommon pains to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians by sea. — “ The latter he told them, were far from enjoying their naval skill as an hereditary right, or a privilege from time immemorial exclusively their own; In fact they were by

“ nature landmen much more than the Syracusans; and necessity
“ alone, in the Medish invasion, had forced them to try their fortune
“ at sea : By enterprising men, as the Athenians were, such as were
“ most daring in opposing them, must needs be regarded as the most
“ formidable enemies. True — *they* had been used to intimidate
“ their neighbours, not by a real superiority of strength but by their
“ daring enterprising genius; and now, by the same methods, *them-*
“ *selves* might become formidable even to Athenians.” He assured
them, “ for his own part he was perfectly convinced, that the Syra-
“ cusans, if by an effort of bold resolution they would on a sudden
“ attack the Athenian fleet, might reap more benefit from the terror
“ which such a step would strike upon the foe, than could accrue to
“ the Athenians from their superior skill when compared with Syra-
“ cusan inexperience.” He pressed them therefore “ to try their
“ fortune by sea, and to bid adieu to fear.”

Thus animated by Gylippus, and by Hermocrates, and by others, the Syracusans were eagerly bent on action by sea, and manned out their fleet. And when the whole was ready for service, Gylippus, by favour of the night, at the head of his land-army marched down to the forts at Plemmyrium, intending to assault them on the land-side. The triremes of the Syracusans at the same instant of time, as had been concerted beforehand, to the number of thirty-five, are sailing up out of the great harbour; whilst forty-five were going about out of the lesser harbour where their dock lay. The latter went round, designing to compleat their junction with the other squadron; and then in a body to stand against Plemmyrium, that the Athenians on both sides might be thrown into confusion. The Athenians lost no time, but instantly manned out sixty vessels. With twenty-five of the number they engaged the thirty-five Syracusan in the great harbour; with the rest they went to meet the other squadron, that was coming about from the dock. A smart engagement immediately ensued in the mouth of the great harbour. The dispute

dispute was a long time obstinately maintained ; one side exerting themselves to clear the passage, but the other to obstruct it.

In the mean time Gylippus — as the Athenians posted at Plemmy- *A naval action, and Plemmy- rium recovered.*
rium had flocked down to the sea-side, and with their utmost attention were looking at the battle on the water — Gylippus seizes the opportunity ; and, no sooner had the morning dawned, than to the great surprise of the enemy he attacks the forts. He first makes himself master of the largest of the three, and afterwards carries the two lesser, the defendants of which, seeing the largest so easily taken, had abandoned their posts. Nay, on the surprisal of the first, those who had manned it, throwing themselves on board the boats and a transport that lay at hand, found no small difficulty in getting away to the camp. For, as the Syracusans had now the better of the engagement with their squadron in the great harbour, they detached one of their nimblest triremes to pursue the fliers. But at the time the other two forts were carried, the Syracusans were plainly vanquished, which gave them who abandoned the last an opportunity to sail away without obstruction. For that Syracusan squadron, that was engaged before the harbour's mouth, having forced their way through the Athenian fleet, by sailing forwards in a disorderly manner and continually running foul one upon another gave the Athenians an opportunity to regain the day. For this squadron they soon routed, and afterwards *that* within the harbour by which they had been vanquished. They also sunk eleven ships of the enemy, and made a slaughter of all their crews, those of three ships excepted, to whom they granted quarter ; and all this, with the loss only of three ships on their own side. Having afterwards drawn ashore the shatters of the Syracusan fleet, and piled them into a trophy on the little isle before Plemmyrium, they retired to their main incampment.

Thus unsuccessful were the Syracusans in their naval engagement. They had carried however the forts at Plemmyrium ; and, to signalize each of their acquisitions, they erected three several trophies.

One

One also of the two forts that were taken last they levelled with the ground ; but the other two they repaired, and garrisoned.

In this surprisal of the forts many were slain, and many were made prisoners, and a great stock of wealth repositied there became the prize of the enemy. For as the Athenians had made use of these forts by way of magazine, much wealth belonging to merchants and corn in abundance were found within, much also of the stores belonging to the captains of the ships of war ; inasmuch as forty masts for triremes and other materials of refitment had been laid up there, and three triremes were hauled ashore to be careened. Nay, this surprisal of Plemmyrium was one of the chief, if not the greatest source of all the distress which the Athenian army suffered in the sequel. For no longer was the sea open to them for the secure importation of necessary supplies. From this time the Syracusans rushed upon them from thence, and awed all their motions. The convoys could no more get in without fighting their way : Besides that, in all other respects, it struck a great consternation, and even a dejection of mind amongst the troops.

*A Syracusan
squadron at sea.*

The next step taken by the Syracusans was, to send out to sea a squadron of twelve ships, under the command of Agatharchus a Syracusan. One of these ships was to proceed to Peloponnesus and land an embassy there, which had instructions “ to notify the present “ hopeful posture of affairs, and to press a prosecution of the war in “ Greece with all possible vigour.” The other eleven stood over to the Italian coast, having received intelligence that a number of small vessels laden with stores for the Athenians were coming up. They intercepted and intirely destroyed most of these ; and the timber on board them, which was ready wrought for the Athenians to frame together into ships, they burnt to ashes on the shore of Caulonia. This done, they stood away for Locri ; and whilst they lay in that road, one of the transports from Peloponnesus, having on board the heavy-armed from Thespiæ, came in. The Syracusans removed

removed these heavy-armed into their own ships, and returned with them to Syracuse.

The Athenians with twenty sail were stationed at Megara, in order to intercept their return ; where one ship alone with all the crew fell into their hands. They were not able to come up with the rest ; since, eluding all pursuit, they recover with security their own harbours.

There happened also a skirmish in the harbour of Syracuse about the piles, which the Syracusans had drove down in the sea before their old docks that their vessels might ride in safety behind them, the Athenians be unable to stand in amongst them, and do any damage to their shipping. Close up to those piles the Athenians had towed a raft of prodigious size, on which turrets and parapets to cover the defendants were erected, whilst others in long boats were fastening cables round the piles, and by the help of a machine convenient for the purpose craning them up ; and such as they broke a set of divers sawed off close at the bottom. The Syracusans in the mean time were pouring their missive weapons upon them from the docks, which were plentifully returned by those posted on the raft. In short, the Athenians plucked up most of the piles. But one part of the staccade was exceeding difficult to be demolished, as it lay out of fight. For they had driven down some of the piles in such a manner, that their heads emerged not above the surface of the water. This render'd all access exceeding dangerous, since ignorant where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge his vessel as it were upon a shelf. But even these the divers for a pecuniary reward searched out and sawed away. And yet, as fast as this was done, the Syracusans drove down a fresh set of piles. The contrivances both of annoyance and prevention were strenuously exerted on both sides, as might justly be expected from two hostile bodies posted so near one another ; the skirmishings were often renewed ; and every artifice of war was successively practised.

The:

Embassies.

The Syracusans further had dispatched embassies, composed of Corinthians and Lacedæmonians and Ambraciots, to the cities of Sicily, “ to notify the surprisal of Plemmyrium, and to give a just representation of the naval engagement in which they had been “ defeated not so much by the strength of the enemy as by their “ own confusion—in other respects, to assure them that their hopes “ of success were high ; and that they firmly depended on receiving “ soon an aid from them composed both of a land and naval force ; “ since the Athenians were also in expectation of a reinforcement “ from Athens, the approach of which would their friends anticipate, the Athenians at present there must be totally destroyed, and “ the war brought at once to an end.” Such schemes were now in agitation in Sicily.

Demosthenes. But Demosthenes, when he had assembled the whole of the armament, with which he was to pass over to the relief of those in Sicily ; weighing from Ægina, and standing over to Peloponnesus, he compleats his junction with Charicles and the squadron of thirty sail of Athenians under his command. And, as a body of heavy-armed had been taken on board the latter from Argos, they steered together for the coast of Laconia. And here first they ravaged in part Epidaurus-Limera ; and, proceeding from thence to that part of Laconia, which lies over-against Cythera, and where stands the temple of Apollo, having ravaged part of the adjacent country, they inclosed and fortified a neck of land, which might serve as a receptacle to such of the Helots as deserted the Lacedæmonians ; from thence, banditti-like, as was done from Pylus, to infest the country. This convenient spot was no sooner taken in, than Demosthenes stood away for Corcyra ; that he might take on board the auxiliaries there, and make the best of his way to Sicily. But Charicles stayed till he had put the place into a state of secure defence and fixed a garrison in it. This being done, he carried back his squadron of thirty sail to Athens ; and the Argives at the same time received their dismissal.

This

This summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers, of those called *Machærophori*, and who are originally ^{State of things at Athens.} Dians. This body was intended to have been sent with Demosthenes into Sicily; but, as they arrived not 'till after his departure, the Athenians had resolved to send them back again to their own homes in Thrace. To retain them merely for the sake of the war waged against them from Decelæa, they thought, would plunge them in too large an expence, since the pay of every soldier was a * drachma * ^{7d. $\frac{2}{3}$.} a day. For now, since Decelæa, which had been fortified this spring by the joint-labours of the whole united army, continued to be garrisoned by detachments from the several *States*, which at certain intervals of time relieved one another in a regular succession; it gave terrible annoyance to the Athenians, and caused amongst them such havoc of their effects, and such a destruction of their men, as threw them into great distress. All preceding incursions of the enemy, having been only transient, had left them in the peaceable enjoyment of their lands for the rest of the year; but now, as they awed the country by one continued blockade, and as by intervals they received considerable augmentations to enable them to give greater annoyance; as even the regular garrison was periodically obliged to scour the country, and plunder for their own subsistence; and, as Agis king of the Lacedæmonians, who with the utmost diligence prosecuted the war, in person directed all the operations — the Athenians were sorely pressed. For, they were debarred the whole produce of their own lands; more than twenty thousand of their slaves had deserted to the enemy, and a large part of these were mechanics of the city. Their whole stock of sheep and labouring cattle was lost beyond retrieve. Their horses — as the horsemen were obliged every day to mount; either to ride towards Decelæa, to awe the excursions of that garrison; or, to guard some important posts in the country; — their horses were either lamed, by running incessantly over hard or rugged ground; or, by wounds were disabled for service. The constant

supplies of provisions for the city, which used to be fetched from Eubœa to Oropus and to be brought in from thence through Decelœa as the shortest passage, were now forced to go round the cape of Sunium by sea, which considerably enhanced their price. For want also of all foreign commodities the city was equally distressed; and Athens was now reduced to be merely a place of arms. To keep guard on the battlements by day, the citizens were obliged successively to relieve one another; but the whole body of the city, except the *horsemen*, mounted guard by night. The latter, ever under arms *without*, the rest on the constant guard of the city-walls; and this, for a summer and winter without any intermission; were reduced to a very low condition. But the point which pressed hardest upon them was having two wars at once upon their hands. And yet, their obstinacy had rose to so high a pitch, as had it not been visible to all the world, the bare mention of its possibility would have been quite incredible. For who would have believed, that this people, so closely blocked up at home by the Peloponnesians, should scorn to give up Sicily? nay, should persevere with unabating zeal to carry on the siege of Syracuse, a city in no respect inferior even to Athens itself? — that they should exhibit such an astonishing proof of their strength and their courage to the eyes of Greece, where upon the first breaking out of the war some people had imagined, that in case the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, they could not hold out above one year intire, tho' others had allowed them two, and others three, but no body a longer space? — and, that in the seventeenth-year after the first invasion of this kind; they should attempt the conquest of Sicily; and, when deeply gashed in every part by one war already upon their hands, should wilfully plunge into another as formidable in all respects as that waged against them from Peloponnesus? But now, when besides what they had suffered already, they were terribly annoyed from Decelœa, and other incidents had exacted from them very large disbursements, their finances were reduced to a very low ebb. At this

this period therefore, instead of the tribute paid them by their dependents, they exacted a twentieth of the value of all commodities imported and exported, which they thought would replenish their coffers faster than the former method. For their disbursements were not as they had been in preceding times, but had been inflamed in the same proportion as the scenes of war had been enlarged, whilst their annual revenue was constantly decreasing.

Unwilling therefore, in the present ebb of their treasures, to defray the charge of this body of Thracians, who came too late for Demosthenes, they sent them back to their own country with all possible haste. Diitrephes was the person pitched upon to conduct them home, and was instructed, that "in the passage (for they were to go through the Euripus) he should employ them, if opportunity offered, against the enemy." He landed therefore near Tanagra, and in a hurrying manner carried off a booty from thence. About the shut of evening he also crossed the Euripus from Chalcis of Eubœa, and having landed his Thracians in Bœotia, led them against Mycaleffus. His design was not discovered that night, tho' he halted at the temple of Mercury, which is distant from Mycaleffus but * sixteen stadia at most. But early the next morning he assaulted this city, which is of large extent. He carries it on the first attack, as there was no guard to resist him, and the inhabitants could never have imagined, that a maritime body would have marched so far into the country to make attempts upon them. The wall besides was weak; in some places it was fallen, and the remaining part of it was low; and the gates from too great a confidence of security, had been left open. No sooner were the Thracians broke into Mycaleffus than they gutted both houses and temples. They massacred the inhabitants, shewing no regard to either old-age or youth, but venting their fury on all that came in their way. They butchered even the women and the children; nay, all the labouring cattle, and every creature that had life which came before their eyes. For the Thracians,

Tragical event at Mycaleffus.

** More than a mile and a half.*

when once their fury is inflamed, are as insatiable of blood, as any other the greatest savages in the Barbarian world. On this occasion, the confusion was terrible, and every ghastly method of destruction was exemplified in act. They even fell upon the publick school, which was a very large one, when the youth of the town were but just got in, and hacked all the children to pieces. And thus, this whole city was involved in a calamity, a greater than which no city had ever felt; nay, a calamity unexpected, and dreadful indeed!

The Thebans had no sooner intelligence of it, than they marched to their assistance; but came not up with the Thracians, 'till they were retired to some distance from the town, where they recovered from them their booty; and, having put them to flight, continue the chase down to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels which had brought them lay at anchor. Here they make a slaughter of most of those who endeavoured to get on board but could not swim, since the persons left in the vessels, when they saw what passed on the shore, put them off beyond their reach. But in the other parts of the retreat, the Thracians behaved with some gallantry against the Theban horse, which attacked them first; since, rallying frequently out on the pursuers, and rallying again after the discipline of their country, they made good their retreat; and thus, few of this body were destroyed. A number further, who stayed behind in the city to plunder, were found there and put to the sword. The whole number of the slain, amongst this body of thirteen hundred Thracians, amounted to two hundred and fifty men: Tho', in return, they killed of Thebans and others, who accompanied by way of aid, of horse and heavy-armed together, about twenty, and Skirphondas of Thebes one of the *Rulers* of Boeotia: The lives of some more Mycaleffians were also lost in their company. Such was the calamity which fell to the unhappy lot of Mycaleffus; and which, for excess of horror, is more to be deplored than any other of the tragical events of this war.

Demoisthenes,

Demosthenes, who after marking out the fortification had stood away from Laconia to Corcyra, surprising a transport-vessel which rode at anchor in the road of Phia of the Eléans, on board of which a number of heavy-armed Corinthians were to pass over into Sicily, sinks that vessel. But the mariners, having saved themselves by flight, found afterwards another vessel, and proceeded in the voyage.

From hence Demosthenes came up to Zacynthus and Cephallene, where he took their heavy-armed on board, and sent for those of the Messenians from Naupactus. He also crossed over to the opposite continent of Acarnania, to Alyzia and Anaetorium, both belonging to the Athenians. Thus employed as he was in augmenting his force, Eurymedon, returning from Sicily whither he had been sent in the winter to carry a supply of money for the army, meets him; and amongst other intelligence relates, that "he had heard since he was upon his return, that Plemmyrium had been taken by the Syracusans." Conon also, who commanded at Naupactus, came to them, with advice, that "the five and twenty sail of Corinthians which lay over-against their squadron had not quitted that station, and even threatened them with an engagement." He exhorted therefore these commanders to detach some vessels thither, since their squadron at Naupactus, consisting only of eighteen ships, was not a match for the enemy whose squadron amounted to twenty-five. Upon this, Demosthenes and Eurymedon detach ten of the prime sailors amongst those under their own command, to follow Conon for the reinforcement of the squadron at Naupactus.

The two former continued to assemble forces for the grand expedition. Eurymedon for this purpose sailed to Corcyra, commanded them to man out fifteen ships, and selected himself the heavy-armed for the service; for, as he was returned from carrying the stores, he joined himself with Demosthenes in the command, in pursuance of the prior nomination. Demosthenes was collecting a body of slingers and darters from the towns of Acarnania.

The

Sicily.

The ambassadors from Syracuse, who were sent round to the Sicilian cities after the surprisal of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their negotiations ; and, having assembled a large body of factours, were intent on bringing them up. Nicias, who had gained an early intelligence of their motion, sends to such of the Siculi as lay upon their route and were in his alliance, namely the Centoripes and Halycyants and others, “ by no means to yield a free passage to the enemy, but “ to assemble in a body and obstruct their march.” It was impossible for them to reach Syracuse by any other route : for the Agrigentines had refused them a passage through their territories. Now therefore, the Sicilians being on their march, the Siculi, in compliance with the request of the Athenians, had placed three different ambuscades in their way. From these rushing suddenly upon them, as they were advancing in a careless manner, they destroyed about eight hundred men, and all the ambassadors, excepting one Corinthian. And this Corinthian brought up afterwards to Syracuse all those who escaped by flight, the number of whom amounted to fifteen hundred.

About the same time, the Camarinéans also send up a body of factours, consisting of five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters and three hundred archers. The Geloans also sent them a squadron of about five sail, beside four hundred darters and two hundred horsemen.

Now almost all Sicily except the Agrigentines, for these still adhered to their neutrality ; all the rest of the island, I say, who hitherto had stood aloof to observe events, united themselves against the Athenians, in behalf of Syracuse. Tho’ the Syracusans, after the blow they had just received from the Siculi, thought it not proper to attack the Athenians again upon a sudden.

Demosthenes. But Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having now completed their embarkations at Corcyra and on the continent, at the head of this united and powerful armament, crossed over the Ionian to cape Iapygia ;

Læpygia; and, standing away from thence, reach the Chærades, islands of Læpygia. Here they take on board their fleet a party of Læpygian darters to the number of fifty, and one hundred more of the Messapian nation. And after they had renewed a friendship of ancient date with Artas, who being lord of these islands supplied them with the darters, they proceed to Metapontium in Italy. Upon the plea of an alliance subsisting between them, they prevail upon the Metapontians to furnish them out three hundred more and two triremes, with which augmentation they stood along the coast to Thuria; where on their arrival they find, that the party, who had acted against the Athenian interest, had in a late sedition been driven out of the city. Desirous here to take a view of the whole armament, and to know whether any part had straggled and was left behind; hoping further, to prevail upon the Thurians to join them with their forces in the most cordial manner, and, since their welfare was connected with that of Athens, to declare the friends and foes of the Athenians to be equally their own, they stay'd some time at Thuria, and compleated their designs.

To return to the Peloponnesians. About the same portion of time their squadron of five and twenty sail, which to favour the passage of the transports to Sicily lay ranged in opposition to the fleet at Naupactus, having now made all things ready for an engagement, and equipped out some additional vessels, which had almost equalized their number to that of the Athenian ships, take their station in Rhypica near Erineus of Achaia. As the place in which they rode was bent in the form of a crescent, the land-force of the Corinthians and adjacent confederates, who marched to their assistance, was posted upon each wing of the squadron, on the jutting necks of land; whilst the ships drawn up close together composed the centre of their arrangement; and Polyarchus the Corinthian commanded the fleet.

*An engagement
on the coast of
Achaia.*

The

The Athenians, with three and thirty sail under the command of Diphilus, weighed from Naupactus, and stood in against them. At first, the Corinthians lay still without motion; but, so soon as it was judged necessary for them to act, and the signal-flag was accordingly hoisted, they advanced to charge the Athenians; and an engagement ensued. The contention was maintained a long time on both sides. Three of the Corinthian vessels are destroyed, whilst not a single ship on the Athenian side was sunk, tho' seven were disabled for service by blows they had received from the enemies beaks, by which their fore-castles had been shattered by the Corinthian ships, made firm and compact for this very purpose by stays on each side of the beak. The event of the engagement remaining doubtful, from whence both sides took occasion to claim the victory, the Athenians however being masters of all the shatters of the enemy's fleet, which the wind drove right into the sea, and which the Corinthians made no efforts to recover, they dropped away from each other. Yet no kind of pursuit was attempted, and no prisoners were taken by either. For the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, who fought close under the shore, were by that enabled to make an easy escape; but on the Athenian side, not even a single ship was sunk. And yet, when the Athenians were sailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy, as if the victory was their own; because they had disabled a larger number of the enemy. They further looked upon themselves as not defeated, because their enemies were not clearly victorious. For it is the way with the Corinthians, to pronounce themselves victors, if they are not sadly beaten; whereas the Athenians esteem themselves defeated, if they have not made a signal conquest. But further, when the Peloponnesians were retired from their station, and the land-army was dismissed, the Athenians erected a trophy. The spot they chose, whereon to place this token of their victory, was distant about * twenty stadia from Erineus, the station in which the Corinthians rode. Such was the event of this naval engagement.

Demosthenes

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, so soon as the Thurians had got in readiness seven hundred heavy-armed with three hundred darters to attend them in the expedition, ordered the fleet to coast along the shore towards the Crotoniatis; whilst themselves, after having taken a review of all their land-army upon the banks of the Sybaris, marched them over land through the Thuriatis. But when they were advanced to the river Hylas, they were met by a message from the Crotoniatæ, intimating to them, that "their consent should never be given for the passage of this army through their dominions;" Upon which they wheel'd off downwards towards the sea and the mouth of the Hylas, where they halted a night, and were joined by the whole body of the fleet.

The next morning they re-embarked and proceeded along the coast, touching at every city except Locri, till they arrived at Petra in the district of Rhegium.

But during this interval, the Syracusans, who had received advice of the approach of the reinforcement, determined to make another attempt with their fleet and the whole augmented body of their land-army, which they had assembled together for this very design of attacking the Athenians again before the reinforcement arrived. But like men, who in the former action had clearly perceived what would give them advantages over the enemy, they had made some alteration in the structure of their vessels. Having shortned the heads of their ships they made them more firm and compact, and fastened very substantial stays to each side of the beak. They strengthened these again by rafters of six cubits in length which were laid along the ribs both within and without; in the same manner, as the Corinthians had strengthened the whole prow of their ships, for the last naval engagement against the squadron at Naupactus. By this means, the Syracusans concluded, they should gain an advantage over the ships of the Athenians, which were of a different structure, as in the prow they were but weak, because of their usual practice in an engagment,

not to charge a-head, but by tacking about to strike upon the sides ; — that further, should the battle be fought in the great harbour, where sea-room would be small and the ships be crowded, this must be also an advantage in their favour ; since, darting themselves a-head, they must needs shatter the prows of the enemy, when with compact and solid beaks they struck against such as were hollow and weak ; — that again, for want of sea-room the Athenians would be too much straitened to make their tacks, or to run through their lines, which were points of art on which they chiefly relied ; they were determined to the utmost of their power to check all attempts of the latter sort, and the narrow space in which they must engage would of itself prevent the former ; and now, they intended with dexterity to turn to their own advantage the method of striking a-head, which on the former occasion appeared to be an error in the masters ; that, hence infallibly the day must be their own ; for the Athenians, if once repulsed, would not have room to go round and return to the charge, since thus they must directly be forced on the shore, which lay but a small distance from their camp and would sadly cramp them up ; that, they themselves must be masters of the rest of the harbour, whilst the enemy crowded together, in case they should be forced to give way, must be driven into narrow compass, and even falling foul on one another, a total confusion and disorder must certainly follow ; — For what hurt the Athenians most, in all their naval engagements, was their inability to make use of the whole harbour for tacking about or returning to the charge, in the same manner as the Syracusans ; — that finally, the Athenians could not possibly get out into wider sea, as the entrance of the harbour and the space behind the lines of battle were in their own command ; nay, other obstacles would co-operate, such as Plemmyrium, which would now oppose any attempt of this kind, and the very nature of the harbour's mouth, which was exceeding narrow.

By

By such a project the Syracusans had given an increase to their former skill and strength ; and, animated more than ever by the thought of having improved from their errors in the former engagement, they sally'd out to encounter the enemy, both with their land and naval force. Gylippus shewed himself, a small portion of time before the rest, at the head of the infantry ; whom, sallying out of the city, he drew up near the Athenian intrenchment, in that quarter where it faced the city. Then, the garrison of Olympiæum to a man, as well heavy-armed as horsemen, with all the light-armed parties of the Syracusans, came and drew up on the other quarters. And immediately after, the ships of the Syracusans and their allies came sailing forwards.

The Athenians at first imagined, that at present they were threatened only with an assault by land ; but when, on a sudden, they saw the fleet bearing down against them, they were struck with confusion. Some of them were taking post *upon* and *without* the intrenchments to make head against the assailants ; others were sally'd forth to encounter the troops from Olympiæum, and those from remoter parts coming on with full speed, a numerous body of horsemen and darters. The rest were hurrying on board to man the ships, or to give what assistance they could upon the beach. And no sooner were the proper complements on board than seventy-five ships stood out to meet the enemy ; but then, the number of the enemy's vessels was about eighty.

Great part of this day was spent in advancing towards and retiring from one another, and in reciprocal endeavours to seize advantages ; but neither side was able to execute any remarkable piece of service, excepting that the Syracusans sunk one or two of the Athenian ships ; upon which they parted, and at the same time the land-army drew off from the intrenchments.

The day following the Syracusans lay quiet, affording the enemy no room to guess at their future designs.

X x 2

But

But Nicias, conscious to himself that hitherto no advantages had been gained by sea, and fully expecting that the enemy would repeat their attempt, obliged the captains of the triremes to repair their ships if any were damaged, and stationed the transports before the piles, which they had drove down in the sea to secure the ships, and lock up as it were that space in which they lay. The transports he ranged in a line at the distance of the breadth of two ² *plethra* from one another; that, in case a ship was repulsed, it might run in hither as a place of security, and might again stand out without any molestation. In perfecting these dispositions the Athenians were all this day employed from morning to night.

The next day, the Syracusans, earlier in the morning than before and with the same parade of their land and naval force, came out to attack the Athenians. Now again, facing each other in the lines of engagement, they spent great part of the day in the same endeavours as before to over-reach and surprize one another; till at length, Aristo the son of Pyrrichus, a Corinthian, and the most expert seaman in the fleet of Syracuse, persuades the commanders of that fleet to dispatch their orders to the magistrates within the city—“with all expedition to bring the provisions which were for sale down to the beach of the sea, and hold the market there; nay further, to compel all those who had any meat to sell, to offer it instantly on the beach, that the mariners might come ashore and dine under the sides of their vessels; so that, after a short repast, they might this same day unexpectedly fall upon the Athenians.” This counsel being approved, the necessary orders were dispatched away, and the market was furnished out. Then suddenly the Syracusan fleet fell back, and stood away towards the city; where, disembarking with all possible haste, they took their repast.

² A *plethron* is said by some to contain 1444, by others, 2000 square feet.

But

But the Athenians, who ascribed this dropping off of the enemy to a consciousness of their own inferiority, quitting their own ships as if there was nothing further to be done, diverted their attention to their own affairs, and especially to prepare a refreshing meal for themselves; confident, there would be no engagement on this day. But on a sudden, the Syracusans, repairing on board, stood out a second time to give them battle. Then the Athenians, in much hurry and confusion, and most of them still fasting, re-embarking without any regularity or order, with great difficulty, after a considerable interval, stood out to receive them. For a certain space, each side stood upon their guard, and declined the charge. At length it occurred to the Athenians, that it was imprudent to dally so long and exhaust their spirits by the mere labour of the oar, which ought rather to be exerted on an expeditious attack. Upon which, animating one another with a shout, they darted upon the enemy, and the engagement began.

The Syracusans received the shock without giving way, and keeping the heads of their vessels right against the enemy, executed their project, and with their strengthened beaks shattered the forecastles of the Athenian ships; whilst their darters, who were ranged along the decks, galled the Athenians sorely with their missile weapons: tho' not near so much, as did the crews of some light Syracusan boats, which scoured about the enemy's fleet; sometimes getting under their wards and gliding along the sides of their vessels; and, from these close positions, aiming their darts at the mariners. In fine, the Syracusans, persevering in this manner to gall their foes, were masters of the day; whilst the Athenians, being put to flight, were obliged to retire, through the intervals of the line of transports, into their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued as far as to this line of transports; but were obliged to stop there, for fear

of the 3 machines which hung upon the yards of the transports to bar all approach. Two ships indeed of the Syracusans, elevated with success, approached too near, and were sunk; and another, with all her crew, was taken by the enemy. And now the Syracusans, who in the action had sunk seven ships of the enemy, had damaged many, had taken many prisoners, and made great slaughter, judged it proper to retire. They then erected trophies as victorious in two engagements, and plumed themselves in the assurance, that by sea they had the superiority over the enemy; presuming, at the same time, that they must soon be victorious also by land. Upon which they got every thing in readiness to attack them once more on both elements.

Demosthenes
arrives.

But at this crisis, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrive, at the head of the reinforcement from Athens; which consisted, of seventy-three sail of ships including foreigners, of about five thousand heavy-armed of their own and their confederate troops; beside a considerable number of darters as well Barbarian as Grecian, and slingers, and archers, and a compleat supply of all military stores. The first appearance of this grand reinforcement struck the Syracusans and their allies with no small consternation. It looked as if the war must be endless, and themselves exposed to dangers that knew no bounds. They saw that, in spite of the annoyance which Decelæa now fortified gave them, the Athenians were arrived before Syracuse with another armament as great and as formidable as the former; and that, in every view, the strength of Athens must be quite unsurmountable. And now also the Athenians, who remained of the former armament, respired from that dejection of spirit, into which a series of misfortunes had plunged them.

3 Called *Dolphins* from their form. They were massy, made of lead, and hung upon the sail-yards by cords and pulleys; and, when thrown into the enemy's ships, either burst or sunk them.

Demosthenes,

Demosthenes, after taking a view of the present posture of affairs, thought it absolutely necessary to avoid delays and keep clear of those errors which had done so much prejudice to Nicias. For Nicias, at his first appearance struck an universal consternation ; and yet, by declining the immediate attack of Syracuse, and loitering a whole winter away at Catana, he became an object of contempt ; and Gylippus had time to land a succour from Peloponnesus, which disconcerted all his measures. That succour, however, the Syracusans could never have sent for, had Nicias assaulted them on his first approach. For deluding themselves with the thought, that they were a match for their foes ; they would have found by sad experience, that they had indulged a cruel mistake, and must the same moment have been invested on all sides. And in such a state, tho' they had invited those succours, yet no effectual relief could have been obtained from them.

Demosthenes therefore, reflecting on these past mistakes, and sensible that he himself this very moment, on the first day of his arrival, appeared most terrible in the eyes of the enemy, resolved without loss of time to improve the present consternation, which his reinforcement had struck amongst them. He further took notice, that the counterwork of the Syracusans, by which the Athenians had been excluded from perfecting their circumvallation, consisted only of a single wall ; and in case the heights of Epipolæ could again be regained, with the camp which at first had been occupied there, *that* work might easily be carried, since the defendants could not now be able to withstand the Athenian strength ; — he determined therefore to put this project in execution ; judging, that in case it succeeded it would be a means of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion. For, if the scheme took place, the surrender of Syracuse must soon follow ; at worst, he would draw off the army, and not waste the lives of those Athenians who were employed in this service,

*And determines
on action.*

service, and the strength of the whole *State*, to no manner of purpose.

Now therefore, the Athenians began to act offensively ; and, in the first place, sallying out from their camp, they ravaged the country along the banks of the Anapus ; and were now again, as on the first approach, masters without control both by land and sea. For in neither element durst the Syracusans any longer come out to check their motions, abating what small resistance was made by the cavalry and darters from Olympiæum.

*His attempt to
regain Epi-
polæ.*

In the next place, Demosthenes thought proper to try what could be done against the works of the enemy, by the help of machines. But when upon applying them, those machines were fired by the Syracusans, who from the top of their works made a gallant defence ; and, tho' the army attacked in several quarters at once, they were every where repulsed ; he determined, to waste no longer time upon the trial. But, having prevailed with Nicias and his other colleagues in command, to assent to the scheme he had formed to recover Epipolæ, he proceeded to put it in execution. Yet, by day-light, it was judged impossible for them either to march, or to mount the ascent, without being discovered. Upon this, having issued out his orders, that every man should take with him subsistence for five days, and that all the masons and carpenters should attend the march, with proper store of missive weapons, and all needful materials for raising new works in case the attempt was successful ; he put himself, about the first sleep, at the head of the whole army ; and, assisted by Eurymedon and Menander, marched towards Epipolæ. But Nicias was left behind in the intrenchments.

When now they were advanced to the pass of Euryalus, by which the first army gained formerly the ascent, they are yet undiscovered by the Syracusan guards ; and, mounting the heights, surprise the fort which was there mann'd by the Syracusans, and slaughter
some

some of the defendants. But the majority, flying again towards the camps, of which there were three among the advanced intrenchments of Epipolæ, (one of Syracusans, a second of other Sicilians, and a third of the confederates,) they spread the alarm; and also notified the enemy's approach to the six hundred Syracusans, who at first were selected for the guard of this quarter of Epipolæ. These sallied out instantly to stop their progress; and Demosthenes with his Athenians, falling in with them, put them to flight, after they had made a gallant stand. Upon this success, they immediately pushed forwards, that they might improve the present ardor of the soldiers to the immediate completion of those points, for which they had made this bold attempt. Another party, which had been advancing all along without a check, surprised the counterwork of the Syracusans; of which, since abandoned by its defendants, they were throwing down the battlements.

But now the Syracusans, and their confederates, and Gylippus with *Battle in the night.* the body under his command, marched out of their intrenchments. Yet, having been attacked in so daring a manner amidst the darkness of the night, they had not recovered their surprise when they fell in with the Athenians; and thus, not able to stand the first shock, they were obliged to give way for a time. But, as the Athenians pushed forwards with great irregularity, as if the victory was quite their own; eager further, to make themselves masters of all the tract not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear, lest should they slacken in their ardor, the enemy might have time to rally into a body — the Boeotians first put a stop to their career; and, rushing boldly upon them, routed and put them to flight. By this turn the Athenians were thrown into so much disorder and confusion, that the particulars which followed cannot easily be gathered neither from themselves nor their antagonists. For, even in day-light, when objects are clearest to the sight, men present in a battle are not able to see all that passeth; each single combatant can barely relate what happened about

his own person. When therefore armies engage amidst the darkness of the night (tho' this is the only instance of it between powerful armies in the present war,) how is it possible to come at the knowledge of the several incidents? The moon indeed shone at this time; but then, they only saw one another as objects appear by moon-light, so as to discern the appearance of human bodies, but not to distinguish between friends and enemies. The heavy-armed further, numerous on both sides, were too much crowded for want of room. One party of the Athenians was already clearly defeated; another, unbroke by the first attack upon them, was pushing forwards. Of the remainder of their army, a great part had already mounted the ascent; yet some were still busied in mounting up; but none of these, when they were got upon the eminence, knew which way to advance. For before them (as the rout was begun) there was one grand medley of confusion, and the tumult was so loud that no sounds could be distinctly heard. The Syracusans and their confederates were animating one another with loud exultations (for the season of the night made all signals useless) to compleat the blow, and were clearing before them all that came in their way: But the Athenians were prying about for one another, and regarded every thing they met, even tho' they fell in with their own friends, as the flight was now begun, for an assured enemy. Obligated further by frequent iterations to demand the *word*, as the only method to distinguish one another; all calling out aloud for it at the same instant of time; they heightened the general distraction, and clearly discovered their own *word* to the enemy. But then they had not equal opportunities to discover that of the enemy; because, as the latter were now the victors and kept more in bodies, it was less liable to detection. Hence it came to pass, that tho' a stronger party of the Athenians fell in with a weaker party of their foes, yet they judged it best to fly; because they were sensible that their own *word* was divulged; and, as they could not return the *word* of the Syracusans, they

they must unavoidably be cut to pieces. But what had the greatest effect, and did most hurt to the Athenians, was the singing the *pæan*; since *that* used on both sides, being nearly the same, raised the utmost confusion. And, when the Argives, and Corcyréans, and all others of Doric descent, who were with the Athenians, began from time to time their *pæan*, it struck the same alarm into the Athenians as when the enemy themselves sung it. So that, in short, falling in amongst one another in different quarters of the army, when once the confusion was rose to a height; friends against friends, and citizens against fellow-citizens; they not only impress a reciprocal terror, but proceed to blows with so much fury that they could not easily be parted. The pursuit was briskly followed, in which many of them plunging headlong down the precipices were dashed in pieces, because the pass downwards from Epipolæ was too narrow for their numbers. But of those, who from the heights got down into the plain, many, and all in general who came in the first armament, since better experienced in the country, escaped in safety to the camp. Whereas of the last comers, some, straggling into bye-ways, were bewildered in a country to which they were utter strangers; and, at break of day, were cut to pieces by the Syracusan horse, who scoured the plains.

On the day following, the Syracusans erected two trophies on Epipolæ; one, on the summit of the pass; and the other, where the Boeotians first stopped the enemy's progress. The Athenians also obtained a truce to fetch off their dead; the number of which was large⁴, both in their own troops, and those of their allies: And yet, more arms were taken by the enemy than bore proportion to the slain. For, of the number of light-armed, who were pushed to the brink of the precipices, and throwing away their shields were

*The Syracu-
sans victo-
rious.*

⁴ *Plutarch* puts it at two thousand: But *Diodorus Siculus* says, it was two thousand five hundred.

obliged to leap down, tho' some perished by the fall, yet others escaped with life.

But after this, the Syracusans, highly animated again with this fresh unexpected turn in their favour, sent out Sicanus at the head of fifteen sail to Agrigentum now embroiled in a sedition, with orders to exert the utmost of his power to reduce it to their obedience. Gylippus also made once more the tour of Sicily, to levy another army; confident, that with such a reinforcement he could carry the very intrenchments of the enemy by storm, since affairs had taken such a favourable turn on Epipolæ.

*A council of
war.*

In the mean time, the Athenian generals were employed in the needful consultations since the last misfortune, and the present universal dejection of their troops. They saw, that all their attempts were blasted by ill success, and that the soldiers were chagrined at the continuance of so fruitless a service. For a sickness spread amongst their people from a double cause; from the present season of the year, in which the human body is most subject to disorders; and the marshy unwholesome ground on which they were incamped; besides that, in every respect, their situation appeared desperate, and quite beyond the power of redress.

*Opinion of
Demosthenes.*

The opinion of Demosthenes was therefore totally repugnant to a longer continuance before Syracuse. He urged "the immediate
" execution of the scheme he had formed, before he made the late
" dangerous attempt upon Epipolæ; which since it had miscarried,
" they should no longer protract their departure, whilst yet the sea-
" son of the year was proper for their voyage homewards, and they
" had strength enough in the last reinforcement to force their passage
" in spite of the enemy." He affirmed, "it would be more con-
" ducive to the public welfare, to turn their arms against those who
" were erecting fortifications within Attica itself than against the Sy-
" racusans, whose reduction now was almost become impracti-
" cable; — and, that it was madness to persist any longer in a siege,
" which

“ which dissipated the wealth of the *State* in fruitless vain expences.”

In this manner Demosthenes declared his sentiments.

As for Nicias; tho' convinced within himself that their affairs were *Of Nicias.* in a bad situation, yet he was unwilling with his own mouth to confess their low condition; or, that a departure should be fixed by the general votes of a public council, where all that passed must be reported to the enemy: because should the determination be formed in this manner, the execution could not go forwards without the enemy's privity. Besides, as he knew the state of the enemy somewhat more perfectly than others; he imagined, there were grounds to hope that the state of the latter would soon become worse than their own, would they only continue to press the siege. A want of supplies must soon reduce them to great straits; and this the sooner, as by the accession of the last squadron themselves, were now again masters of the sea. And what is more, in Syracuse itself there was a party, which wished to see the city fall into their hands. These had dispatched their agents to Nicias, and insisted he should not quit the siege. Yet, thus enlightened as he was, in reality he knew not how to act, as his mind was balanced between two measures, which equally required mature deliberation. But for the present, he openly declared himself in council against drawing off the army. He told them, “ he was perfectly well assured, that the Athenians would “ never forgive him, should he carry their troops from Sicily without peremptory orders: That the affair would not then lie under “ the cognizance of such as here advised it, and with their own eyes “ were convinced of the necessity of such a step; but of men, who “ would form their judgments upon the spiteful calumniations of “ others, and the influence some malicious demagogues would have “ over their understandings, by which their fate would be determined.” He further represented that “ many, nay the greater “ part of the soldiers, who now formed the troops and make such “ tragical outcries about the perils that environ them at present, “ would

“ would change their notes, so soon as they were landed again
 “ at Athens, and ascribe their return to the treachery and corruption
 “ of their commanders.” For such reasons, he declared, “ as he
 “ was well acquainted with Athenian tempers, he would choofe, ra-
 “ ther than be undone at Athens by base criminations and an unjust
 “ sentence, to hazard the last extremity, and perish, if so it must
 “ be! under the violence of the enemy.” He maintained however
 that “ the state of the Syracusans was worse than their own. The
 “ demand upon them for the pay of foreigners was large; their ex-
 “ pences in securing the outworks of Syracuse were high; they had
 “ now supported a large navy for the space of an intire year; want
 “ therefore must soon come upon them, and they must shortly be to-
 “ tally distressed: because the sum of * two thousand talents they
 “ had already expended of their own stock, and had even contracted
 “ a large debt beside. And, in case they abate of their present
 “ punctuality or making good the appointments of the forces they
 “ have on foot, their strength must moulder away; since it con-
 “ sisted, not like the Athenians, of troops which must serve, but of
 “ such as were only discretionary aids.” He concluded with “ the
 “ necessity they lay under from the ties of duty to continue the siege
 “ with vigour, and by no means expose a superior strength to
 “ ruin, through a false presumption, that they were inferior in point
 “ of supplies.”

* 387500 l.
Sterling;

Nicias expressed himself on this occasion with an air of neat confidence, as a person perfectly well acquainted with the state of Syracuse, and the failure of money there, and because there was a party within the city, which acted in favour of the Athenians, and had advised him by their agents “ by no means to raise the siege.” And what is more, he placed a stronger dependence now upon the fleet than ever he had done before the late unsuccessful engagement.

As to the proposal of continuing the siege, Demosthenes would not yield the least degree of attention to it; — “ If the army must not
 “ evacuate

“ evacuate Sicily without a peremptory order from Athens, but must
 “ persist in this destructive service; he judged, it would be better to
 “ draw them off to Thapsus or to Catana; where they might find
 “ opportunity enough to make incursions with the land-army upon
 “ the territories of the enemy, and by committing devastations
 “ might highly distress them. Their fleet might then engage in the
 “ open sea; not in a space confined and straitned, which was the
 “ greatest advantage to the enemy; but in sufficient sea-room, where
 “ all their superior skill might fairly be exerted, where they would
 “ be able to make their tacks, and bear down again upon the foe
 “ with greater agility and more violent shocks, than could be done
 “ in the limitary space of a close pent up harbour. Upon the
 “ whole, (he affirmed,) that his consent never should be given to a
 “ longer continuance in their present posts; but, he was for moving
 “ off with all possible expedition; and they had not a moment to
 “ lavish upon delay.”

Eurymedon then declared, that his sense of things coincided with ^{Of Euryme-} that of Demosthenes. And, Nicias persisting in the contrary opi-^{don.} nion, a fit of languor and suspense ensued; attended with the secret imagination, that the positiveness of Nicias resulted from some stronger hopes of success he had conceived above his colleagues. And in this manner the Athenians fell into dilatory measures, and continued in their camp before Syracuse.

But in this interval Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse; — ^{Gylippus;} Sicanus truly, disappointed of Agrigentum; for he was advanced no farther than Gela, when the sedition in favour of the Syracusans was brought to an amicable period; — but then Gylippus was returned at the head of a numerous body, consisting of levies made in Sicily, and the heavy-armed troops from Peloponnesus, who in the spring had put to sea on board the transport, but came over last from Africa to Selinus. For into Africa they had been driven by contrary winds; and, having there been furnished by the Cyrenéans with two triremes-
 and

and a set of pilots, as they coasted along the African shore, they relieved the Evēspēritæ then blocked up by the Libyans. The latter they defeated in a set battle; and proceeding from thence along the shore they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, from whence lies the shortest cut to Sicily, being only a passage of two days and a night. Hence therefore they stood across, and landed at Selinus.

*The Athenians
resolve to raise
the siege.*

With this accession of strength, the Syracusans instantly prepared to attack the Athenians again both by land and sea. But the Athenian generals — finding they had received so large an augmentation; and that the posture of their own affairs was so far from being changed for the better, that day after day it grew worse in every respect; and, what was worst of all, that their troops were quite exhausted with fatigue and sickness; — they repented now in earnest, that they had not drawn off in time. And, as Nicias now no longer opposed that step with the same vehemence as he had done before, but merely endeavoured that it should not be determined in public council, they issued out orders with the utmost secrecy, that the whole armament should hold themselves in readiness to put to sea upon a signal given. But, all things now ready, the very moment they are going to embark, the moon is eclipsed: for it was now the time of the *full*. The bulk of the army, struck with the awful appearance, called out upon the generals to halt. And Nicias, always addicted too much to superstition and such vulgar scruples, positively declared, that “it should no more be debated whether they should remove or not, till the three times nine days were past which the soothsayers prescribe on such occasions.” So, for this reason, a longer stay was forced upon the Athenians, who had been too dilatory already ⁵.

*Stopped by an
eclipse.*

The

⁵ That the bulk of an army or a fleet no wonder at all. They are ever ignorant, should be frightened at such appearances, is and the most daring of them in other respects

The Syracufans, who had soon an intelligence of their designs, *A battle.* were now more animated than ever to press briskly on the Athenians, as on men who had given proofs of their own inward conviction,

respects have been much addicted to superstition. But one cannot help being surprised at the ignorance and superstition of Nicias; one cannot help pitying and deploring the foible of a man who had so good a heart. *Plutarch* expatiates largely on this occasion. “Even the vulgar, (says he,) at this time were well apprised, that an eclipse of the sun was often occasioned, about the time of the change, by an interposition of the moon. But, as to the moon, by the interposition of what body, and how on a sudden at the full its light fades away or emits variety of colour, was not easy for them to conceive. They thought it a strange occurrence, and sent from God as a prognostic of great calamities. The first person, who wrote a clear and bold solution of the enlightning and obscuration of the moon, was Anaxagoras, who now had not been long dead: Nor was his account in every body’s hands; but concealed, imparted only to a few, and that with caution and assurances of secrecy. The world could not bear, that Naturalists and Meteor-mongers, as they were then stiled, should seem to restrain the divine power by quaint argumentations, invisible operations, and necessary consequences. For such attempts Protagoras was banished; and Pericles with much ado procured the release of Anaxagoras, when thrown into prison. Nay Socrates, who never meddled with any of these points, was however put to death upon the charge of *philoso-*

phizing. It was not ’till late, that the glory of Plato shone abroad; who, by his irreproachable life, and subjecting natural necessities to a divine and sovereign power, cleared away all bad imputations from studies of this kind, and by a mathematical beginning opened a field to other sciences. And thus, his friend Dion, at what time he was setting sail from Zacynthus against Dionysius, was not at all disheartened by an eclipse of the moon, but landed safe at Syracuse, and ejected the tyrant. It was the misfortune of Nicias at this juncture, not to have even a skilful soothsayer with him; for his intimate Stilbides, who had cured much of his superstition, had died a little before: Since this portent (as Philochorus says) was not a bad one, but an excellent good one for a flying army; since acts which are accompanied with fear, stand in need of concealment, and light is ever an adversary to them. Besides, after eclipses of the sun or moon, it was the usual custom (as Autocles hath informed us) to hold only a three days cessation from business. But Nicias persuaded himself, that a compleat revolution of the moon ought to be waited for; as if with his own eyes he had not seen her shine bright again, when she had passed the shadow and the earth’s interposition. Yet throwing up all attention to other points, he minded nothing but sacrificing, ’till his enemies attacked him.” *Life of Nicias.*

that they were no longer a match for their foes either by sea or on land; since with other thoughts they never could have projected a re-embarkation. Apprehensive at the same time, that should they remove to any other quarter of Sicily they would become more difficult of reduction; they saw the necessity of engaging them by sea without a moment's loss, whilst yet they had an advantage in compelling them to fight. Upon this they ordered the complements of men on board their ships, and exercised their crews as many days as was judged sufficient. But, when opportunity offered of acting with advantage, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian intrenchments; and a party of heavy-armed and horsemen, tho' not numerous, falling out at some of the ports to beat them off, they cut off some of the heavy-armed from the rest of that party, and having put them to flight follow the pursuit. As the spot further on which the assault is made was narrow, the Athenians lose seventy horses and a small number of their heavy-armed. Nothing more happened on this day, as the army of the Syracusans now made their retreat.

But on the day following, they stand out with their ⁶ fleet, to the number of seventy-six ships; and, at the same time, the land-army marched up to the intrenchments. The Athenians lanced out with fourscore and six to give them a reception; and thus charging one another, an engagement ensued. Eurymedon commanded the right wing of the Athenian fleet, and endeavoured to over-reach and surround the ships of the enemy. For this purpose he opened his

⁶ *Plutarch* adds, That "on this occasion the very lads came out in fishing-boats and skiffs, taunting and insulting the Athenians. One of these lads, Heraclides, of a noble family, who had advanced too near, was in great danger of being intercepted by an Athenian vessel. But Pollichus, the uncle of the

"lad, alarmed for his safety, charged instantly with the ten triremes he had under his command. The rest of the Syracusan fleet, now alarmed for Pollichus, ran in at once, and brought on a general engagement." *Life of Nicias.*

line

line and stood along too close to the land; which gave the Syracusans and their allies, who had now defeated the centre of the Athenians, an opportunity to intercept him in the bottom and recess of the harbour, where they *slay* Eurymedon himself, and destroy the ships ^{Eurymedon killed.} which had separated in his company. And this done, they gave chase to the whole Athenian fleet, and drove them ashore.

Gylippus now, perceiving that the ships of the enemy were defeated and drove aground quite wide of the piles and their camp, formed instantly a design to make slaughter of the men as they were leaping on shore, and of giving the Syracusans an opportunity easily to draw off all the ships from land of which they were intire masters. At the head therefore of one division of the land-force, he marched down to the pier to second the fleet. The Tyrrhenes happened to have been posted nearest by the Athenians; who, seeing a body of the enemy running down thither in a disorderly manner, advanced eagerly to meet them; and, charging briskly on the van, put them to flight and drive them into the lake of Lyfimelia. But soon after, a reinforcement of Syracusans and their allies coming up, the Athenians also advanced with speed to succour their friends, and trembling for their ships soon came to an engagement with them, and after routing pursued them again. They slaughtered now a great number of the heavy-armed; and, what was more, preserved the far greater part of their fleet; and towed again to their former moorings all their ships, except eighteen, which the Syracusans and their allies made prizes, and put all the men on board them to the sword. With a view further to destroy the rest by setting them on fire, they filled an old transport-ship with fascines and combustible matter; and, as the wind blew right upon the Athenians, set her on fire, and let her drive in amongst them. The Athenians, trembling for the ships, put all their engines instantly at work to extinguish the flames; which, having at length effectuated, and kept this fire-ship

clear of their own vessels, they were delivered from this imminent danger.

*The Syracu-
sans victorious.*

After this, the Syracusans erected a trophy for their victorious engagement on the water, and for the interception of the party of the heavy-armed before the intrenchments where they had taken so many horses. The Athenians also did the same for the repulse given by the Tyrrhenes to the land-forces of the enemy, and their being chased into the lake, and the larger success they afterwards obtained with the rest of their army.

But now, when beyond the reach of doubt the Syracusans, tho' at first alarmed at the large reinforcement of shipping brought against them by Demosthenes, had gained a signal victory by sea, the Athenians were plunged into a total dejection of spirit; they were thunderstruck by the reverse of misfortunes so little expected; and begun to repent, with much more bitterness of thought, that they had ever engaged in so fatal an expedition. They had invaded *States*, whose polity was already of a piece with their own, whose form of government was *popular* like that of Athens, and which flourished in shipping, in horses, and each article of power. And yet finding themselves unable to give any measure of success to their projects by introducing dissensions amongst them, through political embroilments; nor even by a powerful force, superior to that of their foes, able to ward off the many blows they had received; they had fallen beforehand into great anxieties, and now sadly beaten as they were at sea, one thought of which they never could hitherto have conceived, their despondency became more violent than ever.

*The
sans
spirit*

*Syracu-
in high*

From this time the Syracusans scoured the whole harbour without having any thing to fear. They had also formed a scheme of barring up its mouth, that the Athenians, tho' never so intent upon it, might for the future not have it in their power to steal away. Their care and diligence were no longer employed on the view alone
of

of their own preservation, but on the larger view of ruining the Athenians. They concluded, and justly too, that the latter turns in their favour had given them the ascendent over these invaders; and, could they but compass the total overthrow of this body of Athenians and their allies, the grand atchievement would strike all Greece with admiration. Nay more, all other Grecians must reap the fruits of such success; of whom, some would in an instant recover freedom, and others be delivered from the fear of losing it: For the remaining strength of Athens would never be able to stand against that weight of war, with which she must be soon encompassed about. And thus, could they (Syracusans) be the glorious authors of such desirable events, they must infallibly become objects of wonder not only to all the present age but to latest posterity. And of a truth, considered in such a light, it was great and glorious ambition, to aim at the conquest not only of the Athenians, but also of their whole extensive and combined alliance. And this, not merely to earn laurels for themselves, but for the auxiliaries also who had engaged in their cause; since, exposed in the front of the war with the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, they had objected their own *State* to the fury of a storm which threatned them all, and by their own personal valour in naval engagements had contributed most to such a height of success.

The various people now got together at this one city of Syracuse *Catalogue;* were so very numerous, as to be exceeded only by the comprehensive roll of those, who in the series of the present war sided either with the *States* of Athens or Sparta. The catalogue is subjoined of those, who mustered in the offensive and defensive armies at Syracuse; who fought against, or in behalf of Sicily; who joined for the reduction or preservation of this island, not so much from just and lawful motives, or a concurrence resulting from the ties of blood, as from policy, or interest, or direct compulsion.

The

The Athenians truly, in quality of Ionians, had voluntarily come hither against the Syracusans, who were Dorians; attended by those, who spoke the same dialect, and used the same institutions with themselves, the Lemnians, and Imbrians, and those Æginetæ who were the present possessors of Ægina. The Hestians further, now inhabiting Hestiaz in Eubœa, as an Athenian colony, had joined in the expedition. Of the remaining numbers, some came along with them because they were dependents; some, tho' independent, because they were confederates; and some there were, who attended merely for their pay. The dependents and tributaries were the Eretrians, and Chalcidæans, and Styrensiens, and Carystians, from Eubœa; from the islands, the Cœans, and Andrians, and Teians; from Ionia, the Milesians, and Samians, and Chians. Of these, the Chians, being not subjected to a tribute but only to furnish a quota of shipping, tho' independent at home yet followed their arms. And all these hitherto recited were Ionians, and Athenian colonies, excepting the Carystians; for these last are Dryopes. But as subjected to Athens, not so much from choice as Ionians as by mere compulsion, they now followed their masters against Dorians. To these were added Æolians; the Mithymnæans for instance, who were to furnish shipping but were exempted from tribute; the Tenedians further, and Ænians, who were tributaries. But these, being Æolians, were now compelled to fight against other Æolians; namely, their own founders the Bœotians, who adhered to the Syracusans. The Platæans did the same, and were the only Bœotians that acted against Bœotians upon the justifiable pretext of lasting enmity. The Rhodians further and Cytherians attended, tho' both of Doric descent: The Cytherians truly, who are a Lacedæmonian colony, bore arms at this juncture on the Athenian side against the Lacedæmonians under the command of Gylippus: And the Rhodians, Argives by descent, were obliged to turn their arms against the Doric Syracusans; nay, against the Geloans, a colony of their own, now acting

acting in concert with the Syracusans. Of the people of the isles on the coast of Peloponnesus, came the Cephallenians and Zacynthians, independent in fact, but through their situation controled in some measure by the Athenians, who are masters of the sea. The Corcyreans further, who were not only of Doric but what is more were even of Corinthian original, as being a colony of the latter and by blood allied to the former, from compulsion, as they gave out for a colour, tho' in truth from deliberate malice, since opposing the Corinthians whom they hated, followed the Athenians with an ardor inferior to none. The Messenians also, now stiled Messenians of Naupactus, and those from Pylus, which was still held by the Athenians, were brought along to the war. To whom must be added a small party of Megaræan exiles, who by a sad reverse of fortune now took part against the Selinuntians, who were also Megaræan. The residue of the confederates were engaged rather upon free and spontaneous choice. The Argives, for instance, not more from obligations of subsisting treaties than the rancour they bore the Lacedæmonians and the gratification of private spleen, tho' Doric, yet followed the Ionic Athenians against their Doric kindred. But the Mantinéans, and the rest of the Arcadians, who are mercenaries, and eternally habituated to act against any foe pointed out to them, were now so far influenced by gain as to regard those Arcadians as their enemies, who came over on this occasion in company with the Corinthians. The Cretans also and Ætolians were there, allured by an advantageous pay. And thus it happened, that the Cretans, who in concert with the Rhodians had founded Gela, readily took part for the sake of gain, not *with* but *against* a colony which themselves had planted. There was also a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, partly induced to join by the pay they received; but principally, by their personal regard for Demosthenes, and their attachment to the Athenians. And thus have we run them over to the utmost boundary of the Ionian gulf. Of the Italic nations, the Thurians and those Metapontians, whom

whom intestine feuds had reduced to the necessity of fighting for subsistence, joined their arms; and of the Sicilian, the Naxians and Catanéans; of Barbarian, the Egestéans, who were the first movers of this grand contention; and the major part of the Siculi; and out of Sicily, some of the Tyrrhenes, from enmity to the Syracusans; and the mercenary Iapygians. So many nations were assembled together at present under command of the Athenians.

The auxiliaries, on the side of the Syracusans, were the Camarinéans who border close upon them; and the Geloans, who are situated next the Camarinéans. To proceed regularly; as the Agrigentines were neutral, the Selinuntians next occur, who are seated beyond the Agrigentines; since they inhabit that tract of the island, which faceth Afric. Then the Himéréans, the only Grecian people, who inhabit that part of the island which lies off the Tyrrhene sea, and were the only body which came from thence to the aid of Syracuse. The several nations of Greek descent settled in Sicily, being all Doric and independent, acted together in concert. Of the Barbarous people; they had those Siculi alone, who did not openly revolt to the Athenians. But out of Sicily; the Lacedæmonians sent them a *citizen* of Sparta to command and a body of *Neodamodes* and *Helots*: by a *Neodamas* is meant a citizen newly enfranchised. The Corinthians alone aided them both with shipping and a land-force, in conjunction with the Leucadians, and Ambraciots by blood allied to Syracuse. From Arcadia also came a body of mercenaries, sent by the Corinthians; and the Sicyonians, who acted on compulsion. And of those, who dwell without the Peloponnesus, were the Bœotians. But beside these foreign aids, the Sicilians, as possessed of great and powerful cities, furnished out in all respects a much greater and well-appointed force. For by them a numerous body of heavy-armed, of ships, and horses, and other kinds of military force, in an amazing abundance, were raised and brought to Syracuse. And yet it must be said, that the domestic force of the Syracusans was
more

more to be considered than all the rest, from the greatness of their *State* and the immediate urgency of those perils with which they were environed.

These were the aids, the numerous aids, assembled together by the contending parties. And, at this juncture, all these were present on each side of the contest; and from this crisis neither party received any accession.

The Syracusans therefore and their confederates thought, since the signal victory they had gained upon the water, it would be a brave exploit and highly for their glory, to make the whole extensive camp of the Athenians their prize, and cut off their retreat on both elements, both by land and sea. With this project, they immediately barred up the great harbour, the mouth of which is about * eight * *Near a mile.* stadia over, with a line of triremes placed side by side, and other vessels and boats moored fast together by anchors; and got every thing besides in readiness, in case the Athenians should venture on another engagement. Their every view was now become large and aspiring.

Grand scheme of the Syracusans.

When the Athenians saw the harbour thus barred up, and perceived further the whole of the enemy's designs, it was judged high time to go to consultation. The commanders of the different bodies were called to council with the generals; in which, upon representations made " of the great distress to which they were reduced; and, " that they had not a stock of provisions ample enough for their immediate subsistence (for, bent on sailing away, they had sent already to Catana to countermand any fresh convoys;) and, unless " they could recover their mastery at sea, it would be impracticable " for the future to obtain a supply;" they came to a final resolution — " To quit their intrenchments on the higher ground, and before the station of their shipping to raise a circular work, of as little compass as possible, but sufficient to serve for a magazine and hospital, and to this only to assign a guard; as for the rest of

“ the land-army they were to oblige every soldier to go on board,
 “ that all the ships, which yet were undamaged or had been laid up
 “ for want of hands, might be compleatly manned ; and thus, they
 “ must fight their passage out of the harbour ; and, if it succeeded,
 “ make directly for Catana ; but, if repulsed, they would burn their
 “ shipping, and moving off in one body by land would endeavour,
 “ by the most expeditious marches, to reach the nearest place that
 “ would receive them, whether Barbarian or Grecian.”

*Athenian
measures.*

Such was the plan resolved on, and which they began immediately to execute. For now, abandoning their upper intrenchments, they drew down to the beach, and manned the whole of their shipping, on board of which they forced without exception all such as had youth and vigour enough to be of service there. The whole number of ships they were by this means enabled to man amounted to a hundred and ten. They also placed on board the fleet a large number of archers, the darters of the Acarnanians, and other foreign auxiliaries ; and provided, in all other respects, for action, as well as their condition would permit, or the nature of the project required.

When things were thus in great forwardness, Nicias taking notice, that the soldiery was much dejected by the great defeats, which, contrary to their wonted custom, they had received by sea ; and yet desirous to hazard another engagement as soon as possible, because pinched for want of necessary subsistence ; he gathered them all round about himself, and endeavoured to raise their drooping spirits by the following exhortation, the first of the kind he had ever made.

*Speech of
Nicias.*

“ MY fellow-soldiers whether of the Athenian or the confederate troops ! the bold attempt we are now going to make is of
 “ equal concern to each individual amongst us ; since, not more for
 “ victory over our foes than for the preservation of ourselves and our
 “ country,

“ country, we are now to fight; and, if our naval efforts be crowned
 “ with victory, each of us may again be blest with the sight of his
 “ own native city. Away therefore with these faces of despair, this
 “ painful dejection, fit only for a raw unexperienced multitude; who
 “ unsuccessful in their first attempts for ever after bid adieu to hope,
 “ and by unmanly fears anticipate misfortunes!

“ As for you, Athenians, who form so considerable a part of this
 “ assembly, experienced as you are in such variety of warfare! —
 “ And you also our allies, who have ever fought under our banners! —
 “ recal to your reflexion the unexpected turns of war; encourage
 “ the hope, that fortune may at length declare for us; and deter-
 “ mine once more to engage the foe with a spirit worthy of that
 “ numerous strength, of which by ocular demonstration you see
 “ yourselves this moment possessed. Those points, of which we
 “ perceive we may avail ourselves against the narrowness of the har-
 “ bour's mouth, against such a multitude of vessels as will be crouded
 “ together, and against that particular disposition of soldiers on their
 “ decks, from which on the former occasion we suffered so much,—
 “ all these, I must tell you, are as well adjusted, as our present con-
 “ dition will permit, by the united care of us your generals and
 “ your own masters. For many archers and darters shall now line
 “ your decks, and that croud of soldiers, which when we engage
 “ in the open sea we never can use, because the vessels would be
 “ too heavily-laden to allow the proper exertion of our skill; that
 “ crowd, I say, in this pent up contracted space shall give to our
 “ naval battle the strength and stability of a land-engagement. We
 “ have also devised the proper means to compensate the inferior
 “ structure of our ships; and, in return for the consolidated beaks
 “ of our enemy, have provided the ships with grappling-irons, which
 “ will hold fast a vessel that hath run against you from getting clear,
 “ provided those on board will perform their duty. Because, as ne-
 “ cessity inforceth us now to fight a mere land-battle from our decks,

A a a 2

“ it

“ it highly concerns us, neither to be beat off ourselves, nor to suf-
 “ fer them to get clear from our grapple; especially, when all the
 “ ambient shore, excepting the small tract now occupied by our own
 “ army, is hostile in regard to us. Mindful of these things, it be-
 “ hoves you to fight it out so long as strength and vigour shall enable
 “ you, and never suffer yourselves to be driven on *such* a shore; but,
 “ when once your ship hath grappled with a foe, never once to think
 “ of losing your hold, till you have cleared the enemy’s decks of all
 “ the defendents. But these points I give in charge to the heavy-
 “ armed, not less than to the seamen; since this method of engage-
 “ ment is more particularly your province; and, since it still remains
 “ within your power to earn a glorious victory, by putting your land-
 “ method into practice. But the seamen I exhort, and with my ex-
 “ hortations mingle my intreaties, not to shrink too much under the
 “ sensibility of past defeats, as your decks are now better armed in
 “ all respects than they were before, and as the number of the ship-
 “ ping is enlarged. Recal the idea of that heart-delighting privi-
 “ lege, of which you are now to secure the continuance; — To you
 “ I speak who, tho’ not of Athenian extraction, have hitherto been
 “ regarded and honoured as Athenians; and, for speaking well our
 “ language, and appropriating our manners, have been admired
 “ through the whole extent of Greece, have participated the bene-
 “ fits of our large-extended empire, not less than ourselves in point
 “ of profit, and much more than ourselves in striking awe into
 “ your vassals, and being exempted from the attacks of injustice.
 “ Since therefore you alone have freely shared our empire with us,
 “ you are bound by all the ties of honour, by no means to desert its
 “ present vindication. Then in open despight of those Corinthians,
 “ whom you have so often conquered; and of those Sicilians, not
 “ one of whom durst look us in the face so long as the vigour of our
 “ fleet was unimpaired, drive your foes before you, and strike into
 “ them the plain conviction — that your military skill, tho’ strug-
 “ gling

“gling with weakness and misfortunes, is yet far superior to all their strength and luck united.

“But to the native citizens of Athens amongst you I must once more suggest, that you have now no longer in your docks such another fleet as *this*, nor have left behind you such another body of heavy-armed. If therefore your immediate fate be any thing less than victory, your enemies will sail and be directly at Athens; and the remainder of our forces there will no longer be able to repulse the united assaults of their domestic foes and such foreign invaders. Nay, the infallible result must be, that you at once put on the chains of Syracusans, against whom you are conscious with what intentions you at first came here; whilst your country must be forced to submit to a Lacedæmonian bondage. Now therefore summon all your courage, to earn the day, in which your own liberty and that of Athens is to be the victor's prize. And, let each individual amongst you invigorate himself with the thought; nay, let it throw spirit and life into the whole army — that, *those* who are now to engage on board this present fleet are the whole of the land and naval force of your country, are the surviving supports of the *State* and the great NAME of Athens. In so momentous a conflict, whoever amongst you excels in military skill or inward bravery, that person had never so fine an opportunity to give demonstration of his superior worth, or to perform a great service for himself, or for the welfare of his country.”

Nicias, after he had finished this earnest exhortation, ordered them to repair directly to their posts on board the fleet.

As all this hurry of preparation lay within their view, Gylippus and the Syracusans could not escape the conviction, that the Athenians were bent on another engagement. They had, moreover, received intelligence of the new project of the grappling-irons. As therefore they had provided against every thing besides, they also
made

made provision to counterwork that project. For this purpose, they had covered the prows and almost the whole gunnel of their ships with hides; that, when the grappling-iron was thrown, it might slip off and catch no hold. And, no sooner were all their preparations compleated, than the Syracusan generals in concert with Gylippus animated their men to engage with resolution, by the following harangue :

*Speech of the
Syracusan
commanders.*

“ THAT your past achievements have been glorious indeed,
 “ and for the acquisition of greater honour and glory that you are
 “ now on the brink of engaging, — the generality of you, ye Syra-
 “ cusan and confederates! are well convinced, and need not at pre-
 “ sent to be informed: For otherwise you could never have per-
 “ sisted so far in this warm career of bravery and success. But if
 “ there be a man amongst you, whose sense of things drops short
 “ of their real position, we shall now throw upon it the needful
 “ illustration.

“ This land, our property, the Athenians have invaded; aiming,
 “ in the first place, at enslaving Sicily; and had this design succeeded,
 “ at inflicting an equal fate on Peloponnesus, and the rest of Greece.
 “ And yet these very Athenians, who enjoy already the largest tract of
 “ empire that any ancient or modern *State* of Greece hath at any time
 “ enjoyed, you are the first who have bravely resisted, and of that
 “ navy, on which they erected their increaching pile of power, are
 “ plainly the victors in several engagements; as again, in that which
 “ now approacheth you will assuredly beat them. For men, who
 “ have received such severe checks in a point for which they so
 “ highly plumed themselves, will for the future have a much worse
 “ opinion of their own merit, than if they had never conceived so
 “ high a value of it; and, when all their towering pretensions are so
 “ unexpectedly blasted, their subsequent efforts must of course drop
 “ short of their real strength: And this, you may rest assured, is the
 “ present

“ present state of *yonder* Athenians. And by parity, in regard to
“ ourselves, that proportion of strength we enjoyed at first, with
“ which, tho’ far inferior in skill, we boldly and successfully pre-
“ sumed to withstand them, must now be suitably enlarged; and,
“ with the further accession of this inward assurance, that we are
“ really the best since we have beat the best seamen in the world,
“ our hopes of success are in every light redoubled. And then hu-
“ man experience teacheth us, that in every competition the warmest
“ hope is ever accompany’d with the greatest resolution.

“ But further, those late alterations, which they have introduced
“ among their shipping, in order to equalize and balance ours, have
“ been a long time familiar to our own practice. And each of their
“ new preparations we shall dextrously improve to our own advan-
“ tage. For when, contrary to the long and inveterate discipline of
“ their fleet, there are crowded together upon their decks, a nume-
“ rous body of heavy-armed, as well as another numerous body of
“ mere *terra firma* darters, as they may properly be stiled; when
“ thus Acarnanians and other land-men are forced on board, who
“ even sitting would be unable to point and direct their weapons; —
“ how can they avoid indangering their vessels? or, jumbled con-
“ fusedly together and tottering under motions to which they are not
“ inured, how can they escape a total disorder?

“ What still makes more against them, the multitude of their
“ shipping will only serve the more to embarrass them; — and let
“ this dispel the fears of those who may be afraid of engaging
“ against their superior numbers. For a multitude of ships in a con-
“ tracted space will be more slow in executing orders, and are at the
“ same time most easily exposed to the annoyance, which our pre-
“ parations are contrived to give them. And now, attend to the
“ true and real situation of the foe, as from good intelligence we are
“ enabled clearly to declare it to you.

“ Environed

“ Environed on all sides with misfortunes, and distressed in a present want of the necessaries of life, they are become quite desperate. And hence, tho’ they have resigned all confidence in their real strength, yet in the fury of despair they are throwing themselves upon the decision of fortune ; that either, if the passage can be forced, they may lanch out to sea ; or, that project failing, may attempt a retreat by land ; — as if, to a worse condition than their present, it were not in the power of fortune to reduce them. Warmed therefore with brave resentment, let us also try the encounter against such wild confusion, and against the fortune of our inveterate foes now treacherously bent to finish their destruction. Let us charge with the full conviction, that on an enemy, who would justify their invasion on the principle of redressing wrongs, it is most fair and equitable to satiate all the fury of revenge ; nay more, that vengeance on a foe is an appetite of our nature, and commonly said to be the sweetest of all human enjoyments. But — that those men *yonder* are our foes, our most bitter unrelenting foes, you need no further proofs ; since bent on enslaving this our country, they first made the voyage. And, had this their odious project been successful, on our citizens they had inflicted the most cruel torments, on our wives and children the most indelcent enormities, and on Syracuse the most ignominious appellation. In a work of so just retaliation, to indulge a tenderness of mind, or to think it gain to let them depart without additional revenge, will be a matter of just reproach. For the latter is all they will be able to effect, even tho’ at length they may be victors. But to us, could we execute the fair and equitable wishes of our hearts, by inflicting upon *them* the punishment they well deserve, and in setting the liberty of all Sicily, as it hath been ever enjoyed by us, beyond the reach of any future insults ; how glorious must such achievements be ! For such critical moments of adventure are most rarely to be met with ; which, if unsuccessful, can do the least

“ least disservice ; but, if successful, draw after them the most valuable acquisitions.”

When the Syracusan generals, seconded by Gylippus, had finished this their exhortation to their own soldiers : they also, in their turn, repaired immediately on board their fleet, as they found was already done by the Athenians.

But Nicias, whose mind was surcharged with present cares, sensible — how extreme the danger ! and how nearly approaching ! since this very moment they were only not in motion ; — and once more reflecting, that, as generally happens in affairs of such prodigious moment, some points might yet be left imperfect, something of energy and weight and influence be yet left unsaid ; he called out again upon every single captain in the fleet, addressing himself separately to them, with the honourable mention of their *fathers, themselves, and their tribe* ; and conjuring each, by his own distinguishing splendor whatever it was, “ not now to betray it, nor tarnish those “ hereditary virtues on which their ancestors had founded their “ glory ;” reminding them earnestly “ of the uninterrupted freedom “ of their country, and the privilege they had ever enjoyed of living “ in it quite free and uncontrolled ;” inserting other arguments, such as, with men who had their *all* so much at stake, might have influence and weight ; no matter now how trite or hackneyed by frequent repetitions, or how equally applicable to every case, as fetched from the endearments of their wives, and their offspring, and their paternal Gods ; such as, from every topic in a plunge of horror and distress are rung in the ears of men, as likely to animate and persuade. And thus at last, tho’ fearful that not even yet he had said enough but all that the time would permit — he parted from them ; and, placing himself at the head of the land-army, marched down to the beach ; where, he drew them up in as large a line as they

Earnest for action.

could possibly form, that their appearance might have the greater effect in emboldening those on board the fleet.

And now Demosthenes, and Menander, and Euthydemus, (for these went on board to command the fleet) getting clear from their moorings, stood away directly towards the barricade of the harbour, and that interval of its mouth not yet compleatly barr'd in order to clear the passage. The Syracusans also and their allies had now lanch'd forth against them with their usual number of ships. A detachment of these were so stationed as to guard the passage; the rest were spread circularly quite round the harbour; that, on all sides at once, they might attack the Athenians; and their land-army on the beach might second them on approaches to the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharchus, who were respectively stationed in each of the wings; whilst Pythen and the Corinthians compos'd the centre.

The battle.

When the Athenians were come up to the barricade, they run boldly at it; and by the violence of the first shock they beat off the vessels ranged about it, and were intent on clearing away the whole barricade. But here, the Syracusans and allies falling in amongst them from every quarter, a general engagement ensued, not only at the barricade but in every part of the harbour. Obstinate it really proved; and such a battle, as they had never fought before. Great in truth was the ardor of the seamen on both sides in running upon the enemy, whenever the word was given; and great was the art exerted by the officers in attack, and defence, and reciprocal contention. The soldiers on board exerted all their efforts, that, when ship came to close with ship, no stretch of military skill should be omitted on the hatches. Every individual, abiding firmly in his post, strained all his diligence to signalize his own behaviour. But, as numerous ships were falling in together amongst one another in little sea-room, — and so large a number never fought before in so small a space,

space, since the amount of both fleets fell little short of two hundred ; — the direct incursions with the beak were few, because room was wanting for tacks and passages ; but boardings were frequent, as the vessels were continually running foul on one another, or in sheering off met with others which were coming on. And, so long as a vessel was in her approach, those on the hatches poured plentifully against her whole showers of javelins, and arrows, and stones ; but when they were once come to grappling, the soldiers closing in firm battalion endeavoured by force to board one another. Nay, it most frequently happened, through the straitness of sea-room, that the very moment one party boarded the enemy, the very same moment they were also boarded themselves, as two vessels lay often along-side of an enemy ; nay sometimes more, by necessity mingled and squeezed fast together. In the mean time, the care of the officers was not confined to one single point, but distracted on all sides by a whole round of perils ; they were here intent on their own defence, and there on the annoyance of the enemy. And further, the prodigious crash that was made by such a number of ships running at the same instant upon one another, struck such dismay and loss of hearing, that the voices of those who issued out orders could no longer be distinguished. Loud besides were the exhortations and shouts of the officers on both sides ; partly in conformity to rule, tho' swelled at present by the ardor of contention. Amongst the Athenians it was shouted amain — “ To force the passage, and now or never to exert
 “ their utmost stretch of bravery to earn a safe return to their native
 “ country ;” — amongst the Syracusans and their allies ---- “ How
 “ glorious it would be to hinder their escape, and by present victory
 “ for every one amongst them to increase the growing honours of
 “ his country !” The commanders also on both sides, if they saw a vessel dropping off before it was overpowered by the enemy, called out aloud by name on the captain, demanding ---- on the Athenian side ---- “ Did they retire on the wild presumption that yonder most

" hostile shore would prove more friendly to them than the open sea,
 " which by long prescription they had claimed as their own province:"--
 But, on the Syracusan --- " Would they, who were perfectly assured
 " that the Athenians wanted nothing so much as to escape --- would
 " they fly first from those who were flying?" The land-army, fur-
 ther, of each party upon the beach, whilst yet the battle was alter-
 nately fluctuating on the water, felt the utmost anxiety and the most
 painful conflict of mind --- earnestly bent, as the one *domestic* party
 was, " on gaining accumulated honours;" but fearful, as the other
invading party was become, that " their condition might soon be-
 " come worse than it was already." For, the whole hope of the
 Athenians centring at present in that *fleet*, their anguish for the event
 was more acute than ever they had felt, and was aggravated by their
 own position on the beach, which gave them a clear uninterrupted
 prospect of all that passed in the battle upon the water. The scene
 was but at a trifling distance from their eyes; and, as the looks of
 all of them were not at the same instant fastned upon the same spec-
 tacle --- if any saw their own party prevailing, they grew at once
 exalted; and immediately began an invocation to the Gods, that the
 efforts of their friends might be crowned with success; --- whilst
 another party, beholding those who were vanquished, uttered a loud-
 shriek which ended in a groan; and, by the sight of such affecting
 turns were more subdued in spirit, than those who were actually
 engaged in this medley of horror. Others further, who were intent
 upon a quarter of the engagement, where the event was yet in sus-
 pence, and no judgment amidst such confusion could be formed,
 adjusted the contortions of their bodies to their own inward fears,
 and passed that interval in extremity of anguish. For each single
 moment, they were within a little of escaping or being sunk.
 And thus, in one and the same army of Athenians, so long as the
 event was under decision, a whole medley of noises was heard toge-
 ther --- *shrieking* --- *shouting* --- *victory!* --- *undone, undone,* and all
 other

other sounds of various import, which in such extremity of danger a numerous body of men may be forced to utter.

Those further on board were equally sensible of all the quick alternatives of passion; 'till at last, after the battle had for a long time been obstinately maintained, the Syracusans and allies put the Athenians to open flight; and plying briskly in the chace, with obstreperous clamour and loud exultations drove them upon the beach. And here, the land-soldiers which had served on board, excepting such as had been taken in the deeper water, leaping in all parts as they severally could on shore, run in great confusion for shelter to the camp. The army on the beach, with passions no longer diversified, but with one and the same uniform vehemence, having expressed their resentment of the horrible conclusion by a loud shriek and a hearty groan, — some hurried along the beach to succour the shipping; others, to defend what yet remained of their intrenchments; whilst a third party, and the bulk of the army, confined their whole care to themselves, and were solely intent on their own personal preservation. The horrid consternation, in which this moment they were universally plunged, was greater than Athenians had ever felt before. They suffered now, what on a former occasion they had made others suffer at Pylus. *There* the Lacedæmonians having first lost their fleet; had the further mortification to see all their gallant Spartans in the island undone. And now, the desperate condition of the Athenians offered no glimmering of safety on the land, unless some miraculous contingency should take place in their favour.

After an engagement so hardy and well disputed, after the sinking of a large number of ships, and the death of numbers on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies, who were masters of the day, took up the shatters and the dead. This being done, they sailed in triumph to the city, and erected a trophy.

But the Athenians, quite sunk with the weight of their present misfortunes, never so much as once entertained the thought of re-
The Athenians quite dispirited.
 covering

covering their shattered vessels or their dead ; but were contriving how to decamp by favour of the approaching night. Demosthenes, upon this, repairing to Nicias, declared it as his own opinion, that “ manning at once the whole number of their vessels they should “ exert their utmost efforts to force their passage out of the harbour “ early the next dawn ;” affirming that “ they had still a larger “ number of shipping fit for service than the enemy :” For the Athenians had yet about sixty left, whereas those of the enemy were under fifty. Nicias came into the proposal ; but, when both joined in issuing proper orders for the execution, the seamen flatly refused to go on board. Dispirited as they were by the last great blow, they had resigned all hope of ever beating these enemies again. No measure now remained but a retreat by land, on which the universal attention was henceforth employed.

Hermocrates. Hermocrates the Syracusan had conceived a suspicion, that such a step would be taken by them ; and, foreseeing what difficulties might arise, if so large an army should march across the country, and posting themselves afresh on Sicilian ground should again resume their spirits, and renew the war against Syracuse, — he waited upon those in authority, and suggested to them, that “ they ought not by any “ rules of policy to let the enemy steal off by night (inserting here “ his own sentiments of the affair,) but that all the Syracusans and “ their allies rallying out in a body should pre-occupy and secure “ the roads, and in good time beset and put strong guards in all the “ passes.” The magistrates were sensible as much as he who gave this advice how reasonable it was, and declared themselves for its execution ; — But then, “ the men, who now indulging their joy for “ the late victory were intent on recreations, and as besides it was a “ festival-time (for this very day they were performing the anniversary sacrifice to Hercules,) in all probability would refuse to “ march : Because, transported as they were with success, the generality no doubt were celebrating the festival with good cheer and “ wine ;

“ wine ; and any thing might sooner be hoped from them, than obedience to an order for taking up their arms and sallying forth at a “ minute’s notice.” As the magistrates were convinced that things would so turn out, the scheme was judged impracticable, and Hermocrates could in no wise prevail. But he thought of an artifice to play off against the foe. Afraid, lest the Athenians dislodging quietly by night might possess themselves of the most difficult passes, before any opposition could reach them ; he dispatcheth some of his most trusty friends, under an escorte of horse, to the Athenian camp so soon as it was dark ; who, riding up so near to the intrenchments that their words might be distinctly heard, and calling out aloud on some persons to come forth, since they were a party sent from his friends in Syracuse to bring Nicias some intelligence ; charged them to carry word immediately to Nicias “ by no means to draw off the “ army by night, because the Syracusans had beset the roads ; but “ to defer his march ’till day-light, when he had leisure to make the “ proper dispositions.” And, after delivering this message, they rode off ; whilst those who received it went and reported it faithfully to the Athenian generals.

Wrought upon by this piece of intelligence, in which they were far from suspecting any fraud, they continued all night in their posts. And then, as they had not dislodged at once in a hurry, they thought it adviseable to stay where they were *but* one day longer, that the soldiers might pack up and carry away with them as large a part as was possible of their necessary stores. The rest of the baggage, it was agreed, should be abandoned to the enemy. They were only to carry off, each person for himself, what was absolutely necessary for food and raiment.

But in this interval, the Syracusans and Gylippus by sallying out with the land-forces had gained a march before them ; had blocked up the roads along the country, by which it was judged the Athenians would march ; and had posted strong guards upon all the fords of

*The siege of
Syracuse is
raised.*

of brooks and rivers: nay, their detachments stood ready drawn up in battalia to beat off the enemy from the most convenient passes. Standing out further into the harbour with their fleet, they dragged from the shore the Athenian shipping. Some few of these they burnt, as the Athenians themselves had designed to do; but the residue, at their leisure, from the spot where each lay stranded, they took in tow, and carried away to the city. And this being done; when Nicias and Demosthenes judged, that they had completed such preparations for their march as were absolutely needful, the dislodgment of the whole army was put in execution on the third day from the naval engagement.

Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed in one particular light, as that they retreated because they had lost the whole of their fleet, and all their mighty hopes had terminated in such personal dangers to themselves, and such as even boded the ruin of Athens; but the very abandoning of the camp presented to their sight the most cutting spectacles, and struck each soul amongst them with heart-piercing anguish. For, as the dead lay uninterred upon the surface of the earth, when the remains of an old acquaintance thus miserably laid out arrested the eyes of a soldier, he was instantly seized with regret and horror. But the living, who on account of wounds and sickness were left behind, were causes of much greater affliction to the sound than were even the dead, and in truth were much more to be deplored than those who had no longer a being. For, bursting out into prayers and lamentations, they occasioned a wild irresolution of thought; earnestly intreating, that they might not be left behind, and screaming out aloud on each by name, as they saw a friend or an acquaintance or an old comrade moving off; throwing their arms about their necks, and so dragged along whilst they could keep their hold. But when strength and bodily vigour failed and left them destitute of resource, they gave them the last adieu not without a shower of curses and a hideous howl. By such cutting incidents the whole
army

army was filled with tears and a wild irresolution ; so that they could not depart, without the highest regret, tho' from a spot so hostile, where they had suffered more than tears could alleviate ; and the dread of more which yet might be impending was inexpressible. Dejection of the head and self-accusation were general through all the troops. And they resembled nothing less than a large subjugated city, whose numerous inhabitants were escaping from the fury of a sack. For the amount of those, who were now marching off together, was not less than forty thousand men.

Of these, the generality carried off merely what necessary subsistence they had scraped together ; but the heavy-armed and horsemen, contrary to custom, were now obliged to carry their own sustenance themselves, beneath their armour ; some, because they had none ; others, because they durst not trust their servants. The desertions had for a long time been large, but of late in greater numbers than ever. Neither were they thus provided with sufficient stores ; for there was no longer any corn to be found in the camp. Nay truly, the general calamity and equability of misfortunes, which in many cases alleviate the pain as numbers are involved, were unable to render the present evils in any degree supportable ; especially, when the thought occurred,—from *what* a height of splendor and preceding glory, to *what* a plunge and miserable state they were now reduced ! For a most cruel turn of fortune this really proved to a Grecian army ; who, coming hither to enslave others, were departing now with the sad alternative of fearing to be made slaves themselves ; and, instead of the prayers and pæans with which they first began the voyage, were now dislodging with omens that portended nothing but misery : Those further, who came hither as lords of the ocean, were now stealing away by land ; from henceforth to be saved, not by naval skill but the perseverance of a land-army. However, all these reflexions put their patience nothing on the stretch, in compa-

rison of that weight of misery which this very instant was hovering over their heads.

Nicias, perceiving the whole army to be overwhelmed in despair and sunk in this plunge of distress, addressed himself severally to the troops; exhorted, and comforted by every topic which occurred each single party whom he visited by turns, elevating his voice far beyond the ordinary pitch to suit the earnestness of his heart, in hope that the louder he spoke, the more extensive effect it might have upon the hearers.

*Speech of
Nicias.*

“EVEN yet, and in the present low ebb of our fortune, my
“dear countrymen and confederates, we ought to encourage hope.
“Instances may be given of armies who have been rescued from a
“deeper plunge of dangers than that which is now our portion.
“Nor ought you to torture yourselves with too painful regret at
“what you suffer, or at the unmerited miseries which this moment
“environ you about. Even I myself, who have much less room to
“boast of a constitution superior to hardships than the meanest soldier
“in your ranks (for your own eyes can witness to how low a state my
“bodily infirmities have reduced me,) who however in the conti-
“nued happiness of my former course of life, or in any other re-
“gard, am inferior to none amongst you, — yet am buffeted now
“by the storms and outrages of fortune as cruelly as ever were the
“vilest and most abject of my fellow-creatures. It is true, I have
“ever habitually worshipped the Gods, with a conscientious defer-
“ence to established laws; and have made justice and beneficence
“to man the constant practice of my life. Upon the strength of
“this, when I look forwards to the future, my mind is enlivened
“with invigorating hope; — tho’ I own these misfortunes, so far
“undeserved, strike no little terror on my thoughts; — but better
“times perhaps may be approaching. For sure our enemies have
“been

" been blessed with an ample measure of success; and, tho' some
 " Deity may have frowned at first on this our expedition, yet, by
 " this time his wrath must be fully wreaked upon us. We are not
 " the first instance of a people, who have wantonly invaded the pos-
 " sessions of another. Many such offences have taken their rise
 " from the impulse of human passions, and have been punished with
 " such a measure of vengeance, as human nature was able to en-
 " dure. Good reason therefore have we now to hope for a milder
 " fate from the offended Deity; who, depressed as we are, seem
 " objects of compassion much more than of resentment. Cast
 " therefore your eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed, and the
 " goodly numbers, which even now compose your retreat; and let
 " the sight revive and cheer your drooping spirits. Conclude, that
 " wherever you chuse to halt, you are of yourselves that instant a
 " mighty community; such, as no other Sicilian people can pre-
 " sume to stand before should you attack, nor to dispossess wherever
 " you think proper to settle. But, that your march be orderly and
 " safe — be that the care of each individual amongst your ranks,
 " made warm and earnest by the thought, that on whatever spot
 " you may be compelled to fight, on that, if crowned with victory,
 " you regain a country and a bulwark of your own. But then, our
 " march must be continued both day and night with unabating speed,
 " because our stock of provision is but scanty. And can we but
 " reach some friendly territory belonging to the Siculi, who from
 " their excessive dread of the Syracusans will ever preserve their at-
 " tachment to us, conclude yourselves that moment to be beyond
 " the reach of danger. Send therefore your messengers beforehand
 " to them, with orders to meet us on our route, and bring us the
 " needful supplies of food. On the whole, my fellow-soldiers, rest
 " assured that the last necessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave,
 " since to cowardise now no place of shelter is any longer open; and
 " only, if you stem the efforts of your foes — can you again be
 " happy

“ happy in the enjoyment of those scenes your eyes so fondly regret ;
 “ and *can* Athenians re-erect the extensive power of the Athenian
 “ *State*, how low soever it may be fallen at present. For they
 “ are *men* who make a *State*, not walls nor ships by men
 “ abandoned.”

*The Athenian
march.*

With these words of encouragement Nicias ran regularly thro' all the ranks of the whole army ; careful at the same time, if he saw any parties straggling from the main body and quitting the order of the march, to fetch them up and replace them. Demosthenes exerted himself as diligently in his own department, encouraging his troops with the same energy and ardor of address. The body under Nicias, drawn up in a square, led the van of the march ; that under Demosthenes brought up the rear ; whilst the baggage-men and the numerous croud that attended the camp marched within the centre of the heavy-armed.

*Harassed by
the enemy.*

When they were advanced to the place of fording the Anapus, they find a body of Syracusans and allies drawn up in battalia there, to oppose the passage. But, putting these to flight, they gained the passage of that river, and advanced into the country beyond ; tho' their march was terribly harassed by the incursions of the Syracusan horse, and by the missive weapons, which the light-armed of the enemy poured in from time to time amongst them. And yet in this

** About 4 miles.*

day's march the Athenians wrought about * forty stadia, and halted for the night upon an eminence.

† 2 miles.

On the ensuing day by early dawn they were again in motion, and advanced about † twenty stadia, when descending into a certain plain they halted and formed an incampment. Their design in this was to fetch in some provisions, for the adjacent country was inhabited ; and to get a proper supply of water to carry along with them. For in the country beyond, through which their route was fixed, no springs were to be met with for the length of several stadia. But
 during

during this halt, the Syracusans advancing beyond them throw up a work across their route, to stop their further progress. The spot chose for this was a strong eminence, flanked on both sides by an inaccessible crag, and known by the name of Acræum-Lepas.

On the day following the Athenians resumed their march; but the horse and numerous darters of the Syracusans and allies stop'd their advance, the latter pouring in their weapons upon, and the former riding up and disordering their ranks. For a long time, it is true, the Athenians maintained the skirmishes against them; but, at length, they retreated again to their last incampment. And now, all further supplies of provisions were totally cut off; it being no longer possible to fetch in any for fear of the horse.

But, decamping early in the morning, they continued their march, and forced their progress to the eminence which was fortified by the new work. Here they found the Syracusan infantry drawn up before them in firm and deep battalia, posted also on the strong eminence they had occupied on purpose: for the pass was very narrow. The Athenians marched up and assaulted the work; but being pelted by showers of darts from the eminence, which was very steep, and so gave those upon it a great advantage in throwing their weapons home; and finding themselves unable to force it; they again drew off, and attempted it no further. It happened at the same time, that some claps of thunder were heard accompanied with rain, effects not unusual in this season, as the year was now in autumn. And yet, these accidents contributed still more to dispirit the Athenians; who concluded, that every thing now acted in combination for their destruction. During this interval of inaction, Gylippus and the Syracusans send off a detachment of their forces to throw up a work in their rear, where the enemy had already passed. But the Athenians sent also a detachment of their own body, which prevented its execution. And after this, wheeling off with their whole body more into the plains, they halted there for the night.

The.

The next morning they began to move forwards again. And now, the Syracusans besetting them quite round in a circle poured volleys of darts and arrows amongst them, and wounded numbers. If indeed the Athenians sallied out against them, they retreated; but, when the Athenians drew back, they then pressed upon their retreat; and falling in chiefly amongst their rear, if at any time they put small parties to flight, they struck a consternation into the whole army. But for a long time, in such a train of skirmishings, the Athenians made good their ground; and, advancing afterwards the length of

* Above $\frac{1}{2}$ a
mile.

March in two
columns.

* five or six stadia, they halted in a plain. Here also the Syracusans no longer molested them, but withdrew to their own camp.

This night it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes that since the army was reduced to so low a condition, and began already to be pressed with a total failure of provisions; since further large numbers had been wounded in the many incidental assaults of the enemy; — they should first kindle a great number of fires, and then march the whole army off, no longer by the route which they had first projected, but by another towards the sea, quite contrary to that which the Syracusans had already pre-occupied and guarded. The residue of the march was no longer pointed towards Catana, but to the other coast of Sicily, towards Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that quarter both Grecian and Barbarian. In pursuance of this, a large number of fires being kindled, they dislodged in the dead of night.

This part of their retreat — as is the general fate of armies but especially of the greatest, ever subject to fears and panics, particularly when moving in the night and on hostile ground, and conscious further that the enemy is close at their heels — was made in a sad and disorderly manner. The column indeed under Nicias, which composed the van, kept firm together in a body, and quite out-marched the rest of the army. But that under Demosthenes, being one half at least if not the major part of the whole force, was separated from
the

the van, and came on in great confusion and disorder. However, by the dawn of day they reach the coast ; and gaining the great road which is called *the Hebraine*, took their route along it ; that, after they had reached the river Cacyparis, they might pierce upwards along the course of that river into the heart of the country. For thus, they hoped to meet with the Siculi, whom they had summoned to be ready on their route. But when they had gained the sight of that river, they found its banks already occupied by a Syracusan guard, busy in throwing up a rampart and palisado to defend its passage. This party they soon dispersed, and passed the river ; and from thence advanced towards another river, the Erineus ; for thus their guides had plan'd their route.

In the mean time the Syracusans and allies, when the day was clearly broke, and they knew the Athenians were stole off, began in general to throw heavy imputations on Gylippus ; as if the Athenians had made their escape through his connivance. Yet beginning the pursuit with all possible expedition, and it was easily discoverable what route they had taken, they come up with them about the hour of repast. And, as they fell in first with the column under the orders of Demosthenes, which composed the rear, and had moved in a more slow and disorderly manner than the van, because the darkness of the night had so highly incommoded and confounded their march ; they immediately charged them, and fought. The Syracusan cavalry beset them quite round, the more easily indeed as they were separated from the van ; and drove them into one crouded heap. But the column under Nicias was now * fifty stadia before * *Above 5 miles.* them. For Nicias led them forwards with great celerity, concluding that their safety consisted, not in lingring voluntarily at so critical a period, or exposing themselves to an engagement ; but, in pushing forwards with their utmost speed, and fighting only when by absolute necessity they were compelled to fight. But then Demosthenes was involved in a much more laborious and continued toil ; because, as
he

he fled off last, the enemies were left upon his rear ; and, soon convinced that they had began the pursuit, he was obliged, not so much to move forward as to draw up his troops in the order of battle, 'till by such necessitated lingering he is environed by them ; and himself, and the body of Athenians under him, are thrown into high tumult and confusion. For now, hemm'd in as they were on a certain spot, surrounded quite round by walls ; and whence the issues both on one side and the other were full of olive-trees ; they were terribly galled on their flanks by the darts of the enemy. This kind of annoyance the Syracusans wisely chose to give them, and to decline all close engagement : because, to hazard the latter against enemies now become quite desperate, they judged would make more for the advantage of the Athenians than of themselves. Tho' at the same time, a kind of frugality, inspired by the great career of success they had already obtained, taught them not to exhaust their strength on superfluous encounters ; and persuaded them, that *thus* they might effectually subdue, and make this great army their prisoners. When therefore, for the whole remainder of the day, they had galled them on all sides with missive weapons, and now perceived, that the Athenians and their allies were reduced to a miserable plight by the wounds which they had received and the other calamities which lay hard upon them ; Gylippus, in concert with the Syracusans and allies, causeth a herald to proclaim, — First, that “ such inhabitants of the “ isles as would come over to them should rest in the secure enjoyment of their liberty.” — Upon which, some cities, tho' not many, went over to them : And in the next place, after some time, a surrender is agreed on of the whole body of troops commanded by Demosthenes, on the terms, that “ they should deliver up their “ arms ; and, no one should suffer death, either by public execution, or the miseries of a prison, or the want of necessary subsistence.” Thus, this whole body, to the number of six thousand men, surrender'd themselves prisoners, and produced all the silver they

The column under Demosthenes surrenders.

they had about them, which they were commanded to throw into the hollows of shields, four of which in this manner were filled full with spoil. And these prisoners the victors immediately led away to Syracuse.

But Nicias, and the column under his command, arrived the same day on the banks of the Erineus; and, having passed that river, halted on an eminence. The day following, the Syracusans coming up to his post, notified to Nicias, that "those under Demosthenes had surrendered;" and summoned him to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, he begs leave to send out a horseman to discover the truth; who upon his return affirming that "they had actually surrendered," Nicias sends an intimation to Gylippus and the Syracusans, that he was ready to stipulate in the name of the Athenians — that, "whatever sums the Syracusans had expended in this war should be fairly reimbursed, on condition the forces under his command might have free departure; but, till the money could be paid, he would leave with them a number of Athenians as hostages for performance, a man for a talent."

Gylippus and the Syracusans refused the offer; and, resuming offensive measures, ranged their parties quite round the eminence, and poured in their missive weapons upon them till the evening. This body of troops was also sadly distressed for want of bread and necessary subsistence. Watching however for the dead and silent hours of the night, they were then determined to continue their march. They accordingly take up their arms; the Syracusans perceive it, and sung the pæan of alarm. The Athenians were thus convinced, that they could not dislodge without being discovered, and so grounded their arms again; all, but one party of three hundred men. For these, having forced themselves a passage through the guards, made off in the night as fast as it was possible.

So soon as the day appeared, Nicias at the head of his troops led them forwards. But the Syracusans and allies pressed upon him on

Vol. II.

D d d

all

all sides in the usual manner, pouring in volleys of darts and javelins. The Athenians made the best of their way to reach the river Asinarus; — not only because annoyed on all sides by the irruption of the numerous cavalry and skirmishing parties, they concluded they should be eased of these could they once pass that river; but also, through bodily fatigue, and a vehement desire to extinguish their thirst. When therefore they are upon the bank, they rush into the river; no longer observant of order, but each single soldier intent on passing the first of the army. And the enemy, who now pressed hard upon them, had rendered the passage already a business of toil. For, obliged as they were to go down in confused heaps, they fell and trampled upon one another; some, embarrassed by their spears and luggage, met with instant destruction; others, intangled in the croud, were carried away by the current. The hither bank of the river was now filled with Syracusans; and, it being naturally steep, they poured down their darts upon the Athenians, numbers of whom were drinking greedily of the stream, confusedly hampered together in the hollow of the channel. The Peloponnesians, plunging in after them, made a great slaughter of those who were in the river. The water was immediately discoloured with blood. But the stream polluted with mud and gore deterred them not from drinking it greedily, nor many of them for fighting desperately for a draught of it. But in short, when the carcases of the dead began to lie heaped one upon another in the river, and the whole army was become a continued carnage⁷; of some in the river; of those, who were making off from the banks, by the horsemen of the foe; Nicias surrenders himself prisoner to Gylippus, into whose power he chose to fall sooner than into that of the Syracusans. He told him, that “he himself and the Lacedæmonians might decide his fate as best pleased themselves; but intreated, that a stop might be put to the

⁷ According to *Diodorus Siculus*, the number of the slain amounted to eighteen thousand men.

slaughter

"slaughter of his soldiers." Upon this, Gylippus issued out orders to give quarter; and thus they carried off the remnants of this body as prisoners of war, such excepted as were secreted by their captors, the number of which was large. Having further detached a party in pursuit of the three hundred, who in the night had broke through the guard; they also made them prisoners. The whole number now collected together as the public prize was not large; but very numerous were they, who were clandestinely secreted. Not a town in Sicily but was crouded with them, since these had not surrender'd upon terms like those under Demosthenes. A considerable number had also perished. For this was a terrible slaughter; nay, there was no one greater in the course of the Sicilian war. And in the preceding skirmishes, which had happened very frequently during the march, not a few had been slain. Yet notwithstanding all this, many made their escape; some, from the scenes of action; and others, from their prisons, from whence they afterwards gained an opportunity to run away. These repaired to Catana as a safe resort.

And now, the Syracusans and allies in one grand collective body, *Both put to death.* having amassed together as large a number of prisoners as they possibly could and all the spoils, returned in triumph to Syracuse. The bulk of prisoners, whether of the Athenians or their confederates, whom they had taken, they thrust down into the quarries; concluding, that from such a confinement they could not possibly make escapes; but Nicias and Demosthenes, in spite of all the remonstrances of Gylippus, they butchered. For Gylippus imagined, that the finishing of this war would invest himself with pre-eminent degrees of glory, if besides the rest of his achievements he could carry home to the Lacedæmonians the Generals of the enemy. It had further so happened, that one of these, that is Demosthenes, was regarded as their most inveterate enemy, because of his exploits against them in the island Sphaacteria and Pylus; and the other (Nicias) as their most sincere

well-wisher, from his behaviour on those very incidents. For Nicias had strenuously exerted himself in behalf of those Lacedæmonians, who were made prisoners in the island. It was he, who prevailed with the Athenians to sign the treaty, in pursuance of which they were released. For such services done them, the Lacedæmonians had a kindness for him; and it had been chiefly owing to his assurance of this, that he surrender'd himself prisoner to Gylippus. But a party of the Syracusans, as was generally reported, fearful, because they had kept up a correspondence with him, lest, if put to the torture, he might now amidst the general prosperity involve them in trouble; others also, and not least of all the Corinthians, lest as he was rich he might purchase the connivence of his keepers to get his liberty; and then again, might have influence enough to foment fresh stirs to their prejudice; obtained the concurrence of their allies, and put him to death. For these, or reasons most nearly neighbouring to these, was Nicias doomed to destruction; tho' the man of all the Grecians in the present age, who least deserved so wretched a catastrophe, since his whole life was one uniform series of piety towards the Deity*.

*The Athenians
confined in the
quarries.*

As for those who were doomed to the quarries, the Syracusans treated them at first with outrageous severity. As great numbers were crowded together in this hollow dungeon, the beams of the sun in the first place, and then the suffocating air annoyed them in a more terrible manner, because the aperture was left uncovered; and each succeeding night, the reverse of the preceding day, autumnal and nipping, through such vicissitudes threw them into strange disorders. Thus straitned as they were for room, they did whatever they had to do on one and the same spot; and the carcases of those who died lay heaped up promiscuously together; as some expired of their wounds, and others perished through the vicissitudes of air they suffered, or some other such deadly cause. At length, the stench became into-

* Mr. Hobbes in his translation hath omitted this last Comma.

lerably

terribly noisome; and they were further oppressed with hunger and thirst. For, during the space of eight months, the allowance to each was only a * *cotyl* of water and two † *cotyls* of bread a day. * *Little more than half a pint.* Nay, whatever species of misery numbers cooped up in so close a confinement might be liable to suffer, not one of these but pressed † *About 32 solid inches.* cruelly upon them. They were all thus thronged and dieted together for seventy days. But after this term, all but the Athenians, and such of the Sicilians and Italians, as had joined with them in the invasion, were sold out for slaves^s;

What the whole number of prisoners was, it is hard exactly to relate; but however they could not be fewer than seven thousand. And this proved to be the greatest Grecian exploit of all that happened in the course of this war; and, in my opinion, of all that occur in the whole history of Greece; since the event to the victors was most glorious, and to the vanquished most calamitous. For in every respect they were totally overpowered, and their miseries in no respect had any mitigation; in short, root and branch, as is commonly said,

8 “ The decent and engaging behaviour
“ of the Athenians was of great service to
“ them. For by it they either soon obtained
“ their liberty, or were highly esteemed
“ and caressed by their masters. Some of
“ them were indebted for their freedom to
“ Euripides. The Sicilians, it seems,
“ were fonder of the muse of Euripides,
“ than were even the people who lived in
“ Greece itself. If the strangers, who
“ were often resorting to Sicily, brought
“ them any specimens or morsels of his
“ poetry, they learned them by heart, and
“ with high delight communicated them
“ to their friends. It is said, that several,
“ who by this means earned their liberty,
“ went afterwards to wait upon Euripides
“ in token of their gratitude; assuring

“ him, some of them, that they had
“ been released from slavery, for teaching
“ their masters what pieces of his writing
“ they were able to repeat; and others,
“ that, when vagabonds after the defeat,
“ they had been supplied with meat and
“ drink for singing some of his lines. This
“ is not to be wondered at; since, even a
“ Caunian vessel, which being hard chased
“ by pirates, and endeavouring to get for
“ refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was how-
“ ever kept off by force; ’till at length
“ being asked, Whether they could repeat
“ any of Euripides his verses? they an-
“ swered in the affirmative; upon which
“ they obtained immediate reception and
“ refuge.” *Plutarch in the Life of*
Nicias.

their.

their land-armies and their shipping were now ruined ; nay, nothing belonging to them was exempted from destruction. And few, out of all their numbers, had the good fortune to revisit their native country.

Such were the transactions in Sicily *.

* Some Iambic verses of an unknown author are found at the end of this book in the latter Greek editions ; and I beg the reader to accept the following translation of them.

The pride of glory, the exalted height,
The frequent trophies on the land and sea,
The long career of well deserv'd success,

On which their great forefathers tower'd
aloft,

Whilst Persia trembled at th' Athenian
name,

Now droop'd at once ! — a chaos soon
succeeds

Of anarchy, destruction, and distress :

Low ebb'd the *State*, as high it erst had
flow'd.

THE
H I S T O R Y
O F
The PELOPONNESIAN WAR
By THUCYDIDES.
BOOK THE EIGHTH.

C O N T E N T S.

THE news of the overthrow in Sicily causeth a great consternation at Athens. All Greece is in combination against them : And their dependents are meditating revolts.

Year XX. Revolt of the Chians. An alliance between Darius Nothus and the Lacedæmonians. The war transferred to Ionia. Battle of Miletus. A second alliance between Darius and the Lacedæmonians. Proceedings at Chios. Revolt of Rhodes. The politic conduct of Alcibiades : His intrigues. A sedition among the Athenians at Samos in favour of an oligarchy. Pbrynichus counterplots Alcibiades. A third alliance between Darius and the Lacedæmonians.

Year XXI. Proceedings at Chios. The democracy overturned in several places of the Athenian jurisdiction ; and at Athens, by the influence of Antipho, Pbrynichus, and Theramenes. A council of four hundred take upon them the government. The army at Samos declares for the democracy, recalls Alcibiades, and elects him General. Athens full of factions. Pbrynichus stabbed. A tumult ; in the midst of which the fleet of the enemy appears in fight. Battle of Eretria : And revolt of Eubæa. The Four-hundred are deposed : And a new form of government settled at Athens. The banishment of Alcibiades repealed. Battle of Cynos-Sema.



THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

B O O K VIII.

WHEN the news was reported at Athens, no belief for a long time was given—even tho' the most creditable part of the soldiery, who had made their escape from this disastrous business, proved it by a circumstantial relation—that so total a destruction was become their lot. But no sooner were they convinced of its reality, than their resentments burst forth against those

Constitution at Athens.

Plutarch from report tells an odd story on this occasion. —“ A stranger, who (it seems) had come ashore at the Piræus, and had sat him down in a barber's shop, began to talk about the overthrow in Sicily, as of a point well known at Athens. The barber hearing

“ it, before any other person had the news, ran with all speed up into the city; and, having first informed the magistrates of it, spread the report in an instant all over the forum. Consternation and tumult at once ensued. The magistrates convened an assembly of the people,

those of the orators, who had advised and recommended the expedition, as if their own suffrages had never concurred to its execution: They further vented their gall against those retailers of oracles and foretellers of future events, against all in general, who, pretending privity to the will of heaven, had elevated their hopes with the certain conquest of Sicily. On all sides now, all manner of disasters environed them about; and never had Athens been thrown into so great a consternation and dejection, as at the present juncture. For now, beside what each private family suffered, as the *public* at the same time had lost the bulk of its heavy-armed and horsemen, and that flower of its youth which they saw it impossible to replace, they were sorely dejected. Conscious, further, that they had not shipping sufficient in their docks for a fresh equipment, nor money in the public treasury, nor even hands to man what vessels they had left, they gave up all hope of deliverance in the present plunge. Their enemies from Sicily, they imagined, would soon enter the Piræus with a powerful navy; especially, as they were flushed with such a career of success; and their enemies nearer home would now, for a certainty, redouble their preparations, and with the utmost resolution fall upon them at once both by sea and land, and be farther strengthened by the revolt of their own temporizing confederates. At last, however, they agreed it was their duty to do what might yet be done, — not basely to abandon their own preservation, but to fit out a navy by collecting from all possible resources both timber and money, — and timely to secure their own dependent *States*, above all Eubœa, — and to reduce the expences of the civil administration with all possible œconomy, — and to lodge the sove-

“ people, and produced the barber before
 “ them. He was called upon to tell from
 “ whom he had the news: And, when he
 “ could not name the person, being looked
 “ upon as an idle fellow and a disturber of
 “ the public peace, he was immediately

“ tied upon the wheel, and a long time
 “ whirled round upon it, till several per-
 “ sons arrived, who gave a minute and
 “ circumstantial account of the whole.”
Lift of Nicias.

reignty

reignty in the hands of a select body of old experienced statesmen, whose maturer counsels might if possible yet extricate the *State* from its present misfortunes. Such an effect had the general consternation now upon them, — an effect not unusual with a *people*, — that they became heartily disposed to order their government aright. And, as to such resolutions they came, they proceeded farther to put them in execution : And the summer ended.

In the beginning of the ensuing winter, animated by the terrible blow the Athenians had received in Sicily, the whole body of Greece was alert against them. Even such, as had hitherto observed a strict neutrality, without so much as waiting for a formal invitation to accede, thought it incumbent upon themselves no longer to be absent from the war, but voluntarily to enter the lists against the Athenians. Not a *State* but reasoned thus — that “ themselves also these Athenians, had they succeeded in Sicily, would undoubtedly have attacked ;” and then concluded — that “ as the war for certainty was very nearly finished, it would be glorious for them to have a hand in its completion.” But, the old confederates of the Lacedæmonians, as their desires were greater ; so they exerted themselves now with higher alacrity than ever to procure a speedy relaxation of their heavy burdens. Yet, in a most remarkable manner, such *States* as were dependent upon Athens manifested their readiness to revolt, even beyond the bounds of caution ; since now, they formed their judgments in all the warmth of indignation, and could discern no probable method, by which the Athenians could retard their ruin for another summer.

All these circumstances coinciding, the Lacedæmonian *State* became prodigiously alert ; and, above all, with the expectation, that their confederates of Sicily with a powerful reinforcement, as their navies must now of necessity act in concert, would be with them, in all probability, very early in the spring. In every view their hopes were gallant and elate. They determined to go on with the war

The rest of Greece in high spirits.

Particularly the Lacedæmonians.

without any delay ; concluding, that if once brought well to a conclusion, they should ever for the future be released from such dangers as had lately threatned from Athens, in case Sicily had been reduced : And, should they now demolish their competitors, must remain for the future supreme leaders of Greece, without fear of a reverse.

Agis in motion. Instantly therefore Agis their king, though in the depth of winter, sallying forth with a body of troops from Decelæa, marched round the confederacy, levying sums of money for the service of the marine. Turning his route to the Melian gulf, he took a large booty from the Ætæans, against whom their enmity had been of long duration, which he converted into money. He also compelled those Achæans, who were seated in the Pthiotis, and other *States* in this quarter dependent on Thessaly, spite of all the complaints and murmurs of the Thessalians, to give him some hostages for their good behaviour, and to furnish him with money. He disposed of these hostages into safe custody at Corinth, and spared no pains to get them over into the alliance.

Order for a large equipment.

The Lacedæmonians, further, circulated an order among the *States*, for the building of one hundred sail of ships. They taxed themselves and the Bœotians to furnish respectively twenty-five, the Phocians and Locrians fifteen, the Corinthians fifteen, the Arcadians and Peloponnesians and Sicyonians ten, the Megaræans and Trœzenians and Epidaurians and Hermionians ten. They went to work with all other needful preparations, that they might prosecute the war briskly upon the first approach of spring.

Measures taken at Athens.

The Athenians on the other hand, were not remiss in preparing for their own defence ; since, in pursuance of the plan they had formed, they were busy during all the winter in building of ships, having collected proper quantities of timber ; and in fortifying Sunium, that the navigation of their victuallers round that cape might be preserved from molestation. They also evacuated the fortress in Laconia, which they had raised in the voyage to Sicily. And in all respects,

respects, where they judged themselves involved in any less needful expence, they contracted their disbursements with the utmost frugality. But their principal care was keeping a close eye upon their dependents, that they might not revolt.

Amidst these employments of both parties, which were nothing less than most earnest preparations on all sides, as if war was just in its commencement; the Eubœans took the lead, and sent ambassadors this winter to treat with Agis about a revolt from the Athenians. Agis accepted what terms they proposed, and sends for Alcámenes the son of Sthenelaïdas and Melanthus from Lacedæmon, to pass over as commanders into Eubœa. Accordingly they arrived with a body of * citizens newly enfranchised, to the number of about three hundred; and Agis was preparing for their transportation. But in this interval the Lesbians arrived, with declarations of their readiness to revolt. And, as they were seconded by the recommendations of the Bœotians, Agis is persuaded to put off for a time the affair of Eubœa, and began to expedite the revolt of the Lesbians, having assigned them Alcámenes for their governor, who was to have passed over to Eubœa. The Bœotians promised to send them ten ships, and Agis ten. These points were transacted without the privity of the Lacedæmonian State. For Agis, so long as he continued at Decelea, having under his command the army of the State, was invested with a power of sending detachments whithersoever he thought proper, and to levy men and money at his own discretion. And it may with truth be affirmed, that the confederates during this period paid a much greater deference to him than to the State of Lacedæmon. For having a powerful force under his own orders, he was formidable in his every motion. And thus he arbitrarily settled the negotiation of the Lesbians.

*Schemes for re-
volts.*

* Neodamodes.

But then, the Chians and the Erythræans, who also were desirous to revolt, addressed themselves not to Agis but at Lacedæmon. In their company also went thither an ambassador from Tissaphernes, who

who was lieutenant for Darius the son of Artaxerxes in the maritime provinces of Asia. Even Tissaphernes concerned himself now to inflame the Peloponnesian ardor, and promised them large supplies. For lately he had been summoned by *the king* to make returns of the revenue of his government, which not being able to exact from the Grecian cities because of the Athenians, he was run into a large arrear. He concluded therefore, that, could he demolish the Athenians, he then with great ease might levy the tributes; what is more, might make the Lacedæmonians confederates to the *king*; and might at length convey to him, either alive or dead, Amorges the bastard-son of Pisistratus, who had revolted in Caria, as the king had expressly commanded. The Chians therefore and Tissaphernes were now negotiating this point in concert.

Calligonus the son of Laophon a Megarian and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras a Cyzicene, both exiles from their native places and refuged with Pharnabazus the son of Pharnabacrus, arrive at Lacedæmon about the same point of time, commissioned by Pharnabazus to procure an aid of shipping for the Hellespont, by which he might be enabled (the very same thing as Tissaphernes desired) to work the revolt of the cities within his district from the Athenian obedience, because of the tributes, and expeditiously to gain for himself the credit of having procured for his master the alliance of the Lacedæmonians. As the agents of Pharnabazus and those also of Tissaphernes were negotiating the same point, though apart from each other, a great debate arose among the statesmen at Lacedæmon; one party insisting with vehemence, that an aid of shipping and a land-force should be sent to Ionia and Chios; another party, that they should be sent first to Hellespont. The Lacedæmonians, however, complied by far the soonest with the demands of the Chians and Tissaphernes. Alcibiades indeed espoused the cause of the latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark hereditary friendship to Endius, who at this juncture presided in the college of *Ephori*. On this account

it

it was, that the family of Alcibiades, in compliment to this friendship, had taken a Lacedæmonian name: For this Endius was the son of an Alcibiades. Yet, previously, the Lacedæmonians dispatched Phrynis, a person born and educated in those parts, to Chios; to inspect the state of affairs there and report, whether they had so large a number of shipping as they pretended, and their situation in other respects equalized the fine account they had given of it. Accordingly, when Phrynis had reported, "that all the accounts they had heard were true," the Chians and Erythræans were instantly admitted allies. They voted, farther, to send them forty sail of shipping, as there were already assembled at Chios not fewer than sixty from places which the Chians named. Ten of these they designed to dispatch as soon as possible, under the command of Melanchridas who was appointed admiral. But afterwards, the shock of an earthquake being felt, instead of Melanchridas they sent Chalcideus; and, instead of ten, equipped in Laconia only five ships for this service.

Here the winter ended; and the nineteenth year of this war came also to an end, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

Y E A R XX.

SUMMER now coming on, as the Chians were most earnestly *Before Christ* soliciting the dispatch of the ships, and were also afraid lest the Athenians should get notice of their transactions, — For the whole of ^{412.} the negotiation had been carried on without the knowledge of the ^{The Lacedæmonian measures.} *fact.* latter — the Lacedæmonians send to Corinth three citizens of Sparta, to prevail with that *State* for the transportation of their ships with all possible expedition across the Isthmus, from the other sea into that which lies towards Athens, that all in a body might stand away for Chios, as well those which Agis had destined for the service of Lesbos

Lesbos as the rest. The whole number of shipping belonging to the alliance, now assembled together there, amounted to thirty-nine.

But Calligitus truly and Timagoras refused, in the name of Pharnabazus, to have any participation in the expedition to Chios; nor would part with the money they had brought with them, which
 * 4843 l. 15 s. was * five and twenty talents, to disburse this equipment. They
Sterling. intended to get another fitted out, which should sail away under their own orders.

As for Agis — when now he perceived that the Lacedæmonians were determined to go *first* to Chios, he no longer suffered his own projects to clash with those of the *State*: But the confederates now assembling at Corinth proceeded to draw up a plan of operations. It was accordingly agreed, that they should go first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who fitted out the five ships in Laconia; from thence to Lesbos under the command of Alcamenes, whom Agis had destined for that service; in the last place they should proceed to Hellepont, and in this service it was agreed beforehand that Clearchus the son of Ramphias should take upon him the command: But the first step should be the transportation of a moiety of their shipping across the Isthmus, which were immediately to stand out to sea, that the attention of the Athenians might be less engaged upon such, as were already in their course, than on those which were to follow. — For now they determined to cross the sea in an open insulting manner, as they contemned the present impotence of the Athenians, because they had no considerable force any where at sea.

When these resolutions were formally compleated, they immediately transported one and twenty ships. Expedition sailing was earnestly solicited; but the Corinthians declared a reluctancy to go the voyage, 'till they had celebrated the Isthmian games which were at hand. To remove this obstacle, Agis declared himself ready to have the whole procedure charged to his own account, that they might
 be

be cleared from a breach of the Isthmian cessation. The Corinthians not complying with this proposal, and delay necessarily resulting from it, the Athenians gained by this an earlier discovery of the negotiation of the Chians; and, dispatching Aristocrates one of their generals, charged them openly with the guilt of such a procedure. The Chians as strenuously denying the charge, they commanded them to send away their shipping forthwith to Athens by way of pledge for their safety.

The Chians accordingly sent seven. But the detachment of these was owing intirely to the *popular* party of that island, who had been kept in utter ignorance of the late negotiation. The *few*, who were privy to it, had no mind to incur the popular resentment before they were enabled to stem its fury; especially as now they had resigned all hope of the arrival of the Peloponnesians, whose motions were exceeding dilatory.

In the mean time the Isthmian games were solemnized. And at these the Athenians, who had the regular invitation sent them, assisted in form. The practices of the Chians became here more apparent to them than ever. No sooner therefore were they returned to Athens, than they put all the needful expedients in readiness, to prevent the squadron which was to sail from Cenchreæ from passing undiscovered.

When the festival was over, the latter with one and twenty sail, under the command of Alcámenes, stood out to sea in order for Chios. *A squadron sails for Chios.* And the Athenians advancing against them, at first with an equal number of shipping, stood off again into open sea. But when the Peloponnesians would not follow them far, but stood in to the land, the Athenians disappeared. For, having amongst their number the seven ships of the Chians, they thought it not safe to trust them. But having afterwards manned out others to the amount of thirty-seven, *Intercepted, and driven into Piræus.* they drive the enemy along the coast into Piræus of the Corinthians: This is a desert harbour, and the last upon the confines of Epidauria.

One ship indeed, which the enemy came up with at sea, the Peloponnesians lost; but all the rest they draw together to a station within the harbour. Here the Athenians attacked them, on the water with their ships, and by land with a party sent purposely on shore. The attack was attended with great confusion, and carried on in a disorderly manner. The party of the Athenians, which attacked from the land, disable the bulk of the squadron, and kill the commander Alcarnenes: Some also of their own people perished in the action. But when the dispute was ended, they posted a sufficient number of their ships to lie facing those of the enemy, and with the remainder anchor near a little isle, on which as it lay at a small distance they form an incampment, and send away to Athens for a reinforcement.

*Blocked up
there.*

In favour of the Peloponnesians, came up, on the day following, not only the Corinthians; but, soon after, a number also of others from the adjacent country, in aid of the squadron; who perceiving, that the preservation of it would be a work of laborious toil on so desert a coast, were sadly perplexed. Some argued vehemently for setting the ships on fire; but at length it was concluded to draw them ashore, and incamping with their land-forces round them to guard them from the enemy, till some convenient opportunity should offer of getting them away. Agis also, when informed of their situation, sent to them Thermo, a citizen of Sparta.

To the Lacedæmonians the first advice that had been sent was this, — that “the squadron had set sail from the Isthmus.” For orders had been given Alcarnenes by the *Ephori*, that when this point was executed he should dispatch an horseman to them: And immediately then they had determined to dispatch away the commander Chalcideus accompanied by Alcibiades, with the five ships of their own equipment. But at the instant they were ready to move off, the news arrived — that “the squadron had been drove into Piræus.” Dejected by this unexpected event, because they had stumbled in
the

the very first entrance on an Ionian war, they no longer persisted in the design of sending away their own ships, but even thought of recalling some of those which were already at sea. But as this was discovered by Alcibiades, he again persuades Endius and the other *Ephori* by no means intirely to give up the expedition; assuring them, that “ by a timely dispatch they yet might make that island, “ before any information of the disaster which had befallen the squadron could reach the Chians; and of himself, were he once in Ionia, “ he could easily effectuate the revolt of the cities, by opening “ their eyes in respect to the weakness of the Athenians, and the “ hearty and vigorous interposition of the Lacedæmonians; since “ on these topics he should be heard with greater deference than “ any other person whatever.” He also privately encouraged Endius with the prospect of “ great glory to himself, if through him “ Ionia could be brought to revolt and the *king* be made confederate “ to Lacedæmon, whilst Agis had no manner of participation in “ these masterly strokes of policy:” For he happened now to be at a variance with Agis. By such insinuations Alcibiades prevailed upon the college of *Ephori* and Endius, and sailed away with the five ships in company with Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian: And the voyage they performed with all possible expedition.

A second squadron sails.

2 No reasons are here assigned for the variance between Alcibiades and Agis. Numbers of probable ones might occur from the different tempers and manners of the persons. But we learn from *Plutarch*, that Alcibiades had been intriguing with Timæa the wife of Agis, and had had a son by her who was called Leotychides, disowned afterwards by Agis, and incapacitated from succeeding to the throne. Alcibiades was always dissolute; and yet, this (it seems) was merely to gratify his pride, since he declared his intention in this intrigue to have

been, that his descendents might reign at Sparta. This fine gentleman from Athens was exceeding agreeable in the eyes of her Spartan majesty; even tho’ his deportment at Sparta was such, as if he had been trained from his birth in the severe discipline of Lycurgus. He was a *stern* Spartan, shaved close, plunged into cold water, could make a meal on dry bread, and feast on black broth: One would think, says *Plutarch*, he had never kept a cook in his life, never seen a perfumer, nor ever worn a Milesian robe. *Life of Alcibiades.*

F f f 2

About

About the same time, the sixteen ships which had been at the war of Sicily under the orders of Gylippus, regained in safety the Peloponnesian ports. They had been intercepted near Leucadia, and terribly harassed by twenty-seven sail of Athenians commanded by Hippocles the son of Menippus, who was stationed there to watch the return of the fleet from Sicily. Yet only a single ship was lost. The rest, escaping the Athenian chase, arrived safe in the harbour of Corinth.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were now upon their voyage, stopped and detained whatever they met, that their course might not be divulged. And touching first at Corycus on the main, and there setting at liberty such as they had detained, and gaining a conference with some of the Chians who were privy to their designs, by whom being advised to make directly for the harbour of Chios, without any formal notification — they arrive there, intirely unexpected by the Chians. By this the *many* were thrown at once into astonishment and terror; but the *few* had so conducted matters, that the *council* was that moment sitting; in which Chalcideus and Alcibiades being admitted to speech it — that “many other ships are coming up,” — but suppressing all mention of the squadron blocked up at Piræus, the Chians declare a revolt from the Athenians; and the Erythræans soon follow their example.

*Revolt of
Chios.*

And Clazomenæ.

So far successful, they passed on with three ships to Clazomenæ, and cause that city also to revolt. Instantly upon this, the Clazomenians crossed over into the continent, and fortified Polichne, to be a place of safe resort for themselves, in case obliged to quit the little isle they occupied at present. All the revolters, in short, were warmly employed in fortifying their towns, and making preparations for war.

*Measures taken
at Athens.*

At Athens soon the news arrives of the revolt of Chios. They were now convinced, that horrid and apparent dangers already environed them about, and that the rest of their dependents would not long

long be quiet, when the most powerful *State* amongst them had thrown off the yoke. Now therefore the * thousand talents, which through all the course of the war they had religiously refrained from touching, the penalties being discharged which the law inflicted upon him who should move or whoever should vote it, amidst their present consternation, they decreed "should be employed in the public service, and that a large number of ships should by this means be equipped; — that further, from the squadron which blocked up Piræus eight ships should immediately be detached;" which accordingly quitting the blockade, pursued the squadron under Chalcideus, but being unable to come up with them returned again. This detachment was commanded by Strombichides the son of Diotimus — that "soon after twelve others under the orders of Thrasycles should repair to Chios, these also to be detached from the same blockade." Having, moreover, fetched off the seven vessels belonging to the Chians, which assisted in forming the blockade at Piræus, they set at liberty the slaves who were on board them, and threw all the freemen into prison. But, to replace the whole number detached from the blockade of the Peloponnesians, they lost no time in fitting out other vessels and sending them to that post. They had also a scheme for the expeditious equipment of thirty more. Great indeed was their ardor, and nothing of small importance was taken in hand, as the point in agitation was no less than the recovery of Chios.

In the mean time Strombichides with the eight sail of ships arrived at Samos; and, taking with him one Samian vessel, stood onwards to Teos, and required of them "to have no participation in the present commotions." From Chios also, Chalcideus was now coming over to Teos with a fleet of three and twenty sail; and the land-force of the Clazomenians and also of the Erythræans, attending his motions, was marching thither by land. But Strombichides, having timely notice of their approach, put out again before their arrival.

* 193750 *l.*
Sterling.

arrival. Standing out aloof into open sea, he had a view of this numerous fleet in their course from Chios, upon which he fled again to Samos. But the enemy followed in pursuit.

The Teians, who at first refused admittance to the land-forces, when now the Athenians plainly fled, thought proper to open their gates. Here, the bulk of them were inactive for a time, attending the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit. But when time wore on without his appearing, they demolished of their own accord the wall which the Athenians had built on the side of Teos facing the continent. In this they were also assisted by a small party of Barbarians, who in this interval had joined them, and were commanded by Tagas the deputy of Tissaphernes.

*Revolt of
Miletus.*

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, having furnished the mariners of the Peloponnesian vessels with proper arms, leave them as a garrison in Chios. Having manned their vessels afresh at Chios, with an addition of twenty others, they stood away for Miletus, as meditating its revolt. This was owing to Alcibiades, who, having an interest in persons of the first rank among the Milesians, made it a point to effectuate their accession before the fleet should come up from Peloponnesus, and to secure the whole honour to the Chians and himself and Chalcideus and Endius who had sent him, in pursuance of his engagements to work the revolt of the cities with the sole power of the Chians and with Chalcideus. Having therefore performed the greatest part of their voyage thither without being discovered, and prevented by a small portion of time Strombichides and also Thra-sycles, who was lately come up from Athens with twelve ships and in junction with the former followed after them, they cause Miletus to revolt. The Athenians indeed with nineteen sail arrived upon their heels; but, as the Milesians denied them a reception, they took their station at Lade an adjacent isle.

The

The first alliance between *the king* and the Lacedæmonians was made immediately after the revolt of Miletus, by Tissaphernes and Chalcidæus, as followeth:

- “ ON these terms the Lacedæmonians and confederates have made
 “ an alliance with *the king* and Tissaphernes ——— Alliance be-
tween the king
and the Lace-
dæmonians.
 “ Whatever region or cities the *king* possesseth, and the ancestors
 “ of the *king* possessed, be those the *king*’s.
 “ And out of those cities whatever sums of money or any other
 “ supply went to the Athenians, let the *king* and the Lacedæmonians
 “ and confederates jointly stop, that the Athenians may no longer
 “ receive those sums of money, nor any other such supply.
 “ And, the war against the Athenians let the *king* and the Lace-
 “ dæmonians and confederates jointly carry on.
 “ And, be it unlawful to put an end to the war against the Athe-
 “ nians, without the consent of both the contracting parties, of the
 “ *king* on one side, of the Lacedæmonians and confederates on the
 “ other.
 “ If, further, any revolt from the *king*, be they declared enemies
 “ to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.
 “ And, if any revolt from the Lacedæmonians and confederates,
 “ be they declared enemies, in the same manner, to the *king*.”

This alliance was now formally concluded.

Immediately after this, the Chians, who had manned out ten ad- More revolts.
 ditional ships, stood away to Anzæ, being desirous to pick up some
 information of what was doing at Miletus, and at the same time to
 cause the revolt of the cities. Here, being reached by an order from
 Chalcidæus to return back to Chios, with an intimation that Amorges
 with a land-army would soon be upon them, they sailed away to the
 temple of Jupiter. From hence they descry sixteen ships, which
 Diomedon was bringing up from Athens, from whence he had
 failed

failed somewhat later than Thrasycles. Upon this discovery they fled amain — with a single ship to Ephesus, but with the rest of their fleet to Teos. Four indeed of the number, which their crews had abandoned, the Athenians take; yet all the hands escaped on shore; but the remainder reach in safety the city of the Teians. After this, the Athenians stood away into Samos. But the Chians, putting again to sea with the residue of their ships and attended by a land-force, caused Lebedos to revolt, and also Eræ. And these points carried, both the land-force and the squadron returned respectively to their own homes.

The blockade at Piræus broke.

About the same time, the twenty sail of Peloponnesians, which had been chased into Piræus and lay blocked up there by an equal number of Athenians, having made an unexpected sally upon the enemy and got the better in a naval engagement, take four of the Athenian ships; and, sailing away for Cenchreæ, were again fitting out for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Aftyochus also came down thither from Lacedæmon as admiral, in whose hands the whole command at sea was now lodged.

Teos.

When the land-army had quitted Teos, Tissaphernes in person came thither with a body; and, after compleatly demolishing those parts of the wall before Teos which were yet left standing, marched away.

Not long after his departure, Diomedon arriving there with ten sail of Athenians, in order to gain a reception, made a truce with the Teians. From thence he coasted along to Eræ, and assaulted the place: But not being able to take it, he sailed away.

Insurrection at Samos.

Coinciding with this in point of time, an insurrection was made at Samos by the *people* against the *nobility*. The Athenians, who with three ships were then lying at Samos, assisted the former. On this occasion, the Samian *people* massacred about two hundred persons, all of the *nobility*. Four hundred others they condemned to exile; and, having divided amongst themselves their lands and houses,

and

and obtained from the Athenians a decree of being governed by their own constitutions as men whose fidelity was no longer to be suspected, they assumed the whole civil administration, leaving no share of it in the hands of the *landed gentry*, and absolutely prohibiting to the *people* all alliance for the future with them, so as neither to give their daughters to them, nor ever to marry theirs.

After these transactions, during the same summer, the Chians proceeding with unabated ardor, left nothing undone to compass the revolt of the cities. Even without Peloponnesian aid they made them visits with their own single force; and, desirous at the same time to involve as large a number as possible in their own dangers, they undertake a voyage with thirteen sail of ships to Lesbos. — This squared exactly with the Lacedæmonian plan, which was to make the second attempt upon that island — and from thence to proceed to Hellespont. The land-force at the same time of such Peloponnesians as were at hand, and their adjacent allies, attended their motions by the route of Clazomenæ and Cyme. These were commanded by Eualas a Spartan; but the fleet was under the orders of Deixiadas a native of those parts. And those ships, steering first towards and arriving at Methymne, cause its revolt³. * * * * *

Revolt of Lesbos.

But Aftyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral in chief, putting to sea from Cenchreæ where he had taken upon him the command, with four sail of shipping arrives at Chios. And the third day after his arrival there, twenty-five sail of Athenians commanded by Leon and Diomedon reached the isle of Lesbos: For Leon had been lately sent from Athens with a reinforcement of ten. On the very evening of that day, Aftyochus put out again to sea with the addition of one Chian ship, and stood away for Lesbos to give them all the assistance

Reduced again by the Athenians.

³ From what follows it looks as if some words were wanting here. The Latin translators have endeavoured to supply it, thus. — “ And the Chians, leaving four ships here for the defence of the place, stood away with the rest to Mitylene, and caused it to revolt.”

in his power. Accordingly he toucheth first at Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day following to Ereſſus, where information meets him that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians at a ſhout. For the latter, as their arrival was intirely unexpected, ſtanding boldly into the harbour, ſeized at once all the Chian veſſels: And then landing, and gaining the victory over ſuch as made head againſt them, became maſters of the city. Aſtyochus, informed of this event by the Ereſſians and the Chian ſhips under command of Eubulus from Methymne — which, having been left in the harbour of that place, had fled at once when Mitylene was taken: Three of them came up ſafe to Aſtyochus, but one had fallen into the hands of the Athenians — Aſtyochus now deſiſted from proceeding to Mitylene. Having effectuated the revolt of Ereſſus and provided the inhabitants with arms, he ordered the ſoldiers from on board his own ſquadron to march by land under the orders of Eteonicus towards Antiffa and Methymne; whiſt himſelf, with his own ſhips and the three Chian, advanced along the ſhore towards the ſame places. He hoped the Methymneans upon the ſight of this ſuccour would reſume their ſpirits, and abide by their revolt. But when every thing in Leſbos ſeemed to act in concert againſt his ſcheme, he took his land-men again on board, and made the beſt of his way back again to Chios. The forces, farther, that had attended the motions of his ſquadron, and which were to have proceeded with him to Hellespont, were diſmiſſed to their reſpective cities. After this, they were joined at Chios by ſix ſhips, which were ſent thither from the confederate fleet of Peloponneſians aſſembled at Cenchrea.

And Clazomenæ.

The Athenians, in the mean time, were employed in reſettling the ſtate of affairs in Leſbos. Standing acroſs from thence, and demolishing Polichne on the continent lately fortified by the Clazomenians, they removed all the latter back again to their city in the iſle, excepting ſuch as were authors of the revolt: For theſe had retired to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenæ once more became ſubject to the Athenians.

The

The same summer the Athenians, who with twenty ships had stationed themselves at Lade, to awe Miletus, having made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, kill Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian, who with a handful of men endeavoured to repulse them. The third day after this action they re-embarked, but first erected a trophy; which the Milesians thought proper to demolish, as not fixed on a spot which was the property of the victors.

Chalcideus killed.

Leon also and Diomedon, at the head of the Athenian fleet on the station of Lesbos, assembling together what force they could from the Oinussæ-islands which lie before Chios, and from Sidusa and Pteleum fortresses of their own in Erythræa, stood away from Lesbos in a body, and carried on the war by sea against the Chians. The land-soldiers on board them were some of the heavy-armed of the public roll of Athens, now pressed into this service. At Cardamyle they landed; and at Bolissus having routed in battle a body of Chians that made head against them, and done great execution upon them, they reduced all the places in that quarter of the island. At Phanæ also, they fought a second time with great success; and a third time, at Leuconium. But, as after these repeated defeats, the Chians no longer shewed themselves in the field to oppose them, the victors made cruel ravage on that rich and fertile country; and which, from the invasion of the Medes to the present period of time, had been totally exempted from the miseries of war. For next to the Lacedæmonians the Chians are the only people, who (as far as I have been able to observe) have enjoyed a series of public prosperity with a steady and uniform moderation; and in proportion as their State increased in wealth and power, made suitable accessions to its domestic splendor and security. Nay, even their late revolt, if this should chance to be ascribed to a want of judicious and cautionary measures, they never ventured to declare, till they had fortified the hazardous step with numerous and gallant confederates, and saw plainly that the Athenians (as even the Athenians themselves could not possibly deny)

War against the Chians.

after the blow received in Sicily, were plunged into the lowest depth of impotence and distress. If therefore they proved mistaken, it was one of those cases inseparable from the constant mutability of human affairs, where numbers were involved in the same mistake with themselves, who yet in their judgment were perfectly convinced, that the intire ruin of Athens was fast approaching.

Now therefore blocked up as they were by sea, whilst their lands all around were ravaged by the enemy, a party amongst them were concerting the method of delivering up the city into the hands of the Athenians. But those in the administration, getting wind of their design, refrained indeed from making a bustle about it in public; but, fetching over Aftyochus the Lacedæmonian admiral in chief with his four ships from Erythræ, they consulted how to prevent the execution of the plot by the mildest and most gentle methods, either by taking hostages for the fidelity of the suspected, or some other such cautionary expedients. In this posture stood affairs at Chios.

*The battle of
Miletus.*

But from Athens, in the close of the same summer, one thousand five hundred heavy-armed Athenians and a thousand Argives (for five hundred Argives who were but light-armed, the Athenians had equipped in the manner more compleat) with the addition of a thousand confederates, in eight and forty sail of ships, including the transports of the heavy-armed, and put under the command of Phrynichus and Onomacles and Skironidas, sailed away to Samos, and thence stretching over to Miletus incamped themselves before it. The Milesians marched out into the field to the amount of eight hundred heavy-armed, assisted by the Peloponnesians who came over with Chalcideus and a body of foreign mercenaries furnished by Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes also assisted them in person with an aid of cavalry. And thus, battle was joined against the Athenians and confederates. The Argives, of whom a whole wing was composed, advanced before the rest of the line; and, contemning their enemy too much, as Ionians, and
unable

unable to stand their shock, they charged in a disorderly manner, are routed by the Milesians, and no less a number than three hundred of their body are destroyed. But the Athenians beat first the Peloponnesians, and then cleared the field of the Barbarians and all the rabble of the enemy, yet came not at all to an engagement with the Milesians. For the latter, returning towards the city from the chace of the Argives, no sooner perceived that their own side was vanquished than they quitted the field of battle. The Athenians therefore, as victors, posted themselves under the very walls of Miletus. It is observable, that in this battle the Ionians had on both sides the better of the Dorians. For the Athenians beat those Peloponnesians who were ranged against them; and the Milesians did the same by the Argives. But now, after erecting a trophy, as *Siege of Miletus.* the town was seated on an isthmus, the Athenians were preparing to cut it off by a work of circumvallation; concluding; that "if they once could get possession of Miletus, they should easily com-
 "pleat the reduction of the other States."

It was now about the shut of evening, and advice is brought them *The united fleets of the enemy arrive.* that "five and fifty sail of ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily are only
 "not at hand." For from Sicily, where Hermocrates the Syracusan strenuously advised to go on with what yet remained in regard to the total demolition of the Athenians, twenty sail of Syracusans and two of Selinuntians came over: The Peloponnesian fleet, which had been sitting out, was now ready for service: And both these, were sent out in conjunction under the orders of Theramenes the Lacedæmonian, who was to carry them to Astyochus the admiral in chief. They arrived first at Eleus, an island before Miletus. Being there informed that the Athenians lay before Miletus, they departed thence: And steering first into the gulf of Iæsus, were desirous to pick up information how things went at Miletus. Alcibiades had now rode to Teichiussa in the Milesian; in which quarter of the gulf the fleets had come to anchor for the night, and receive there a
 full

full account of the battle. Alcibiades had been present at it, and had given his assistance to the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He therefore earnestly pressed them, " unless they were desirous to see all " Ionia lost and all their great expectations blasted at once, to repair " with all possible expedition to the succour of Miletus, and by no " means to suffer it to be invested by a circumvallation." In pursuance of this it was resolved, that at the first dawn of day they would stand away to its succour.

*The Athenians
bald a council
of war,*

But Phrynichus the Athenian commander, when advised from Lerus of the certain arrival of this united fleet, even though his colleagues declared openly for keeping their ground and hazarding an engagement by sea — protested boldly, that " such a step for his " own part he could not take; and were he able to hinder it, that " neither they nor any one should force him to it. For, since it " would be afterwards in their power, when they had got better " intelligence of the numbers of the enemy, and made what possible accessions they could to their own, and when they had prepared " for action in an ample and leisurely manner, — since it would be " still in their power to fight, the dread of a shameful or reproachful imputation should not bind him to risk an engagement against " his judgment. It could be no matter of reproach to the Athenians, to retire with their fleet when the exigencies of time required " it: But in every respect, it would be highly reproachful to them, " should they fight and be vanquished. He would not therefore involve the *State*, not only in reproach but in the greatest of " dangers; — The *State*, which but just respiring from the terrible " blows it had received, scarce thought it prudential with most ample preparation to chuse voluntary hazards, or even when the last " necessity demanded, to strike first at the enemy — why now, " when no necessity compelled, must it be thrown into wilful spontaneous dangers?" He exhorted them therefore, " without loss " of time to carry the wounded on board, to re-embark their troops,

“ troops, and securing what baggage they had brought along with
 “ them, to leave behind what booty they had got from the enemy
 “ that their ships might not be too deeply laden, and make the best
 “ of their way to Samos: And from thence, after collecting toge-
 “ ther what additional force they could, to watch for and seize the
 “ seasons of advantage to attack their foes.” The advice of Phry-
 nichus thus given, was prevailing; and, accordingly, was put in
 execution. He was regarded not only on the present but on future
 occasions, not only for this but all the subsequent instances of his con-
 duct, as a man of an excellent understanding.

In pursuance of this the Athenians, so soon as the evening was
 closed, made the best of their way from Miletus, and left their vic-
 tory imperfect. And the Argives, without making the least stay,
 chagrined as they were at their late defeat, departed immediately
 from Samos to return to Argos.

The Peloponnesians, early the next dawn, weighing from Teichi-
 ussa stand into Miletus. After one day's stay in that harbour, on the
 next having augmented their squadron with the Chian ships which
 had formerly been chased in company with Chalcideus, they deter-
 mined to go back again to Teichiussa to fetch off what stores they
 had landed there. Accordingly, when they were thus returned, Tis-
 saphernes being come up with his land-army, persuades them to stand
 directly against Iäsus, in which his enemy Amorges at that instant
 lay. Thus falling on Iäsus by surprise, the inhabitants of which ex-
 pected none but an Athenian squadron, they become masters of it.
 In this action the Syracusans were the persons who gained the
 greatest honour. Amorges, further, the bastard-son of Pissuthnes, who
 was a revoler from the king, was taken prisoner by the Peloponnesians.
 They delivered him up to Tissaphernes, that if he pleased he might
 send him to the king in obedience to his orders. Iäsus, further, they
 put to the sack; and the army made on this occasion a very large
 booty: For this city had ever been remarkable for its wealth. They
 gave

*And retire by
 night from
 Miletus.*

*Proceedings of
 the combined
 fleet.*

Iäsus surprised.

*Amorges
 taken prisoner.*

gave quarter to the auxiliaries in the service of Amorges; and, without committing the least insult upon them, took them into their own troops, as the bulk of them were Peloponnesians. They delivered up the town into the hands of Tiffaphernes, as likewise all the prisoners whether slaves or freemen, upon covenant to receive from him

* 12. 12. 3d. $\frac{1}{2}$

a * Daric-stater for each. This being done, they again repaired to Miletus. And from hence they detach Pedaritus the son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had sent expressly to be governor of Chios, to march over-land to Erythræ, having under his command the auxiliaries who had served under Amorges; and appoint Philippus to command at Miletus. And the summer ended.

Tiffaphernes
is for abridging
the pay of sea-
men.

+ 7 d. $\frac{3}{4}$.

† Half a
drachma.

The winter now succeeding, after Tiffaphernes had garrisoned and provided for the security of Iäsus, he repaired to Miletus, and distributed a month's subsistence, in pursuance of his engagements at Lacedæmon, to all the ships, at the rate of an † Attic drachma to each mariner by the day; but, for the remainder of time he declared he would only pay at the rate of ‡ three oboli, 'till he had consulted the king's pleasure: And in case his master's orders were for it, he said, he would make it up a compleat *drachma*. But, as Hermocrates the Syracusan commander remonstrated sharply against this usage (for Theramenes, not regarding himself as admiral since he was now at the head of the fleet meerly to carry it up to Astyochus, was very indolent about the article of pay,) it was at length compromised, that excepting the five supernumerary ships, the crews of the rest should receive more than three *oboli* a man. For to the five and fifty ships he paid 4 three talents a month: And for the rest, as many as exceeded

4 There is manifestly a fault here. For *τρία, three*, in the original should be read *τριάκοντα, thirty* talents a month. Mr. Hobbes hath taken the pains to compute, and finds that the Peloponnesian ships carried eighteen men apiece. What? only so

small a crew as eighteen men for a ship of war with three banks of oars? or, where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did Tiffaphernes only pay a tenth part of the number? *Xenophon*, in the first book of his *Great history*, enables us to set all to rights.

exceeded that number, pay was to be furnished at the rate of only three *oboli* a day.

The same winter, the Athenians now lying at Samos had been re-^{The Athenian fleet reinforced.}inforced by the arrival of five and thirty sail from Athens under the command of Charminus, and Strombichides, and Euctemon; and they had farther assembled all their ships from Chios, and others. A resolution was therefore taken, after assigning each his peculiar command by lot, to make up against it with a naval force and awe Miletus; but, to send against Chios both a naval and a land-force. And this accordingly they put in execution. For, in fact, Strombichides and Onomacles and Euctemon with a squadron of thirty sail and a body of transports, which had on board a detachment from the thousand heavy-armed which came against Miletus, stood away for Chios, as this service had fallen to them by lot. But the rest of the commanders who now remained at Samos, having under them seventy-four ships, were quite lords of the sea, and sailed boldly up to awe Miletus.

rights. Lyfander is negotiating with Cyrus for an increase of pay. Cyrus insists upon the former agreement made by Tissaphernes, that every ship should receive but thirty *mine* a month. The daily pay of each was of course one *mina* or one hundred *drachmas*: Whence it appears, that at three *oboli* or half a *drachma* a man, the pay of sixty ships, each carrying two hundred men, would be just thirty *talents*. Thirty *talents* therefore paid to fifty-five ships for a month was two *talents* and a half above three *oboli* a day. And hence it seems pretty clear, that the complement of a Peloponnesian ship of war was two hundred men.

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm what hath been already said, and serve at the same time to ascertain the number of men on board a ship of war.

In the sixth book Thucydides says, the Egeſſeans brought to Athens sixty *talents* as a month's pay for sixty ships. He says also, that in the Sicilian expedition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised to a *drachma* a man. Now a *talent* a month, reckoning thirty days to the month, is two *mine* a day; and two *mine* are just two hundred *drachmas*. Hence it is plain, the complement of an Athenian ship was two hundred men. And, according to the former computation, that of a Peloponnesian ship was, as might reasonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a farther confirmation, that there is a mistake in the printed copies of the original, as was said above, where instead of *three talents*, which amount but to 581 *l. 5 s. sterling*, should have been read *thirty talents*, amounting in English money to 5812 *l. 10 s.*

Astyochus.

Astyochus, who happened at this juncture to be in Chios, selecting hostages as a prevention against treachery, thought proper for the present to desist, when he heard of the arrival of the squadron under Theramenes, and that their engagements with Tissaphernes were much altered for the better. But, taking with him ten sail of Peloponnesians and ten of Chians, he putteth to sea : And having made an attempt upon Pteleum, though without success, he crossed over to Clazomenæ. He there summoned such of the inhabitants as were attached to the Athenians to remove with their effects up to Daphnus, and leave him possession of the place. Tamus, further, the sub-governor of Ionia joined with him in the summons. But when the inhabitants rejected this offer, he made an assault upon the city which had no fortifications ; yet, miscarrying in the attempt, he put off again to sea in a hard gale of wind, and reached with those ships that kept up with him to Phocæa and Cyme ; but the rest of the squadron was by stress of weather forced over to the isles which lie near to Clazomenæ, Marathusa and Pele and Drimussa. And whatever effects belonging to the Clazomenians had by way of security been repositied there, during eight days continuance which the stormy weather obliged them to stay, they partly plundered and partly destroyed ; and, having secured their booty on board, got away to Phocæa and Cyme, and rejoined Astyochus. But, whilst he was yet in this station, ambassadors reach him from the Lesbians imparting to him their desires to revolt. Him indeed they persuade, but when the Corinthians and the rest of the confederates declared their repugnance because of their former miscarriage, he weighed from thence, and made sail for Chios. And now a storm dispersing his squadron, at last they all come in, though from different quarters to which they had been separately driven, and rejoin him at Chios.

The next step to this was the junction of Pædaritus, who being now at Erythræ after marching by land from Miletus, passed over in person with the troops under his command into Chios. He had also
with

with him about five hundred soldiers, taken out of the five ships under Chalcideus, who had been left behind with their arms.

But now, the Lesbians notifying again their readiness to revolt, Aftyochus, in a conference with Pædaritus and the Chians, maintains " the necessity of going thither with a squadron to support the revolt " of Lesbos; since, in consequence of it, they must either enlarge " the number of their confederates; or, even though miscarrying in " the design, must hurt the Athenians." But they were deaf to this remonstrance; and Pædaritus positively declared that he should not be attended by the ships of Chios. Upon this, taking with him five sail of Corinthians, a sixth ship belonging to Megara, and one more of Hermione; and all the Laconian which he himself brought thither; he stood away from thence to his station at Miletus, uttering grievous threats against the Chians, that " how low soever they " might be reduced, they should never receive any succour from " him." Accordingly, touching first at Corycus of Erythræ, he moored there for the night. The Athenians, who from Samos with a considerable strength were now bound against Chios, were lying at the same instant of time on the other side of the cape, but so stationed that neither party knew of the nearness of the other. At this juncture, a letter being delivered from Pædaritus, that " a party of " Erythræans, who had been prisoners at Samos and released from " thence, are coming to Erythræ to betray that place," Aftyochus puts out again immediately for Erythræ: And thus narrowly, on this occasion, did he escape falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pædaritus, further, had made the passage upon this affair: And both having joined in making all necessary enquiries about those who were accused of this piece of treachery, when they found the whole to have been a plot of the prisoners at Samos merely to recover their liberty, they pronounced them innocent, and so departed—the latter to Chios; but the other, in pursuance of his first designation, made the best of his way to Miletus.

In the mean time, the armament of the Athenians, having failed round from Corycus to Arginum, falls in with three long vessels of the Chians; and, no sooner had descried than they gave them chase. And now a violent storm ariseth, and the vessels of the Chians with great difficulty escape into harbour: But of the Athenian squadron three, which had most briskly followed the chase, are disabled and drive ashore at the city of the Chians: The crews of them were partly made prisoners and partly put to the sword. The rest of the fleet got into a safe harbour, which is known by the name of Phœnicus, under the Mimas. From hence they afterwards took their course to Lesbos; and got all in readiness to raise fortifications.

Another squadron from Peloponnesus.

From Peloponnesus, the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedæmonian, putting out to sea, with ten sail of Thurians commanded by Doricus the son of Diagoras and two colleagues, with one ship of Laconia, and one of Syracuse, arriveth at Cnidus. This place was now in revolt from Tissaphernes. Those at Miletus were no sooner advised of the arrival of this squadron, than they sent them orders, with one moiety of their ships to keep guard upon Cnidus, and with the other to post themselves at the Triopium, in order to take under their convoy the trading-vessels which were in their course from Egypt: The Triopium is a point in the territory of Cnidus, jutting out into the sea, and a temple of Apollo. But the Athenians, informed of their designs and standing away from Samos, take six of the ships which were stationed at the Triopium: The crews indeed quit their ships, and reach the shore. This being done, the victors sailed directly to Cnidus; and, making an assault upon that city which was quite unfortified, had very nearly taken it. On the next day they renewed the assault. Yet, as the inhabitants had taken care to make it more secure by favour of the night, and the men escaped from the vessels taken at Triopium had thrown themselves into the place, they did less damage than on the preceding day. After
scouring

scouring and laying waste the territory of Cnidus, they sailed back to Samos.

About the same time, Aftyochus having rejoined the fleet at Mile- Miletus.
letus, the Peloponnesians were still abounding in all the needful expedients of war. Good pay was regularly advanced them, and the soldiers had store of money yet remaining of the rich booty they made at Iäfus. The Milesians, further, sustained with alacrity the burden of the war. It was, however, the opinion of the Peloponnesians, that the first treaty made with Tissaphernes by Chalcideus was in some articles defective and less advantageous to themselves. Upon this they drew up and ratified a second, in the presence of Theramenes. The articles of it are these :

“ STIPULATED by the Lacedæmonians and confederates *Second alliance
between Da-
rius and the
Lacedæmo-
nians.*
“ with king Darius and the sons of the *king* and Tissaphernes, that
“ peace and amity subsist on the following conditions :
“ Whatever province or city soever belongeth to king Darius, or
“ did belong to his father or ancestors, against them in a hostile man-
“ ner not to march and no injury to do are bound both Lacedæmo-
“ nians and confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Not to exact tri-
“ bute from any such places are bound both Lacedæmonians and
“ confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Neither shall king Darius,
“ nor any subject of the *king* march in an hostile manner against,
“ nor do any injury to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.
“ But, in case the Lacedæmonians or confederates need any assist-
“ ance whatever from the *king* ; or, the *king* from the Lacedæmoni-
“ ans and confederates ; whatever either party can-convince the other
“ to be right, let that be done.
“ Be the war against the Athenians and confederates carried on by
“ both parties in strict conjunction. And, in case an accommoda-
“ tion be taken in hand, be it settled by both parties acting in
“ conjunction.

“ But,

" But, whatever army be brought into the territories of the *king*,
 " at the request and summons of the *king*, the *king* to defray the
 " expence.

" And, if any of the *States* comprehended in this league with the
 " *king* invade the territories of the *king*, the others to oppose and act
 " with all their power in defence of the *king*.

" And, if any province belonging to the *king*, or subject to his
 " dominion, invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians or confederates; the *king* to oppose, and with all his power to defend the
 " party invaded."

When the finishing hand was put to this treaty, Theramenes, after delivering up the fleet to Astyochus, puts to sea in a fly-boat, and intirely disappears.

*Proceeding: at
 Chios.*

But, the Athenians from Lesbos, having now made their passage and landed their forces in Chios and being masters of the coast and the sea, fortified Delphinium; a place remarkably strong by nature towards the land; abounding farther with harbours, and seated at no considerable distance from the city of the Chians. And now the Chians — dispirited by the many defeats they had already received, and what is worse far from being actuated by general unanimity; but, on the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and his adherents having been lately put to death by Pædaritus for *atticizing*, and the rest of the citizens obliged by necessity to submit to the *few*; each individual amongst them suspecting his neighbour — the Chians now remained quite inactive. Thus, for the reasons above-mentioned, they neither looked upon themselves, nor the auxiliaries under Pædaritus as a match for the enemy. Yet, as their last resource, they send to Miletus, requesting Astyochus to come over to their succour. But as he was deaf to their intreaties, Pædaritus sends a letter to Lacedæmon about him, which accused him of injustice. And to this situation were brought the Athenian affairs at Chios.

Their

Their squadron also at Samos made several visits to the squadron of the enemy at Miletus; but, as the latter refused to come out to engage them, they returned again to Samos, without committing any hostilities.

From Peloponnesus, in the same winter, twenty-seven sail of ships equipped by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus, at the in-^{Another squadron comes from Peloponnesus,} stances of his agents Calligitus the Megaræan and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out to sea and made over to Ionia about the solstice: Antisthenes the Spartan was on board as admiral. With him the Lacedæmonians sent also eleven Spartans to be a council to Astyochus, in the number of whom was Lichas the son of Arcefilaus. To these an order was given, that "when arrived at Miletus, they should in concert act in all respects as might be best for the service; and this squadron, or one equal in strength or larger or smaller, at their own discretion, should proceed to Hellespont for the service of Pharnabazus, and be sent away under the command of Clearchus the son of Ramphias, who accompanied them in the voyage: And, in case it was judged expedient by the council of *eleven*, to dismiss Astyochus from the chief command, and substitute Antisthenes." On account of the letters of Pædaritus they began to suspect the former. This squadron therefore standing out to sea from Malea arrived first at Melos; and, falling in with ten sail of Athenians, they take and burn three of them, which their crews had abandoned. But apprehensive, that those Athenian ships which had escaped might advertise the fleet at Samos of their approach, as was actually the case, they stretched away for Crete; and, for better security keeping a good look-out and taking more time, they made land first at Caunus of Asia. From thence, as being now beyond the reach of danger, they dispatch a messenger to the fleet at Miletus, to attend and bring them up.

But about the same juncture of time, the Chians and Pædaritus, ^{The Chians} not bearing to acquiesce under the dilatory answers of Astyochus, ^{sadly distressed,} pressed

pressed him by repeated messages " to come over with the whole of
 " his force and relieve them from the present blockade ; and by no
 " means to look indolently about him, whilst the most important of
 " the confederate-States in Ionia was shut up by sea, and by
 " land exposed to rapines." For the domestics of the Chians, —
 being many in number, nay the largest that any one community ex-
 cepting the Lacedæmonians kept, and accustomed because of their
 multitude to be punished with extraordinary severity for their misde-
 meanors — no sooner judged that the Athenian forces by throwing up
 works had gained a sure footing in the island, than large numbers of
 them at once deserted to the enemy, and were afterwards the persons
 who, as perfectly well acquainted with the country, committed the
 heaviest depredations. The Chians therefore urged, that " the last
 " necessity called upon him, whilst yet there was hope or a possibi-
 " lity of success remaining, the works round Delphinium yet incom-
 " plete, and a larger circle even still to be taken in and fortified for
 " the security of the camp and the fleet, to undertake their relief." Upon this Aftyochus, who to verify his threats had never before
 thought seriously about it, being now convinced that the whole con-
 federate-body was bent on their preservation, determined in person to
 go to their succour.

Aftyochus.

But just at this crisis, advice is brought him from Caunus, that
 " twenty-seven sail of ships and the assistant-council of Lacedæmoni-
 " ans are arrived." Concluding upon this, that every other point ought
 to be postponed to this large reinforcement, that his junction with it
 might be effected in order to invest them with the sovereignty of the
 sea, and that the Lacedæmonians who came to inspect his own con-
 duct might securely finish their voyage ; throwing up immediately all
 concern for Chios, he sailed away for Caunus. But, having landed
 in his passage at Cos Meropidis, the inhabitants of which had refuged
 themselves in the mountains, he rifled the city which was quite un-
 fortified, and had lately been tumbled into ruins by an earthquake,
 the

the greatest that had been felt there in the memory of us now living. By excursions also through all the country, he made prize of all he found excepting freemen, for such he dismissed unhurt.

From Cos advancing by night to Cnidus, he is dissuaded by the Cnidians from landing his men; but, on the contrary, without loss of time to get out to sea, and make head against twenty sail of Athenians, which Charminus one of the commanders from Samos had under his orders, and with them was watching the approach of the twenty-seven sail coming up from Peloponnesus, which Aftyochus was now going to join. For they at Samos had received from Miletus advice of their coming, and Charminus was appointed to cruize for them about Cyme, and Chalce, and Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia: And, by this time, he knew for certainty, that they were lying at Caunus.

Aftyochus therefore without loss of time stood away for Cyme, with a view to surprise the ships of the enemy at sea before they could get any advice of his approach. A heavy rain and thick cloudy weather occasioned the dispersion of his vessels in the dark, and sadly disordered him.

When morning broke, the fleet being widely separated and the left wing driven already [within the view of the Athenians, the remainder yet driving in confusion about the island, Charminus and the Athenians lanch out against them with all possible expedition, though with fewer than twenty sail; imagining this to be the squadron from Caunus whose approach they were to observe: And proceeding instantly to the attack, they sunk three, and disabled others. They had by far the better in the action, till the more numerous remainder of hostile ships appeared to their great consternation, and encompassed them round on all sides. Then, taking to open flight, they lost six of their ships: but with the remainder

*An action at sea
off Cyme.*

reach in safety the isle of Tenguſſa, and from thence proceed to Halicarnaffus.

This being done, the Peloponneſians, putting back to Cnidus, and the twenty-seven ſail from Caunus compleating here their junction with them, they put out again to ſea in one body, and after erecting a trophy at Cyme, returned again to their anchorings at Cnidus.

The Athenians, on the other hand, had no ſooner been informed of the engagements of the ſquadrons, than with the whole of their fleet they put out from Samos, and made the beſt of their way to Cyme. And yet againſt the fleet at Cnidus they made no ſallies, as neither did the enemy againſt them; But, after taking up the tackling of the veſſels left at Cyme, and making an aſſault upon Lorima on the continent, they returned to Samos.

*The treaties
with Darius
diſliked by the
Lacedæmoni-
an council of
war.*

The whole united fleet of the Peloponneſians, now lying at Cnidus, was buſy in refitting compleatly for ſervice; and the Lacedæmonian council of *eleven* had a conference with Tiſſaphernes who was now come to them, in which they notified to him their diſlike of ſome things in paſt tranſactions: And, in regard to the future operations of war, debated in what manner they might be carried on for their joint benefit and convenience. But Lichas was the perſon, who ſcrutinized moſt cloſely into the paſt, and expreſſed a diſſatisfaction with both treaties; affirming, that “ even the laſt ſettled by Thera-
“ menes was far from being good; but, that terrible it would be,
“ ſhould the *king* now claim upon that pretext the poſſeſſion of that
“ tract of country, of which either he or his anceſtors had formerly
“ been maſters: For thus he might be enabled once more to enſlave
“ all the iſlands, and Theſſaly, and Locri, and quite as far as Bœotia;
“ whiſt the Lacedæmonians inſtead of freeing, would be obliged to
“ impoſe the Median ſubjection on the Grecians. He inſiſted there-
“ fore that a better treaty ſhould be made; or, at leaſt, the former
“ ſhould

"should be instantly disarmed, for on terms like the present they would scorn to take pay from *the king*." Nettled at this, Tisaphernes went from them in a fit of choler, without bringing affairs to any kind of settlement.

The scheme now next in agitation was a voyage to Rhodes, which ^{Revolt of Rhodes.} the most *powerful* persons there had by embassies solicited them to undertake. They were full of hopes to bring into their subjection an island, by no means inconsiderable either for number of mariners or soldiers; and at the same time judged themselves able by their present alliances to defray the expence of their fleet, without requesting pay from Tisaphernes. Accordingly, this winter, with great dispatch they put to sea from Cnidus; and, arriving first at Camirus on the Rhodian coast with ninety-four ships, they struck a consternation into the *multitude* who knew nothing of past transactions, and were the sooner tempted to abandon their dwellings as the city was not guarded by the least fortification. The Lacedæmonians, afterwards, summoning to a conference these, and the Rhodians also from two other cities, Lindus and Iëlyfus, persuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. Rhodes accordingly went over to the Peloponnesians.

At the same juncture of time the Athenians, who had discovered their design, put out with their fleet from Samos, earnestly bent on preventing the scheme. They were seen indeed out at sea by the enemy, but made their appearance a little too late. For the present therefore they put back to Chalce, and from thence to Samos. And afterwards, making frequent trips from Chalce, and Cos and Samos, they warred against Rhodes.

The Peloponnesians exacted from the Rhodians a sum amounting to about * two and thirty talents; and, having laid their ships aground, continued with them eighty days, without subjecting them to any farther imposition.

* 6200 l. Sterling.

During this interval of time, nay extended further back before they undertook this enterprize against Rhodes, the following transactions happened :

*Politic conduct
of Alcibiades.*

Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus, falling under the suspicion of the Peloponnesians, and through them a letter having been sent from Lacedæmon to Aftyochns to put him to death; for he was an enemy to Agis, and his treachery in other respects was become notorious; — Alcibiades, I say, fearful of his life, withdraws himself first to Tissaphernes; and, in the next place, did all that lay in his power to undermine what interest the Peloponnesians had in him. Grown at length his dictator in every affair, he abridged their pay, that instead of an Attic * *drachma* three *oboli* only should be given them, and that too with no punctuality. He advised Tissaphernes to remonstrate to them, that “ the Athenians, who “ through a long tract of time had gained experience in naval affairs, paid only three *oboli* to their seamen; — not so much from a “ principle of frugality, as to prevent their seamen from growing insolent through too much plenty: Some of them would otherwise “ render their bodies less fit for fatigue, by having wherewithal to “ purchase those pleasures by which weakness is occasioned; and “ others would desert, and leave their arrears to balance their desertion.” He instructed him further, how by seasonable gratuities to the commanders of ships and generals of the *States* he might persuade them all to acquiesce in his proceedings, excepting the Syracusans: For amongst these, Hermocrates alone made loud remonstrances in behalf of the whole alliance. Nay, Alcibiades himself took upon him to give the denial to such *States* as petitioned for money, making answer himself instead of Tissaphernes; that, for instance, “ the “ Chians were void of all shame, who, though the most wealthy of “ the Grecians, and hitherto preserved by the auxiliary efforts of “ others, yet are ever requiring strangers to expose their lives and “ fortunes

* 6 oboli, or
7d. $\frac{3}{4}$ Sterling.

“ fortunes to keep them free.” As for other *States*, he maintained
“ they acted basely, if when subjected to vast expences before they
“ revolted from the Athenians, they refused to lay out as much, nay
“ a great deal more in their own defence.” He was also dextrous
at proving that “ Tissaphernes, since now he supported the war at
“ his own private expence, was in the right to be frugal ; but as-
“ suredly, when returns were made him from the *king*, he would
“ make up the present abatement of pay, and do strict justice to
“ every single *State*.” He further suggested to Tissaphernes, that
“ he should not be too much in a hurry to bring the war to a con-
“ clusion ; or entertain the wish, either by bringing up the Phœni-
“ cian fleet which he had provided, or by taking into pay a larger
“ number of Grecians, to turn the superiority at land and sea in fa-
“ vour of the Lacedæmonians : He ought rather to leave both par-
“ ties pretty nearly balanced in strength ; and so enable the *king*,
“ when one of them became troublesome, to let the other party
“ loose against them : whereas should the dominion in both elements
“ be given exclusively to either, he would then be distressed for want
“ of sufficient power to pull down the triumphant *State* ; unless, at
“ a prodigious expence and through infinity of danger to himself, he
“ should choose to enter the lists in person, and war them down.
“ The risks incurred by the other method were far more eligible,
“ because attended with a smaller proportion of expence : And his
“ master might lie by with perfect security, whilst he was wearing
“ out the Grecians by their own reciprocal embroilments.” He
moreover hinted to him, that “ the Athenians were the best suited of
“ the two to share the dominion with him : because they were less
“ desirous of power on the continent, and by their peculiar turn of
“ politics and military conduct were better adapted for his purpose :
“ They would be glad at the same time, to subdue the maritime
“ parts to their own yoke, and to that of the *king* all Grecians
“ whatever who live upon the continent : The Lacedæmonians, on
“ the

“ the contrary, came thither with the sole passion to set them
 “ free; — nor in common prudence could it be judged likely, that
 “ *men* who were this moment employed to deliver Grecians from
 “ the yoke of Grecians, would in that case be stopped by any thing
 “ but a superior force from delivering them also from the yoke of
 “ Barbarians.” He advised him therefore, “ in the first place to
 “ wear out the strength of both; and, after clipping as much as
 “ possible the wings of the Athenians, then instantly to drive the
 “ Peloponnesians from off his coasts.”

*He gains the
 ascendancy with
 Tissaphernes.*

The larger part of this advice Tissaphernes determined to follow, so far at least as may be gathered from his actions. For satisfied by this means with Alcibiades, as a person who on these points gave him found advice, and resigning himself up to his guidance, he paid but forrily their subsistence to the Peloponnesians, and would not suffer them to engage at sea. By the constant pretext that the Phœnician fleet was coming up; and then, with so great a superiority of strength the war might be brought to a clear decision, he ruined all operations of war; he suffered the vigor of their fleet, which in fact was strong and mighty, insensibly to moulder away, and disconcerted them so openly in other respects, that his motives in doing it were no longer to be concealed.

*His view is to
 get recalled
 from banish-
 ment.*

Such was the advice which Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes and the king, when he had opportunities; and which he really thought to be the best in policy. But, at the same time, he had deep in his heart and in his study, his own return to his country; assured within himself, that if he preserved it from a total destruction, he might find a time to compass his own restoration: And nothing he judged could expedite his purpose more, than if it appeared to the world that Tissaphernes was his friend; which also was verified by fact.

*Caballing at
 Samos.*

For when the Athenian troops at Samos perceived that he had so strong an interest with Tissaphernes; and Alcibiades had already paved the way by sending intimations beforehand to the men of influence

influence and authority amongst them, how desirous he was " they should patronize his return with the consent of the persons of the " greatest honour and worth in their company ; since only under an " *oligarchy*, but not under an iniquitous *cabal* or that *democracy* " which had formerly banished him, could he even desire it ; — and " thus recalled, he would come and join his cares with theirs for the " public welfare, and procure them further the friendship of Tis- " saphernes ;" — when more than this, the officers of those Atheni- ans at Samos and the men of highest authority amongst them, were voluntarily inclined to put an end to the *democracy* ; — the method of bringing it about began to be agitated, first in the army, and from thence soon made a stir in Athens itself.

Some persons passed over from Samos to concert matters with Alcibiades ; who gave them room to hope, that " he could render first " Tissaphernes, and in the next place the *king* their friend, if they " would dissolve the *democracy* ; since, on this sole condition, could " the *king* be assured of their sincerity." This contributed to in- crease their sanguine expectations, that on this their affairs might take a new turn, in which men of first rank in the community, who in the present management were most depressed, might recover the ad- ministration and gain the ascendent over their enemies. Returning therefore to Samos, they took in the most proper persons there to be assistants to the scheme ; and to the *many* made public declarations, that " the *king* might be made their friend and supply them with " money, were Alcibiades recalled and the *democracy* suspended." The effect of these declarations on the *many* was this, that though for the present they were chagrined at the scheme in agitation, yet soothed by the flattering hope of the royal subsidies, they refrained from all manner of tumult.

But the set which was caballing in favour of an *oligarchy*, after such open declarations to the *multitude*, re-considered the promises of Alci- biades amongst themselves, and with a larger number of their associates.

The

*Proposal to
change the po-
pular govern-
ment.*

*Opposed by
Phrymichus.*

nichus was detected by his own letter, and insists upon it that he be put to death. Phrynichus, terribly alarmed and pushed to the very brink of destruction by such a discovery, sends again to Astyochus, blaming his indiscretion on the former occasion in not keeping his secret, and assuring him that "now he was ready to deliver up to his "sury the whole force of the Athenians at Samos" (distinctly relating to him the particulars by which, as Samos was unfortified, the whole scheme might be accomplished) and that "undoubtedly he "ought not to be censured, if, when his unrelenting foes had reduced him to such extremity of danger, he chose to do this, or "even more than this, rather than be destroyed by their rancour." But this proposal also Astyochus communicates to Alcibiades.

Phrynichus, perceiving in time that Astyochus betrayed him, and that notice each moment was only not arrived from Alcibiades about the contents of his last, anticipated the discovery, and becomes himself informer to the army, that "the enemy had resolved, as Samos "was unfortified and the whole of their fleet not securely stationed "within the harbour, to endeavour a surprise: of this he had gained "the most certain informations; and therefore, Samos ought necessarily to be put into a posture of defence with the utmost expedition, and proper guards in every respect be appointed." He himself commanded, and consequently was empowered to see this put in execution. All hands were instantly at work on the fortification; and Samos, though otherwise intended soon to be, was by this piece of artifice immediately secured. And no long time after came letters from Alcibiades, importing that "the army was betrayed by "Phrynichus, and in pursuance of it the enemy was coming to surprise them." Their opinion of the good faith of Alcibiades was not in the least established by this: It was argued, that as he was privy to the plans of the enemy, from a principle of enmity he had fastened upon Phrynichus the charge of being their accomplice. By the last notification therefore he was so far from hurting him, that he only confirmed his evidence.

¶ Yet,

Yet, subsequent to this, Alcibiades continued to make use of all his address and persuasion with Tissaphernes to gain him over to the Athenians, who in fact stood most in terror of the Peloponnesians, because they had a larger fleet at hand than the Athenians; but was inwardly inclined, were it any how feasible, to comply with his suggestions; especially, as ever since the jar at Gnidus about the treaty of Theramenes he had been exasperated against the Peloponnesians: For that jar had already happened at the time of their expedition to Rhodes; and the suggestion of Alcibiades formerly mentioned, that "the views of the Lacedæmonians were to set the cities free," was yet more verified by the behaviour of Lichas, who had affirmed, that "it was an article never to be suffered in treaty, that the king should have these cities of which either himself or his ancestors had at any time been possessed." And in truth Alcibiades, as one who had important concerns at stake, continued with much zeal and assiduity to ingratiate himself with Tissaphernes.

The Athenian deputies with Pisander at their head, who were sent from Samos, had no sooner reached Athens, than they obtained an audience from the people; where, after touching in a summary manner upon many other advantages, they expatiated chiefly on this, that "by recalling Alcibiades and making an alteration in the democratical form of government they might gain the friendship of the king and a superiority over the Peloponnesians." Large was the number of those, who would not hear the proposal against the democracy. The enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in their clamours, that "shameful it would be, if so enormous a transgressor of the laws were recalled; one, to whose crimes in point of the mysteries the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces had bore solemn attestation,

These were sacerdotal families at the Eleusinian mysteries; and it was the Athens, descended from Eumolpus and grand privilege of his descendants to preside Ceryx. The former of them instituted at and regulate those sacred rites. Who

K k k 2

Ceryx

tion, the consequence of which was his exile; nay, had further denounced a curse upon those who should restore him." Pisander, interposing to put a stop to this violent opposition and these tragical outcries, addressed himself apart to each of these opponents, and asked them singly — "Whether any hope they had left of saving their country, now that the Peloponnesians had as many ships upon the sea as they had themselves, but a larger number of confederate-States, beside supplies of money from the king and Tisaphernes, whilst themselves were quite exhausted, unless some body could persuade the king to declare in their favour?" And when those, to whom the demand was put, replied in the negative, he proceeded to make them this plain declaration — "And yet this turn in your favour can never take place, unless we temper our form of government with greater moderation, and intrust the administration in the hands of *the few*, that *the king* may have room to place confidence in us. For we are at present to consult about the very being of the State, and not to litigate the forms of its administration. The sequel may again enable us to return to the primitive form, if we find it expedient; and we shall recover Alcibiades, the only man alive who is able to accomplish the point."

Their plan approved.

The people, in fact, upon the first mention of an *oligarchy*, were stung to the heart. Yet afterwards, convinced by Pisander that no other resource was left, dispirited by fear, and encouraged at the same time by a distant hope that another change might in the sequel be brought about, they yielded up the point to the necessity of the

Ceryx was, and what the particular privileges of his descendants, any farther than that (according to Suidas) they were "holy and venerable," is not agreed. All of them were commanded to pronounce the solemn curse on Alcibiades, when he

was outlawed. Yet one priestess (as *Pistarch* relates) Theano, the daughter of Menon, refused to obey; alledging, that "it was her duty to bless, and not to curse."

State.

State. Accordingly they passed a decree, that "Pisander and the
 " ten joined with him in the deputation should pass the sea, and ne-
 " gotiate the affair with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, in the method
 " judged by them most conducive to the public service." At the
 same time, as Pisander had preferred a charge of male-administration
 against Phrynichus, they discharged him and his colleague Skironidas
 from their commands, and sent away Diomedon and Leon to take upon
 them the command of the fleet. The article with which Pisander
 charged Phrynichus, was the betraying of Iäsus and Amorges. The
 truth is, he thought him by no means a proper person to be let into
 a share of their intrigues with Alcibiades.

And thus Pisander — after visiting in order all the several junto's
 of the accomplices, already formed in the city with a view to thrust
 themselves into the seats of judicature and the great offices of state;
 and exhorting them severally, to act with unanimity, and by general
 concurrence to labour the demolition of the *popular* government;
 and after adjusting all previous measures to guard the best against di-
 latory proceedings — repasseth the sea to Tissaphernes, accompanied
 by his ten associates in the deputation.

*They proceed to
 Tissaphernes.*

In the same winter, Leon and Diomedon being arrived at their Rhodes.
 post, at the head of the Athenian fleet made an expedition against
 Rhodes: And there, they find the ships of the Peloponnesians
 hawled ashore. They made a descent upon the coast; and after
 defeating in battle such of the Rhodians as made head against them,
 they stood away for Chalce: And for the future carried on the war
 more from thence than from Cos. For in that station they were
 better enabled to watch the motions of the Peloponnesian fleet.

But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas a Lacedæmonian, dispatched *The Chians.*
 by Pædaritus from Chios with advice, that "the works of the Athe-
 " nians were almost perfected, and unless with the whole of their
 " shipping they came over to relieve them, all is lost at Chios." A
 resolution accordingly was taken to endeavour their relief. But in
 the

the mean time Pædaritus, at the head of his body of auxiliaries and the Chians, with all the force he could assemble together, sallied out against the rampart which the Athenians had raised around their ships; demolished a part of it; and made himself master of those vessels which were hawled ashore. The Athenians ran from all quarters to their defence; and, having first engaged and put to flight the Chians, the rest of the forces under Pædaritus are also defeated. Pædaritus is killed, as were numbers also of the Chians, and many arms were taken. And after this, the Chians were blocked up by sea and land more closely than ever, and a terrible famine raged amongst them.

*Pædaritus
killed.*

*The deputies do
nothing with
Tissaphernes.*

The Athenian deputation headed by Pisander, having reached Tissaphernes, enter into conference about terms of accommodation. Alcibiades now, as the conduct of Tissaphernes was still dubious and wavering, since he stood in great awe of the Peloponnesians, and adhered to that rule of policy he had learned from him "to war both sides out," — Alcibiades now had recourse to another piece of refinement, causing Tissaphernes to insist upon such exorbitant terms that no accommodation could ensue. Tissaphernes truly seems to me to have proceeded in this manner from his own voluntary motives, because fear was predominant in him: But in Alcibiades it was purely art; since, as he found the other would not agree upon any terms whatever, he affected to strike the conceit into the Athenians, that it really was in his power to manage him at pleasure, and that he was already wrought to their purpose and willing to come to terms, whereas the Athenians would not offer enough. For Alcibiades himself made such extravagant demands (since, tho' Tissaphernes assisted at the conference, the other managed it,) that tho' the Athenians had yielded to the far greater part, yet the breaking off the treaty would be thrown at their doors. It was insisted, beside other demands, that "all Ionia should be given up;" and what is more, "all the islands on the Ionian coast;" and other points.

The

The Athenians seeming to acquiesce in these, at length upon the third meeting, lest the smallness of his own influence should be plainly detected, he demanded leave "for *the king* to build a fleet, "and to sail along the Athenian coasts, wherever, and with what- "ever force he pleased." Here all accommodation was over. The Athenians, concluding these points insuperable and that they were abused by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation, and return to Samos.

In the same winter, immediately after breaking off the conference, Tisaphernes repairs to Caunus with intention to bring the Peloponnesians again to Miletus, and to form other compacts with them the best he should be able, to supply them further with pay, and by all means to stave off an open rupture. He was in fact apprehensive; that should so large a fleet be deprived of subsistence, or necessitated to engage with the Athenians should suffer a defeat, or should the mariners quit their vessels, the Athenians then would carry their point without thanks to him: But his greatest fear was this, lest for the sake of subsistence they should ravage the continent. Upon all these considerations, and the prudential motives arising from each, co-operating with his principal maxim of balancing the Grecians against one another, he sent for the Peloponnesians, pays them their arrears of subsistence; and makes the following treaty, the third of the kind, with them:

"IN the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas *A third treaty of alliance.*
 "presiding in the college of *Ephors* at Lacedæmon, articles are signed
 "in the plain of Mæander between the Lacedæmonians and confederates on one side; and Tisaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons
 "of Pharnaces on the other; concerning the affairs of *the king* and
 "those of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

" The

“ The whole of the *king's* dominions situate in Asia belongeth
“ to the *king* : And, all his own dominions let the *king* govern,
“ as to him seemeth meet.

“ The Lacedæmonians and confederates are not to enter the do-
“ minions of the *king* to commit any act of hostility whatever :
“ Nor he those of the contracting parties, for any act of hostility
“ whatever.

“ And, in case any of the Lacedæmonians or confederates enter in
“ an hostile manner the dominions of the *king*, the Lacedæmonians
“ and confederates are bound to restrain them : And, in case any
“ subjects of the *king* act in a hostile manner against the Lacedæ-
“ monians and confederates, be the *king* also bound to restrain
“ them.

“ Tiffaphernes shall pay subsistence to the ships now upon the sta-
“ tion, according to the rates agreed on, 'till the *king's* fleet
“ come up.

“ But, the Lacedæmonians and confederates, so soon as the *king's*
“ fleet shall be come up, shall have it in their own option to maintain
“ if they please their own fleet ; or, in case they chuse to take
“ subsistence from Tiffaphernes, he is bound to supply them : Yet,
“ the Lacedæmonians and confederates, at the expiration of the
“ war, shall repay to Tiffaphernes whatever sums they may thus re-
“ ceive from him.

“ When the *king's* fleet cometh up, let the ships of the Lacedæ-
“ monians and those of the confederates and those of the *king*
“ carry on the war in concert, by the joint counsels of Tiffapher-
“ nes and of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

“ And, whenever a peace with the Athenians be thought
“ advisable, it shall be concluded by the joint-consent of both
“ parties.”

The

The treaty was made and ratified in these terms. And after this, Tissaphernes employed himself with diligence to bring up the Phœnician fleet, as hath been mentioned, and duly to perform all the branches whatever of his engagements. At least, he was willing to convince the Peloponnesians by the measures he took, that he was heartily in earnest.

In the close of this winter, the Bœotians got possession of Oropus by treachery, though an Athenian garrison was in it. The business was effectuated by the management of a party of Eretrians, and those Oropians who were plotting the revolt of Eubœa. For as this town was situated over-against Eretria, it was impossible but whilst in Athenian hands it must terribly annoy both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Having therefore thus gained Oropus, the Eretrians repair to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponnesians to come over to Eubœa: But their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios now sadly distressed. Putting therefore from Rhodes with the whole of their fleet, they stood away to sea: And having gained the height of Triopium, they descry the Athenian squadron out at sea in a course from Chalce. Yet, neither making any motion to bear down upon the other, one fleet pursued their course to Samos, the other put into Miletus. They were now convinced that, without fighting at sea, they could not possibly relieve Chios.

*Steps towards
the revolt of
Eubœa.*

Here this winter ended: and the twentieth year of this war expired, the history of which Thucydides hath compiled.

Y E A R XXI.

IN the ensuing summer, upon the first commencement of the spring, Dercylidas a *Spartan*, at the head of an army not considerable for numbers, was sent over-land to Hellespont, to effectuate the revolt of Abydus: They are a colony of the Milesians. The Chians also, whilst Aftyochus was perplexed about the method of relieving them,

*Before Christ
411.*

The Chians,

them, were necessitated by the intolerable closeness of the blockade to hazard an engagement at sea. It happened, whilst Astyochus was yet in Rhodes, that Leon a *Spartan*, who came over with Antisthenes, though merely as a passenger, had arrived at Chios from Miletus, to act as governor after the death of Pædaritus, with twelve sail of shipping draughted from the squadron stationed at Miletus: Of these five were Thurian, four Syracusan, one belonged to Anæa, another was Milesian, and one was Leon's own. Upon this the Chians, having sallied out with all their force and carried a strong post from the enemy, and at the same time their fleet consisting of six and thirty sail lanching forth against the thirty-two Athenian, an engagement followed. And, after a battle hotly maintained on both sides, the Chians and allies, who had not the worst of the dispute, sheered off again into harbour: For by this time it began to grow dark.

Fight at sea.

*Revolt of
Abydus and
Lampsacus.*

Instantly upon this, Dercylidas having compleated his march from Miletus, Abydus in Hellespont revolts to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus: And two days after Lampsacus did the same.

*The latter re-
duced.*

But intelligence of this having reached Strombichides at Chios, and he with twenty-four sail of Athenians including the transports which carried the heavy-armed, stretching thither with all possible expedition, the Lampsacenes sallied out to repulse him. He defeated them in battle; and, having at a shout made himself master of Lampsacus which was quite unfortified, he gave up all the effects and slaves for pillage to his men; and, after re-establishing such as were free in their old habitations, proceeded against Abydus. But, finding them deaf to all schemes of accommodation and himself unable to reduce them by force, crossing over to the spot opposite to Abydus, he garrisons Sestus a city in the Chersonese, which had formerly belonged to the Medes, and put it in a condition to guard the Hellespont.

The Chians.

During this interval of time, the Chians had very much enlarged their room at sea, and those stationed at Miletus and even Astyochus, upon

upon receiving the particulars of the late engagement and advice that Strombichides was drawn off with so many ships, began to be high in spirits. Aftyochus, accordingly, arriving at Chios with only two ships, carrieth off along with him what shipping was there, and with the whole force is now at sea in order to make an attempt upon Samos. But when the enemy there, because mutually embroiled in jealousies, came not out against him, he returned again to the station of Miletus. For about this time or rather before, the democracy was overturned at Athens.

The deputation, at the head of which was Pisander, were no sooner returned to Samos from Tissaphernes, than they found their schemes had gained a stronger footing in the army, and that the Samians had been encouraging the men of power amongst the Athenians to join their efforts with them for the erection of an oligarchy, though a party was very busy in opposing them with a view to quash the projected alteration. The Athenians, further, at Samos had in private conferences come to a resolution — “ to think no longer of Alcibiades, since he shewed himself so averse to join them, and in fact “ was by no means a proper person to have a share in an oligarchical “ adminitration : — But merely from a principle of self-preservation, as now they were environed with dangers, they should take “ all possible care that the project should not drop in the execution : — “ That, further, they should prosecute the war with vigor, and contribute largely towards it from their own private purses, and answer every other exigence of service, since no longer for others but “ their own sakes they must continue the struggle.” Determined therefore to proceed in this manner, they dispatch Pisander and half the former deputation once more to Athens, to manage the execution of the project there : To whom, further, instructions were given, at whatever places in their dependency they should touch upon the voyage, to set up the oligarchy. The other half they sent severally about to other of the dependent-States. Diotrephes also, who was

*Detail of the
revolution at
Athens.*

now at Chios but appointed to take upon him the command of the Thracian provinces, they ordered away immediately to his post.

Diotrephes upon his arrival at Thasus dissolved the *popular* government. And, in the second month at most after this, the Thasians fortified their city, as men who no longer cared for an *aristocracy* under Athenian influence, but were in daily expectation of receiving liberty from the Lacedæmonians. For a number of their countrymen, driven out by the Athenians, were now refuged among the Peloponnesians. These were labouring the point with their correspondents in Thasus, to bring off their shipping, and declare a revolt. The present alteration therefore fell out exactly to their own wish; their *State* was restored to its ancient form without any trouble; and the *people*, who alone were able to disconcert them, were divested of their power. In Thasus therefore the event took an opposite turn to what those Athenians, who laboured the *oligarchy*, had at heart. And, in my judgment, the case was the same with many other of their dependent-*States*. For having now their eyes open to their own welfare, and being exempted from the dread of suffering for what others did, they ran into the scheme of a total independence, which they preferred before the precarious situation of being well-governed by the Athenians.

Pisander and his colleagues in the course of their voyage observed their instructions, and dissolved the *popular* governments in the cities where they touched. From some of these they also procured parties of heavy-armed to aid them in the grand project, and so landed at Athens. Here they find affairs in great forwardness through the activity of their accomplices. For some of the younger sort having combined together in a plot against Androcles, who had the greatest sway amongst the people, and had also been deeply concerned in banishing Alcibiades, they secretly dispatch him. On him, for a double reason, because of his influence with the people, and with the thought that it might oblige Alcibiades, whose recalcment was

now

now expected and through his interest the friendship of Tisaphernes, they chose first to wreak their fury. Of some others also, whose tractability they doubted, they had rid themselves by the same practices. A specious harangue had further been dressed up for the purpose that "none ought to receive the public money but such as served the *State* in war with their persons; that, affairs of state ought not to be communicated to more than *five thousand*, and those to be men who were best qualified by their estates and personal bravery to serve the public."

This with the majority of the city had a fair outside, since such as should concur in the change, bid fairest for a share in the administration. Yet still the assembly of the *people*, and the * council of the *bean* continued their meetings: But then they only passed such decrees as were approved by the cabal. Nay, of this number were all who spoke, and who had previously considered together what should be said upon every occasion. No other person presumed at any time to oppose their motions, through dread of a cabal which they saw was large. Or, did any one venture to open his mouth, by some dextrous contrivance he was certainly put to death. Who were the agents in these murders, no enquiry at all; and of who were suspected, no kind of justification. The people on the contrary looked on with stupid gaze, and such a fit of consternation as to think it clear gain not yet to have suffered violence, even though they held their tongues. Imagining besides, that the conspiracy had spread much farther than it really had, they were quite dispirited. To discover any certainty of their numbers they were quite unable, because of the great extent of the city and their ignorance how far their neighbours might be concerned. On the same account it was also impossible for him, who deeply resented his condition, to bemoan himself in the hearing of another, or to participate counsels for reciprocal defence. He must either have opened his mind to one whom he did not know, or to an acquaintance in whom he durst not
confide.

confide. For all the *popular* party regarded one another with jealous eyes, as in some measure involved in the present machinations. Some in fact were concerned, who could never have been suspected of oligarchical principles: And these men gave rise to the great diffidence which spread amongst the *many*, and drew after it the highest security to the schemes of the *few*, as it kept alive that mutual distrust which reigned among the people.

Pisander therefore and his associates, arriving at this very juncture, gave the finishing stroke without delay. In the first place, having called an assembly of the people, they moved for a decree — “ That
 “ a committee of *ten* should be elected with full discretionary
 “ power: — This committee of *ten* should draw up the form of a
 “ decree to be reported to the people on a day prefixed — in what
 “ manner the *State* may be best administered.” In the next place, when that day came, they summoned an assembly of the people at Colonus: This is a temple of Neptune without the city and distant
 * 1 English mile. from it about * ten stadia. And here, the committee reported no other proposal but this — That “ it be lawful for any Athenian to
 “ deliver whatever opinion he himself thought proper.” They then enacted heavy penalties against any man, who hereafter should accuse the speaker of a breach of law or should bring him into any trouble whatever.

This being done, it was now without the least reserve or ambiguity moved — That “ no magistrate whatsoever should continue in his
 “ post upon the old establishment, nor receive a public salary; but
 † *Neander*. “ that five † presidents be chosen, who should chuse one hundred persons, and each of these hundred should name three persons for associates: That these persons should enter into the
 “ senate, be invested absolutely with the administration, and should
 “ farther be empowered to convene the *five thousand* whenever they
 “ should deem it proper.”

Pisander

Pisander was the person who made this proposal, and who also in other respects shewed himself openly one of the most zealous to pull down the democracy. But he, who contrived the whole of the plan, and by what steps the affair should be thus carried into execution, was Antipho; a man, who in personal merit was second to no Athenian then alive, and the greatest genius of his time to devise with sagacity, and ingeniously to express what he had once devised. At the assemblies of the people or any public debate he never assisted, if he could possibly decline it, since the *multitude* was jealous of the great reputation he had gained: Yet, in the courts of judicature or appeals to the people, he was the only person, who was able effectually to serve those clients who could get him for their patron. And this same Antipho, when in process of time the government of the *four hundred* was quite demolished, and severely prosecuted by the *people*, is judged to have defended their conduct and pleaded in a cause where his own life was at stake, the best of any person that down to this time was ever heard to speak.

Phrynichus also was another, who singularly distinguished himself in his zeal for the *oligarchy*. He dreaded Alcibiades, as conscious that he was privy to the whole of the correspondence he had carried on with Aftyochus. He proceeded thus on the supposition that Alcibiades would never be restored by an oligarchical government. And then he was a man, in whose capacity and zeal, if once engaged, the greatest confidence might reasonably be placed.

Theramenes further the son of Agnon, a man who both in speaking and acting made no ordinary figure, had a principal share in the dissolution of the *popular* government. No wonder therefore, as the business was managed by so many and so able agents, that spite of every obstacle it was brought to effect. Grievous indeed it was to the Athenian people, to submit to the loss of their liberty a century after the expulsion of their tyrants, during which period they had

not

not only been independent, but accustomed for above half that space to give law to others.

To return. When in the assembly of the people not a soul was heard to oppose the motion, it passed into a law, and the assembly was adjourned. They afterwards introduced the *four hundred* into the senate, in the following manner :

The four hundred take possession of the government.

The whole body of the citizens were daily under arms either upon the walls or in the field, to bridle the excursions of the enemy from Decelæa. Therefore, on the day appointed, they suffered such as were not in the secret to repair to their posts as usual ; but to those in the plot it had been privately notified — “ by no means to repair “ to their posts, but to lag behind at a distance, and in case any one “ should strive to oppose what was now to be agitated, they should “ take up arms and quell all opposition.” Those, to whom these orders were previously imparted, were the Andrians, and Teians, three hundred of the Carysthians and other persons now established in Ægina, whom the Athenians had sent thither by way of colony, but were now invited to repair to Athens with their arms to support the scheme. When these dispositions were formed, the *four hundred*, each carrying a concealed dagger, and guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of Greece whose hands they had employed

* *The Senate of five hundred.*

when assassination was the point, broke in upon the * *counsellors of the bean*, who were this moment sitting in the senate-house, and called out to them “ to quit the place and take their ⁶ salaries.” Accordingly, they had ready for them the full arrears due to them, which they paid to each as he went out of the house. In this manner the *Senate*, without giving the least opposition, removed themselves tamely from their office : And the rest of the citizens made no effort to check such proceedings, and refrained from any the least tumult.

6 The stated salary for a senator of Athens was a *drachma* or seven pence three farthings a day.

The

The *four-hundred*, having thus gained possession of the senate-house, proceeded immediately to ballot for a * set of *presidents* from * Πρυτάνεις amongst their own body : and made use of all the solemn invocations of the deities and the sacrifices, with which the presiding magistrates execute their office. By their subsequent proceedings, they introduced considerable alterations in the *popular* form of government ; excepting that, on account of Alcibiades, they refrained from recalling exiles. But, in all other respects, they ruled with all possible severity. Some persons, whose removal was deemed convenient, though few in number, they got assassinated ; some they threw into prison, and some they banished. To Agis also king of the Lacedæmonians, who was still at Decelæa, they dispatched a deputation ; “ notifying their readiness to accommodate all disputes ; and that “ with greater confidence he might proceed to make up matters “ with *them*, than with a *democracy*, which was not to be trusted.”

Agis, full of the imagination that the city would not quietly submit to these changes, and that the *people* would not thus tamely part with their ancient liberty ; or, should they now behold his numerous army approaching, that public combustions must ensue amongst them ; unable to persuade himself, that at the present juncture they could possibly be kept from tumults ; — Agis, I say, returned no proposal of terms to the deputation, which came to him from the *four-hundred*. But, having sent for a numerous reinforcement from Peloponnesus, he advanced soon after with the garrison of Decelæa and the fresh reinforcements up to the very walls of Athens. He took this step on the presumption, that “ thus, either thrown into “ utter confusion they might be mastered whenever he gave the “ word ; or, even at the first sight of his approach, through the “ great confusion which in all probability must follow both within “ and without : Since, to make himself master of their *long-walls*, “ as there could not be hands at leisure for their defence, he could “ not fail.”

Agis marched
up to Athens.

*He again re-
pairs.*

But when, upon his nearer approach, the Athenians within were thrown into no stir or bustle at all; when even they caused their cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed, light-armed, and archers, to fall out into the field, who made a slaughter of such as were too far advanced, and became masters of their arms and dead bodies; — finding then he had proceeded upon wrong presumptions, he again drew off his army. After this, he himself with the former garrison continued in the post of Decelæa; but the late reinforcement, after some continuance in the country, was sent back to Peloponnesus.

*Proceedings of
the four-hun-
dred.*

Yet subsequent to this, the *four-hundred* persisted in sending deputations to Agis with as much eagerness as ever: And, he now receiving them in a better manner and with encouragements to proceed, they even send an embassy to Lacedæmon to propose a treaty, being of all things desirous to obtain an accommodation.

They also send to Samos a deputation of ten, in order to satisfy the army, and give them ample assurance, that “the *oligarchy* was not set up for the prejudice either of the *State* or any individuals, but as the only expedient left to preserve the whole community; — that the number of those who now had the management was *five thousand* and not barely *four hundred*: And yet, on no occasion whatever had the Athenians, partly through employs in their armies abroad or other foreign avocations, ever met together to consult on affairs of state, in a number so large as five thousand.” Having instructed them to insert some other alleviating pleas, they sent them away upon the first instant of the change they had made; apprehensive of what actually came to pass, that the bulk of their seamen would never quietly submit to an oligarchical government, and an opposition beginning there might overturn all that had hitherto been done.

For at Samos some stir had already arose about the *oligarchy*; and that which is now to be recited happened exactly at the time,

the time, that the *four-hundred* seized the administration at Athens.

The party, which at this juncture was subsisting at Samos against the nobility, and were of the popular side, having now altered their schemes, and followed the suggestions of Pisander ever since his return from Athens, and gained the concurrence of Athenians at Samos, combined together by oath to the number of about three hundred, and resolved to fall upon their antagonists as factious on the side of the people. Accordingly, they murder one ^{A turn at Samos.} 7 Hyperbolus an Athenian,

7 This was the person, whom the *ostracism* made in some measure famous, and who made the *ostracism* quite infamous. *Plutarch* hath repeated the story thrice: The following extract is taken from the *Life of Nicias*:

“ When the opposition was very hot at Athens between Alcibiades and Nicias, and the day for *ostracizing* was drawing on; which at certain intervals the people of Athens were used to enforce, and send away into a ten years exile some one citizen suspected of designs against their liberty, or odious for being too illustrious or rich; each of these grand competitors was under grievous apprehensions, and with reason too, that it might be his own lot to be exiled on this occasion. Alcibiades was hated for his way of life, and for his bold and enterprising genius. Nicias was envied on account of his wealth; his way of living was neither sociable nor popular; as he avoided a crowd and herded with a few intimates, he gave great distaste: Besides, as he had often opposed the caprices of the people and constrained them to pursue their real interest, he was deep in

“ their displeasure. In short, the contest ran high between the young and military men on one side, and the old pacific Athenians on the other, whilst each were endeavouring to throw the *ostracism* upon the hated object. But,

“ Parties ran high, and scoundrels got renown.

“ Such dissensions in the community gave scope to knaves and incendiaries. There was one Hyperbolus of Perithadæ, very assuming without the least reason to be so, however by dint of impudence working himself into power, and the disgrace of his country so soon as he had made himself conspicuous in it. On this occasion, Hyperbolus could have no suspicion of becoming himself the butt of an *ostracism*; he had a much better title to the gallows. Presuming on the contrary, that, when either of these great men were exiled, he himself could easily make head against the other, he manifested great pleasure at the contest, and irritated the fury of the people against them both. Nicias and Alcibiades perceiving his

“ roguish

Athenian, a scurvy fellow, and banished by the *ostracism*, not from a dread of his influence or weight but for the profligacy of his life and his being a public disgrace to his country. In this they were countenanced by Charminus one of the commanders and some of the Athenians associated with them, to whom they gave this pledge of their fidelity. Some other acts of the same nature they committed by instructions from them; and had it in agitation to multiply their blows. But those marked out for destruction, getting wind of their scheme, communicate the whole to Leon and Diomedon who thought of an *oligarchy* with high regret, because their credit was high with the *people*; to ⁸ Thraſybulus also and Thraſyllus, the former a captain of a trireme and the latter of a band of heavy-armed,

“ roguish intent, conferred privately together, and getting their several factions to unite, secured one another; and threw the votes on Hyperbolus. Such a turn at first gave the Athenians much pleasure and diversion; yet soon after they were highly chagrined, by reflecting that making such a scoundrel the object of it was shaming the *ostracism* for ever: There was dignity even in punishments: The *ostracism* was of such a nature as to suit a Thucydides, an Aristides, and men of such exalted characters: It was clear honour to Hyperbolus, and gave him room to boast, that though a scoundrel he had been distinguished like the greatest and best Athenians; as Plato, the comic poet, says of him:

“ He always acted worthy of himself,
“ But quite unworthy of such high reproof:

“ The *shell* was ne’er design’d to honour scoundrels,

“ In a word, no person was ever banished
“ by the *ostracism* after Hyperbolus; it
“ was he who closed the list.”

8 Thraſybulus, whose name now first occurs, acts a very high-spirited and noble part in the close of this history. “ If virtue could be weighed merely by itself without any regard to outward circumstance, I should not hesitate (says Cornelius Nepos) to prefer him before all the great men of Greece. But I aver, that not one of them surpassed him in integrity, in resolution, in grandeur of soul, and true patriotism. — Yet, I know not how it is, though no body excelled him in real merit, many have outstripped him in point of fame. In the Peloponnesian war (*the part of it which now remains*) Thraſybulus did many things without Alcibiades, Alcibiades did nothing without Thraſybulus; and yet the other, through an happiness peculiar to himself, reaped the glory and benefit

armed, and to such others as were judged most likely to stem the fury of the conspirators. These they conjured "not to look calmly on 'till their destruction should be completed, and Samos rent away from the Athenians, by which alone 'till now their empire had been preserved and supported." Listening therefore to these representations, they privately exhorted every single soldier not to suffer such proceedings, and more earnestly than others the *Paralians*, since all that sailed in that vessel were citizens of Athens, all free, and enemies determined from time immemorial to an *oligarchy*, even when it had no existence. Leon also and Diomedon never went out to sea without leaving them some ships for their guard; insomuch that when the *three-hundred* made their attempt, as all these united in their obstruction, but most heartily of all the *Paralians*, the *popular* party at Samos was rescued from destruction. Thirty of those *three hundred* they even slaughtered, and three of the most factious amongst the survivors they doomed to banishment. Then having published an indemnity for the rest, they continued to support the *democracy* at Samos. The democracy secured there.

But the Samians and soldiery dispatch the *Paralus* with all expedition to Athens, having on board her Chæreas the son of Archestratus an Athenian, who had born a considerable share in the last turn of affairs, charged with a notification of these last transactions: For yet it was not known at Samos, that the *four-hundred* had seized the administration. No sooner therefore were they come to their moorings, than the *four-hundred* caused two or three of the crew of the *Paralus* to be dragged away to prison: The residue they turned over from that vessel into another ship of war, and ordered them away

"benefit of all." So far this elegant Roman writer. The reader will soon see some of Thraſybulus his exploits, separately from and in concert with Alcibiades. But the glory of his life was ridding Athens some years after of *thirty* tyrants at a blow; for which he was rewarded by a wreath of olive, the most honourable recompence his grateful countrymen could bestow upon him. He was ever a firm, intrepid, disinterested patriot; and lost his life at last in the service of his country.

as a guard-ship for the station of Eubœa. But Chæreas, sensible in what train affairs were going, had the good fortune to make his escape: And returning again to Samos, related to the soldiery all that had been done in Athens, exaggerating every point with abundant severity. — That “ every citizen was now kept in awe with “ whips and scourges, and that even their own wives and children “ daily felt the insolence of those tyrants; — nay, they have it now “ in agitation, that if any on duty at Samos shall presume to oppose “ their pleasure, immediately to arrest and imprison the whole of “ their kindred; and, in case the former will not submit, to put the “ latter to death.” On many other points he also expatiated, all aggravated with falsehoods.

Those at Samos
in fury against
the four-hun-
dred.

His audience, in the first instant of their passion, were fully bent on the destruction of all those, who had appeared most active for an *oligarchy*, and in short of all who had any hand in its promotion. But, being stopped by the interposition of others more moderate, and listening to the remonstrance, that “ they ought not to accelerate “ the ruin of their country, now that a fleet of the enemy lay almost “ ranged against them for battle,” they desisted. And afterwards, those who had openly avowed the design of restoring the democratical form at Samos, namely Thrasylbulus the son of Lycus and Thrasyllus (for these had the principal agency in this new revolution;) caused every soldier to swear the most solemn oaths, more especially such as were for an *oligarchy*, that “ they would submit to no “ form but the *democracy*, and would act in this cause with general “ unanimity; and, further, would zealously prosecute the war “ against the Peloponnesians: That, eternal enemies they would remain to the *four-hundred*, and would enter into no treaty of accommodation with them.” All the Samians, further, that were old enough to bear arms took the same oaths: And henceforth, the army communicated all their affairs to the Samians, and gave them an insight into all the dangers which might attend the sequel; convinced,

convinced, that otherwise no safe resource remained for either; but, if the *four-hundred* or the enemy at Miletus proved too hard for them, their ruin was unavoidable.

Terrible were the present embroilments of the times, whilst ^{*They depose their commanders.*} those at Samos were striving to re-establish the *democracy* at Athens, and those at Athens to force an *oligarchical* form upon the army. The soldiers further immediately summoned a general assembly, in which they deposed their former commanders, and all such captains of triremes as fell under their suspicions; and then chose others to fill up the vacancies, both captains of triremes and land-commanders, amongst whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The last rose up in the assembly, and encouraged them by every topic of persuasion, particularly — that “ they had not the least reason to be dispirited, tho’ Athens itself had revolted from them; for this “ was merely the secession of a minority from men whose numbers “ were greater, and who were better furnished for every exigence; — “ because, the whole navy of Athens was their own, by which they “ could compel dependent-states to pay in their former contingents “ of tribute, as fully as if they sailed on such an errand from Athens “ itself. Even yet, they were masters of a city at Samos, a city “ despicable in no respect, but which once in a former war had well “ nigh wrested the empire of the sea from the Athenians. The seat “ of war in regard to their public enemies would continue the same “ as it was before. Nay, by being masters of the fleet, they were “ better enabled to procure all the needful supplies than their opponents who were now at Athens. It was purely owing to their “ own peculiar situation at Samos, that the others had hitherto been “ masters of the entrance into the Piræus: And they soon should be “ highly distressed, if they refused to restore them their ancient po- “ lity, since those at Samos could more easily bar them the use of “ the sea than be barred up by them. What assistances Athens had “ hitherto given them against the enemy were but trifling and of no “ real

“ real importance: Nothing could be lost from that quarter which
 “ was no longer able to supply them with money, since with that
 “ they had been supplied by the army; nor to send them any valuable
 “ instructions, for the sake of which alone the troops abroad were
 “ submissive to the orders of the *State* at home. Nay, in some
 “ points those at Athens had most egregiously offended, since they
 “ had over-turned the laws of their country, which those *here*
 “ had preserved, and were exerting their efforts to compel others
 “ to the observance of them. And therefore in every method of
 “ valuation, the men who *here* provided well for the public welfare
 “ were in no respect worse patriots than the men at Athens. Even
 “ Alcibiades, should they grant him an indemnity and a safe return,
 “ would readily procure them *the king's* alliance. And, what had the
 “ greatest weight, should they miscarry in every branch of their
 “ present designs, many places of refuge lay always open to men pos-
 “ sessed of so considerable a fleet, in which they might find fresh
 “ cities and another country.”

After such occurrences in the assembly convened by the soldiery,
 and the conclusion of their mutual exhortations, they continued their
 preparations for war with unremitting diligence. — But the deputation
 of *ten* sent from the *four-hundred* to Samos, being informed of
 these proceedings, when they were advanced in their voyage so far as
 Delos, thought proper to proceed no farther.

Miletus.

About this very time, the Peloponnesians on board the fleet in the
 station of Miletus clamoured loudly amongst themselves, that “ they
 “ are betrayed by Aftyochus and Tiffaphernes, as the former had al-
 “ ready refused to engage, when themselves were hearty and in fine
 “ condition, and the fleet of the Athenians was small; nor would
 “ do so even now, when the latter are reported to be embroiled with
 “ intestine seditions, and their own ships are daily impairing; but,
 “ under pretext of a Phœnician fleet to be brought up by Tiffa-
 “ phernes, an aid merely nominal and which would never join them,
 he

“ he was ruining all by dilatory measures : And as for Tiffaphernes,
 “ it was never his intention to bring up that fleet ; but he was plainly
 “ undermining the strength of theirs, by not supplying them con-
 “ stantly and fully with their pay. The time therefore (they insisted)
 “ ought no longer to be thus idly wasted, but an engagement ha-
 “ zarded at once.” Yet in such clamours those deepest concerned
 were the Syracusans.

The confederates and Aftyochus himself being affected with these clamours, and having declared in a council of war for engaging the enemy forthwith, as they had received undoubted intelligence of the confusions at Samos ; putting out to sea with the whole of their fleet amounting to a hundred and twelve sail, and having ordered the Milesians to march thither over-land, they stood away for Mycale. At Glauæ of Mycale the Athenians were now lying, with eighty-two ships of the Samian department : For in this quarter of Mycale Samos lies but a small distance from the continent. But when they saw the fleet of the Peloponnesians approaching they retired to Samos, judging their own strength insufficient for an engagement with the foe which might prove decisive. Besides, as they had discovered the intention of those at Miletus to venture an engagement, they expected Strombichides from the Hellespont, who was to bring to their assistance the ships on the station of Chios which had gone up to Abydos : And a message had already been dispatched to hasten him up. For these reasons they plied away to Samos. The Peloponnesians, arriving at Mycale, incamped upon the shore along with the land-forces of the Milesians and those sent in by the bordering people. On the next day, when they were fully bent on standing directly against Samos, advice is brought them that “ Strombichides “ is come up with the ships from the Hellespont ;” upon which, they made the best of their way back again to Miletus. And now the Athenians, having gained so large an accession of strength, shew themselves immediately before Miletus with a hundred and

*The grand
 fleets on both
 sides at sea.*

sight sail desirous of coming to an engagement with the enemy. But as nothing stirred out against them, they also returned to Samos.

The Peloponnesians send a squadron to Pharnabazus.

In the same summer, immediately after the former movements, the Peloponnesians — who had waved coming out to an engagement, since with the whole of their strength they thought themselves by no means a match for their enemy, and were now reduced to great perplexities about the methods of procuring subsistence for so numerous a fleet, especially as Tissaphernes was so remiss in his payments — send away to Pharnabazus (pursuant to the prior instructions from Peloponnesus) Clearchus the son of Ramphias with a detachment of forty sail. For Pharnabazus had demanded such a force, and was ready to support the expences of it: And it had further been notified to them in form, that Byzantium was ripe for a revolt. And thus this detachment of Peloponnesians, having ran out far to sea to get clear of the Athenians during the course, met with very tempestuous weather. The bulk of them, it is true, with Clearchus rode it out to Delos, and from thence return again to Miletus. But Clearchus setting out again travelled over land to Hellespont, and took upon him the command. Ten ships however of the detachment, under Elixus the Megaræan who was joined in the command, reached the Hellespont without damage, and effectuate the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos informed of these incidents send away a detachment to the Hellespont, to support and guard the adjacent cities. And a small engagement happens before Byzantium, between eight ships on a side.

Alcibiades recalled by the troops at Samos.

Those who were in the management at Samos, and above all Thraſybulus, adhering still to the sentiments they had entertained ever since the last turn of affairs there, that Alcibiades must needs be recalled; the latter at last obtained in full assembly the concurrence of the soldiery. Accordingly, when they had voted a return and an indemnity to Alcibiades, Thraſybulus repaired immediately to Tissaphernes,

phernes, and brought Alcibiades back with him to Samos; convinced, their last resource depended on his being able to alienate Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians. Hereupon, an assembly being called, Alcibiades at large expatiated upon and deplored the malignity of his fate in having been exiled from his country. And then, having amply run over every topic relating to the present posture of affairs, he raised their expectations high in regard to the future. He magnified with a mighty parade of words his own interest in Tissaphernes; from the view, not only to intimidate the patrons of the oligarchical government at Athens, and put a stop to their cabals; but also, to render himself more respectable to these at Samos, and to raise up their confidence in him as high as possible; — to give the enemy, further, as many handles as he was able to calumniate Tissaphernes, and to lower all their present sanguinary expectations. These were the schemes of Alcibiades, when with all imaginable ostentation he gave the strongest assurances to his audience, that

“ Tissaphernes had pledged his word to him, that could he once
 “ firmly depend upon the Athenians, they never should be distressed
 “ for want of supplies whilst he had any thing left, nay though at
 “ last he should be forced to turn into ready cash the very bed he
 “ lay on; and the Phœnician fleet already come up to Aspendus he
 “ would join with the Athenians, but never with the Peloponnesians:
 “ The only pledge of fidelity he required from the Athenians,
 “ was for Alcibiades to be recalled and pass his word for their future
 “ conduct.”

The army, delighted with these and many other soothing topics, *And appointed a commander.* proceed immediately to associate him with the rest of the commanders, and implicitly trusted every thing to their management. Not a man was any longer to be found amongst them, who would have parted with his present confidence of certain security and revenge on the *four-hundred* for all the treasure in the universe. Nay, they were ready this very moment, upon the strength of what

Alcibiades had said, to flight the enemy now at hand and steer directly for the Piræus. But, though numbers with vehemence recommended the step, he stopped their ardor by remonstrances, that "they ought by no means to think of steering for the Piræus and leave their nearer enemies upon their backs. But in relation to the operations of war, since he was elected a *general* (he said) he would first go and confer with Tissaphernes, and would then proceed to action." Accordingly, the assembly was no sooner dissolved than he immediately departed, that he might appear in all respects to be perfectly united with Tissaphernes; desirous also to raise himself in his esteem, and give him a sensible proof that he was appointed a general; and, by virtue of this, enabled either to do him service or to do him harm. It was the peculiar fortune of Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by the Athenians.

*A mutiny at
Miletus.*

The Peloponnesians at Miletus had no sooner heard of the recal of Alcibiades, than, as before they suspected treachery in Tissaphernes, they now loudly vented invectives against him. What more inflamed them was, that ever since the Athenians shewed themselves before Miletus and they had refused to put out to sea and engage them, Tissaphernes had slackened more than ever in his payments: and thus hated by them for that reason sufficiently before, he now became more odious on account of Alcibiades. The soldiery again, as on former occasions, ran together in parties, and enumerated their grievances. Nay, some of higher ranks, persons of real importance and not merely the private men, were full of remonstrances, that "they had at no time received their full subsistence; his payments had been always scanty, and even those had never been regular: in short, unless they were led directly against the enemy, or carried to some other station where they might be sure of subsistence, the crews would abandon their vessels. And the whole blame of all that befel ought to be charged upon *Astyochnus*, who for
" private.

"private lucre endured patiently the caprices of Tisſaphernes." Employed as they were in thus enumerating grievances, a tumult actually broke out againſt Aſtyochus. For the mariners belonging to the Syracuſan and Thurian veſſels, by how much they enjoyed the greateſt liberty of all others in the fleet, by ſo much the more heightened confidence did they flock about him and demand their pay. Upon this, Aſtyochus returned an answer too full of ſpirit, threatning hard * *that Dorian*, who ſeconded and encouraged the demands of his men, and even lifting up his ſtaff and ſhaking it at him. This was no ſooner perceived by the military crowd, than ſeamen as they were with a loud uproar they ruſhed at Aſtyochus to knock him down : But, aware of their deſign, he flies for refuge to an altar. He eſcaped indeed without any blows, and the fray was ended without any harm committed. * Hermocrates.

The Milesians alſo made themſelves maſters by ſurprize of a fort erected by Tiſſaphernes at Miletus, and oblige the garrifon left in it to evacuate the place. Theſe things pleaſed the reſt of the allies, and not leaſt of all the Syracuſans. Lichas however was by no means ſatisfied with theſe proceedings. He inſiſted " the Milesians were " obliged in duty to be ſubmiſſive to Tiſſaphernes ; and, that all " others who lived in the dominions of *the king* lay under the ſame " obligation, and were bound to pay due regard to his juſt authority, 'till ſuch time as the war was handsomly compleated." This drew upon him the reſentment of the Milesians ; and becauſe of theſe expreſſions and ſome others of the ſame nature, when he afterwards died of a natural diſeaſe, they would not ſuffer him to be buried in a ſpot of ground, which the Lacedæmonians who were amongſt them had choſe for his interment.

Whiſt affairs were thus ſadly embroiled between the ſoldiery on one ſide, and Aſtyochus and Tiſſaphernes on the other ; Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon, as ſucceſſor to Aſtyochus in the chief command of the fleet. Accordingly he takes the command upon him, and Mindarus ſucceeds Aſtyochus.

and Astyochus sailed away for home. But with him as ambassador Tissaphernes sent one of his own creatures, by name Gatallites, a Carian, who spoke both languages, to accuse the Milesians about the seizure of the fort, and also to make apologies for *his* conduct. He knew that the Milesians were already set out with an outcry, chiefly against him; and, that Hermocrates was gone with them, well armed with proofs that Tissaphernes in concert with Alcibiades baffled all the Peloponnesian schemes, and basely tampered with both the warring parties. But an enmity had always subsisted between these two about the payments of subsistence. And at length, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other Syracusans came to Miletus to take upon them the command of the Syracusan vessels, namely Potamis, and Myscon, and Demarchus, Tissaphernes vented his choler more bitterly than ever against Hermocrates now an exile; and amongst his other accusations of him affirmed, that "he had demanded a sum of money, which being refused him, he had ever since declared himself his enemy." Astyochus therefore and the Milesians and Hermocrates are now sailed for Lacedæmon.

*The deputies
from the four-
hundred at
Samos.*

By this time also Alcibiades had repassed from Tissaphernes to Samos. And from Delos, the deputation sent from the *four-hundred* on the late revolution to sooth and gain the concurrence of those at Samos, arrive also whilst Alcibiades is there. Upon which, an assembly being called, they endeavoured to open the cause. The soldiers at first refused to hear them, and roared aloud for the murder of those who had overturned the *popular* government. At length, with great difficulty, being quieted, they gave them a hearing.

Their plea.

The deputies remonstrated, that "not for the ruin of Athens was this new change introduced, but purely for its preservation — in no wise to betray it into the hands of the enemy, because that might have been done effectually, upon the late approach of its enemy to her walls, since *they* were in power. Every single person amongst

" amongst the *five-thousand* was intended to have a regular share
 " in the administration. Their friends and relations are not treated
 " in an insolent manner, as Chæreas had maliciously suggested to
 " them; nay, were not in the least molested, but every where re-
 " mained in the undisturbed possession of their property."

Though on these topics they amply enlarged, yet they were heard with no manner of complacence, but with manifest indignation. Alcibiades gives the answer. Different methods of proceeding were recommended by different persons; but the majority declared for sailing away at once for the Piræus. On this occasion Alcibiades first shewed himself a true patriot; nay, as much a patriot as ever Athenian had been. For when the Athenians at Samos were hurried furiously along to invade their own-selves, the plain consequence of which was giving up at once Ionia and Hellespont to their public foes, he mollified their fury; and, at a crisis when no other man living could have been able to restrain the multitude, he persuaded them to desist from this strange invasion; and, by reprimanding those whose private resentments burst out most violently against the deputies, prevented mischief. At length, he himself dismissed them with the following answer:—That,
 " the administration in the hands of *five-thousand* he had no
 " intention to oppose: But he ordered them to give an immediate
 " discharge to the *four-hundred*, and to restore the council of *five-*
 " *hundred* to their prior state. If further, from a principle of frugality
 " they had made retrenchments, in order that those who served in
 " the armies of the *State* might be better subsisted, he praised them
 " altogether. He then recommended to them a steady resistance,
 " and by no means in any shape to give way to the enemy. For
 " could the *State* once be secured from its public foes, a reconciliation
 " amongst its members might easily be hoped for; but, should either
 " party be once destroyed, either this at Samos, or theirs at Athens,
 " none would soon be left to be reconciled at all."

There

There were present at this audience ambassadors from the Argives, who brought assurances of aid to the *people* of Athens at Samos. Alcibiades commended them for their zeal; and then, exhorting them to hold themselves in readiness to come upon a summons sent, he civilly dismissed them. These Argives came to Samos in company with the *Paralians*, who had been lately turned over by the *four-hundred* into a vessel of war, to cruize round Eubœa, and to carry to Lacedæmon the ambassadors, Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melesius, sent thither from the *four-hundred*. But, when advanced to the height of Argos, they put the ambassadors under arrest as chief agents in pulling down the *democracy*, and delivered them up to the Argives. They had no business now at Athens, and so came from Argos to Samos, convoying the Argive ambassadors in the trireme which they had seized.

*The mysterious
conduct of Tif-
saphernes.*

The same summer Tissaphernes — about that juncture of time in which the Peloponnesians were most furious against him, for the other reasons, and the recalment of Alcibiades, as having now pulled off the mask and declared for the Athenians, — desirous, as in truth it appeared, to efface the bad impressions they had entertained of him, got ready to go to Aspendus to the Phœnician fleet, and prevailed with Lichas to bear him company. In regard to the Peloponnesians, he declared that he substituted his own lieutenant Tamas to pay them their subsistence, whilst he himself should be absent. Various accounts are vented about this step; nor can it certainly be known, with what view he repaired to Aspendus, or why when there he did not bring up the fleet. That a Phœnician fleet consisting of one hundred forty-seven sail was now come up to Aspendus, is allowed on all sides; but, why they did not come forwards, is variously conjectured. Some think, he went out of sight merely to carry on his old scheme of wearing away the Peloponnesians; and, in consequence of this, Tamas paid in their subsistence which he was ordered to pay, not better but even worse than Tissaphernes. Others say it was, that
since

since he had brought the Phœnicians to Aspendus, he might save large sums by dismissing them there, as he never had sincerely designed to make use of their service. Others again attribute it to a desire to quiet the clamours against him at Lacedæmon, and to get himself represented there as one abounding in good faith, and who is actually gone to bring up a fleet fairly and honestly fitted out for service.

But, in my opinion, the true solution of the mystery is this. He *its solution.* would not bring them up, merely to wear out and to balance the strength of the Grecians, that during his absence and this studied prolongation the latter might be running into ruin; and further, for the sake of balancing, to join with neither party for fear of making them too strong. For, had he once determined to join heartily in the war, the consequence was certain beyond a doubt. Had he brought them up to join the Lacedæmonians, he must in all probability have given them the victory, since already their naval strength was rather equal than inferior to that of their opponents. But, that their ruin alone was designed by him, is plain from the excuse he made for not bringing up that fleet. He pretended they were fewer in number than *the king* had ordered to be assembled. Yet if this were so, he might have ingratiated himself more abundantly with *the king*, if he made a great saving of money for his master and with less expence had accomplished his service. To Aspendus however, whatever was his view, Tissaphernes repairs and joins the Phœnicians: Nay further, at his own desire, the Peloponnesians sent Philippos a noble Lacedæmonian with two triremes to take charge of this fleet.

Alcibiades had no sooner received intelligence that Tissaphernes was at Aspendus, than taking with him thirteen sail he hastened thither after him, promising to those at Samos an assured and important piece of service: For “ he would either bring the Phœnician fleet
“ to the Athenians, or at least prevent their junction with the Peloponnesians.” *Alcibiades follows him to Aspendus.*

"ponnesians." It is probable, that from a long acquaintance he was privy to the whole intention of Tiffaphernes never to bring up this fleet: And his project was now, to render Tiffaphernes still more odious to the Peloponnesians for the regard he shewed to himself and the Athenians, that so he might at last be necessitated to strike in with the latter. He stood away therefore directly by Phaselis and Caunus, and held on his course upwards.

Fresh cabals in Athens.

The deputation sent from the *four-hundred*, being returned from Samos to Athens, reported the answer of Alcibiades, — how "he encouraged them to hold out and give way in no shape to the enemy; and that his confidence was great he should be able throughly to reconcile them with the army, and give them victory over the Peloponnesians." By this report they very much revived the spirits of many of those who had a share in the *oligarchy*, and yet would gladly extricate themselves from the business upon assurances of indemnity. They had already begun to hold separate cabals, and shew open discontent at the train of affairs. They were headed by some of principal authority even in the present *oligarchy* and who filled the great offices of state, namely Theramenes⁹ the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates the son of Sicelius, and others, who were most deeply concerned in late transactions; and from a dread, as they gave out, of the army at Samos and Alcibiades, had con-

⁹ Theramenes was very expert at turning about and shifting his party. He got by it the nick-name of *Cothurnus* or the *Bushman*; because the tragedians' buskin was made large enough for any foot to go into it. He was however a man of great abilities, and generally regarded as a lover of his country. His turns were dextrous, well-timed, and made with the view of public good. Cæsar, when making Cicero a compliment, likened him to Theramenes. He was deeply concerned in all the subse-

quent revolutions at Athens. He put the finishing hand to the peace with the Lacedæmonians after the taking of Athens by Lyfander, when they demolished their long-walls, opened their harbours, and gave up their shipping. He was afterwards, nominally, one of the *thirty* tyrants: For he soon began to oppose them; first, with moderation; then, with vehemence; which exasperated them so, that they put him to death.

curred

curred in sending an embassy to Lacedæmon, lest by unseasonable dissents from the majority they might have done mischief to the public. Not that they hastened themselves even now to put an utter end to the oligarchical government; but, to enforce the necessity of making use of the *five-thousand* not merely in name but in act, and to render the polity more equal. This was, it must be owned, the political scheme which they all pretended; but, through private ambition, the majority had given into that course by which an *oligarchy* founded upon the ruins of a *democracy* is ripe for subversion. For it was the daily claim of each single person concerned, not to be equal with the rest but to be pre-eminently the first. Whereas, when out of a democracy a preference is awarded, the distinction is the more easily brooked, as if it were the real consequence of superior worth. But what, of a certainty, elevated them most was the great influence of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own consciousness that this business of an oligarchy carried with it no prospect of firm or lasting continuance. A contention therefore ensued amongst them, which of them should shew the greatest zeal for the *people*.

But such of the *four-hundred*, as made the greatest opposition to this new scheme, and were leaders of their party, — namely, Phrynichus, who formerly during his employment as general at Samos had embroiled himself with Alcibiades, — and Aristarchus, one of the most violent and also most inveterate opponents of the *people*, — and Pisander, and Antipho, and others of the greatest influence amongst them, — who formerly, upon establishing themselves first in the government, and ever since the army at Samos had dissented from them in favour of the *democracy*, had bestirred themselves in sending embassies to Lacedæmon, in more firmly establishing the *oligarchy*, and erecting a new fortification on the spot which is called *Ectoneia*: — These, I say, exerted themselves with much greater ardor than ever since the return of the deputies from Samos, as they plainly saw the inclinations of numbers, and some of their own body,

A new fortification.

on whose perseverance they had highly depended, were intirely changed. They even caused Antipho, and Phrynichus, and ten others, to set out with all expedition; so apprehensive were they of fresh opposition both in Athens itself and from Samos; and charged them with instructions to strike up an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians, upon any tolerable terms they could possibly procure. They also carried on with redoubled diligence the new works at Eëtioncïa. These works were intended, as was given out by Theramenes and his party, not so much to keep out of the Piræus those from Samos should they endeavour to attempt it, as to enable themselves at their own discretion to receive both the ships and land-forces of the enemy. For Eëtioncïa is the mole of the Piræus, and the entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. The new work was therefore joined in such a manner to that which guarded it before on the side of the land, that a small party posted behind could command the entrance. For the extremities of it were continued down to the fort in the very mouth of the harbour which was narrow; and both the old wall which was built on the land-side, and this new fortification within reached down to the sea. They also enlarged and secured the *great portico*, which adjoined to the new work erected in the Piræus, and kept it intirely in their own custody. Here they obliged all the citizens to lodge what corn they already had, and all that should hereafter be imported, and here only to expose it to sale, and to vend it.

*It raiseth great
jealousy.*

These proceedings had for a long time drawn sharp insinuations from Theramenes. And when the embassy returned from Lacedæmon, without bringing to any manner of issue a general accommodation for the whole of the *State*, he averred that "by this new work the safety of the city was visibly endangered." For from Peloponnesus, at this instant of time, at the request of the Eubœans no less than forty-two sail of ships were on the coast of Laconia, some of which were Italian from Tarentum and from Locri, and some Sicilian, and all were now bound for Eubœa: At the head of
this

this equipment was Hegesandridas a Spartan, the son of Hegesander. Theramenes maintained, that " it was set out less for Eubœa than " for those who were now fortifying at Eëtioneia ; and, unless we " stand upon our guard, they will surprise and compleat the ruin of " Athens." There was really something in the conduct of the men he accused to countenance this charge, nor was it merely the outcry of slander. Those, who now composed the *oligarchy*, were principally desirous to preserve in their hands the whole appenage of the republic : If this were impracticable, to secure the shipping and walls, and subsist with independence : But, should they be unable to compass this, rather than fall the first victims to the *democracy* re-established, to let in the enemy ; and, resigning their shipping and fortifications, to make any terms whatever for the *State*, provided they could obtain security for their own persons. They accelerated therefore this new work, which was so contrived as to have posterns, and sally-ports, and passages enow to let in the enemy : And they proceeded with all imaginable dispatch in order to outstrip prevention.

Hitherto indeed this charge against them had only been whispered with an air of secrecy amongst a few. But, when Phrynichus, upon his return from the embassy to Lacedæmon, was treacherously stabbed by one of the *patrole* in the forum at the hour of public resort, being got but a few steps from the house where the *council* was sitting, and dropped down dead upon the spot ; — when further the assassin made his escape ; and a stranger from Argos, who assisted at the fact, being apprehended and tortured by the *four-hundred*, discovered not the name of any one person who set them on, nor made any farther confession than that " he knew large numbers met at the " house of the officer who commanded the *patrole*, and at other " places ;" — then at length, as nothing could be made of this affair, Theramenes, and Aristocrates, and as many either of the *four-hundred* or of others as were combined with them, proceeded to act in a more open and resolute manner. For by this time the fleet was

Phrynichus
stabbed in the
forum.

come

A sedition.

come round from Laconia, and riding before Epidaurus had made ravages upon Ægina. Theramenes therefore averred it improbable, that "were they intended for Eubœa they would ever have put into Ægina, and then go again and lie at Epidaurus, unless they had been sent out at the express invitation of those whom he had always accused of traiterous designs; and, it was impossible to be passive any longer under such practices." In fine, after many speeches made to excite a tumult and many suspicions diffeminated abroad, they fell to work in earnest. For the heavy-armed posted in the Piræus to carry on the new works of Eëtioneria, amongst whom Aristocrates himself was employed at the head of his own band, lay under an arrest Alexicles, who commanded there for the oligarchy, and was a most vehement adversary to the opposite party, and carrying him into a house put him under confinement. To this action they were also emboldened by the concurrence of others as well as by Hermon, who commanded the *patrol* assigned for Munichia: And, what was of most importance, it was openly countenanced by the whole body of the heavy-armed. The news of it was immediately carried to the *four-hundred*, who were this moment assembled together in council: And all, excepting those dissatisfied with their measures, were ready to run to arms, and vented terrible threats against Theramenes and his associates.

But he, apologizing for himself, declared his readiness to take up arms along with them, and attend them to the rescue of Alexicles: And, taking with him one of the generals who was in his secret, he hurried down to the Piræus. Aristarchus also ran down to assist; as did further the young men belonging to the cavalry of the *State*.

Great in truth was the tumult and full of horror. For those, who were left in the upper-city, imagined that the Piræus was already seized, and that Alexicles was slain: And they in the Piræus each moment expected an assault from those in the city. Not without difficulty

difficulty could the men of years and experience stop such as were wildly running up and down the streets, and rushing to arms. And Thucydides the Pharsalian, public host of the *State*, who happened then to be at Athens, threw himself with lively zeal in the way of all who were flocking down; conjuring them earnestly, "not to finish the ruin of their country, when the enemy lay so near to strike the blow." But thus, at length, their fury abated, and the effusion of one another's blood was prevented.

As for Theramenes, he was no sooner got down to the Piræus, ^{*The new works demolished.*} than assuming authority (for he himself was at this time a *general*) he pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this piece of mutiny, at least so far as mere making a noise could do it; whilst Aristarchus and all the opposite faction were angry with them in earnest. But the bulk of the heavy-armed drew together in a body, and betray no sign of regret for what they had done. Nay, they demanded aloud from Theramenes — "If in his judgment these new works were raised with a good design, or would not better be demolished?" His reply was this — That "if *they* thought it expedient to demolish them, his opinion should concur with theirs." Hereupon, at a signal given, the heavy-armed and many others who belonged to the Piræus rushed on in a moment, and pulled down all the new fortification.

The watch-word now published to the *multitude* was this — ^{*Progress of the sedition.*} "Whosoever would have the administration lodged in the *five-thousand* instead of the *four-hundred*, let him join in the work." For even still they judged it politic to veil their design under the name of the *five-thousand*, and not to say downright — "Whosoever would have the *democracy* restored," — lest possibly the former might have been actually in force, and a person speaking to any one of them might spoil all by some inadvertent expressions. And on the same account, the *four-hundred* would neither have the *five-thousand* declared, nor yet have it known that they had never been appointed.

To

To admit so large a number into a share of the government, they judged was in fact a mere democracy; but, that leaving the matter in suspense would strike a dread of his neighbour into every Athenian.

The next morning the *four-hundred*, though highly disordered in their politics, assembled however in council. But those in the Piræus, after enlarging Alexicles, whom they had put under confinement and completing the demolition of the new works, marched to the theatre of Bacchus in Munichia; and there, all armed as they were, held a formal assembly. And then, in pursuance of what had been resolved, marched directly into the upper-city, and posted themselves in the Anacéum. Here they were accosted by a select committee sent from the *four-hundred*, who man to man reasoned calmly with them; and, perceiving any to be tractable, plied them with persuasions to proceed in a gentle manner and to restrain the fury of their associates; giving them assurances, that “the *five-thousand* would be declared, “and from them by regular succession at the pleasure of the *five-thousand* the *four-hundred* should be appointed;” conjuring them in the mean time, “not to forward through impatience the destruction of the *State*, nor give it up for a prey to the public enemy.” The whole multitude of the heavy-armed, attentive to these arguments, on which many expatiated at large and pressed home upon numbers, became more tractable than they were at first, and were most terribly alarmed at the mention of the total destruction of their *polity*. It was at last concluded, that on a set day an assembly should be held in the temple of Bacchus to devise an accommodation.

*Approach of the
enemy's fleet.*

But, when this assembly to be held in the temple of Bacchus came on, and all parties were only not compleatly met, comes in the news that “the two and forty sail and Hegesandridas are coast-
“ing along from Megara towards Salamis.” Not one of the heavy-armed this moment but pronounced it true, what before was given
out

out by Theramenes and his friends, that “ to the new fortifications these ships are now bound ;” and it was judged, that in the nick of time they had been levelled with the ground. But Hegesandridas, as perhaps had beforehand been concerted, only hovered about at Epidaurus, or the adjacent coast. It is however probable, that on account of the present sedition amongst the Athenians, he lay for a time in this station, in hope to seize some fair opportunity to strike a blow.

Be this as it will, the Athenians no sooner heard the news than to a man they flocked down amain to the Piræus ; less alarmed at their own domestic war, than at an invasion from a public enemy, no longer remote but at their very ports. Some of them threw themselves on board what shipping was ready, others lunched such as were aground, and others posted themselves upon the walls and at the mouth of the harbour. *All now eager on defence.*

But the Peloponnesian fleet, having failed by and doubled the cape of Sunium, comes to anchor between Thoricus and Prasiæ, and proceeds afterwards to Oropus. Hereupon the Athenians, in all imaginable hurry, manning out their ships with what hands could be got on this sudden emergency, as in a city distracted with sedition, and yet eager to stave off the greatest danger that had ever threatned it (for as Attica was occupied by the enemy, Eubœa now was their *all*,) cause Thymocharis a commander to stand away with their fleet to Eretria. On their arrival there, and their junction with such as were already in Eubœa, they amounted to six and thirty sail, and were immediately forced to engage : For Hegesandridas, after the hour of repaste, came out in line of battle from Oropus. *They put to sea.*

The distance of Oropus from the city of the Eretrians across the sea is about * sixty stadia. And therefore, upon his approach, the Athenians ordered their men on board, imagining the soldiers to be ready at hand to obey their orders ; whereas, they happened not yet to be returned from the market whither they had gone to buy provisions. ** About six English miles.*

For, through the management of the Eretrians, nothing could be got by way of sale, except in such houses as lay in the most remote quarters of the city; with an intent, that the enemy might attack the Athenians before they were all embarked, and oblige them in a hurrying and disorderly manner to begin the fight. Nay, a signal had even been held out to the enemy from Eretria towards Oropus, at what time they ought to come forward to the attack.

Battle of Eretria.

Upon so short a notice the Athenians, having formed their line as well as they were able, and engaging the enemy before the harbour of Eretria, made however a gallant resistance for a time. At length, being compelled to sheer off, they are pursued to land. And as many of them, as ran for safety to the city of the Eretrians, suffered the most cruel treatment; in being murdered by the hands of men whom they supposed their friends. Such indeed as could reach the fort of Eretria, which was garrisoned by Athenians, are safe; as also the vessels which could make Chalcis.

The Athenians defeated.

Revolt of Euboea.

But the Peloponnesians, after making prizes of two and twenty Athenian vessels, and either butchering or making prisoners all on board them, erected a trophy. And no long time after they caused all Euboea to revolt, excepting Oréus, which an Athenian garrison secured, and then settled the state of that island at their own discretion.

Athens in the utmost consternation.

When advice of what was done at Euboea reached Athens, the greatest consternation ensued of all that had to this day been known. Not even the dreadful blow received in Sicily, though great concern in truth it gave them, nor any other public disaster caused so terrible an alarm amongst them. For at a time, when their army at Samos was in open revolt, when they had no longer either shipping in store or mariners to go on board, when they were distracted with intestine sedition, and ready each moment to tear one another to pieces; — and on the neck of all these *this* great calamity supervened, in which they lost their fleet, and (what was more of consequence) Euboea, which had better supplied their necessities than Attica itself, — had they not ample

ample reason now to fall into utter dejection? But what alarmed them most was the proximity of ruin, in case the enemy, flushed with their late success, should stand immediately into the Piræus, now utterly destitute of ships. Not a moment passed, but they imagined they were only not in the very harbour: Which in truth, had they been a little more daring, they might easily have been. Nay, had they made this step and blocked up the city, they must infallibly have increased the seditions within it, must have necessitated the fleet to come over from Ionia, though averse to the *oligarchy*, in order to prevent the ruin of their own relations, and the total destruction of their country. And in the mean time, Hellespont, Ionia, the isles even up to Eubœa, in a word the whole empire of Athens must have been their own. Yet not in this instance only but many others, the Lacedæmonians shewed themselves most commodious enemies for the Athenians to encounter. For as nothing differed more than their respective tempers; the *one* being active, the *other* slow; enterprising *these*, but timorous *those* especially in naval competitions; they gave them many advantages. The truth of this the Syracusans most plainly shewed, who very nearly resembled the Athenians in disposition, and so warred against them with the highest spirit and success.

Terrified however at these tidings, the Athenians made a shift to man out twenty vessels, and convened an assembly of the people, on the first report of their loss, in the place which is called the *Pnyx*, and where generally that assembly was held. In this they put an end to the administration of the *four-hundred*, and decreed "the
 " supreme power to be vested in the *five-thousand*, which number to
 " consist of all such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour;
 " and that no one should receive a salary for any public magistracy;
 " whoever offended in this point they declared a traitor." Other frequent assemblies were afterwards held, in which they appointed

Another revolution of government.

*Nomothetæ*¹, and filled up the other posts in the government. And now at least, though for the first time in my opinion, the Athenians seem to have modelled their government aright. A moderation finely tempered between the *few* and the *many* was now enforced. And from the low situation into which their affairs were now plunged, this enabled Athens to re-erect her head.

Alcibiades re-
called.

They decreed farther the recalment of Alcibiades and his adherents; and, dispatching a *deputation* to him and the army at Samos, exhorted them to exert their utmost efforts for the public service.

Oenoë be-
trayed.

In the first moments of this new revolution, Pisander and Alexicles with their partisans, and in general all the great sticklers for the *oligarchy*, withdraw privately to Decelæa. But Aristarchus, who was one of the generals of the *State* took a different route from all the rest; and, carrying off a party of archers, though rank Barbarians, went off towards Oenoë: Oenoë was a fortress of the Athenians on the frontiers of Bœotia. But the Corinthians, on a provocation peculiar to themselves, having procured the concurrence of the Bœotians held it now blocked up, because a party of their countrymen drawing off from Decelæa had been put to the sword by a sally of the garrison from Oenoë. Aristarchus therefore, having in a conference settled matters with the besiegers, deceives the garrison in Oenoë by assuring them, that "as their countrymen in Athens had made up
" all their quarrels with the Lacedæmonians, they also were bound
" to deliver up this place to the Bœotians; and, that this was an

¹ The general course of appointing *Nomothetæ* was by lot. Their number in the whole was a thousand and one. Their business was not as the name seems to imply, to make new laws, since that belonged to the supreme power lodged in the people;

but, to inspect such as were already made, to re-consider such as were thought to be or were complained of as grievous, and regularly report such as ought to be continued or ought to be repealed.

" express

"express provision in the treaty." Giving credit therefore to him as in public command, and ignorant of all the late transactions because closely blocked up, they agree with the enemy and evacuate the fortress. In this manner the Bœotians regained possession of abandoned Oenoë. And thus the oligarchy and sedition were suppressed at Athens.

But about the same space of time in the current summer, in regard Miletus to the Peloponnesians at Miletus: — When none of those, who were substituted by Tissaphernes during his absence at Aspendus, made regular payments, and nothing could be seen either of Tissaphernes or the Phœnician fleet; — and Philippus who accompanied him sent advice to Mindarus the admiral in chief; and Hippocrates further, a citizen of Sparta, who was then at Phaselis, advised him also, that "this fleet would never join him, and in all respects they were shamefully abused by Tissaphernes:" — As Pharnabazus had made them an invitation, and declared himself ready, if aided by the confederate fleet, to engage as strongly as Tissaphernes for the revolt of what cities yet remained in subjection to the Athenians: — Mindarus, hoping to find more punctuality in the latter, with notable conduct and by a sudden signal to the fleet that his motions might not be discovered at Samos, weighs from Miletus with seventy-three sail, and bent his course to the Hellespont. But earlier this summer, sixteen ships had steered their course thither, and ravaged part of the Chersonesus. Mindarus met with tempestuous weather in his passage, which forced him to put into Icarus; and, after staying there five or six days for want of weather to keep the sea, he arrives at Chios. *The grand fleet quits Miletus.*

Thrasylus, so soon as informed of the departure from Miletus, stood after him with five and fifty sail, making the best of his way lest the other should enter the Hellespont before he reached him. But gaining intelligence that he was put into Chios, and concluding he designed to remain there, he fixed his scouts at Lesbos and the opposite continent; that, if the Peloponnesian fleet put out, their motions. *And the Athenian fleet quits Samos.*

motions might be desisted. He himself, repairing to Methymne, ordered quantities of meal and other necessities to be prepared, that in case he should be forced to stay in these parts, he might make frequent cruizes from Lesbos against Chios.

Ereſſus.

But, as Ereſſus in Lesbos had revolted, his design was further to attempt its reduction, in case it were feasible. For some of the Methymnæan exiles, and those not the most inconsiderable of the number, having brought over from Cyne about fifty heavy-armed who were most firmly attached to their cause, and hired others from the continent, which increased their number to about three hundred, Anaxarchus the Theban in respect of consanguinity being chose their leader --- assaulted first Methymne: And being repulsed in the attempt by the Athenian garrison which came up from Mitylene, and then driven quite off by a battle fought in the field, they retired across the mountain, and make Ereſſus revolt. Thraſyllus therefore, steering with his fleet against Ereſſus, projected an assault. But Thraſybulus with five ships from Samos was arrived there before him, upon information received of the re-passage of the exiles: Yet coming too late before Ereſſus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor before it. Two other ships also bound homewards from the Hellespont came in, and the Methymnæan. All the ships in the fleet amounted now to sixty-seven, from which they draughted an army for the operations of land, as fully bent if possible to take Ereſſus by a bold assault, with engines and all the arts of attack.

Course of the
Peloponnesians
to the Hellespont.

In the mean time, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after two whole days employment in taking in provisions, and receiving from the Chians every man on board three Chian ^a *tesseracosts*, on the third day with urgent dispatch launch out from Chios into the

^a This, according to Spanheim, was a month's pay, since he explains it by forty-three Chian *drachmas*: But the words will not bear such a construction. A *tesseracost*

was, it is most probable, a coin peculiar to the Chians; but, of what value is not known; nor is it of any great importance.

wide sea, that they might not be descried by the fleet before Erebus, and leaving Lesbos on the left stood over to the continent. There; putting into the harbour of Crateræi on the coast of Phocæa and taking their noon repaste, they proceeded along the coast of Cyne and supped at Arginusæ of the continent, over-against Mitylene. From thence, at dead of night, they went forwards along the shore; and, being arrived at Harmatus which lies facing Methymne and having eat their dinner there, they passed with the utmost speed by Lectus, and Larissa, and Amaxitus, and other adjacent places, and reach Rhætium of the Hellespont before midnight. Not but that some ships of the fleet got up no farther than to Sigæum, and some other adjacent places on that coast.

The Athenians, who were lying with eighteen sail at Sestus, when the lights were waved by their own friends for signals and they beheld numerous fires kindled on a sudden on the hostile coast, were well assured that the Peloponnesians are approaching. The same night therefore, under favour of the dark and with the utmost expedition, they crept along under the Chersonesus, and reached Elæus; desirous to put out to sea and avoid the enemy: And, for the sixteen ships at Abydus, they stole away unperceived of the Abydians, though notice had been sent them from their friends just arrived to keep a good look-out, and not suffer them to steal off. Yet morning no sooner appeared, than finding themselves in sight of the fleet under Mindarus and that they were actually chased, they could not all get off. The greater part indeed fled safe to the continent and Lemnos; but four, that got lost under sail, are overtaken by the enemy near Elæus. One also that run ashore at the temple of Protefilæus, they seize with all her hands; and two more, the crews of which escaped. One further, but abandoned, they burn at Imbrus.

This done, the ships from Abydus having joined them, and the whole fleet being now increased to fourscore and six sail, they spent the rest of the day in investing Elæus; but, as it would not surrender, they drew off to Abydus.

The

*The Athenians
pursue.*

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their scouts and never imagined that so large a number of hostile ships could pass along undescried, were very coolly carrying on their siege; but yet, were no sooner informed of the enemy's motions, than instantly quitting Erechus they advanced with the utmost expedition to secure the Hellespont. They also pick up two ships of the Peloponnesians, which running out too boldly to sea in the late pursuit fell in amongst them. And, coming up only one day after them, they anchor at Eléus, and re-assemble from Imbrus the ships which had fled thither. Five whole days they spend here in getting every thing in readiness for a general engagement. And after this respite they came to an action in the following manner.

Battle at Cynossema.

The Athenians, ranged in line of battle a-head, stood along shore towards Sestus. The Peloponnesians, aware of their design, stood out to sea from Abydus to be ready to receive them. And, as both sides were determined to engage, they unfolded their lines to a greater length; the Athenians, along the Chersonesus, reaching from Idacus to Arrhianæ, in all sixty-eight sail; and the Peloponnesians, over-against them, from Abydus to Dardanus, being eighty-six. The line of the Peloponnesians was thus formed: The Syracusans had the right; and on the left was ranged Mindarus and the ships most remarkable for being good sailors. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left, and Thrasylbulus the right: The rest of the commanders were regularly posted according to their rank. The Peloponnesians, shewing most eagerness to begin the engagement, endeavoured with their left to over-reach the right of the Athenians, in order to exclude them if possible from stretching out into the main sea, and by keeping them cramped up to force their centre against the shore, which was not far distant. The Athenians, aware of the enemy's design to shut them up, plying up a-head forced themselves an opening, and in velocity beat them all to nothing.

By these motions, the left of their line became extended beyond the cape called Cynossema. The consequence of which was exposing
their

their centre, composed only of the weakest ships and those ranged at too great a distance from one another; especially, as in number of vessels they were quite inferior, and as the coast round the Cynos-sema was sharp and in an acute angle runs out into the water, so that part of the line on one side was out of sight of the other. The Peloponnesians therefore charging the centre drove at once the ships of the Athenians upon the beach; and, being so far manifestly victors, leaped boldly on shore to pursue them. But neither those under Thrasylbulus could assist the centre from the right, because of the multitude of ships that stood in to awe them; nor could those under Thrasyllus do it from the left, because the interposition of cape Cynos-sema hid from him the view of what had passed; and at the same time, the Syracusans and others, who equal in strength lay hard upon him, prevented his moving. At length the Peloponnesians, presuming the victory their own, broke their order to give different chase to single ships, and in too heedless a manner threw confusion upon a part of their own line. And now those under Thrasylbulus, finding the squadron opposed to them began to slacken, stopped all farther extension of their line a-head; and, tacking upon them, resolutely engaged, and put them to flight. Charging next the dispersed ships of the Peloponnesians, which composed the squadron that presumed itself victorious, they made havoc; and, by striking them with a panic, routed the greater part without resistance. Now also, the Syracusans were beginning to give way before the squadron under Thrasyllus, and seeing others in open flight were more easily tempted to follow their example. The defeat now being manifestly given, and the Peloponnesians flying away for shelter first towards the river Pydius and afterwards to Abydus, the Athenians made prize of only an inconsiderable number of shipping; for the Hellespont being narrow afforded short retreats to the enemy. However they gained a victory by sea, most opportune indeed in their present situation. For hitherto, afraid of the naval strength of the Peloponnesians because of the rebuffs they had lately received from it, and the

*The Athenians
victorious.*

calamitous event of the Sicilian expedition, from this moment they stopped all fruitless self-accusations, or groundless exaggerations of the enemy's ability by sea. Some ships of the enemy in fact they take; for instance, eight Chian, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian; but, of Leucadian and Lacedæmonian and Syracusan and Pollenæan, a single one of each: But then they suffered the loss of fifteen ships of their own.

The news received joyfully at Athens.

After erecting a trophy upon the cape of Cynos-sema, and picking up the shatters of the fight, and giving up under truce their dead to the enemy, they dispatched a trireme to Athens to notify the victory. On the arrival of this vessel, those at home, after hearing the news of this unhopèd-for success, greatly resumed their spirits, which had been dejected by the recent misfortunes at Eubœa and the sad effects of their sedition, and hoped the *State* might again resume its power, if they cheerfully exerted their efforts in its behalf.

Reduction of Cyzicus.

On the fourth day after the battle, the Athenians, having diligently refitted their fleet at Sestus, sailed against Cyzicus which had revolted. And, descrying eight ships from Byzantium riding at anchor under Harpagium and Priapus, they crowded sail towards them; and, having in battle upon the shore defeated their crews, made prizes of them all. Repairing thence against Cyzicus which was quite unfortified, they reduced it once more, and exacted large contributions from it.

But during this interval, the Peloponnesians made a trip from Abydus to Eléus, and brought off as many of their own ships which had been taken as were able to sail; the residue the Eléusians burnt. They also dispatched Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to fetch up their fleet from thence.

Alcibiades.

About the same space of time, Alcibiades also at the head of his squadron of thirteen sail returned from Caunus and Phaselis into the harbour of Samos; reporting, that "by his management he had diverted the junction of the Phœnician fleet with the Peloponnesians, and made Tissaphernes a faster friend than ever to the Athenians."

After

After enlarging his squadron by the addition of nine more just manned, he levied large contributions upon the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After these exploits and putting the government of Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about autumn, to Samos ³.

From Aspendus also, Tisaphernes rode back post-haste into Ionia, Tisaphernes. so soon as advised of the departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Miletus for the Hellespont.

But as the Peloponnesians were now in the Hellespont, the Antandrians (who are of Æolic descent) having procured from Abydus a party of heavy-armed who marched across mount Ida, received them into their city, provoked to this step by the injurious conduct of Arsaees, a Persian, lieutenant to Tisaphernes. This man, pretending he had enemies to cope with whom yet he never named, prevailed with the Delians settled in Adramittium; because they had been obliged by

3 As the English reader is here to take his leave of Alcibiades, he may have the curiosity to know what became of him after — Every thing succeeded so well under him and his active colleagues, that the Lacedæmonians, having received several defeats both by land and sea and lost two hundred ships, were again necessitated to sue for peace. After such great services, Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. The whole city flocked down to the Piræus to meet him. All strove to get a sight of Alcibiades; they caressed him, crowned him, cursed the authors of his exile, and hurried him away to an assembly of the people. There he harangued them for a time, then stopped and shed tears in abundance, then harangued them again. In short, they undid all they had ever done against him; and Alcibiades for a time was all in all at Athens. Yet, in subsequent commands he happened not to be successful, a crime which his countrymen very seldom forgave. He became a second time an exile

from Athens. His great abilities made him a continual terror both to foreign and domestic enemies. Yet now he persevered to serve his country, by caballing in their favour, and advising them on critical occasions. Yet all in vain, Lyfander was soon master of the Piræus, and of Athens. Alcibiades retired into Phrygia, and was handsomely supported by the bounty of his friend Pharnabazus; who however was wrought upon at last, by the joint-solicitations of his enemies, and the plea of its necessity for the service of the king, to undertake his destruction. The agents of Pharnabazus durst not attempt him in an open manner, but set fire to his house by night. By throwing in cloaths to damp the flames, he got out safe. The Barbarians soon spied him, shot him to death with arrows and darts, then cut off his head, and carried it to Pharnabazus. I shall only add, that he was but forty years old, when he was thus destroyed.

the Athenians to quit Delos, in the affair of the expiation, to attend him in this secret expedition with the flower of their strength; and, leading them forwards with all the shew of friendship and alliance, watched the opportunity when they were busy at their meal, surrounded them with a body of his own soldiers, and shot them to death with darts. Fearing him therefore because of this instance of a cruel temper, lest some such act of violence he might execute also upon them, as in other respects he had imposed some burdens upon them which they could not bear, the Antandrians ejected his garrison out of their citadel. But Tissaphernes, perceiving how deeply the Peloponnesians were concerned in this affair, and esteeming himself sadly injured also at Miletus and Cnidus (since in those places too his garrisons had been ejected;) and fearing they would proceed to other commissions of the same nature; chagrined moreover, that perhaps Pharnabazus in less time and with less expence having obtained their concurrence should make a greater progress against the Athenians;— he determined in person to repair to Hellespont, in order to expostulate with them about their late proceedings at Antander, and to wipe off as handsomely as he could the aspersions thrown upon his own conduct in regard to the Phœnician fleet, and other points. Arriving therefore first at Ephesus, he offered sacrifice to Diana, * * * * 4

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the twenty-first year of the war will be also compleated.

4 Here breaks off abruptly the History of the Peloponnesian war by Thucydides. The adjustment of time annexed seems plainly of another hand.

I N D E X.

Note, The Letters refer to the Volumes, and the Figures to the Pages.

A.

- A** *Bronchus*, I. 70.
Acanthus, II. 131.
Acarnahians, excellent slingers, I. 193. conquer the *Ambraciots*, 302. make peace with them, 307. enter into an alliance with the *Athenians*, 181.
Acarnanians, I. 141, 143.
Admetus, king of the *Molossians*, I. 106.
Eantidas, tyrant of *Lampsacus*, II. 259.
Eginetæ, formerly of great power at sea, I. 14. stir up the war against the *Athenians*, 50. conquered by the *Athenians* at sea. 80. how, and why expelled *Egina* by the *Athenians*, 146. are settled by the *Lacedæmonians* at *Thyreæ*, *ibid.* how used by the *Athenians*, when they reduced *Thyreæ*, II. 47.
Egyptians, which of them most warlike, I. 83.
Enesias, II. 96.
Enesias, I. 123.
Enians, II. 358.
Eolians, tributary to *Athens*, II. 358.
Esimides, I. 38.
Eson, II. 148.
Etheans, I. 77.
Etolians, I. 7. invaded by the *Athenians*, 292. defeat them, 294.
Agamemnon, I. 9.
Agatharchidas, I. 194.
Agatharchus, II. 326.
Agessander, I. 111.
Agessippidas, II. 165.
Agis, king of *Sparta*, I. 287. II. 4. he commands against the *Argives*, 166. lets them go without a battle, 168. is accused for it at *Sparta*, 170. marches a second time against them, 171. gains the victory at *Mantineæ*, 178. fortifies *Decelea* in *Attica*, 321. makes an unsuccessful attempt on *Athens*, 449.
Agnon, I. 206. the son of *Nicias*, colleague to *Pericles*, 90. besiegeth *Potidæa*, 168. the founder of *Amphipolis*, II. 83, 124.
Agreans, I. 307.
Agrianians, I. 207.
Agrirentines, neutral in the *Sicilian* war, II. 360.
Alcaus, archon at *Athens*, II. 135.
Alcamenes, II, 397, 401.
Alcibiades, son of *Climias*, II. 151. his expedition into *Peloponnesus*, 162. and to *Argos*, 187. named for one of the commanders in *Sicily*, 212. his speech on that occasion, 219. is accused about the *Mercuries* and for profaning the mysteries, 230, 253. insists on a trial, 231. sets out for *Sicily*, *ibid.* his opinion at a council of war, 250. is recalled to take his trial, 253. flies, and is outlawed, 262. takes refuge at *Sparta*, 286. his speech at *Sparta*, 287. adviseth the *Lacedæmonians* about prosecuting the war, 398, 403. sent to *Cbios* with *Cbalculæus*, 403. his transactions at *Milerus*, 406. goes to *Tissaphernes*, and becomes a favourite, 428. contrives his own recalcment to *Athens*, 430. his quarrel with *Phrynichus*, 432. is recalled, 458. 476. his management at *Samos*, 459, 463. goes to *Aspendus*, 465.
Alcidas, the *Lacedæmonian* admiral, sent to *Lesbos*, I. 229, 236. he flies, 239. returns to *Peloponnesus*, 274. fails to *Corcyra*, 278. one of the three leaders of the colony to *Heraclea*, 290.
Alcinadas, II. 131, 134.
Alcipbron, II. 168.
Alcmaeon, I. 213.
Alcmaeonide, II. 259.
Alexarchus, II. 322.
Alexicles, put under arrest, II. 470. flies to *Decelea*, 476.
Alexippidas,

I N D E X.

- Alexippidas*, II. 439.
Almopians, I. 209.
Ambraciots, aid the *Corinthians* against the *Corcyrans*, I. 22, 23. make war on the *Amphilochians*, 180. and the *Acarnonians*, 191. make another expedition against both, 300. take *Olpe*, *ibid.* are defeated, 301. make peace, 307. send aid to the *Syracusans*, II. 360.
Ameinias, II. 107.
Ameinias, I. 179.
Aminocles, I. 13.
Amorges, revolts from the king of *Persia*, II. 398. is taken prisoner by the *Peloponnesians*, and delivered to *Tissaphernes*, 415.
Ampelidas, II. 132.
Amphias, II. 96.
Amphilochians, I. 180, 407.
Amphissenians, I. 296.
Amyntas, I. 206.
Amyntas, I. 83.
Anaxarchus, II. 478.
Anaxilas, II. 209.
Andocides, I. 42.
Androcles, II. 444.
Andromachus, II. 190.
Androstratus, II. 160.
Andrians, II. 358.
Antippos, II. 131, 134.
Anticles, I. 90.
Antimenidas, II. 150.
Antiochus, king of the *Orsians*, I. 192.
Antiphanes, II. 208.
Antipho, II. 447, 467.
Antisthenes, II. 423, 442.
Antisthenians, I. 191.
Apodoti, I. 292.
Aradians, furnished with ships by *Agamemnon* in the *Trojan* expedition, I. 10. mercenaries, II. 359.
Archadus, II. 259.
Archelaus, I. 210.
Archestratus, I. 45.
Archetimus, I. 24.
Archias of *Camarina*, II. 22.
Archias the *Corinthian*, founder of *Syracuse*, II. 207.
Archidamus, king of *Sparta*, his speech about the war, I. 62. commands in the invasion of *Attica*, 131. his speech, *ibid.* commands in another invasion, 160. and against *Plataea*, 183.
Archonides, II. 308.
Argilians, a colony of *Andriens*, II. 84.
Argives, have thirty years truces with the *Lacedaemonians*, II. 125. are irritated by the *Corinthians* against the *Lacedaemonians*, 137. aim at being a leading state, 138. make war upon the *Epidaurians*, 163. are surrounded by the *Lacedaemonians*, but let go, 168. are defeated at *Mantineia*, and make peace, 178, 181.
Ariantides, II. 73.
Aristagoras, II. 83.
Aristarchus, II. 467, 470, 476.
Aristeus, son of *Pellicus*, I. 24.
Aristeus, son of *Adiantus*, 46, 49, 279; 180.
Ariston, the *Lacedaemonian*, II. 107.
Aristides, son of *Lyfimachus*, I. 70.
Aristides, son of *Archippus*, II. 42, 61.
Aristocles, II. 127, 177.
Aristocrates, II, 131.
Aristocrates, II. 134, 466, 470.
Aristogiton, I. 17. II. 254.
Aristo, II. 340.
Aristonous of *Larissa*, I. 144. the founder of *Agrigentum*, II. 208.
Aristophanes, II. 464.
Aristotle son of *Timocrates*, I. 300.
Arrhenus, king of the *Lyncastians*, II. 65. warred against by *Brosidas* and *Perdiccas*, 67. 99.
Artabazus, I. 100.
Artaphernes, II. 42.
Artas, II. 335.
Artaxerxes Longimanus, I. 79. begins to reign, 108. dies, II. 43.
Asopius, son of *Phormis*, his exploits and death, I. 221.
Asymachus, I. 299.
Astiochus, the *Lacedaemonian* admiral, II. 408, 418. goes to *Cibis*, 409. in great danger, 419. refuseth to succour the *Cibians*, 419, 422. betrays *Phrynichus*, 433. is mutinied against by his own seamen, and returns to *Sparta*, 460.
Atthians, gave shelter at first to all who would settle amongst them, I. 4. had war with the *Megarians*, 90. how they became a naval power, 16. abandoned *Athens* and fought at *Salamis*, 57. rebuild their walls, 69. made war against the king of *Persia* under *Pausanias*, 73. Gain a victory at *Euryndon*,

I N D E X.

400, 76. reduce the isle of *Thasos*, 77. receive the *Helots* and settle them at *Naupactus*, 79. their war in *Egypt*, *ibid.* — 83. — with the *Corinthians* and *Epidaurians*, *ibid.* and *Argives*, 80. with the *Lacedæmonians*, 81. *Bæotians*; 82. *Sicyonians*, 83, 85. *Cyprians*, 85. recover *Cbaronea*, 86. defeated at *Coronea*, *ibid.* reduce *Eubœa*, 87. make war upon *Samos*, 89. make alliance with the *Corcyrians*, 37. assist them against the *Corintheans*, *ibid.* their measures with the *Potidaans*, 44. make war upon *Pordiccas*, 45. fight the *Potidaans* and *Corinthians*, 47. besiege *Potidæa*, 49. deliberate about the *Peloponnesian* war, 111. prepare for defence, 128. send their fleet to cruize upon *Peloponnesus*, 144. attack *Metbone*, 145. invade *Locris*, 146. eject the *Æginææ* from the isle of *Ægina*, *ibid.* make an alliance with *Sitalcus*, 147. take *Solium* and *Astacus*, 148. invade the *Megaris*, 149. fortify *Atalanta*, *ibid.* celebrate the public funeral, 150. are afflicted with the plague, 160. send their fleets to cruize on *Peloponnesus*, 167. are angry with *Pericles*, 169. take *Potidæa*, 182. war upon the *Chalcideans*, 190. fight the *Peloponnesians* at sea, 194. send a fleet to *Lesbos*, 218. besiege *Mitylene*, 220. reduce it, 237. seize the island of *Minoa*, 258. send a fleet to *Sicily*, 285. their war in *Acarwania*, 291. are defeated by the *Ætolians*, 294. their proceedings in *Sicily*, II. 4. they seize and fortify *Pylus*, 5. fight between them and the *Lacedæmonians*, 11. fight the *Syracusans*, 21. invade the *Corinthians*, 36. take *Anactorium*, 42. conquer *Cythera*, 44. take *Thyrea*, 47. surprise *Nisæa*, 57. invade *Bœotia*, and are defeated at *Delium*, 72, 78. lose *Amphipolis*, 86. make a truce with the *Lacedæmonians*, 93. take *Mende*, 104. besiege *Scione*, 106. eject the *Delians*, 113. are conquered by *Brasidas* at *Amphipolis*, 122. make a peace, 128. take *Scione*, 141. want to break the peace, 151. make an alliance with the *Argives*, 156. invade and reduce *Melos*, 187. determine on the *Sicilian* expedition, 205. their preparations, 229. they sail for *Sicily*, 231. land at *Syracuse*, 265. fight, 268. solicit the alliance of *Camarina*, 273. take *Epipolæ*, 295. besiege *Syracuse*, 296. fight with *Gylippus*, 312. send a reinforcement to *Sy-*

racuse, 323. fight the *Corinthians* at *Erineus*, 336. defeated in the attack of *Epipolæ*, 345. are raising the siege, 352. are stopped by an eclipse of the moon, *ibid.* fight the battle in the harbour, 370. march away, 376. and forced to surrender, 384, 386. their consternation at *Athens*, 393. their measures, 396. take *Mitylene*, 410. subdue the *Clazomenians*, *ibid.* besiege the *Chians*, 411. defeat the *Milesiens*, 412. quit *Miletus* for fear of the *Peloponnesians*, 415. fight and are defeated, 425. solicit the friendship of *Tissaphernes*, 438. fight with the *Chians*, 442. lose their democracy, 443. lose *Eubœa*, 474. defeat the *Peloponnesians* in the battle of *Cynossema*, 480.

Athenæus, II. 96.

Athenagoras, his speech at *Syracuse*, II. 240.

Atræus, I. 9.

Autocles, II. 44, 96.

B.

Battus, II. 37.

Bæotians, ejected out of *Arne*, I. 12. conquered by the *Athenians* at *Oenophyta*, 82. become free, 86. win the battle of *Delium*, II. 78. besiege *Delium*, 81. take *Panactum*, 116. send aid to the *Syracusans*, 322.

Bæotian-Rulers eleven in number, II. 73, 146.

Four councils, 146.

Bomienians, I. 294.

Bottians, I. 45, 190, 209.

Brasidas, saves *Metbone*, and receives the public commendation at *Sparta*, I. 145. is of the council to *Alcidas*, 278. his gallant behavior at *Pylus*, II. 11. saves *Megara*, 58. marches to *Thrace*, 63. his character, 66. marcheth against the *Lyncestians*, 67. harangues the *Acanthians*, 68. gets possession of *Amphipolis*, 83. is repulsed at *Eion*, 86. marches into the *Alse*, 88. takes *Torone*, 89. and *Lecythus*, 92. crowned by the *Scionians*, 97. marches a second time against the *Lyncestians*, 99. his brave retreat, 101. makes an unsuccessful attempt on *Potidæa*, 108. opposeth *Cleon* at *Amphipolis*, 117. resolves to attack, 119. harangues, *ibid.* sallies, 122. conquers and dies. 123. his funeral, *ibid.*

Braures, II. 87.

Byzantines, revolt from the *Athenians*, I. 88, 90.

C. Callias,

I N D E X.

C.

Callias, son of *Calliades*, I. 47. killed, 49.
Callicrates, I. 24.
Callienians, I. 294.
Camarinians, twice ejected, II. 209. their conduct in the *Sicilian* war, 253, 285.
Cambyfes, I. 13.
Carcinus, I. 144.
Carians, I. 6, 8.
Carthaginians, I. 14. II. 237, 289.
Carysians, I. 75. II. 358.
Catanians, dwell under mount *Ætna*, I. 308. reduced by the *Athenians*, II. 252, 360.
Cecrops, king of *Athens*, I. 136.
Ceryces, II. 435.
Chæreas, II. 454, 463.
Chalcideus, *Lacedæmonian* admiral, II. 402. his exploits, 404, 406. killed by the *Athenians*, 411.
Chalcideans of *Eubœa*, make war with the *Eretrians*, I. 15. subject to the *Athenians*, II. 358.
Chalcideans of *Thrace*, revolt from the *Athenians*, I. 45. defeat them, 190. enter into league with the *Argives*. II. 141.
Chæonians, I. 191.
Charicles, II. 323, 328.
Charminus, an *Athenian* commander, II. 417. defeated by the *Peloponnesians*, 425. helps the oligarchical party at *Samos*, 452.
Charaxides, son of *Euphiletas*, I. 285. killed, II. 288.
Chionis, II. 131, 134.
Chians, suspected, II. 401. revolt from the *Athenians*, 404. their war, 411.
Chrysis, I. 123. II. 108.
Cilicians, I. 85.
Cimon, son of *Miltiades*, takes *Eion*, I. 75. beats the *Persians* at *Eurymedon*, 76. dies in the expedition to *Cyprus*, 85.
Clearchus, II. 458.
Clearidas, commands in *Amphipolis*, II. 107, 119. conquers *Cleon*, with *Brasidas*, 122. endeavours to break the peace, 132.
Cleippides, I. 218.
Cleobulus, II. 144.
Cleomedes, II. 188.
Cleomenes, I. 98.
Cleon, his speech, I. 242. his command at *Pylus*, II. 25, 27, 35. his command in

Thrace, 114, 117. conquered by *Brasidas*, and killed, 121.
Cleopompus, I. 168.
Cnemus, the *Spartan*, commands a squadron against *Zacynthus*, I. 179. sent into *Acar-nania*, 191. retires from *Stratus*, 193.
Conon, II. 333.
Copienians, II. 76.
Corcyrans, founders of *Epidamnus*, I. 20. were themselves a *Corinthian* colony, 21. make war on *Epidamnus*, 22. beat the *Corinthians* at sea, 24. beg the alliance of *Athens*, 26. their speech at *Athens*, 27. their success, 37. engage the *Corinthians* at sea, 39. their sedition, 274. II. 40. aid the *Athenians* in the war of *Sicily*, II. 359.
Corinthians, first built ships of war, I. 13. their quarrel with the *Corcyrans* about *Epidamnus*, 21. their speech at *Athens*, 31. continuation of their war with the *Corcyrans*, 38. send aid to *Potidæa*, 46. hate the *Athenians*, 50. their first speech at *Lacedæmon*, 51. their second, 92. excite discontent in *Peloponnesus*, II. 135, 137. make alliances with the *Elæans* and *Argives*, 141. aid the *Syracusans*, 293, 320.
Coronians, II. 76.
Cranians, I. 150.
Cranonians, I. 144.
Cratamenes, II. 208.
Crestomians, II. 89.
Cretans, II. 359.
Cræsus, I. 15.
Cyclops, II. 206.
Cylon, the history of him, I. 97.
Cynes, I. 212.
Cyrus, the elder, I. 13, 15.
Cyrus, the younger, I. 178.

D.

Daitbus, II. 131.
Damagetus, *ibid.*
Damagon, I. 290.
Damotimus, II. 96.
Darius, king of *Persia*, succeeds *Cambyfes*, I. 14. reduces the isles, 15.
Darius, son of *Artaxerxes*, II. 398. his leagues with the *Lacedæmonians*, 407, 421, 439.
Dascon, II. 209.
Delians, removed out of *Delos* by the *Athenians*, II. 113. brought thither again, 141.
Demaratus,

I N D E X.

- Demaratus*, II. 303.
Demarchus, II. 462.
Demodocus, II. 61.
Demosthenes, I. 288. his war in *Ætolia*, 292. his seizure of and exploits at *Pylus*, II. 5, 7. his harangue, 9. his attempt on *Megara*, 54. carries up a reinforcement against *Syracuse*, 323. arrives at *Syracuse*, 342. repulsed at *Epipolæ*, 345. is for raising the siege, 348. decamps, 376. surrenders with the troops under his command, 384. is put to death, 387.
Demoteles, II. 22.
Dercyllidas, II. 441.
Derdas, I. 45.
Derseans, I. 211.
Dians, I. 207. II. 329.
Diædians, take *Thyffus*, II. 143. dwell on mount *Atbos*, 185. revolt from the *Athenians*, *ibid.*
Diemporus, I. 124.
Diitrophes, II. 331.
Diodotus, his speech, I. 249.
Diomedon, besieges the *Chians*, II. 411. favours the democracy, 452.
Diomilus, II. 295.
Diotimus, I. 37.
Diostrophes, II. 443.
Diphilus, II. 336.
Dolopes, I. 75.
Dorcis, I. 73.
Dorians, in *Peloponnesus*, I. 12. founders of *Lacedæmon*, 81, 290. bordering on the *Carians*, 131. warred upon by the *Phocians*, 81. perpetual enemies to *Ionians*, II. 278.
Doricus the *Rhodian*, I. 221.
Doricus the *Thurian*, II. 420.
Dreans of *Thrace*, I. 211.
- E.
- Edonians*, I. 77, 209. M. 89.
Egestians, at war with the *Selinuntians*, II. 209. solicit aid at *Athens*, 210. their trick, 248.
Ellians, defeated by the *Athenians*, I. 146. in alliance with the *Corinthians* and *Argives*, II. 140. with the *Athenians*, 156.
Eleusinians, warred against *Eretheus*, I. 137.
Elymi, II. 206.
Empedias, II. 131, 134.
Endius the *Spartan*, II. 398. ambassador to *Athens*, 152. his enmity with *Agis*, 403.
 Vol. II.
- R r r
- Entimus* the *Cretan*, founder of *Gela*, II. 208.
Eordians, I. 209.
Epidamnians, harassed with seditions, I. 20. beg aid at *Corcyra*, 21. at *Corinth*, *ibid.* besieged by the *Corcyrians*, 22. reduced, 24.
Epitadas, II. 8, 34.
Epitolidas, II. 107.
Eretheus, I. 137.
Eretrians, at war with the *Cbalcidiæns*, I. 15. subject and tributary to *Athens*, II. 358.
Erythræans, II. 404.
Eteonicus, II. 410.
Eualas, II. 409.
Evarchus, tyrant of *Astacus*, I. 148. another of the name, II. 207.
Eubulus, II. 410.
Eucles the *Athenian*, II. 85.
Eucles the *Syracusan*, II. 301.
Euclides, founder of *Himera*, II. 209.
Euæmon, II. 417.
Evesperitæ, II. 352.
Euction, II. 315.
Eumachus, I. 149.
Eumolpides, II. 435.
Eumolpus, I. 137.
Euphamidas, I. 149. II. 96.
Euphemus, his speech at *Camarina*, II. 279.
Eurylochus the *Spartan*, I. 296, 300, 303.
Eurymachus, I. 124, 128.
Eurymedon, sent to *Corcyra*, I. 279. to *Sicily*, II. 4. is fined for returning, 53. sent thither again, 319. arrives at *Syracuse*, 342. killed, 355.
Eurystheus, king of *Mycenæ*, I. 9.
Eurytaniæns, I. 292.
Eustrophus, II. 148.
Euthydemus, II. 131, 134. a commander at *Syracuse*, 319. unsuccessful in the last battle, 370.
- G.
- Gelon*, king of *Syracuse*, II. 208, 209.
Geloans, build *Agriгентum*, II. 208. aid the *Syracusans*, 360.
Getæ, I. 206.
Glauco, I. 41.
Goaxis, II. 87.
Gongylus, the *Eretrian*, I. 100.
Gongylus, the *Corinthian*, II. 308.
Graæans, I. 207.
Græciæns, account of the old, I. 4. how they undertook

I N D E X

undertook the *Trojan* expedition, 9. applied themselves to maritime affairs, 13, 16.
Gylippus, sent to command at *Syracuse*, II. 292. arrives there, 309. his battles, 312. takes *Plemmyrium*, 325. procures succours, 351. fights the *Athenians*, 355. stops their de-campment, 375. takes *Nicias* prisoner, 386. brings home the fleet from *Sicily*, 404.
Gyrtomani, I. 144.

H.

Haliartians, II. 76.
Harmodius, history of him, II. 254.
Hegefanter, II. 322.
Hegeandridas, II. 469, 473.
Hegeppidas, II. 162.
Helen, I. 9.
Hellanicus, I. 75.
Hellen, son of *Democleon*, I. 5.
Helots, their revolt from and war with the *Lacedæmonians*, I. 77. are feared, and 2000 of them made away with, II. 65.
Heraclæots, II. 161.
Heraclides, kill *Eurystheus*, I. 9.
Heraclides, the *Syracusan*, II. 271, 301.
Hercules, II. 174.
Hermæondas, I. 220.
Hermocrates, his speech to the *Sicilians*, II. 48. to the *Syracusans*, 235. his character, 270. encourages the *Syracusans*, 271. made a commander, *ibid.* his speech at *Camarina*, 273. his stratagem, 375. banished, 462.
Hermion, II. 470.
Mesiod, I. 293.
Hesians, I. 296.
Histiæots, I. 87. II. 358.
Hesiodorus, I. 132.
Hierensians, I. 290.
Hierophon, I. 300.
Hippagretes, II. 34.
Hipparchus, history of him, II. 254.
Hippias, father of *Pisistratus*, II. 255.
Hippias, the eldest son of *Pisistratus*, history of him, II. 254.
Hippias, the *Arcadian*, I. 240.
Hippocles, tyrant of *Lampsacus*, II. 259.
Hippocles, son of *Menippus*, 404.
Hippocrates the *Athenian*, II. 54. his attempt on *Megara*, *ibid.* his harangue, 77. killed at the battle of *Delium*, 82. tyrant of *Gela*, 209.

Hippocrates, the *Spartan*, 429.
Hippolochidas, II. 63.
Hipponicus, I. 289.
Hipponoidas, II. 127.
Homer, I. 5, 10. II. 298.
Hymæus, I. 296.
Hyblæans, II. 294.
Hyblon, II. 208.
Hyperbolus, II. 451.

I.

Iberians, II. 206, 289.
Illyrians, I. 22. II. 100.
Imbrians, I. 220. II. 358.
Inarus, an *African* king, revolts from the *Per-sian* monarch, I. 79. crucified, 84.
Iolcius, II. 131, 134.
Ionians had a great fleet in the reign of *Cyrus*, and were masters at sea, I. 13. subdued by *Cyrus*, 15. revolt, 73. enemies to the *Dorians*, II. 279. used to assemble at *Delos*, I. 298.
Ionesians, I. 296.
Isarchidas, I. 24.
Ischagoras, II. 107, 131, 134.
Isocrates, I. 194.
Isthmionicus, II. 131, 134.
Italus, II. 206.
Itamæus, I. 240.
Itonians, II. 117.
Ity, I. 147.

L.

Lacedæmonians, their power in *Peloponnesus*, I. 10. their dress, 7. were the first who stripped in the public games. *ibid.* demolished tyrants, 15. deluded by *Themistocles*, 70. accuse him, 105. war against their *Helots*, 77. at war with the *Athenians*, 81. and the *Dorians*, *ibid.* beat the *Athenians* at *Tanagra*, 82. make a truce for five years, 85. begin the holy war, *ibid.* make a thirty years truce with the *Athenians*, 87. consult about the *Peloponnesian* war, 62. determine for it, 67, 97. send embassies to *Athens* to spin out time, 97. invade *Attica*, 131. assign *Thyrea* to the *Æginetæ*, 146. invade *Attica*, 160. make war on *Zacynthus*, 179. march to *Platæa*, and besiege it, 183. invade *Acarnania*, 193. fight at sea, 194. their project

I N D E X.

- project to seize the *Piræus*, 204. invade *Attica*, 217. resolve to succour the *Mitylenians*, 227. become masters of *Plataea*, 259. put the *Plataeans* to death, 272. beat the *Corcyrians* at sea, 278. send a colony to *Heraclea*, 289. their expedition against the *Amphilocbians*, 300. invade *Attica*, II. 4. their endeavours to recover *Pylus*, 7. send an embassy to *Athens* to solicit a peace, 15. vanquished in *Sphacteria*, 29. make away with 2000 *Helots*, 65. take *Amphipolis*, 86. make peace with the *Athenians*, 93. march into *Arcadia*, 142. forbid to assist at the *Olympic* games, 160. succour the *Epidaurians*, 166. gain a victory at *Mantineia*, 178. determine to succour the *Syracusans*, 292. fortify *Decelea*, 322. succour the *Cbians*, 404. enter into league with the *Persian* monarch, 407, 421, 439. take *Efus*, 415. fight with and beat the *Athenians*, 425. seize *Rhodes*, 427. fight with the *Athenians*, 474. are beat at the sea-fight of *Cynos-fema*, 480.
- Lacedæmonius*, son of *Cimon*, I. 37.
- Laches*, commander of the *Athenian* fleet in *Sicily*, I. 285. II. 131, 134, 169. makes war on *Mylæ*, I. 288. defeats the *Locrians*, 298.
- Laco*, I. 259.
- Laſpodias*, II. 303, 464.
- Læſtrigons*, II. 206.
- Lamachus*, loſeth a squadron, II. 62. one of the three commanders in *Sicily*, 212. his opinion at a council of war, 250. killed, 299.
- Lamis*, II. 207.
- Lamphilus*, II. 131, 134.
- Lampo*, *ibid.*
- Leæans*, I. 207.
- Learchus*, I. 179.
- Lemnians*, I. 220. II. 119. accompany the *Athenians* to *Sicily*, 358.
- Leocrates*, I. 80.
- Leon*, the *Lacedæmonian*, I. 290.
- Leon*, the *Athenian*, II. 409, 411, 437.
- Leontines*, II. 22. at war with the *Syracusans*, I. 285. in ſedition, II. 116.
- Leotychides*, I. 68.
- Leſbians*, I. 217.
- Leucadians*, aid the *Corinthians* against the *Corcyrians*, I. 22, 23. join the *Ambraciots*, 191.
- Lichas*, an *Olympic* victor, but scourged, II. 161. his embassies, 132, 181. public hoſt of the *Argives*, 181. his diſpute with *Tiffaphernes*, 426, 461. his death, 461.
- Locrians*, *Oreſian*, I. 7. loſe *Naupaſtus*, 79. confederate with the *Athenians*, 292.
- Locrians*, *Epizephyrian*, II. 307.
- Lycobron*, I. 196. II. 37, 38.
- Lynceſtians*, I. 209. II. 67, 100.
- Lyſicles*, I. 231.
- Lyſistratus*, II. 89.

M.

- Macarius*, I. 296, 303.
- Machon*, I. 194.
- Mantineans*, I. 302, 304. war with the *Tegeates*, II. 108. make alliance with the *Argives*, 138. at war with the *Lacedæmonians*, 142. renew the peace with them, 184. mercenaries, 359.
- Megabates*, I. 100.
- Megabactus*, the *Persian*, I. 83. ſon of *Zopyrus*, *ibid.*
- Megareans*, aid the *Corinthians* against *Corcyra*, I. 23. prohibited the harbours and markets of *Athens*, 51, 111. ſcheme to betray their city to the *Athenians*, II. 54. demolish their long-walls, 88.
- Melians*, II. 117.
- Melanctridas*, II. 399.
- Melanthus*, II. 397.
- Meleas*, I. 220.
- Meleſander*, I. 181.
- Melians*, their conference with the *Athensians*, II. 189. beſieged, 199. reduced, 201.
- Meliſſians*, I. 289. fight with the *Heracleots*, II. 161.
- Menander*, an *Athenian* commander in *Sicily*, II. 319, 370.
- Menas*, II. 131, 134.
- Mendians*, II. 99.
- Menecolus*, II. 209.
- Menecrates*, II. 96.
- Menon*, I. 144.
- Messenians*, of *Peloponneſus*, ejected by the *Lacedæmonians*, I. 77. ſettled by the *Athenians* at *Naupaſtus*, 79. take *Phia*, 146. replaced at *Pylus*, II. 36.
- Messenians*, of *Sicily*, at war with the *Naxians*, II. 22.
- Metagenes*, II. 131, 134.
- Mia-

I N D E X.

Metapontians, II. 359.
Metbymnians, I. 230. II. 358.
Miciades, I. 38.
Milefians, their war with the *Samians*, I. 87.
 beat the *Argives*, II. 413. demolish the fort
 built by *Tissaphernes*, 461.
Mindarus, the *Lacedæmonian* admiral, II. 461,
 477. defeated, 480.
Minos, his naval power, I. 6, 8.
Mitylenians, revolt from the *Athenians*, I. 218.
 their speech at *Olympia*, 222. reduced, 237.
 ordered to be massacred, 241.
Molossians, I. 191.
Mycalæssians, massacred, II. 331.
Myonians, I. 296.
Myrcinians, II. 118.
Myronides, I. 80, 82. II. 77.
Myrrinians, II. 256.
Myrtilus, II. 131, 134.
Myscon, II. 462.

N.

Naucides, I. 124.
Naxians, favour the *Athenians*, II. 252, 350.
 vanquish the *Messinians*, 22.
Nicanor, I. 191.
Nicias, son of *Niceratus*, I. 257. II. 25, 37,
 44, 96. his speeches, 213, 225, 267,
 362, 378. takes *Minoa*, I. 258. attacks
Melos, 289. invades the *Corinthians*, II. 37.
 takes *Cythera*, 44. and *Mende*, 105. besieges
Scione, 106. author of the peace, 126, 156.
 named for the command in *Sicily*, 212. his
 opinion at a council of war, 249. defeats
 the *Syracusans*, 269, 312. his stratagem,
 300. left in the sole command, 301. his
 letter to the *Athenians*, 315. refuseth to
 raise the siege of *Syracuse*, 349. raiseth the
 siege, 376. surrenders to *Gylippus*, 386. put
 to death, 387.
Nicias, the *Cretan* of *Gortyna*, I. 196.
Nicolaus, I. 179.
Nicomachus, II. 72.
Nicomedes, I. 81.
Nicon, II. 322.
Nicomidas, II. 64.
Nicostratus, aids the popular faction at *Cor-*
cyra, I. 277. takes *Cythera*, II. 44. takes
Mende, 105. besieges *Scione*, 106, 169.
Nymphodorus, I. 147.

O.

Odontians, I. 211. II. 117.
Odryians, I. 207.
Oeantians, I. 296.
Oeniades, I. 193, 307. invaded by the *Asbeni-*
ans, 221. received into their alliance, II.
 63.
Oetæans, I. 290. II. 396.
Olympians, II. 147.
Onasimus, II. 96.
Onomacles, II. 417.
Ophionians, I. 292.
Opicians, II. 206.
Orestes, I. 84.
Orestians, I. 192.
Oroedus, I. 191.
Oropians, I. 144.

P.

Paches, sent by the *Athenians* to reduce *Mity-*
lene, I. 230. takes it, 237. and *Notium*,
 241. and *Pyrrha* and *Eressus*, *ibid*.
Pædaritus, or *Pedaritus*, II. 416, 418, 422.
 killed, 438.
Pæonians, I. 207.
Pagondas, his harangue to the *Bæotians*, II.
 74. wins the battle of *Delium*, 78.
Palirensians, I. 148.
Pammilus, II. 208.
Panæans, I. 211.
Pandion, I. 147.
Paralians, I. 290.
Paravæans, I. 198.
Parians, II. 85.
Pausanias, captain-general of *Greece*, I. 73.
 subdues *Cyprus*, *ibid*. besieges *Byzantium*,
ibid. grows a tyrant, *ibid*. recalled and
 tried at *Sparta*, *ibid*. returns to *Hellaspont*,
 99. his letter to *Xerxes*, 100. driven from
Byzantium, 102. betrayed, 104. starved
 to death, 105.
Pausanias, the son of *Pleistonax*, I. 236.
Pedaritus. See *Pædaritus*.
Pelopi, I. 9.
Peloponnesians, their colonies, I. 12. their
 character, 113. originally *Dorians*, II. 279.
 their war with the *Athenians*. See *Athenians*
 and *Lacedæmonians*.
Peræbians, II. 64.

Perdiccas,

I N D E X.

Perdiccas, king of *Macedonia*, his political turns, I. 44, 47, 148, 210. invaded by *Sitalces*, 206. in conjunction with *Brasidas*, invades *Arribeus*, II. 67, 99. quarrels with *Brasidas*, 100: makes peace with the *Athenians*, 107. is again their enemy, 187.

Pericles, commands the *Athenians*, I. 86. conquers *Eubœa*, 87. and *Samos*. 90. his speech for war, 111. makes the funeral oration, 151. his speech in defence of himself, 170. his death and character, 176.

Perieres, II. 208.

Persians, at *Thermopylæ*, II. 33. their noble custom, I. 208.

Phæacians, I. 21.

Phæax, II. 116.

Phædimus, II. 150.

Phæniis, priests of *Juno*, II. 108.

Phalius, I. 20.

Phanomachus, I. 182.

Pharnabazus, II. 398, 423.

Pharnaces, I. 179.

Pharsalians, I. 144.

Phœreans, I. 144.

Philippus, the *Lacedæmonian*, II. 416, 477.

Philocharidas, II. 96, 131, 134, 152.

Philocrates, II. 201.

Philoctetes, I. 11.

Phlasiens, I. 23.

Phocians built *Marseilles*, I. 14. beat the *Carthaginians* at sea, *ibid.*

Phocians, at war with the *Dorians*, I. 81. recover the temple of *Delfhi*, 85.

Phœnicians, exercised piracy, I. 8. inhabited the isles, *ibid.* had settlements in *Sicily*, II. 207.

Phormio, an *Athenian* commander, I. 49, 90. commands their fleet at *Naupactus*, 181. beats the *Peloponnesians* at sea, 194. prepares for a second engagement, 196. his harangue, 199. beats them again, 201.

Photius, I. 191.

Phrynichus, II. 414. his intrigue against *Alcibiades*, 432. deprived of the command, 437. is of the oligarchical faction, 447. 467. is assassinated, 469.

Piræians, I. 209.

Pisander, overturns the democracy at *Athens*, II. 435, 443, 467. flies to *Decelia*, 476.

Pisistratus, the tyrant, I. 298. II. 254. purifies *Delos*, I. 298. died an old man, II. 254.

Pisistratus, the son of *Hippias*, II. 255. dedicated altars, *ibid.*

Pistibnes, I. 88, 239.

Pittacus, II. 87.

Platæans, confederate with *Athens*, I. 124. besieged, 183. a body of them make their escape, 231. surrender, 258. their speech to the *Lacedæmonians*, 259. are put to death, 272.

Pleisionax, king of *Sparta*, I. 81, 87. banished, 142. restored, II. 126, 134, 142.

Pleistolas, II. 131, 134.

Plistarchus, I. 103.

Polis, I. 179.

Polles, II. 117.

Polyantbes, II. 335.

Polycrates, tyrant of *Samos*, powerful at sea, I. 13. consecrates *Rhensa* to the *Delian Apollo*, 14, 298.

Polydamidas, II. 99, 105.

Polymedes, I. 144.

Potidæans, originally from *Corinth*, I. 44. defeated by the *Athenians*, 48. besieged, 49. 169. surrender, 182.

Pratodemus, I. 179.

Procles, I. 288. II. 131, 134.

Progne, I. 147.

Proteas, I. 37, 144.

Proxenus, I. 298.

Ptoedorus, II. 62.

Pytilus, II. 208.

Pythagelus, I. 124.

Pythen, II. 302, 307.

Pythias, I. 274.

Pythodorus, the archon at *Athens*, I. 123. the son of *Isolochus*, in the command, I. 307. II. 131, 134, 303. banished, 53.

R.

Rampias, I. 111. II. 124.

Rhegiens, I. 285. attacked by the *Locrians*, II. 4, 20. neutral in the *Sicilian* war, 247.

Rhodians, *Doric* by descent, II. 358, 427.

S.

Sabylistus, I. 191.

Sacon, II. 209.

Sadocus, son of *Sitalces*, I. 179. made a citizen of *Athens*, 148.

Salæthus,

I N D E X.

Salæthus, sent to *Mitylene*, I. 235. taken prisoner and put to death by the *Athenians*, 241.
Salynthius, king of the *Agæans*, I. 307.
Sami, conquered by the *Athenians*, I. 89: their insurrection, II. 408.
Sargeus, II. 322.
Scionians, of the *Pellene*, originally from *Peloponnesus*, II. 96. revolt, 97. crown *Brasidas*, *ibid.* reduced, and severely treated by the *Athenians*, 141.
Scirphondas, II. 437.
Scythians, I. 207.
Selinuntians, II. 360. at war with the *Egeci-ans*, 209.
Sermilians, II. 130.
Scutbes, I. 207. II. 83. succeeds *Sitalces* in the kingdom of *Odryse*, I. 207. marries the sister of *Perdiccas*, 211.
Sicanians, II. 206.
Sicilians, II. 47, 53.
Siculi, II. 206, 285, 301.
Sicyonians, I. 85, 86. II. 82.
Simonides, II. 6.
Simus, II. 209.
Singians, II. 129.
Sintians, I. 208.
Sitalces, king of *Thrace*, I. 147, 179. ally to the *Athenians*, 148. invades the *Macedoni-ans*, 206. his power, 208. conquered by the *Triballians*, II. 83.
Socrates, son of *Antigenes*, I. 144.
Sophocles, son of *Sofratides*, I. 308. sent to *Sicily*, II. 4. his acts at *Corcyra*, 40. banished from *Athens*, 53.
Stesagoras, I. 89.
Stenelaïtas, his speech, I. 66.
Stratonice, I. 211.
Stratians, conquer the *Chaonians*, I. 192.
Strombichides, II. 405. his exploits, 417, 457.
Styphon, II. 34.
Styrensiens, II. 358.
Syracusans, at war with the *Leontines*, I. 285. are defeated by the *Athenians*, II. 21. draw up against the *Athenians*, 266. prepare for battle, *ibid.* are defeated, 269. fortify their city, 272. send ambassadors to *Camarina*, 273. to *Corinth* and *Sparta*, 286. engage and defeated by the *Athenians*, 295, 299. raise their counterworks, 297. are about treating with *Nicias*, 301. prepare their fleet, 324. attack the *Athenians*

by land and sea, 325. erect two trophies, 347. prepare again for an engagement, 353. defeat them again, 355. prepare for the last battle, 361. engage, 370. are victorious, 373. stop the *Athenians* by a stratagem, 375. pursue them; and take them all prisoners, 380. send aid to the *Peloponnesi-ans*, 413, 480.

T.

Tages, II. 406.
Tamus, II. 418.
Tantalus, a *Lacedæmonian* commander, II. 47.
Taulantii, I. 20.
Taurus, II. 96.
Tegææ, fight with the *Mantiniæns*, II. 108.
Telles, II. 131, 134.
Tellias, II. 301.
Temenidæ, I. 209.
Tenedians, I. 218. II. 358.
Ticians, I. 239. II. 358, 406.
Teres, father of *Sitalces*, I. 147. how he got the kingdom of *Odryse*, 148. enlarged it, *ibid.*
Tentiphas, I. 238. his advice to *Alcidas* and the *Peloponnesians*, *ibid.*
Tbaryps, king of the *Molossians*, I. 191.
Tbasiens, revolt from *Athens*, I. 76. defeated, 77. beg aid from the *Lacedæmonians*, *ibid.* surrender, *ibid.*
Theæntus, I. 231.
Theagenes, I. 97.
Thebans, surprise *Plataea*, I. 124. their speech to the *Lacedæmonians* against the *Plataeans*, 266. demolish the walls of *Thebie*, II. 107.
Themistocles, I. 57, 105, 110. by his advice the battle was fought in the strait of *Salamis*, 57. is sent ambassador to *Sparta*, 69. deludes the *Lacedæmonians*, 70. gets the *Long-walls* and *Piræus* secured, 72. banished *Athens* by the ostracism, 106. resides at *Argos*, *ibid.* accused by the *Lacedæmonians*, 105. flies to *Corcyra*, 106. to *Admetus*, *ibid.* the danger he escaped, 107. his letter to the king of *Persia*, 108. his character, 109.
Theramenes, the *Athensian*, II. 447. one of those who overturned the democracy, *ibid.* turns to the other side, 466.
Theramenes, the *Lacedæmonian*, carries the fleet to *Asia*, II. 413.
Thermo, II. 402.

Thebes,

I N D E X

Pisut, I. 146.
Pisahan, drive the *Babylonians* from *Arne*, I. 12. confederate with the *Athenians*, 78. send them aids, 62, 143. their form of government, II. 64.
Thucles, founder of *Ndus*, II. 207.
Thracians, overthrow the *Athenians*, I. 77. II. 83. are free, 147. their lordly custom, 208. fight with the *Theban*, after the massacre at *Myræssus*, 332.
Thrasibulus, II. 452. supports the democracy, 453. made a commander, 454. brings back *Alcibiades*, 456. bears the *Peloponnesian* war, 480.
Thracians, II. 131, 134.
Thrasylus, the *Argive*, II. 168.
Thrasylus, the *Athenian*, II. 452, 455, 477.
Thrasylus, II. 48.
Thucydides. See *Thucydides*.
Thucydides, son of *Olorus*, why he wrote the history of this war, I. 1, 17, 19, 20. II. 135. had the plague, I. 161. his gold-mines, and great credit in *Thrace*, II. 85. commands in *Thrace*, and arrives too late to save *Amphipolis*, *ibid.* secures *Eion*, 86. was an exile for twenty years, 136.
Thucydides, the colleague of *Athen* and *Phermias*, I. 90.
Thucydides, the *Pisahan*, II. 471.
Thymocharis, II. 473.
Tilacians, I. 267.
Timagoras, of *Corinth*, II. 398, 400.
Timagoras, of *Tegæa*, I. 179.
Timon, I. 24.
Timocrates, I. 196. kills himself, 203.
Tisamenus, I. 203.
Tisander, I. 296.
Tisus, II. 188.
Tissaphernes, lieutenant of *Darius*, II. 398, 412. his compacts and leagues with the *Peloponnesians*, 407, 416, 421, 425, 433, 439. is conquered at *Miletus* by the *Athenians*, 412. fortifies *Iassus*, 416. pays the *La-*

cedæmonian ships, *ibid.* lessens their pay by the advice of *Alcibiades*, 430. wants to be reconciled to the *Lacedæmonians*, 439. inveighed against by the mariners, 457, 460. why he did not bring up the *Phænician* fleet, 464.
Tlepolemus, I. 90.
Tolmides, son of *Tolmæus*, I. 83, 86.
Tolophontians, I. 296.
Trachinians, I. 290.
Trerians, I. 207.
Triballians, conquer *Sitalces* king of the *Odry-*
ans, II. 83.
Trinitians, I. 266.
Trojans, how unable to resist the *Greeks* for ten years, I. 11. some of them settled in *Sicily* after the taking of *Troy*, II. 206.
Troas, II. 412.
Tyndarus, I. 9.
Tyrrenians, II. 355, 360.

U.

Ulysses, II. 21.

X.

Xenades, *Ephorus* at *Sparta*, II. 144.
Xenares, commander of the *Hæraclæots*, killed, II. 162.
Xenochides, I. 38, 307.
Xeno, II. 342.
Xenophantides, II. 437.
Xenophon, son of *Eucippides*, I. 182, 190.
Xerxes, I. 14, 91. his letter to *Pausanias*, 101.

Z.

Zacynthians, a colony of *Achaans*, I. 179.
aid the *Athenians* in the *Sicilian* war, II. 359.
Zenocidas, II. 131, 134.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

VOL. I.

In the Preface, page 6. line 18. for *opposite* read *opposite* p. xxiii. l. 9. for *bad* read *bad*
p. 49. l. 15. for *Pbornis* read *Pbornis* p. 168. l. 28. for *Agon* read *Agon*.

VOL. II.

Page 175. in the Note. for *Skivita* read *Skirita* p. 226. bottom line. for *power*. read *power*,
p. 227. l. 3. for *conclude it to be* read *conclude it to be* p. 282. l. 22. for *incited* read *invited*
p. 287. l. 16. for *Aibens*. read *Aibens*, p. 317. l. 28. for *Hyrcanian* read *Hyccarian* p. 372.
at the bottom. for *undens*, *undens*, read *undens*! *undens*! p. 396. l. 10. for *Etream* read
©Etream.

over

THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY
REFERENCE DEPARTMENT

**This book is under no circumstances to be
taken from the Building**

[illegible]

